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A HISTORY OF SOUTH AMERICA 



^m — ' ' r ~:- T ---^^ 




Simon Boijvak. 



[frontispiece. 



A HISTORY OF 
SOUTH AMERICA 



1854- 1904 



BY CHARLES EDMOND AKERS 



WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 



NEW YORK: 
E. P. BUTTON & CO. 

1904 



Copy. 



L. n/30 



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.A3 









Of 






Printed in Great Britain 



PREFACE 

A residence of fourteen years in South America, in con- 
nection with journalistic work throughout that continent, 
brought home to me the need of a concise history of 
the various South American States since they attained 
independence from Spanish control. True, such infor- 
mation can be obtained from Spanish and Portuguese 
chroniclers and authors of other nationalities. But to 
seek for descriptions of many different events and periods 
in diverse directions and varied tongues is always weari- 
some and often impossible unless a well-stocked library 
be near at hand for reference. To meet this want has 
been the purpose and aim of the present work, which 
although dealing more particularly with the past fifty 
years, is intended also for purposes of general reference 
by students of Latin- American history and civilisation 
from the date of the emancipation of the Spanish 
colonies to the present day. 

I have compressed into small compass the facts which 
have tended to mould the destinies of the South American 
Republics, and I have endeavoured to show how the 
national character of the people of each State has 
assumed distinctive features as the result of local 



vi PKEFACE 

surroundings, modified by foreign immigration and the 
accompanying influence of methods of civilisation other 
than those of Spanish or Portuguese origin. 

To extract from many sources the requisite facts, 
and to marshall these into order, was no easy task. It 
was due to the aid and encouragement of many friends 
that I persevered when my path seemed beset by insuper- 
able obstacles. I owe much to the friendly advice of 
Charles W. Gould and the late Lloyd M'Kim Garrison, 
both of New York, in the earlier stages of this work. 
In the final revision of the manuscript I was so exceed- 
ingly fortunate as to enlist the help and sympathy of 
A. J. Wilson, and his assistance to me was invaluable. 

Some excuse is necessary for the illustrations. I 
regret that they are not more artistic in general char- 
acter, and in defence I must plead that they are the 
best I could obtain under the circumstances. They 
are inserted to give to readers of the book some idea 
of the personal appearance of the men who play a 
prominent part in it, a purpose I trust they will 
accomplish. 



June 1904. 



C. E. AKERS. 



CONTENTS 



PART I 



INTRODUCTION 

Some Traits of Spanish Character. Ferdinand and Isabella. Treatment 
of Moors and Jews. The Inquisition and Intellectual Expansion. 
Population of Spain in the Fifteenth Century. First Spanish Colonists. 
Treatment of Natives in South America. Examples of Spanish Cruelty 
and Treachery. Destruction of Astec and Inca Civilisation. Dissen- 
sions in South America. Spanish Bravery. Catholicism in South 
America. Immigration to the Colonies. Introduction of Negroes. 
Turbulent Settlers. Political Parties in South America. Spain and 
Decentralisation. Trade Restrictions. Causes of Dissatisfaction. 
Spanish Monopoly of Official Posts. Incidents of Brazilian History. 
British, French and Dutch Action. Plot for Brazilian Independence. 
The Peninsular Wars and Brazil. The Empire Proclaimed. Abdica- 
tion of Pedro I. Indian Population. The Tupi-Guarani Stock. 
Araucanians and Patagonians. Aymara and Quichua. Natural 
Resources of the Continent. Geographical Features . 



CHAPTER I 

THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

Colonial Discontent. Weakness of the Spanish Government. Efforts of 
Spain to Conciliate the Colonies. Action of the Regency of Cadiz. 
Caracas and the Separatist Movement. Simon Bolivar and the 
Struggle for Independence. General Paez. Proclamation of Colom- 
bian Independence. Bolivar frees Ecuador and marches to Peru. 
The Revolt in Argentina. Treaty between Argentina and Great 
Britain. Anarchy in Montevideo. Paraguay effects a Bloodless 
Revolution. The Struggle in Chile. The Monroe Doctrine. Mr 
Canning and the Holy Alliance. South America after Independence. 
Bolivar and his Political Enemies. Disintegration of Colombia. 
Venezuela as a Republic. Ecuadorian Affairs. Dissensions in Peru. 
Friction in Chile over Form of Government. Bolivia and General 
Sucre. Uruguayan Developments. Conflict in Argentina between 
Federalists and Unitarians. Advent to Power of Rosas . . 19 



viii CONTENTS 

CHAPTEE II 

THE AEGENTINE EEPUBLIC 

Savage Brutality of Rosas. Revolution against Rosas. Economic and 
Social Conditions. Ambition of the Provinces to Dominate Buenos 
Aires. Wish of Buenos Aires to Secede. Determination of Buenos 
Aires to Appeal to Arms. Revolution under General Mitre. Victory 
of the Insurgents at Pavon. General Mitre Installed as President. 
The National Capital. Revolutionary Movements. Aggressiveness 
of Lopez. War with Paraguay. Political Consequences of the War. 
Cholera in Buenos Aires. Election of Dr Sarmiento to the Pre- 
sidency. Educational Progress. Efforts to Advance Industrial 
Development. Yellow Fever Epidemic. The Administration of 
Sarmiento. The Political Situation in 1874. Cordoba and the 
Presidential Election of 1874. Election of Dr Nicolas Avellaneda. 
The Presidential Election of 1871. Mitre and Revolutionary Pro- 
jects. Conspiracy against the Government. Seditious Outbreaks. 
Political Aims of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Avellaneda. Position 
in 1878. Propaganda of the Cordoba League. Meetings in Buenos 
Aires. The " Tiro Nacional." Buenos Aires and Cordoba. National 
Government Alarmed. Minister of War and the "Tiro Nacional." 
President determines to Suppress the "Tiro Nacional." Popular 
Demonstrations in Buenos Aires. Troops Protect the National 
Authorities. Compromise between President and Citizens. Second 
Mass Meeting in Buenos Aires. Advice of Dr Sarmiento. Confer- 
ence between Governor of Buenos Aires and President. Temporary 
Compromise. Presidential Election of 1880. Issues of Electoral 
Campaign. Presidential Candidates. General Roca. Dr Pellegrini 
as Minister of War. The Cordoba League. Popular Excitement. 
Situation Strained. Buenos Aires buys War Material. Military 
Preparations. Delay in arrival of Arms and Ammunition. 



CHAPTEE III 

THE ARGENTINE EEPUBLIC — continued 

Military Preparations. Attempt to seize Cordoba. National Troops in 
Buenos Aires. Provincial Authorities and the Minister of War. Riot- 
ing in Buenos Aires. The National Government and the Provincial 
Administration. Avellaneda abandons Buenos Aires. Hostilities 
Commence. Strength of National Troops. Preparations for Defence 
of Buenos Aires. Disposition of Provincial Forces. Scarcity of War 
Material in Buenos Aires. Leaders of the Rebellion. Political Dis- 
sensions. Dr Pellegrini. Skirmishing between National Troops and 
Revolutionary Forces. Colonel Arias and the Volunteers. Engage- 
ment near Olivera. Colonel Arias reaches Lujan. Defence of 
Buenos Aires. Attack upon Buenos Aires. Hostilities on July 21. 
Ammunition exhausted in Buenos Aires. Conference of Revolutionary 
Leaders. Armistice on July 23. Peace Negotiations. Terms of 
Surrender. Buenos Aires declared the National Capital. General 
Roca elected President. The New Administration. Cordoba and 



CONTENTS ix 

Roca. Buenos Aires and the new President. The National page 
Policy. Absolute Power of Roca in 1881. Restraint on Military. 
National Feeling. Improvement in Means of Communication. 
Railway Construction. Foreign Immigration. Assisted Passages 
for Immigrants. National Land Sales. Public Works. Revolu- 
tionary Outbreaks. Expansion of Agricultural and Pastoral Industry. 
Foreign Loans. Dr Pellegrini appointed Minister of War. Political 
Intrigues. Discontent in Buenos Aires. Attitude of the Adminis- 
tration in Electoral Matters. Foundation of La Plata. The Port 
of Ensenada. Presidential Election. Presidential Candidates. Eco- 
nomic and Industrial Progress. Financial Policy. Suspension of 
Specie Payments. Inconvertible Currency . . . .51 



CHAPTEE IV 

THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC — continued 

Presidential Election. The Cordoba Clique and the Provisional Governors. 
Dr Juarez Celman. Cordoba supports Celman. Celman Elected. 
Roca and Celman. Uneasy Feeling. Currency Conversion. Paper 
Money Issues. Carpet-bagging Politicians. Political Conditions. 
Corruption in National Administration. Concessions and Monopolies. 
Corrupt Provincial Governments. Position of Pellegrini. Adminis- 
tration and Banking. Provincial Loans. Sale of Gold Reserves. 
Financial Necessities. The " Union Civica." Dr Alem. Aristobulo 
del Valle. Bernardo Irigoyen. Dr Lopez. Lucio Lopez. Provin- 
cial Branches of "Union Civica." Feeling against Celman. The 
Mortgage Banks. Policy of the Administration. Foreign Residents. 
Meeting of " Union Civica." Indictment of National Administration. 
The " Union Civica " and Celman. The " Union Civica " and Revolu- 
tionary Measures. The Army and the " Union Civica." Date fixed 
for Revolt. Revolution of July 26, 1890. Action of National 
Authorities. Attack on the Plaza Lavalle. Numerous Casualties. 
Scarcity of Ammunition. Naval Action. Bombardment of Buenos 
Aires. Attitude of Foreign Warships. Reinforcements from Northern 
Provinces. Consultation of Rebel Leaders. Majority favour Nego- 
tiation. Armistice Arranged. Peace Propositions. Advice of 
Roca and Pellegrini. Peace Concluded. Dispersion of Revolutionary 
Forces. Casualties. Resignation of Celman. Public Temper in 
Buenos Aires. European Opinion. Accession of Pellegrini . . 69 



CHAPTEE V 

THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC — continued 

Ministry under Pellegrini. Attitude of Roca. Public Opinion. National 
Finances. Political Situation. Economic Conditions. Cedula Issues. 
Inconvertible Currency. Policy of Pellegrini. Depreciation in Currency. 
Argentina and Baring Brothers. Suspension of Foreign Debt Service. 



CONTENTS 

Banking Crisis. Patriotic Loan. Banco Nacional and Banco de la 
Provincia. Attempted Assassination of Roca. Pellegrini's Adminis- 
tration. Discontented Feeling. Influence of Mitre. Mitre Returns 
from Europe. Cordoba and Mitre. Roca and Mitre. The ' ' Union 
Civica Radical." A new State Bank. Pellegrini and the "Union 
Civica Radical. " Nomination of Dr Luis Saenz Peila. Dr Bernardo 
lrigoyan and the " Union Civica Radical." Political Situation in 1892. 
State of Siege. Arrest of Alem. Alem Deported. Dr Luis Saenz 
Pefia elected President. Dr Jose Uriburu. Roca resigns Portfolio of 
Interior. Saenz Pefia accedes to Office. Public Opinion and Pellegrini. 
Loss of the Rosales. Officers of the Rosales sentenced to Death. 
Saenz Pefia and Congress. Ministerial Crisis. Obstruction in Con- 
gress. Ministry of Dr del Valle. Alem and Political Agitation. 
Congress and the Administration. Excitement in Buenos Aires. 
Revolt in San Luis. Revolutionary Preparations in Buenos Aires. 
National Government and Governor Costa. National Troops and 
Revolutionary Forces. Alem in Santa Fe. Rosario captured by 
Insurgents. Roca commands in Santa Fe. Surrender of Alem 



CHAPTER VI 

THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC — continued 

Political Conditions in 1893. Financial Policy of Saenz Pefia. Attitude 
of Congress. The Executive and the Chambers. The Provincial 
Mortgage Bank. Dr Lopez and Colonel Sarmiento. Death of Lopez. 
Hostility to Saenz Pefia. Ministerial Crisis. Position in December, 
1894. Death Sentence upon Officers of Rosales. Resignation of 
Saenz Pena. Dr Jose Uriburu. The New Administration. Chilian 
Boundary Question. Argentine Authorities Alarmed. Secret 
Sessions of Congress. Credit of Fifty Million Gold Dollars. Con- 
gress and Railway Guarantees. Financial Policy of Uriburu. Cash 
Payments on External Debt. Political Situation in 1897. Presidential 
Candidates. Nomination of Roca. Roca Elected. Dr Quirno Costa 
Vice-President. Roca and the Buenos Aires Merchants. The Puno 
de Atacama. Chilian Ultimatum. Arbitration. The Chilian Ques- 
tion. Purchase of War Material. Legislation during Uriburu 
Administration. Roca assumes Presidency. Contrast between 
1880 and 1898. Expectations from Roca. Arbitration and the Puno 
de Atacama. Meeting between Roca and Errazuriz. Visit of Roca 
to Patagonia. Welsh Colony at Chubut. Congress in 1899. Roca and 
the administration of Justice. Magnasco and Judicial Reform. Com- 
position of the Chambers. Journey of Roca to Brazil. Rumours of 
Offensive and Defensive Alliance with Brazil. Commercial Treaty 
with Brazil. Complications in the Provinces. Irigoyen and the 
Buenos Aires Legislature. Intervention in Buenos Aires. Outbreaks 
in La Rioja and Catamarca. Roca and National Legislation. The 
Conversion Law. Roca and Public Works. Visit of President of 
Brazil to Argentina. Area of Argentina. Population. Immigration. 
Foreign Residents. Italians. Spaniards. Basques. Other Nation- 
alities. Predominance of Latin Blood. Climate. Growth of Cities. 
Gregarious Nature of Argentines. Landed Proprietors. Crowded 
Centres. Education. Minister Magnasco. Incompetency of Teachers. 
Lack of Discipline in Scholastic Establishments. Missionary Efforts 
for Education. Administration of Justice. Roca and the Argentine 
Courts. Codified Law. Tedious Procedure. Corrupt Lower Courts. 



CONTENTS xi 

Religious Conditions. The Catholic Church. Report of Sir John p aqk 
Hunter Blair. National Character. Hospitality. Agricultural and 
Pastoral Industry . . . . . . . 104, 105 



CHAPTEE VII 

PAKAGUAY 

Origin of the Paraguayan War. Political Disturbances in Uruguay. 
General Flores lands near Salto. Severe Measures increase Rebel 
Popularity. Strained Relations between Uruguay and Argentina. 
Complications between Brazil and Uruguay. Entente between 
Uruguay and Paraguay. Proclamation by Lopez. Mission of Con- 
selheiro Saraiva. Invasion of Uruguay. The Villa del Salto. The 
Brazilian Flag Insulted. Brazil supports Revolt. Siege of Paysandii. 
Murder of Colonel Gomez. Attitude of Argentina. Uruguayan 
Expedition to Rio Grande. March of Brazilians and Rebels upon 
Montevideo. Montevideo Capitulates. Withdrawal of Brazilian 
Army. Attitude of Lopez. The Marques cTOlinda. War between 
Paraguay and Brazil. Invasion of Matto Grosso. Engagement at 
Neuva Coimbra. Paraguayan Administration in Matto Grosso. 
Consternation in Rio. Brazil prepares for War. Schemes of Lopez. 
Paraguayan Congress. Lopez and Urquiza. Paraguayan Army in 
1865. Attack upon Corrientes. Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes. 
Excitement in Buenos Aires. Proclamation of General Mitre. Alliance 
between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Warlike Preparations. 
Phases of the War. Importance of the Parana and Paraguay. Plan 
of Campaign. No forward movement possible before June. Dis- 
tribution of the Paraguayans. Lopez neglects to advance beyond 
Corrientes. The Paraguayans in Corrientes. Capture of Corrientes 
by the Argentines. Battle of the Riachuelo. Paraguayan Advance 
towards Uruguay. Operations near San Borge. Invasion of Rio 
Grande. Mutiny in Entre Rios. Flores appointed to command 
the Allied Vanguard. Conditions in Uruguay. Paraguayans march 
down the Upper Uruguay. Battle of Yatay. Defeat of the Para- 
guayans. Occupation of Uruguayana. Surrender of Colonel 
Estigarribia. Preparations for Defence of Paraguay. Modification 
in Plan of Campaign. Advance of Allied Forces. Matto Grosso . 130 



CHAPTER VIII 

PARAGUAY — continued 

Public Feeling in South America. Consultation of Argentine, Brazilian, 
and Uruguayan Representatives. Corrientes the Base of Operations. 
Defences of the Parana. Engagement at Paso de la Patria. Con- 
duct of the Argentine National Guard. Raid to Itati. Reconnais- 
sance of Paraguayan Positions. Paso de la Patria. Crossing of the 
Parana. Over-confidence of Allies. Surprise of Allies. Advance 
into Paraguay. Battle of May 20. Camp at Tuyuti. Lines of Rojas. 



xii CONTENTS 

Discontent in Allied Army. Engagements July 15 and 20. Arrival vaqk 
of Reinforcements. Expedition against Curupaitf. Engagement at 
Curuzii. Garrison of Curuzii. Conference between Mitre and Lopez. 
Effect of Peace Proposals. Attack upon Curupaitf. Inefficient Recon- 
naissance. Paraguayan Victory. Breakdown of Plans. Military 
Changes. Public Opinion in Argentina and Brazil. Paralisation of the 
Operations. Revolution in Mendoza. Marshal Caxias' Invasion. 
Arrival of General Osorio at Tuyutf. Forward movement. Occupation 
of Rio Hondo. Advance under Marshal Caxias. Situation in Matto 
Grosso. General Mitre. Attack upon Convoy at Humaita. Squadron 
forces passage at Curupaitf. Unsatisfactory situation of the Fleet. 
Difficult Transport. Operations at Humaita. Effort of Paraguayans 
to recapture Tayf. Attack of Paraguayans upon Tuyutf. Heavy 
Losses. Revolt in Argentina. Assassination of Flores. Squadron 
forces the Humaita passage. Attack on Humaita. Squadron 
reaches Asuncion ........ 150 



CHAPTER IX 

PARAGUAY — continued 

Paraguayan Attempt to Destroy Squadron. Capture of Rojas. Capitu- 
lation of Curupaitf. Concentration of the Paraguayans in Humaita. 
Bombardment of Humaita. Attempt to Seize the Monitor Rio 
Grande. Assault on Humaita. Passage of Humaita again Forced. 
Evacuation of Humaita. Attack on the Allies. Booty in Humaita. 
Asuncion the Objective Point. Humaita the Base of Supplies. 
Paraguayans abandon Riverside Towns. The Allied Army leaves 
Villa del Pilar. Passage of the River Tibicuarf. Paraguayans fall 
back. Conditions at Tibicuarf. Victims of Lopez. Paraguayans 
in Force near the River Carabe. Passage of the River Paraguay. 
Plan of Campaign. Attack upon Villeta. Renewal of Hostilities. 
Capture of Villeta ....... 



CHAPTER X 

PARAGUAY — continued 

Resumption of Hostilities on December 20. Work of Allied Cavalry. 
Paraguayan Camp in the Valentine Hills. Action of December 27. 
Defeat of the Paraguayans. Surrender of Angostura. Occupation of 
Asuncion. Disorderly Conduct of the Allied Troops. Delay in 
Operations. Mission of Senhor Parunhos. Provisional Government 
at Asuncion. A new National Capital. Concentration at Oscurra. 
Engagement at the River Manduvira. Arrival of the Conde d'Eu. 
Military Reorganisation. Operations against Lopez in July, 1869. 
Fight at Sapucay. Attack on Peribebuy. Lopez evacuates 
Oscurra. Plan of Campaign of Conde d'Eu. Retreat of Lopez to 
Caraguatay. Engagement at Yagari. Action at Campo Grande. 
Lopez seeks Refuge in the Forests. Paraguayan Encampment near 
the Aquidaban. Colonel Silva Tavares and Major Oliveira. Death 
of Lopez. Madame Lynch. Treaty of Peace. Withdrawal of 
Argentine and Uruguayan Troops. Election of President Rivarola. 



CONTENTS xiii 

Political Representation under the Constitution of 1870. Difficulties of page 
President Rivarola. Vice-President Salvador Jovellanos. Assassination 
of Rivarola. Election of President Gill. Brazilian Policy in Paraguay. 
Assassination of President Gill. Senor Uriarte. Election of President 
Baredo. Death of the President. Vice-President Saguier. Revolu- 
tion in 1881. Saguier Deposed. General Caballero named Pro- 
visional President. General Caballero elected President. Election of 
President Escobar. Condition of Country. Election of President 
Gonzalez. Attempts at Reform. Deposition of President Gonzalez. 
Vice-President Moriiiigo takes Office. Election of President Egus- 
quiza. Rupture with Uruguay. Election of President Aceval. 
Oligarchy in Control. Political Rights. Economic Conditions after 
1870. Natural Causes and Reaction. Idleness of Male Population. 
Improvement in General Conditions. Population during Thirty 
Years. Immigration. Australian Socialistic Colony. Sicilian Coloni- 
sation. Educational System . . . . . .178 



CHAPTEE XI 

UKUGUAY 

Colorado^ and Blancos. Flores refuses Re-election. Revolt of Colonel 
Fortunato Flores. Presidency of Dr Pedro Varela. Blanco Con- 
spiracy. Assassination of General Flores. Execution of Rebels. 
General Batlle becomes President. Cholera Epidemic, 1868. Forced 
Currency. Insurrections under Maximo Perez and General Caraballo. 
Blanco Revolution. Insurgent Successes. Engagement near Santa 
Lucia. Government Defeat. Engagement near Corralito. Retreat 
of General Caraballo. Insurgent Losses. Siege of Montevideo. 
Capture of the Cerro. Public Opinion in Montevideo. Sortie from 
Montevideo. Siege of Montevideo Raised. Operations near Puerto 
del Ingles. Decisive Battle. Government Victory. Reorganisation 
of Rebel Forces. Further Insurgents Defeat. Senor Gomensoro 
accedes to Presidency. Restoration of Peaceful Conditions. Con- 
gressional Elections. Dr Jose Ellauri. Election of Dr Ellauri. 
Complicated Situation. Threatening Attitude of Military. Adminis- 
tration of Ellauri. Conspiracy of Colorados netos. Assassination of 
Colonel Castillo. Revolt in Soriano. Municipal Election in Monte- 
video. Ministers Resign. Military Revolt. Deposition of Ellauri. 
Provisional Administration. Senor Pedro Varela elected President. 
Unsettled Conditions. Political Arrests. Revolution in May, 1875. 
Revolutionary Committee in Buenos Aires. Military join Insurgents. 
Fighting in Soriano and Paysandii. Measures against the Rebels. 
Defeat of Insurgents. Financial Difficulties. Dictatorship of Colonel 
Latorre. Praetorian Administration Established. Public Education. 
Election of Latorre. Latorre Resigns. Dr Vidal as President. 
Colonel Santos. Attack on Independent Newspapers. Increase of 
Militarism. President Vidal Resigns. Santos succeeds to Presi- 
dency. Discontent Spreads. Question with Italy. Irresponsible 
Administration. Paraguayan Debt. Preparations for Revolt against 
Santos. Dr Vidal again Elected. Revolt in Western Part of Republic. 
Defeat of Rebels by General Tajes. Title of Captain-General granted 
to Santos. General Santos again President. Attempt to Assassinate 
Santos. Ministry of Dr Ramirez. Santos resigns Office. Suppres- 
sion of Militarism. Decree exiling Santos. Election of Herrera y 
Obes ........ 196, 197 



xiv CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XII 

Uruguay — continued 

Foreign Capital in Uruguay. Corrupt Administration. Revival of Mili- 
tarism. Extravagant Financial Policy. Discontented Feeling. 
Economic and Financial Crisis. Temporary Administration of Senor 
Duncan Stewart. Election of Senor Borda. The Borda Administra- 
tion. Revival of Corruption. Formation of Revolutionary Committee 
in Buenos Aires. Depots of War Material. Congressional Elections. 
Outbreak of Revolt. Aparicio Saraiva and Colonel Diego Lamas. 
Condition of Insurgent Forces. Engagement at Arbolito. Government 
Forces Augmented. Engagements at Tres Arboles, Cerro Colorado, 
and Cerros Blancos. Insurgent Expedition in Venus. Peace 
Negotiations. Assassination of Borda. Accession of Senor Cuestas. 
Fresh Peace Negotiations. Peaceful Conditions Re-established. 
Festivities in Montevideo. Death of Lamas. Policy of New Adminis- 
tration. Attitude of Congress. Cuestas dissolves the Chambers. 
Congress elects Cuestas to the Presidency. Military Revolt. Blanco 
Majority in Senate. Political Situation. Cuestas and Economic 
Situation. Climate Conditions. Area of Territory. Density of Popu- 
lation. Foreign Residents. Immigration. Apathy regarding Educa- 
tion. Secondary and Higher Education. School of Arts and Trades. 
Administration of Justice. Criminal Courts. Uruguayan National 
Character. Influence of the Church. Means of Communication and 
Economic Progress. Industrial Enterprise. Cattle-breeding. Importa- 
tion of Foreign Stock. Sheep Farming. Export of Sheep. Agricul- 
ture. Viticulture. Olive Orchards. Tobacco Cultivation. Industry 
and Taxation. Landed Proprietors. Values of Foreign Holdings. 
Tendency of Foreign Landowners to Decrease .... 



CHAPTER XIII 

BRAZIL 

Brazil after the Paraguayan War. Influence of Dom Pedro II. His 
Reputation in Europe. Quick Recovery in Economic Conditions. 
Dom Pedro visits Europe. Immigration Projects. Personality of 
Dom Pedro. His wish to benefit Brazil. His admiration for the 
United States. Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu. Church 
Influence and the Princess. Unpopularity of the Conde. Brazil and 
Imperial Regime. Political Situation, 1870-1880. Effect of August 
Comte on Brazilian Character. Sao Paulo and Republican Doctrines. 
The Emperor and Republican Ideas. Rio Grande do Sul. Reason 
for German Settlements in the Southern Provinces. The Emperor and 
Railway Extension. Public Instruction. The Emperor and Higher 
Education. The Clergy and Education. Internal Development of 
Brazil. Third Visit of Dom Pedro to Europe. Abolition of Slavery. 
Acts in Relation to Emancipation. Treatment of Brazilian Slaves. 



CONTENTS xv 

Troubles in Sao Paulo. Enmity of Plantation Owners to Emancipa- page 
tion. Seditious Feeling gaining ground. Return of Dom Pedro to 
Rio. Inconsistencies in the Parliamentary System. The Ouro Preto 
Ministry. Unpopularity of Cabinet. Ouro Preto supported by 
Dom Pedro. Political Position strained. Plot to overthrow Ministry. 
Younger Officers urge Deposition of Emperor. Seditious Feeling 
runs Riot. Military Conspirators. Generals da Fonseca and 
Floriano Peixoto Leaders of the Movement. The Fete in Rio de 
Janeiro. The Palace surrounded. Arrest of Dom Pedro. Public 
Buildings occupied by Rebels. Barao de Ladario Wounded. Pro- 
clamation of General da Fonseca. Provincial Governors support 
Republic. Fonseca proclaimed Provisional President. Dom Pedro 
sent to Portugal. Country accepts Change with IndiiFerence. Dis- 
content in Sao Paulo. Monarchists and Public Life. Brazilians 
condone Revolution. Praetorian Administration. Reaction in Sao 
Paulo. Imaginary Plot against Government. Arbitrary Measures. 
New Banking Laws. Misiones Question. Congress Summoned. 
Law of Constitution. Presidential Election .... 231 



CHAPTEE XIV 

brazil — continued 

Autocratic Administration. Sao Paulo dissatisfied. Manifesto con- 
demning Federal Authorities. Second Manifesto accusing the 
President. Severity of Praetorian Regime. Chambers Hostile to 
President. Congress refuses Supplies. Coup d'etat of da Fonseca. 
The Chambers Dissolved. Martial Law. President da Fonseca as 
Dictator. Monarchist Conspiracies. The Public and the President. 
General Peixoto becomes Prominent. Sao Paulo disappoints 
Public Expectation. Rio Grande against the Dictatorship. Para 
follows the lead of Rio Grande. Naval Revolution in Rio. Arrests 
of Prominent Persons. President Resigns. Vice-President Peixoto 
succeeds to the Presidency. Riots in the Capital. Congress Re- 
assembles. Death of Dom Pedro II. New Electoral Law. Militarism 
Dominant. Mutiny at Santa Cruz. Intervention in Local Affairs. 
Question of New Presidential Election. Protest of Officers. Presi- 
dent and Congress. Military Despotism. Insurrection in Rio Grande 
do Sul. General Peixoto and Governors of States. Resignation of 
Marine and Finance Ministers. Affairs in Rio Grande do Sul. 
Admiral Wandelkolk and the Insurgents. Naval Revolt. Govern- 
ment Surprised. Admiral de Mello. Prolonged Conflict not expected. 
Determination of Peixoto. Defence of Rio de Janeiro and 
Nictheroy. Rebel Squadron and Resources. Bombardment of Rio. 
Panic amongst Inhabitants. Italian Incident. Indemnity Paid. Rebel 
Ships leave Rio. Object of sending Expedition to South. Formation 
of Provisional Government, Situation in Rio Harbour. Ville- 
gaignon joins Revolt. Explosion at Gouvernador Island. The 
Aquidaban and Esperanto, leave Harbour. Saldanha da Gama joins 
Revolt, Supporters of Peixoto assert da Gama attempting Restora- 
tion of Monarchy ........ 250 



xvi CONTENTS 

CHAPTEE XV 
bkazil — continued 

Position in December 1893. Many Persons Emigrate. Precautions to stop 
Rebel Supplies. Peixoto orders Daily Firing against Rebel Ships. 
Troops in Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy. The Government Flotilla. 
Admiral da Gama. Strain of Continuous Fighting. Ilha Gouver- 
nador. General Telles Killed. Capture of Ilha Mocangue. Person- 
ality of da Gama. Question of Belligerent Rights. Journey of Mello 
to the South. Saraiva marches Northwards. Personality of Saraiva. 
Rebel Plan of Campaign. Saraiva reaches Parana. Mello captures 
Paranagua. Successes raise Revolutionary Prestige. Lapa Sur- 
renders. War Material captured at Curityba. Scarcity of Ammuni- 
tion. Rebel Casualties. Artillery Fire more effective. Government 
Flotilla sails from Europe. Foreign Trade Suffers. Insurgent 
Hospital Bombarded. Admiral da Gama urges Mello to send Rein- 
forcements. The Aquidaban reaches Harbour. Rebels attack the 
Armaeao. Incident of U.S. Admiral Staunton. Arrival of U.S. 
Admiral Benham. Threat if United States Merchantmen Molested. 
Situation of Rebels. Council of War. Cruiser Republica Appears. 
Aquidaban and Republica sail Northwards. Government Flotilla 
Arrives. Population advised to leave City. Rebel Situation 
Desperate. Captain Castilhos grants asylum on Portuguese Men-of- 
War. Rebel Positions Abandoned. Peixoto demands Surrender of 
Refugees from Castilhos. Portuguese Vessels convey Rebels to 
Montevideo. Diplomatic Relations interrupted with Portugal. Inci- 
dent of H.M.S. Sirius. Brutal Treatment of Insurgent Wounded 

CHAPTER XVI 

bkazil — continued 

The Voyage of the Aquidaban and the Republica. Saraiva deceived as to 
the Position. Mello and Saraiva. Discontent with Provisional Govern- 
ment. Presidential Election. Dr Prudente Moraes. News reaches 
Saraiva. Parana Evacuated. Mello organises Expedition to Rio 
Grande. Curityba occupied without Resistance. Rebel Cause col- 
lapses. Naval Expedition against Desterro. Rebel Expedition 
enters Rio Grande. Threatened Bombardment of Rio Grande. Attack 
on Rio Grande. Insurgent Troops landed in Uruguay. Mello delivers 
Rebel Ships to Argentine Authorities. Argentine Government returns 
Vessels to Brazil. Naval Expedition at Desterro. Aquidaban sunk. 
Desterro occupied. Insurgents shot by Military Authorities. French- 
men executed. Indemnity demanded by French Government. Fate 
of Saraiva. Revolution crushed. President Moraes accedes to Office. 
Policy of new President. Militarism decreases. Opposition to Moraes. 
Amnesty for Rebels. Law of Constitution strictly observed. Misiones 
Boundary settled. Outbreak at Military School. Firm Attitude of 
President. Diplomatic Relations with Portugal resumed. Disturb- 
ances in Rio Grande do Sul. Admiral da Gama joins Insurgents. 
Atrocities by Troops and Rebels in Rio Grande. Battle at Campo 
Osorio. Death of da Gama. Suspension of Hostilities. The Trinidade 
Question. Peace arranged with Insurgents. Amnesty for Officers. 
Suppression of Praetorian Methods. Italian Claims. Financial Legis- 
lation. President Moraes temporarily vacates Office . 



CONTENTS 



xvii 



CHAP TEE XVII 

brazil — continued 

Sudden return of President Moraes to Rio de Janeiro. Plot against the i"age 
President. Story of Antonio Maciel. The Canudos Settlement. The 
Jagunqos and the Bahia Police. Bahia Government ask help against 
Conselheiro. Troops sent to Canudos and defeated by Jagunqos. 
Another Expedition to Canudos under Colonel Moreiar Csesar. Riots 
in Rio de Janeiro. Murder of Colonel Gentil de Castro. Strong force 
organised against Canudos. General Oscar in charge of Military 
Operations. Situation of Expedition unsatisfactory. Heavy Casual- 
ties amongst Troops. Followers of Conselheiro attack Troops under 
General Oscar. Situation saved by General Savaget. Minister of 
War at the front. Power of Religious Fanaticism. Failure to storm 
Canudos. Siege of the Stronghold. Canudos captured, October 3. 
Atrocities of Canudos. Withdrawal of Troops. Final Report of Opera- 
tions. Accusations of Military Clique in Rio against Moraes. 
Plot to Assassinate President Moraes. Murder of Minister of War. 
Arrests made. Public Opinion and Attempt upon Life of President. 
Presidential Candidates. Campos Salles supported by President. 
Dr Campos Salles elected. Personality of President-elect. Critical 
financial situation. Mission of Campos Salles to London. Fund- 
ing Loan Agreement. Campos Salles accedes. Contrast between 
1894 and 1898. The Amapa Question. Nebuco represents 
Brazil. Policy of President Campos Salles. Brazilians satisfied. 
President of Argentine visits Brazil. Fiscal Legislation. Lack of 
strong Political Parties. Bubonic Plague in Santos and Rio. 
Economic Development and Political Disturbances. State Govern- 
ments. Illegitimate Taxation. Federal Courts. States and Railways. 
Distribution of Population. Italians. State-aided Immigration. 
Sao Paulo and the Italian Colony. German Settlements in Brazil. 
German Colonists during Revolution. Portuguese Immigrants. 
Brazilian National Character. Positivist Tendencies. Public Instruc- 
tion. Number of "Illiterates." Apathy concerning Education. 
Administration of Justice. Condition of Prisons. Capital of Minas 
Geraes. Depreciation of Currency. Means of Communication. 
Inadequate Railway System. State Control of Railways. Central 
Railway a Political Machine. Telegraphs and Cables. Inefficiency 
of the State Lines. Brazilian Waterways . . . 295,296 



PART II 



CHAPTEE XVIII 



CHILE 



Law of Constitution. Congress. The Executive. State Council. Adminis- 
tration from 1833 to 1861. President Bulnes. President Montt. 

b 



xviii CONTENTS 

President Perez. Liberal Administration. Disaster to the Com- PAG > E 
pafiia Church. War with Spain. Blockade of Valparaiso. Capture 
of the O ovadonga. Bombardment of Valparaiso. Truce with Spain. 
Foundation of Chilian Navy. Re-election of President Perez. 
Economic Progress. President Errazuriz. Construction of the 
Cochrane and Blanco Encalada. Railway Expansion. Presidential 
Candidates in 1876. President Pinto. Relations between Chile and 
Bolivia. Economic Crisis. Inconvertible Currency. Relations with 
Argentina. Quarrel with Bolivia and Peru. President Pinto and the 
War. Presidential Contest in 1881. Election of Santa Maria. Con- 
gressional Elections. Treaty with Peru. Truce with Bolivia. Laws 
of Civil Registry and Marriage. The Cemeteries. Presidential Election 
in 1886. Origin of Parliamentary System. Early Days of Balmaceda. 
Special Mission to Lima. His connection with Politics. Election to 
Congress. Programme of Reformistas. Opposition to new Political 
Movement. Balmaceda appointed Minister in Buenos Aires. Balma- 
ceda in 1882 and 1885. Election to Presidency. Political Intrigues. 
Ministry of Senor Carlos Antunez. Zahartii Cabinet. Congressional 
Elections, 1888. Resignation of Zafiartu. Ministerial Changes. 
Policy concerning Church and Education. Conflict between Congress 
and Executive. Political situation in 1890. Dictatorial attitude of 
Balmaceda. Senor Vicuna proclaimed Presidential Candidate. 
Resolutions by Mass Meetings. The Comisidn Gonservadora. Pretext 
for Revolt 321 



CHAPTEE XIX 

chile — continued 

Preparations for Rebellion. The Navy Revolts. Capture of War Material. 
Skirmish in Valparaiso. Occupation of Coquimbo. Engagement at 
Pisagua. Attitude of Balmaceda. Measures against Revolution. 
Position in January, 1891. Public Opinion. Capture of Pisagua. 
Revolutionary Troops. Fight near Dolores. Congressionalists 
Defeated at Huara. Occupation of Iquique. Attempt to Recapture 
Iquique. Intervention of Admiral Hotham. Congressionalists at 
Iquique. Defeat of Robles at Pozo Almonte. Capture of Arica. 
Reinforcements for Tarapaca. Antofagasta Blockaded. Evacuation 
of Antofagasta. Colonel Camus Retires into Bolivia. Occupation of 
Caldera. The Blanco Encalada. Lull in Hostilities. Treatment of 
Suspected Persons. Financial Difficulties. The Junta de Gobierno. 
Revolutionary Agents. The Itata Incident. Peace Negotiations. 
Meeting of Commissioners in Santiago. Attempt to Assassinate 
Balmaceda. Optimistic Feeling. The Condell and Lynch. Dicta- 
torial Tendencies of Balmaceda. Election of Senor Claudio Vicuna. 
Richard dimming. Revolutionary Propaganda in Europe. Sym- 
pathy with Revolutionary Cause. Armaments reach Iquique. 
Congressionalist Army. Revolutionary Committee in Santiago and 
Valparaiso. Embarkation of Revolutionary Army. Balmaceda and 
the Invasion. Insurgents near Santiago. Execution of Prisoners. 
Massacre of Lo Ganas. Tyrannical Conduct of Balmaceda. The 
Esmeralda off Valparaiso. Landing of Congressionalists. The Central 
and Southern Districts . . . . . , .345 



CONTENTS xix 

CHAPTEE XX 

chile — continued 

Country round Quinteros. Congressionalist Army. Tactics of Defence, page 
Battle of Concon. Congressionalist Victory. Heavy Casualties. 
Reorganisation of Government Troops. Reinforcements from Santiago. 
Defence of Vina del Mar. Faulty Information Concerning Valparaiso. 
Advance on Vina del Mar. Concentration at Quilpue. Preparations 
for Attacking Valparaiso. March to Placilla. Defence of Placilla. 
Strength of the Armies. Battle of Placilla. Severe Losses. Occu- 
pation of Valparaiso. Riotous Scenes. Message to Balmaceda. The 
President Resigns his Powers. Decree of General Baquedano. 
Political Prisoners. Unprotected state of Santiago. Arrival of the 
Junta de Gobiemo. Disarmament of Troops .... 370 



CHAPTEE XXI 

chile — continued 

General Baquedano Surrenders Powers. Proclamation by Admiral Montt. 
Work of Reconstruction. Unsettled Conditions. Disappearance of 
Balmaceda. Suicide of Balmaceda. Political Testament of Balmaceda. 
Explanation of Suicide. New Congress. Junta de Gobiemo Resigns. 
Admiral Montt as Presidential Candidate. Cost of the Revolution. 
Election of Montt. Promotions for Services. Actions concerning 
Supporters of Balmaceda. Law of Amnesty. Chile and the United 
States. The Baltimore Incident. Message of President Harrison to 
the U.S. Congress. Telegram from Santiago to Chilian Minister in 
Washington. United States Ultimatum. Excitement in Chile. 
Apology to U. S. Government ...... 383 



CHAPTEE XXII 

chile — continued 

Real Issues of the Civil War. Political Situation in 1892. Comisidn 
Conservadora. Increase of Naval Strength. Military Reorganisation. 
Congressional Elections in 1894. Political Situation. Domestic 
Legislation. Municipal Law. Conversion of the Currency. 
Political Parties in Congress. Coalition Cabinet. Complications 
with Argentina. Sale of the Esmeralda to Japan. Understanding 
with Peru re Tacna and Arica. Treaty with Bolivia. A Diplomatic 
Blunder. Presidential Contest in 1896. Election of Seiior Federico 
Errazuriz. Congressional Elections in 1897. The Boundary Question 
with Argentina. War Imminent. Attitude of Errazuriz. Arbitration 
re Tacna and Arica. The Bolivian Question. The Kbnig Note. Presi- 
dential Contest in 1901 . . . . . . .397 



xx CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XXIII 
CHILE — continued 

Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal Disturbances. Movement of Popula- PAGE 
tion. Infantile Mortality. Immigration. Araucanian Indians. 
Physical Qualities. Tendency to Drift to the Cities. Spread of 
Alcoholism. Drunkenness in Valparaiso and London. Regulation of 
Liquor Traffic. Chilians and the Government. Educational Facilities. 
Primary Instruction. Educational Statistics. German Schools. 
Secondary and Higher Education. Religious Liberty. Church 
Influence. Administration of Justice. Brigandage. National Char- 
acter. Aggressive Nature of Chilians. Means of Communication. 
State and Private Railways. Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. 
Industrial Zones. Mining Industry. Nitrate of Soda. Development 
of Tarapaca. Copper Mining. Want of Transport Facilities. Silver 
Mining. Gold and Manganese. Specimens of Minerals at Santiago. 
Coal and Iron. Borax. Proportion of Minerals to remainder of 
Exports. Agricultural Enterprise. Rapid Decadence after 1893. 
Production of Wheat. The Government and Agricultural Industry. 
Viticidture. Pastoral Industry. Sheep-breeding in Patagonia. The 
Lumber Trade. The Fishing Industry. Manufactures. Lack of 
Skilled Labour. Cloth and Cotton Factories. Sugar Refineries. 
Protection for Manufacturing Interests ..... 410 



CHAPTEE XXIV 

THE CHILIAN-PEKUVIAN WAK 

Position of Atacama. Chile and Bolivia. The Guano Deposits. Bolivian 
Claims. Dispute in 1861. Situation in 1864. War between Peru 
and Spain. Treaty between Bolivia and Chile. Bad Faith of Bolivia. 
Intrigues by Peru. Treaty between Bolivia and Peru. Relations 
between Bolivia and Chile. Chilian Capital in Atacama. Violation 
of Treaty of 1874. Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia. Duty on Nitrate 
of Soda. Ultimatum of Chile to Bolivia. Occupation of Antofagasta 
by Chilians. Declaration of War by Bolivia. Peru proposes Arbi- 
tration. Chile declares War on Peru. Relations between Argentina 
and Chile. Illusions of Bolivia and Peru. Naval Armaments. 
Equipment of Chilian and Peruvian Vessels. Military Forces of the 
Three Countries. Chilian Preparations. Inaction of Bolivia and 
Peru. Embarkation of Chilian Troops. Occupation of Antofagasta. 
Attack on Calama. Occupation of Tocopilla and Cobija. Blockade 
of Iquique. Peruvian Seaboard Harried by Chilians. Bombardment 
of Pisagua. Reconnaissance to Callao. Peruvians attempt to raise 
Blockade of Iquique. Attack of the Huascar and Independencia on 
the Esmeralda and Qovadonga. Loss of the Esmeralda and the 
Independencia. Preponderance of Chilian Sea-power. Peruvian 
Reprisals.- Chilian Discontent. Capture of the Huascar and 
Pilcomai/o.. . . .. . . . . . 433 



CONTENTS xxi 

CHAPTEE XXV 

THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — continued 

Third Phase of the War. Chilians at Antofagasta. Embarkation of pagk 
Expeditionary Forces. Peruvians defend Tarapaca. Attack on 
Pisagua. Retreat to San Roberto. Occupation of Junin. Skirmish 
near Agua Santa. Attack on Chilians near Dolores. Chilian Victory. 
Retreat to Tarapaca. Occupation of Iquique. Stand at Tarapaca. 
Expedition under Colonel Arteaga. Battle of Tarapaca. Peruvian 
Victory. Peruvians fall back on Arica. Defence of Arica. The 
Chilian Advance. Engagement at Torata. Tacna and Arica 
Isolated. Skirmish near the River Sama. Battle of Tacna. Rout of 
Defenders. Heavy Casualties. Battle of Arica. Sinking of the 
Manco Capae ........ 458 



CHAPTEE XXVI 

THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — continued 

Internal Dissensions. President Prado leaves Peru. Senor Pierola heads 
a Revolt. Blockade of Callao. Bombardment of Callao. Sinking 
of the Janequeo. Loss of the Loa. Sinking of the Covadonqa. 
Bombardment of Chancay, Ancon, and Chorillos. Expedition to 
the Northern Coast. Protests from Foreign Representatives. Efforts 
of United States for Peace. Conference on U. S. Warship Lackmvana. 
Conditions of Chile. Chilian Preparations for Advance on Lima. 
Army of Invasion. Occupation of Pisco and Yea. Landing at 
Curayaco. Naval Operations off Callao. Defences of Lima. 
Fourth Phase of War. Advance on Peruvian Positions. Battle of 
Chorillos. Fighting on Morro Solar. Armistice arranged by Foreign 
Diplomats. Battle of Miraflores. Lima Surrenders. Occupation of 
the Peruvian Capital ....... 474 



CHAPTEE XXVII 

THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — continued 

Panic in Lima. Asylum given by the Legations. Action of British and 
French Admirals. Urban Guard. General Saavedra re-establishes 
Order. Conduct of Chilians. Entry of General Baquedano into Lima. 
Vessels Destroyed at Callao. Admiral Lynch Commands in Peru. 
Government of Dr Calderon. Recognition of Calderon Administra- 
tion by United States. Admiral Lynch overturns Calderon. The 
Montero Government. Situation in 1882. Caceres and Guerilla 
Warfare. Peruvian Army at Arequipa. Expedition against Arequipa. 
Peruvians Defeated. Government of General Iglesias. Conditions of 
Peace. Treaty between Chile and Peru. Evacuation of Lima. Ratifi- 
cation of Treaty. Negotiations between Chile and Bolivia. Text of 
Agreement between Chile and Bolivia. Result of the War . . 490 

62 



xxii CONTENTS 

CHAPTEE XXVIII 

PERU 

Constitution of 1860. President San Roman. Revolution against Pezet. page 
Dispute with Spain. Squadron under Admiral Pinzon. Incident at 
Talambo. Memorandum of Spanish Commissioner. The Chincha 
Islands. Action of Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. Loss of the Triunfo. 
Treaty between Peru and Spain. Pezet driven from Office. War 
with Spain. Capture of the Covadonga. Suicide of Spanish Admiral. 
Naval Fight near Abtao. Bombardment of Callao. Withdrawal of 
Spanish Squadron. Dictatorship of Prado. Revision of Constitution. 
Prado proclaimed President. Revolution against Prado. Reforms 
of 1867. Election of Colonel Balta. Financial Embarrassments. 
The Dreyfus Contract. Railway Construction. Presidential Candi- 
dates in 1872. The Gutierrez Conspiracy. Death of Colonel Silvestre 
Gutierrez. Assassination of Balta. Death of Colonel Tomas Gutierrez. 
Presidency of Manuel Pardo. Economic Conditions. Revolutionary 
Attempts of Pierola. Foreign Policy. Alliance with Bolivia. Election 
of Prado. Revolutionary Outbreak. The Huascar and the Shah 
and Amethyst. Treaty with Spain. Murder of Pardo. Complications 
with Chile". Outbreak of Hostilities. President Prado commands 
the Army. The President abandons Peru. Revolution under Pierola. 
Fighting in Lima. Pierola proclaimed Supreme Chief. Occupation 
of Lima. Pierola leaves Peru. Administration of Iglesias. Revolu- 
tion under Caceres. Insurgents attack Lima. Second Assault on Lima. 
Iglesias Resigns. Election of Caceres. Quiet Conditions. Economic 
Crisis. Presidency of Bermudez. Death of Bermudez. Colonel 
Borgoho assumes Office. Revolutionary Rising. Chambers Dis- 
solved. Caceres again President. Spread of Revolution. Pierola 
attacks Lima. Caceres Defeated. Provisional Administration. 
Pierola Elected. Insurrection at Iquitos. Reforms under Pierola. 
Revolution in 1898. Election of Romana. International Questions . 505 



CHAPTEE XXIX 

PERU — continued 

Movement of Population. Effect of Wars and Revolutions. Decrease 
of Inhabitants. Races of Peru. Conflicting Elements in Population. 
Japanese Immigration. Infantile Mortality. Unhygienic Conditions. 
Alcoholism. National Language. Similarity with Semitic Customs and 
Words. Topographical Zones. Education. Primary Instruction. 
Educational Statistics. Secondary and Higher Education. Justice. 
Legal Procedure. Influence of the Roman Catholic Church. National 
Character. Municipal Government. Typical Spanish Features in 
Lima. City of Arequipa. The Commercial Situation. Trade Con- 
ditions. Financial Situation. Contract with Bondholders. The 
Peruvian Corporation. Internal Debt. Taxation. The Currency 
Question. Industrial Occupations. Sugar Enterprise. Labour 
Question. Cotton Production. Coffee and Cacao. Minor Agricul- 
tural Products. Pastoral Industry. Llamas and Alpacas. Minerals. 
Difficulties of Mining Enterprise. Cerro de Pasco. Silver Production. 
Petroleum. Coal. Borax. Mining Laws. The Rubber Districts. 
Manufacturing Industry. Cotton and Woollen Mills. Panama Hats. 
Motive Power for Manufacturing. Development and Transport . 530 



CONTENTS xxiii 



CHAPTEE XXX 

BOLIVIA 

Political Conditions before War with Chile. Conservatives and Liberals, page 
Peruvian Intrigues. President Daza. Situation of Bolivia when 
Hostilities Ceased. President Campero. Reform of the Constitution. 
Negotiations with Chile. Presidency of Senor Pacheco. President 
Arce. Argentine and Chilian Pretensions. Treaty with Argentina. 
Indian Outbreak. President Baptista. Attitude of Chile. Senor 
Severo Alonzo succeeds Baptista. Sedition fomented by Liberals. 
Outbreak of Insurrection. Abdication of Alonzo. Provisional Govern- 
ment under Pando. Casualties during the Revolution. Election of 
Pando. Question with Chile. The Konig Note. The Acre Dispute. 
The National Capital. Means of Communication and Seditious Out- 
breaks. Internal Politics. The White Population. The Political 
Significance of the Indians. Stories of Indian Ferocity. Geographical 
Position. Disturbed Internal Conditions and Economic Progress. 
Area and Population. Classification of Inhabitants. Bolivian Cities. 
Topographical Features. The Four Zones. Bolivian Languages. 
Local Colour. Native Customs. Education. Primary Instruction. 
Secondary and Higher Education. Administration of Justice. National 
Character. Communication with Bolivia. Lack of Internal Trans- 
port Facilities. Industrial Enterprise. Agriculture. The Mining 
Industry. Silver Production. Indiarubber. Pastoral Industry. The 
Financial Situation. Commercial Conditions . . . .554 



CHAPTEE XXXI 

ECUADOK 

Acts of Constitution. Administration of President Moreno, and his Assassi- 
nation. Presidency of Dr Borrero. Revolt under General Veintemilla. 
Defeat of the Government. Provisional Administration. Election of 
Veintemilla. Veintemilla declared Dictator. Revolt against Veinte- 
milla, and his Flight. Administration of Dr Placido Caamafio. Sedi- 
tious Conspiracies. Election of Dr Flores, and his Policy. Presidency 
of Dr Luis Cordero. The Esmeralda Incident. Indignation against 
Cordero. Revolution under General Alfaro. Fight of Cordero. 
Provisional Government under Alfaro, and his Election. Alfaro and 
the Clergy. Conspiracies against Alfaro. Laws regarding Sedition. 
Political Conditions and Economic Progress. Lack of Immigration. 
Area and Population. Cities of Ecuador. Fires in Guayaquil. 
Topography of Ecuador. Educational Progress. Justice. National 
Character. Indian Characteristics. Means of Communication. 
Industrial Enterprise. Pastoral Pursuits. Mineral Wealth. Financial 
Situation. Revenue and Expenditure. Commercial Situation. Future 
Prospects ....... . 577 



xxiv CONTENTS 



CHAPTEE XXXII 

COLOMBIA 

Various Titles of Colombia. Internal Political Troubles. Political Parties, page 
Election of Senor Rafael Nunez. Revolution in 1881. Settlement 
with Costa Rica. President Laldua. General Obaldra. Liberals 
support Senor Nunez. Boundary Question with Venezuela. President 
Nunez in 1884. Nunez and the Conservatives. Rebellion in 1S85. Re- 
establishment of Peace. Occupation of Panama and Colon by United 
States Forces. President Nunez at Cartagena. Revision of the Law of 
Constitution. Discontent between 1888 and 1892. Nunez again elected. 
Senor Miguel Caro Vice-President. Death of Nunez. Revolt in 1895. 
Election of Senor Sanclemente. Senor Marroquin as Vice-President. 
Revolution in 1898. President Sanclemente temporarily Resigns. Vice- 
President Marroquin supercedes Sanclemente. Panama Secedes. 
Incapacity of Colombians for Independent Government. Topography 
and Revolutionary Practices. Reason of Present Political Conditions. 
Economic Progress and Political Disturbances. Topographical Features. 
Climate. Area and Population. Hygienic Conditions. Education. 
Primary Instruction. The Peasant Class and Education. Secondary 
and Higher Education. Justice. The Roman Catholic Church. 
Religious Seminaries. Missionary Work and the Indians. National 
Character. Alcoholism. Industrial Enterprise. Mining. Manu- 
factures. The Pradera Iron Works. The Panama Canal. Financial 
Situation. Future Prospects . . . . . .591 



CHAPTEE XXXIII 

VENEZUELA 

Internal Dissensions. Struggle between the " Yellows " and the " Blues." 
General Blanco. Revolt under General Salazar. Policy of Blanco 
Conspiracy in 1889. Blanco Overthrown. Election of General Palacios 
Revolt under Crespo. Provisional Government. Crespo Elected 
Revolution under Dr Rojas Paul. Boundary Question with Great 
Britain. The Uruan Incident. Venezuela and the United States 
Mr Olney and the Marquess of Salisbury. The Monroe Doctrine, 
The United States and Great Britain. The Cleveland Message, 
Venezuela and British Trade. Dignified Attitude of Crespo. Boundary 
Dispute Centres in Washington. The Cleveland Commission. The 
Arbitration Tribunal. The Award. Diplomatic Relations between 
Great Britain and Venezuela. The Crespo Administration. Election 
of Senor Andrade. Revolt against Andrade Administration. Death 
of Crespo. Victory of the Revolution. Election of President Castro. 
Modification of the Constitution. Political Division of Venezuela. 
Seditious Practices. Revolutionary Tendencies. Climate and Topog- 
raphy. Statistics of Population. Immigration. Municipalities. 
Public Education. Justice. Influence of the Church. Aversion to 
the Marriage Ceremony. The Priesthood. National Character. 
Indian Characteristics. Industrial Enterprise. Mining Enterprise. 



CONTENTS xxv 

Manufacturing Industry. Means of Communication. Financial pagk 
Situation. Estimates for 1899-1900. The Commercial Situation. 
Low Prices for Coffee. Imported Merchandise. Exports. Com- 
parison of British and United States Trades. German Competition. 
Future Prospects . . . . . . . .617 



CHAPTEE XXXIV 

CONCLUSION 

The Republics and Internal Dissensions. Spanish and Portuguese Influ- 
ence on the Inhabitants. South America and Cuba. Spanish Traits 
Modified. More Peaceful Future Conditions. Measures for Consoli- 
dation. Necessity of Closer Relations between South American 
Republics. Free Interchange of Commodities. Europe and South 
America. Reasons why Progress Watched. Outlet for Emigration 
from Latin Countries. Wheat, Maize, Beef, Mutton and Coffee. 
Simon Bolivar and the Spanish Colonies. The Ideals of Sucre and 
San Martin. The Development of South America. United States 
Influence. The Panama Canal. Chilian Influence on the Pacific 
Coast. The United States and Chile. Bolivian Mineral Wealth and 
Foreign Immigration . . . . . . 647 



LIST OF ILLUSTRAT 



Simon Bolivar ..... 
Jose San Martin .... 

Juan Martin de Puvredon 
Map of Southern Section of South America 
Jose J. de Urquiza . . 

Mitre, Sarmiento, Alem, del Valle . 
Roca . . . . 

Juarez Celman ..... 
Pellegrini ..... 

Uriburu ..... 

Map of Paraguay .... 

Flores, Latorre, Santos 
Borda, Cuestas, Aparicio Saraiva, Lamas 
Dom Pedro II. . 

Fonseca, Moraes, Campos Salles, Bittencourt 
Map of Brazil ..... 
Peixoto, da Gama, Mello, Gumercindo Saraiva 
Map of Peru, Bolivia, and Northern Chile . 
Chilian Celebrities .... 
Balmaceda ..... 

Montt, Barros Luco, Canto, Korner . 
Map of Valparaiso and District 
Baquedano, Pedro Montt, Errazuriz, Riesco 
An Araucanian Type .... 



Frontispiece 
Face page 24 
32 
34 
38 
42 
54 
70 
86 
108 
130 
198 
218 
232 
244 
250 
262 
Part II 
322 
334 
350 
372 
384 
416 



XXV111 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



Natives of Tierra del Fuego . 




Face page 


430 


PlEROLA .... 




» 


476 


Caceres .... 




>) 


492 


Bermudez, Candamo 




>) 


526 


R.OMANA .... 




>) 


530 


Inca Cup 




a 


546 


Indian Hut 




>) 


562 


Indians in Gala Costume 




)> 


572 


Map of Northern Section of South America 


• >} 


576 


Map of South America 




At the end 



PART I 



INTRODUCTION 

Some Traits of Spanish Character. Ferdinand and Isabella. Treat- 
ment of Moors and Jews. The Inquisition and Intellectual 
Expansion. Population of Spain in the Fifteenth Century. First 
Spanish Colonists. Treatment of Natives in South America. 
Examples of Spanish Cruelty and Treachery. Destruction of 
Astec and Inca Civilisation. Dissensions in South America. 
Spanish Bravery. Catholicism in South America. Immigration 
to the Colonies. Introduction of Negroes. Turbulent Settlers. 
Political Parties in South America. Spain and Decentralisation. 
Trade Restrictions. Causes of Dissatisfaction. Spanish Monopoly 
of Official Posts. Incidents of Brazilian History. British, French 
and Dutch Action. Plot for Brazilian Independence. The 
Peninsular Wars and Brazil. The Empire Proclaimed. Abdica- 
tion of Pedro I. Indian Population. The Tupi-Guarani Stock. 
Araucanians and Patagonians. Aymara and Quichua. Natural 
Resources of the Continent. Geographical Features. 

A destructive tendency was ever a prominent trait 
of the Spaniards, as indeed it has been, and is, of most 
conquering races ; and it had far-reaching influences 
over the countries falling under Spanish dominion at 
the latter end of the fifteenth century. Their inclination 
was to crush out the civilisation of a conquered foe, 
never to absorb its useful features. No consideration 
was extended to established customs in regions where 
Spanish arms proved victorious, no effort made to adapt 
existing forms to a higher standard of moral and 
material progress. The monarchs of Spain governed 
by absolute authority, and this system was accepted by 
the Spanish people. Everything foreign was regarded 
with distrust, and, where opportunity offered, was sup- 
pressed to make room for Spanish practices. 



4 INTRODUCTION 

The period under Ferdinand and Isabella is regarded 
by Spaniards as the most noteworthy epoch in the 
national life, and it was certainly replete with striking- 
historical events. It resounded with the clash of arms. 
Supremacy over the Moors was won by unstinting 
sacrifice of blood and treasure. In industrial arts the 
vanquished foe was more advanced than the victor. 
But the Spaniard could not stay his destroying hand. 
He had no monopoly of savagery during an epoch when 
brutality was a feature of the age, but his barbarity left 
so deep an impress on South American character, that 
it is necessary to make full reference to it in any en- 
deavour to understand the condition of the people of 
that continent. Without thought of future benefit to 
Spain from Moorish industry under Castilian rule the 
conquered enemy was driven from the land, his civil- 
isation eliminated, the accumulated wealth of centuries 
irretrievably dispersed. Never an effort was made to 
assimilate what was best in the Moorish community. 
The self-satisfied and unreasoning dogma of the 
Spaniard ordained that Spanish methods and ideas 
alone should be tolerated. 

The treatment of the Jewish population of Spain 
has a strong bearing upon the national character. 
Under the thinly veiled pretext of religion, these 
unfortunate people were mulcted of goods and chattels, 
and threatened with untold penalties if they refused to 
embrace Christianity. They were denounced as heretics 
when they did abjure the faith of their forefathers. To 
obtain wealth, Spaniards married into Jewish families 
to such an extent, that a strain of Jewish blood had 
become a marked racial trait in Spain at the close of 
the fifteenth century. Yet blood relationship availed 
nothing when the fiat went forth at the instigation of 
the Holy Inquisition that Jews should be driven from 
Spanish territory. Authentic records attest that 33,000 
families were expelled under circumstances of most 
repulsive cruelty. So hard were the conditions imposed, 
that many of these exiles died by the wayside, starved 



INTRODUCTION 5 

to death in consequence of Spanish authorities forbid- 
ding them to carry away from their plenty a sufficiency 
to sustain life, until the haven of a foreign country was 
reached. That was four centuries ago. How little the 
national character has changed, can be judged by the 
treatment meted out by Spaniards to Cubans yesterday. 

Nor is it strange that when other European nations 
were awakening to the demands of progressing civilisa- 
tion, Spain should have shown none of the intellectual 
expansion which forced other communities onwards and 
upwards. The iron hand of the Inquisition checked all 
forward movement. That dread tribunal controlled the 
mental faculties of Spaniards, and literature and art were 
subordinated to its tyranny. It formed the medium of 
spiteful revenge for every person ill disposed against his 
neighbour. Its power was omnipotent, crushing all 
individual initiative. It was the custodian of every 
Spaniard's conscience. Resistance to its dictates 
entailed torture and death, and generation after genera- 
tion grew to manhood with this awful, mysterious force 
pervading public and private life, so that the constant 
terror of its workings dwarfed national personality. 

It was no passing phase this effort of the Church in 
Spain to terrorise men and women. It lasted for 
centuries, and made an indelible impress upon the 
national mind. It was unsparingly used for political 
purposes when occasion required. From it arose the 
tyrannical spirit and lust of killing that afterwards 
found wide scope in the vast colonial possessions of 
Spain. The Inquisition fostered the destructive 
tendency in the national character emanating from 
the internal dissension and constant warfare to which 
Spain has been a prey from earliest ages. It en- 
couraged every form of cruelty under pretence of 
protection for religious belief; therefore it brutalised 
and degraded where it professed to purify and upraise : 
and it was under such guidance that Spain was destined 
to impose her sway over the new world which Columbus 
opened to her knowledge. 



6 INTRODUCTION 

At the end of the fifteenth century the people of 
Spain were of mixed blood, for the Spanish stock was 
diluted with Jewish and Moorish strains. Moreover, 
the national character had been formed under malignant 
influences, and the outcome was narrow-minded fanati- 
cism, carelessness as to human life, despotic conduct 
towards all of lower rank, an absence of any impartial 
sense of justice. A lower standard of the relation of 
man to man, a narrower conception of public morality, 
it would even in those days have been difficult to find 
anywhere. It was from the scum of this fanatical 
population that the first colonists came. Adventurers 
who had nothing to lose at home were willing enough 
to risk their lives in the hope of substantial reward for 
their services. From such elements was drawn the 
nucleus of the Spanish population of a continent already 
claiming many millions of inhabitants and teeming with 
enormous natural resources. In such circumstances it 
was natural that the worst characteristics of the 
Spaniards should become abnormally developed. Out- 
casts in their own country, they now enjoyed unbridled 
license, and their cupidity was unduly excited by riches 
in the new countries open to the free exercise of their 
evil passions. To these men killing was no murder, 
theft no crime, treachery an everyday occurrence. 

The Spanish expeditions to America and the West 
Indies, as recorded by Spanish chroniclers, were marked 
by ferocious cruelty, unlimited bloodshed, unparalleled 
lust for treasure. A kindly reception by natives was 
recompensed by the wholesale enslavement of the people 
for enforced labour in the search for gold and other 
wealth. Nor was any vestige of humanity shown in 
the treatment of the various tribes thrown into bondage. 
If food was scarce they were allowed to starve whilst 
their masters feasted. Padre Casas relates how, when 
lack of provisions threatened a disastrous famine amongst 
the slaves, many of these unfortunates were butchered, 
and the victims served out to the survivors to keep 
them alive to work as beasts of burthen. Yet these 



INTRODUCTION 7 

expeditions were conducted under the pretence of 
advancing civilisation and hallowed by the presence of 
priests. The hideous barbarities committed were 
cloaked over by the fact that the Holy Cross was 
planted on Pagan shores and the heathen forced to 
accept the outward forms of Christianity. Can we 
wonder that these creatures of misfortune at times rose 
up in their agony and slew their oppressors ? 

Nowhere does history record a more pitiful picture 
than when the ■ Spaniards depopulated Cuba of an 
inoffensive and friendly race. Or turn to the action of 
Cortes towards Montezuma, or of Pizarro towards 
Atahualpa. Yet the Church condoned the atrocious 
cruelty practised upon the representatives of Astec and 
Inca royalty. Upholders of Spanish traditions plead 
that the barbarities attending the conquest of Mexico 
and South America were in accordance with the spirit 
of the age. Such excuse is less than half true, and 
avails nothing when the effect upon the character of 
succeeding generations is considered. 

Nothing can be said in favour of the absolute 
destruction of Astec and Inca civilisation. The 
Spaniards could offer no better system of administration 
to replace the empires so wantonly destroyed. Fear 
that the conquered nations might rise and drive the 
Spanish hordes into the sea decided the leaders of the 
invading hosts to smite their victims hip and thigh. 
The narrow-minded ideas of Cortes, Pizarro, and their 
colleagues never recognised that the civilisation they 
found could be turned to the inestimable advantage of 
the Spanish Crown and these new countries governed 
by expanding a system already established. The Astecs 
and Incas belonged undoubtedly to a barbaric period. 
They were pagans. In customs and habits of thought 
they had little in common with the Spaniards, who 
swept like a thunderbolt over their territories. But 
they had developed a form of government well adapted 
for the needs of the people and countries over which 
they claimed jurisdiction. Justice was administered by 



8 INTRODUCTION 

responsible chiefs, rapid communication between the 
seat of the central power and the different sections of 
the Empire was maintained, and peace so far assured 
as to admit of agricultural and other pursuits to be 
followed. 

With full knowledge of the conditions surrounding 
the imperial rule of Astec and Inca, the Spaniards 
deliberately tore down the whole fabric of existing 
order. On the principle that they were few and the 
inhabitants of these countries many, the Spanish leaders 
determined that the position of themselves and their 
followers would be better secured if anarchy replaced 
stable administration in Mexico, Peru, and elsewhere in 
South America. The seed of unrest was thus sown 
broadcast. It matured with amazing rapidity, and is 
not quelled to this day. 

When the fear of immediate danger from the con- 
quered nations was removed, the Spaniards allowed their 
hatred and jealousies of one another to emerge. The 
disputes between the brothers Pizarro and the leader 
Almagro are typical of the state of affairs prevailing in 
South America in the first half of the sixteenth century. 
Bloody battles were fought by rival factions. When 
Almagro was defeated and captured near Cuzco in April 
1538, 'his speedy execution followed as a natural con- 
sequence. For Spaniard or Indian death was the penalty 
for opposition to the clique in power. 

One quality these Spaniards had to aid them in their 
conquests. There was no lack of personal courage. 
Ignorant they were, but of their bravery no question 
can be raised, and the long marches of those bands of 
armed men over vast stretches of arid desert compel 
admiration. Although often clays without a drop of 
water to moisten throats parched by the burning rays 
of a tropical sun, they never despaired, but pushed 
onwards until the goal was reached. As soldiers, 
they presented an undaunted front, and won their 
way in the face of incredible hardships through 
countries where progress was ever threatened by a 



INTRODUCTION 9 

hostile population, smarting under the knowledge of 
cruel wrongs. 

While it is hard to view with leniency the attitude 
of the Catholic priesthood during the subjugation of 
South America, it cannot be denied that in subsequent 
years the clergy helped to inculcate orderly ways amongst 
the natives. The Jesuits were active in founding settle- 
ments where agriculture was encouraged and mechanical 
arts taught. Schools and churches were established in 
every section of South America. Even Paraguay and 
the desolate regions of Patagonia were not too distant 
to receive the earnest attention of these preachers of 
Christianity, and missionaries were never lacking for 
the task of exploration in these unknown districts. 
The policy of the Church in South America is full 
of curious contradiction. An almost indiscriminate 
slaughter of the inhabitants was countenanced as a 
necessary prelude to the foundation of Christianity. 
This was succeeded by the offer of thousands of indi- 
vidual members of the priesthood to risk their lives and 
suffer exile to spread the faith in which they professed 
such earnest belief. Sword in one hand, crucifix in the 
other, these missionaries accomplished work of stupen- 
dous magnitude. And it is due to unparalleled efforts 
by these stalwart pioneers of the gospel in the sixteenth 
and two succeeding centuries that Roman Catholicism 
has now so firm a grip in South America. 

For three centuries after the discovery of South 
America, immigration from Europe was restricted to 
natives of Spain. There was no desire to encourage 
settlers from other countries, and obstacles were 
thrown in the path of travellers of other nationalities 
desirous of visiting territories under Spanish control. 
It was only by special permission that foreign explorers 
were allowed to reach the interior of the continent. 
Even as late as the close of the eighteenth century these 
restrictions were maintained, so that it was with difficulty 
Humboldt obtained the privilege of journeying through 
Spanish America for scientific purposes. And as for 



io Introduction 

the immigrants from Spain, they were principally men 
attracted by tales of great wealth in New Granada, Peru, 
Chile, and the Bio de la Plata. These adventurous 
spirits intermarried freely with the native women. 
Another racial element was introduced into South 
America during this period, for the importation of 
slaves from Africa attained large proportions, and this 
traffic continued until the commencement of the nine- 
teenth century. From the mixture of Spanish, Indian, 
and negro blood thus brought about, sprang up the people 
who now form the principal population of the continent. 
It is only since the dominion of Spain was cast off that 
any considerable influx of other nationalities has 
occurred, and even that has taken place to an impor- 
tant extent only during the last thirty years. In these 
circumstances it is too soon to expect to see any radical 
alteration from the dominant traits of Spanish character. 
In Brazil the state of affairs was almost identical, 
Portugal following the example of Spain in her colonial 
policy. 

Unsatisfactory conditions prevailed in these colonies 
during the sixteenth century. In the vice-royalties of 
New Granada and Peru, where great mineral wealth 
abounded, the Spanish population was defiant of 
authority. The representatives of the Spanish Crown 
held absolute power, and frequently adopted towards 
Spaniards as well as Indians an attitude which could not 
fail to raise bitter resentment. Provided that a Viceroy 
could remit large sums of treasure to fill the royal purse 
he was assured that small fault would be found with the 
methods he employed in his administration. With no 
redress from the Crown, the colonists often took the 
remedy of their grievances into their own hands. Such 
a case was the assassination of Francisco Pizarro in 
June, 1541. From time to time similar fate befell other 
prominent officials, for sacrifice of human life to satisfy 
revengeful feelings was a common means to an end. In 
1542 the promulgation of new laws for the colonies 
caused a storm of indignation, and the first Viceroy of 



INTRODUCTION 11 

Peru, Velasco Nunez de Vela, sent out to enforce them, 
was defeated by the revolutionary party under Gonzalo 
Pizarro, and killed near Quito in January, 1546. It was 
not until eight years later that Spanish dominion was 
again established over the disaffected districts by the 
third Viceroy, Don Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, and 
then only after heavy losses. 

The gradual development of the population and 
wealth of the colonies during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries resulted in a situation little under- 
stood in Spain. Two principal political parties arose. 
The first and more numerous comprised the native-born 
colonials, and a certain section of Spaniards wishing 
greater freedom for self-government than the Crown 
was prepared to grant ; the second was composed of 
the official element, and those Spaniards who were 
opposed to any measure of decentralisation. Repre- 
sentations from the Colonial Party met with scant 
consideration at the hands of the Spanish Crown. To 
some extent this was because communications passed 
through the officials in South America, and complaints 
were reported upon and smothered before reaching their 
destination. The spirit of the age in Spain, moreover, 
was distinctly averse to any extension of autonomy for 
the colonies. Absolute power at home and abroad was 
the policy of the Spanish Crown, and this alienated 
Colonial sympathy from the mother country. 

As the natural resources of South America became 
better known in Spain, the desire of the Crown to be 
the principal beneficiary of the riches existing in these 
new territories was increased. Trade with foreign 
nations was not permitted, and severe restrictions were 
placed upon intercolonial commerce. In 1602 a custom- 
house was established at Cordoba for the purpose of 
levying duties equivalent to 50 per cent, of the value of 
all commodities passing between Peru and the River 
Plate. It was not until 1665 that this irritating restraint 
on commercial business was relaxed, and only in 1774 
were many of the obstacles in the way of trade be- 



12 INTRODUCTION 

tween the various South American colonies removed. 
Naturally, the interference of the Home Government 
with the normal expansion of the South American 
settlements raised violent criticism and bitter feeling on 
the part of the colonists. From these causes began 
that wish for independence, which became increasingly 
evident towards the close of the eighteenth century. 

Another element in the Spanish regime which caused 
acute dissatisfaction was the exclusive nomination of 
Spanish officials to all public offices, the claims of 
colonial-born aspirants to take part in local administra- 
tion being ignored. Moreover, the tendency of the 
scattered Spanish- speaking population which had grown 
up during three centuries was for decentralisation. 
This sentiment met with the extreme disapproval at 
home. Peru was the principal stronghold of Spanish 
power, and the jurisdiction granted to the Viceroy there 
was more widely extended than the powers invested in 
the governments of Rio de la Plata or elsewhere ; but 
the determination of the Spanish authorities to maintain 
a monopoly of official appointments for Spaniards at 
the expense of colonials, applied to all Spanish posses- 
sions in South America, and was not restricted to Peru. 
A distinct line was created between Spaniards and 
colonials, and a feeling of animosity thereby developed 
which made possible the outbreak against Spanish 
dominion at the commencement of the nineteenth 
century, and finally led to the independence of the 
colonies. 

Brazil boasts a more chequered history than any 
other South American republic. It was originally taken 
possession of in the name of the Spanish Crown by 
Vincent Yanez Pincon. In 1500 Pedro Cabral annexed 
a portion of its territory to Portugal, but attempted no 
settlement. A little later Amerigo Vespucci was sent to 
found a colony in the vicinity of the district now known 
as Bahia. Between 1500 and 1578 some progress in 
the work of colonisation was made, but in the latter 
year these territories passed under control of Spain, and 



INTRODUCTION ]3 

remained under Spanish jurisdiction until 1640. It 
was during this period of sixty-two years that Brazil was 
subject to constant attacks from English, French and 
Dutch adventurers. The Dutch took possession of 
Bahia in 1624, and for more than a score of years 
Holland was the dominant power over the provinces of 
the north. In 1649, however, an expedition commanded 
by Vieyra was despatched from Portugal, and after 
severe fighting for half a dozen years, Portuguese 
authority was re-established. No further foreign inva- 
sion of a serious character took place until 1710, when 
a French squadron under Duclerc attacked the city of 
Rio de Janeiro, but half the invading force was killed, 
and the remainder, to the number of 500 men, captured. 
In the following year a French fleet under Admiral 
Duguay Trouin appeared, and Rio de Janeiro was 
occupied in September 1711, after four days of desper- 
ate fighting. But the French admiral merely levied 
substantial ransom and withdrew, and from thence- 
forth no attempt was made to wrest the colony from 
Portugal. 

In 1789 a movement was set afoot to establish the 
independence of Brazil from Portuguese dominion, but 
the conspiracy failed, and Tiradentes, the leader of the 
plot, was arrested and hanged, while other prominent 
persons implicated in the movement were banished to 
Africa. 

The Peninsular war brought a crisis of far-reaching 
importance in Brazilian affairs. To begin with, the 
invasion of Portugal by Napoleon in 1807 forced King 
Joao VI. to fly the country. The monarch, with a 
following of prominent Portuguese, including the 
cabinet ministers, left Lisbon in November, 1807, and 
reached Bahia in January 1808, thence proceeding to 
Rio de Janeiro. Consequently for some years the 
colony became the seat of the parent Government. As 
retaliation for the invasion of Portugal, Joao VI. ordered 
an expedition to attack French Guiana, obtaining 
possession of that territory, which, however, was restored 



14 INTRODUCTION 

to the French by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. The 
same year saw the title of Brazil changed from a colony 
to that of the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and 
Alagarves. In 1817 Brazil entered upon a war of 
aggression in the south, and succeeded in capturing 
Montevideo, but lost it again in 1823. 

Additional taxation had been imposed by King 
Joao VI. to obtain the necessary funds to sustain his 
court, and this led to dissatisfaction. Nor was the 
subversive spirit thus generated allayed when the king 
threw Brazilian commerce open to the world. An 
agitation for independence sprang up and rapidly gained 
ground. In 1821 King Joao went to Portugal, leaving 
his son Pedro as Regent of Brazil. For a few months 
Pedro was able to stay the progress of the revolutionary 
movement, but in the following year the leaders decided 
to offer the Regent the title of Emperor, provided that 
independence from the mother country was accepted. 
The proclamation of Pedro as first Emperor of Brazil 
took place on October 12, 1822, and from that date 
Portuguese dominion in Brazil was ended, notwith- 
standing efforts from Lisbon to enforce re-establishment 
of colonial authority. In 1825 the independence of 
Brazil was recognised by King Joao VI. 

The reign of Pedro I. was not happy. His auto- 
cratic administration "of public affairs was unpopular. 
The question of republic or monarchy was discussed 
openly, while matters drifted generally from bad to 
worse. On the death of Joao VI. the crown of Por- 
tugal descended to Pedro, but was renounced by him 
in favour of his daughter Maria. The popularity he 
gained by this act was only temporary, and in 1831 the 
political situation became more complicated, and as a 
result the Emperor abdicated in favour of his five- 
year-old son, and embarked for Europe. 

A Regency was formed to administer the government 
during the minority of Pedro II. The council was 
elective, and based on thoroughly democratic principles, 
but was not a success. Bitter jealousy arose against 



INTRODUCTION 15 

the men who controlled the central power, and it was 
decided to proclaim Pedro II. as Emperor, although he 
was only fourteen years of age. On July 23, 1840, 
the solemn announcement of his accession to the throne 
was made- — the beginning of a reign destined to last for 
nearly half a century. 

When the European colonisation of South America 
began, the Indian population of the continent consisted, 
broadly speaking, of two great racial divisions, together 
with a group of tribes dwelling in Araucania and 
Patagonia, where conditions of climate and surroundings 
produced different physical characteristics. On the 
Atlantic slope of the Andes the Indians belonged to 
the Tupi-Guarani stock, the many sections of population 
from Venezuela in the north to the pampas of Argentina 
in the south showing certain similarities in customs and 
language that leave small doubt of their common origin. 
Naturally, in this widely separated area, the features of 
the various tribes became modified by local circum- 
stances, but throughout the tropical and semi-tropical 
latitudes of the eastern section of the continent the 
main racial characteristics indicate a common root. 
These tribes were nomadic, and existed principally on 
the products of the chase or the wild fruits of the 
forests. There is little evidence of husbandry previous 
to the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors. 
Three hundred years of contact with European civilisa- 
tion completely changed the chief characteristics of the 
mass of this Indian population. The conquerors taught 
the natives the value of agriculture and many of the 
industrial arts. In those three centuries the mingling 
of Portuguese and Spanish blood with that of the 
Indians was so great that the bulk of the population 
plainly showed the foreign strains. In the centre of the 
continent there are still tribes that modern civilisation 
has not touched, but they are few, and each year the 
number lessens. 

The Araucanian and Patagonian also were nomadic 
and of fiercer temperament than the majority of the 



16 INTRODUCTION 

tribes living further to the north. They levied constant 
warfare against the Spanish colonists, and in consequence 
their numbers dwindled to insignificant proportions. In 
recent years the Araucanian has accepted the outlines 
of modern civilisation in that he cultivates the ground 
for his food, and barters the produce of his flocks and 
herds with his Spanish- speaking neighbour, but his 
picturesque identity is disappearing rapidly as settle- 
ment from the north encroaches on the area over which 
formerly he held undisputed sway. The advance of 
civilisation into Patagonia is marked by the rapid 
extinction of the Indian inhabitant in that quarter ; for 
he will not adapt himself to any form of industry, and 
as his hunting grounds every year become more con- 
tracted, his final elimination can be only a matter of a 
very few years. 

On the Pacific slope of the Andes the Spaniards 
found very different conditions on their arrival early in 
the sixteenth century. From north of Quito to as far 
south of Cuzco as the Rio Maule in Chile, the Incas had 
welded the many tribes, chief amongst these being the 
Canas, the Quichuas, the Chancas, the Huancas, the 
Rucanas, the Collas, or Aymaras, the Conchucos, the 
Huamachucos and Ayahuecas, into a great community 
over which they exercised supreme power. The two 
languages in common use were Quichua and Aymara, 
the latter being confined to a comparatively limited area 
of which Lake Titicaca and Arequipa were the principal 
centres. The people lived under settled conditions, 
built towns and roads, and were proficient in agricultural 
and other industries. Evidences of the public works 
executed by them before the Spanish conquest are 
extant to-day at Cuzco, Trujillo, and many other 
localities throughout Peru and Ecuador. Encouraged 
to preserve their ancient institutions and develop their 
existing industrial pursuits, these people might have 
adopted modern civilisation and formed a great nation ; 
but their individuality was so far crushed out of them 
by their conquerors that they relapsed into a condition 



INTRODUCTION 17 

of serfdom without ambition for any effort on their own 
behalf. 

The great natural resources of South America are 
dealt with more particularly in connection with each 
individual state, but it can well be understood how 
the great mineral wealth of the continent attracted the 
Spanish and Portuguese adventurers who led the expedi- 
tions to this new world. Gold, silver, and precious 
stones tempted them to face the most terrible hardships 
in their desire to attain wealth. Minerals still form one 
of the principal sources of riches in South America, but 
they have been outdistanced by the astounding develop- 
ment of agricultural and pastoral industry which has 
taken place in recent years. 

The geographical position of South America is proof 
of its value for commercial and productive purposes. 
There is a choice of climate from tropical to extreme 
cold, and the series of great plateaux rising from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Andine ranges allow settlers 
from Europe to find congenial surroundings even in 
tropical latitudes. The great Andine chain divides the 
continent from north to south. On the east the country 
from Venezuela to the delta of the Orinoco generally 
rises abruptly from the seaboard, and between each suc- 
cessive mountain range lie fertile valleys where soil and 
climate are fitted for semi-tropical cultivation until 
increasing altitude brings a lower temperature. Gold, 
silver, and other minerals are found in this region. From 
the Orinoco to the Amazon there is an immense area 
watered by the tributaries of these two mighty streams 
and largely covered by heavy forests of valuable timber 
containing many millions of rubber trees, and embracing 
also open grass-covered plains known as the llanos. 
South from the Amazon until the borders of Rio Grande 
do Sul are reached, the land rises rapidly from the ocean, 
and the open, rolling plateaux are the characteristic 
feature. South of Rio Grande do Sul to the borders 
of Patagonia <are the grass plains of the Pampas formed 
by the rich alluvial deposits washed clown from the 

B 



18 INTRODUCTION 

Andes by the waters of the Rio de la Plata, the Uru- 
guay, the Parana and their tributaries. Patagonia, 
although rugged and broken as a rule, contains many 
fertile plains and valleys as well as vast stretches of 
alkaline, arid desert. 

On the western side of the continent spurs of the 
Andes run down to the coast-line, and these are inter- 
spersed with valleys of amazing fertility. Even in the 
rainless section which embraces the greater part of Peru 
and a large portion of Chile irrigation has converted 
into gardens most of the bottom lands of the valleys. 
In this rainless district lie enormous deposits of mineral 
wealth in the shape of nitrate of soda, borax, copper, 
gold, silver and other commodities. It was from Peru 
and Bolivia that the Spanish Crown obtained fabulous 
riches in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries. 



CHAPTER I 

THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

Colonial Discontent. Weakness of the Spanish Government. Efforts 
of Spain to Conciliate the Colonies. Action of the Regency of 
Cadiz. Caracas and the Separatist Movement. Simon Bolivar 
and the Struggle for Independence. Genei'al Paez. Proclama- 
tion of Colombian Independence. Bolivar frees Ecuador and 
marches to Peru. The Revolt in Argentina. Treaty between 
Argentina and Great Britain. Anarchy in Montevideo. 
Paraguay effects a Bloodless Revolution. The Struggle in Chile. 
The Monroe Doctrine. Mr Canning and the Holy Alliance. 
South America after Independence. Bolivar and his Political 
Enemies. Disintegration of Colombia. Venezuela as a Republic. 
Ecuadorian Affairs. Dissensions in Peru. Friction in Chile 
over Form of Government. Bolivia and General Sucre. 
Uruguayan Developments. Conflict in Argentina between 
Federalists and Unitarians. Advent to Power of Rosas. 

The beginning of the nineteenth century found the 
Spanish colonies seething with discontent against the 
rule of the mother country, and so ripe for revolt that 
a spark only was necessary to fire the train. The 
Napoleonic wars had shown the colonists the weakness 
of the Spanish Crown at home, and the confusion 
resulting from the orders sent simultaneously by Carlos 
IV., Joseph Bonaparte, and Ferdinand VII. served to 
loosen materially the ties between South America and 
Spain. Moreover, an appeal from Buenos Aires for aid 
in repelling British aggression had met with the reply 
that the colonists must protect themselves as no 
assistance could be given. This incident set men think- 
ing of the position of the colonies towards Spain, and 



20 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

when the residents of the River Plate had driven out the 
British by their own unassisted exertions, the trend of 
opinion everywhere in South America pronounced de- 
cidedly in favour of separation from Spanish control. 

The Spanish authorities were not altogether blind 
to popular feeling in South America, and an effort was 
made to quell the rising spirit of rebellion by the grant 
of various concessions. There is, moreover, no doubt that 
the revolutionary outbreak at Quito in 1809 thoroughly 
roused Spaniards at home to the immediate danger of the 
loss of the colonies, the more so as this occurred after the 
enactment of certain measures which were intended to 
conciliate the disaffected section of the population. 
This movement at Quito was suppressed, but it is 
noteworthy as the first attempt of the Spanish colonies 
to secure their emancipation by force of arms. 

By royal decree on January 22, 1809, it was 
announced that the South American colonies were an 
integral part of the monarchy, and, as provinces, entitled 
to direct representation in the Cortes. Three individuals 
for each capital were to be selected by the municipalities, 
and from these three persons the representative to the 
Cortes was to be chosen. Ordinances were passed, 
mitigating the existing restrictions on colonial commerce 
and trade. This change of policy was well received, but 
came too late to eradicate the bitter resentment created 
in the past. When, therefore, a year later the Regency 
of Cadiz abolished these Ordinances, the colonists 
determined to make a supreme effort to obtain for 
themselves the freedom of government hitherto denied 
to them by the mother country. 

Caracas was the scene of the beginning of the 
movement which led to emancipation. On April 19, 
1810, the Municipal Council was constituted into a 
Junta of Government, and refused to obey the authority 
of the Regency, but expressed willingness to recognise 
the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII. The movement was 
aggravated by the arrival of emissaries from Joseph 
Bonaparte, to request the recognition of his right to the 



1810] SIMON BOLIVAR 21 

Spanish crown. Revolutionary outbreaks followed in 
quick succession in Bogota, Quito, Buenos Aires, Monte- 
video and Chile ; in Bolivia an insurrection against the 
authorities became a separatist campaign, but Peru 
remained loyal to Spain until a later period. 

In Venezuela the real leader of the rebellion was 
Simon Bolivar, a man of European education and great 
wealth. Born at Caracas in 1785, he was a very young 
man at the time his compatriots decided to enter on the 
struggle for the control of their future destiny. Bolivar 
after the outbreak of the revolt visited England as the 
rebel envoy, but was received coldly, and shortly after- 
wards returned to Venezuela, bringing a small supply of 
arms and ammunition. At first the Spaniards were 
unable to cope with the revolutionary movement, but 
two years later General Monteverde, at the head of a 
strong force of royalist troops, recovered control of the 
greater portion of the province, and in 1812 the cause of 
the rebels looked gloomy from all points. In that year 
Bolivar, who had sought asylum in Curacao, collected 
all the refugees from Venezuela and New Granada, and 
landed with 800 men at Cartagena. Marching from 
that town into Venezuela, he was joined by many thou- 
sands of volunteers, and routed the Spanish forces in a 
series of battles. On August 4, 1813, Bolivar entered 
Caracas in triumph, and was proclaimed dictator until 
such time as Venezuela could unite with New Granada. 

But the Spaniards were not yet beaten. Under Puy 
and Bover a bloody and energetic campaign was com- 
menced which ended in the defeat of Bolivar and his 
flight by sea to Cartagena in 1813. He offered his 
services to New Granada, and the Congress at Bogota 
accepted them on condition that Venezuela, when free, 
should join that confederation. In 1814 came news that 
Ferdinand VII. was sending a force of 10,000 men to 
protect the royal interests in New Granada and Vene- 
zuela. Bolivar, now appointed Captain-General for New 
Granada and Venezuela, marched through Magdalena, 
where he inflicted serious losses on the Spaniards. But 



22 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

dissensions broke out between him and the revolutionary 
authorities, with the result that the Captain-General 
embarked for Jamaica ; while on December 6, 1815, 
General Morilla, at the head of a Spanish army, occupied 
Cartagena. Once again the outlook for the rebels was 
gloomy. 

Bolivar now saved the situation for the insurgents. 
He organised a naval expedition, and defeated the 
Spanish flotilla ; then, landing in Venezuela, he recruited 
a large body of men under the Indian Paez and pushed 
operations energetically and successfully against the 
Spaniards. Campaign followed campaign with varying 
fortune until the end of 1818, when Lopez Mendez 
recruited and equipped in Europe some 9000 men to 
fight for the revolutionary cause. From 1818 the 
success of the rebellion was never in doubt. Victory 
after victory was gained by the revolutionary arms, and 
in December 1819 New Granada and Venezuela were 
united under the name of the Republic of Colombia. 
For a time the Spaniards attempted to retrieve the 
position, but in 1821 they were crushed at the battle of 
Carabobo, the remnants of their army retiring to Puerto 
Cabello, and surrendering to General Paez some two 
years later. Paez was one of the most remarkable 
figures in the War of Independence, and is credited with 
extraordinary heroism. It is stated that he captured 
a flotilla of Spanish gunboats on the Apure river by 
swimming his cavalry out and boarding the ships. 
On another occasion he is credited with killing 40 
Spaniards single handed in one fight. 

On August 30, 1821, the constitution of Colombia 
was formally ratified, and Bolivar was proclaimed Presi- 
dent. He determined to free Ecuador from Spanish 
control, as he had New Granada and Venezuela, and he 
organised an expedition to Quito for that purpose. The 
turning-point of this campaign was the battle of Pichincha 
in 1822, where General Sucre destroyed the Spanish 
army and left the road to Quito open for the advance 
of Bolivar. The Ecuadorian capital was occupied on 



1822] SIMON BOLIVAR 23 

June, 1822, and the country thenceforth emancipated 
from Spanish dominion. 

Bolivar now determined to march from Quito to 
Peru to aid in the destruction of the Spanish power in 
that country. Chile and Argentina had combined to 
drive the Spaniards out of Peru, and in 1820 a fleet 
under command of Lord Cochrane had defeated the 
Spanish squadron and landed a force of 5000 men com- 
manded by the Argentine General, San Martin, on the 
Peruvian coast. This army had occupied Lima on July 
28, 1821, but the Spaniards maintained a stout resist- 
ance at Callao and other points. It was not until 1824 
that the final battles were fought which broke down the 
Spanish power. On August 6 of that year the forces 
under Bolivar met the Spaniards at Junin, and gained a 
decisive victory, due in great part to a brilliant cavalry 
charge led by Colonel Suarez. After this action Bolivar 
left the army in charge of General Sucre, and at 
Ayacucho, on December 9, 1824, this officer inflicted a 
crushing defeat on the Spanish forces under General 
Canterac, capturing all the principal Spanish civil and 
military officials, and putting an end to the power of 
Spain in this section of South America. General Sucre 
then proceeded to Bolivia, or Upper Peru as it then 
was called, and in a very short time overcame such resist- 
ance as the Spaniards were able to offer, and in 1825 he 
was proclaimed the first President of that republic. 

In the south of the continent the struggle for 
independence was severe, but it was more difficult for 
Spain to send troops and supplies to sustain her cause 
in those far-away regions, and had the colonists on both 
sides of the River Plate acted in unison, the conflict 
would have been short. Unfortunately, individual 
ambitions amongst the leaders of the movement in 
Montevideo and Buenos Aires constantly occurred, and 
proved of material assistance to the Spanish cause, 
these internal dissensions preventing a decisive bloAv 
for emancipation. 

In the provinces of the Rio de la Plata the leaders 



24 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

of the movement were Moreno, Rivadavia, Castelli, 
Belgrano, and Valcarcel. In 1810 an assembly of 600 
notables deposed the Viceroy Baltasar de Cisneros, and 
he retired to Montevideo, still under Spanish dominion. 
In 1814 a revolutionary army from Buenos Aires 
captured Montevideo, but this did not end the struggle, 
and for another two years hostilities continued between 
the partizans of Spain and the supporters of the 
rebellion. On March 25, 1816, a congress assembled 
at Tucuman proclaimed Puyredon dictator, and on July 
9 of the same year the Act of Independence of the 
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata was ratified. 
A National Convention for the States forming the 
present Argentine Confederation assembled in Buenos 
Aires on January 23, 1825, and on February 2 Sir 
Woodbine Parish, acting under instructions from Mr 
Canning, signed a treaty of commerce and friendship by 
which the independence of the new republic was 
acknowledged. 

Meanwhile Montevideo had been a centre of anarchy 
and strife. General Artigas had been declared dictator 
of Uruguay, and was recognised by the authorities of 
Buenos Aires as the head of the republic of the Banda 
Oriental. Portuguese aggression, which aimed at per- 
manently annexing Uruguay to Brazil, brought about a 
conflict between Brazil and Buenos Aires, and the 
struggle continued until August 27, 1828, when, through 
the mediation of Great Britain, a treaty was signed at 
Rio de Janeiro acknowledging Uruguayan independence, 
and was ratified at Santa Fe on October 4 of the same 
year. 

Paraguay secured emancipation from Spain without 
any sanguinary conflicts with the representatives of the 
mother country. Isolated in the interior of the continent, 
it took some time for the revolutionary ideas of the 
period to permeate the principal centres of population, 
and when General Belgrano appeared in 1810, with an 
Argentine force, to aid a revolution against Spanish 
dominion, he was received in a most hostile spirit and 




H& 



Jose San Martin. 



[Face page 24. 



1818] THE RIVER PLATE AND CHILE 25 

defeated in battle some forty miles from Asuncion. Not 
long afterwards the Paraguayan leaders reconsidered 
their attitude, with the result that on May 14, 1811, a 
bloodless revolution was accomplished, and Dr Rodri- 
guez de Francia and Fulgencio Yegros were nominated 
First Consuls of the New Republic. In 1841 Francia 
was succeeded by his nephew, Don Carlos Lopez, and 
he by his son the notorious General, Solano Lopez, in 
1862. 

In Chile the separatist movement became active in 
1810, and at first the colonists achieved many successes ; 
but in 1813 an army under General Paroja re-established 
the authority of the Spanish Crown. The Chilians 
begged for help from the Government at Buenos Aires, 
and in 1817 General San Martin crossed the Andes 
with an army of 4000 strong, and on February 12, 1817, 
gave battle to the royalist forces at Chacabuco and won 
a decisive victory. Three days afterwards San Martin 
with his troops and the Chilian revolutionary army 
entered Santiago. A new Government was formed, 
with General O'Higgins at its head, and on January 1, 
1818, the independence of Chile was formally pro- 
claimed. But the fighting was not yet over, and the 
royalists, commanded by General Osorio, and reinforced 
by 5000 men from Peru, prepared to make another 
desperate effort to regain supremacy. In the valley of 
Concha Rayada he inflicted a serious defeat on the 
troops under General San Martin ; but the insurgents 
rallied, and on April 5, 1818, succeeded in crushing 
General Osorio at Maypu, by this victory finally securing 
the independence of their country. 

As a rule South Americans give too little importance 
to the influence the Monroe doctrine exercised upon the 
final outcome of their struggle for liberty. It is true 
that no public announcement of the United States 
policy was made until December, 1823, when the 
Spaniards had been defeated in nearly all the colonies ; 
but this fact detracts nothing from its paramount im- 
portance for the South American republics. Its effect 



26 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

was to prevent any attempt on the part of the mother 
country to reconquer the Spanish colonies by her own 
single-handed exertions or in combination with other 
European powers. 

The idea of America for the Americans was not new 
when Mr Monroe enunciated it in the United States 
Congress. We know that the formulation of that policy 
was uppermost in the minds of Washington and 
Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin after 
the separation of the American colonies from Great 
Britain — indeed, it may be said that only the 
opportunity was awaited to announce it to the 
world. When the danger arose of the intervention 
of the Holy Alliance to aid Spain to regain her 
lost possessions, Mr Canning saw an occasion to 
further British interests by the recognition of South 
American independence as a means of adjusting the 
balance of power, and so counteracting the influence of 
that league of despotisms. At his instigation the 
popular sentiment in the United States was expressed 
in the memorable message of President Monroe. It is 
said that Canning even went so far as personally to 
draft the portion of the message which dealt with the 
neutrality of the United States in European political 
affairs, and the abstention of European aggression in 
North and South America ; but that oft-repeated tale 
is improbable, for Monroe did little more than formulate 
a sentiment which had been gaining ground steadily in 
America for fifty years. That Canning thoroughly 
approved of the United States policy is proved by the 
fact that, by his advice, Great Britain was the first 
European power to recognise the independence of the 
South American States. The first South American 
minister accredited to the Court of St James was sent 
by the Republic of Colombia, and Mr Canning in 
presenting him to George IV. used the dramatic 
expression, " Sire, I bring to you the representative of 
a new world." 

The years immediately succeeding the struggle for 



1827] INTERNAL DISSENSIONS 27 

independence were troublous times in South America. 
The former colonists had no clear idea of the responsi- 
bility entailed by the liberty for which they had fought 
and sacrificed their blood and treasure. So long as 
Spain was the common enemy, a sense of patriotism 
held in check, to a great extent, the internal dissensions 
which always existed. Once the common danger dis- 
appeared, intrigue and personal ambition ran riot, and 
led to a condition of affairs bordering upon anarchy in 
many of the new republics. 

Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, after the extinction 
of Spanish rule in Peru, endeavoured to bring about a 
federation of the South American republics into one 
great community, but his action was unacceptible to 
Chile and Buenos Aires, and aroused bitter jealousy in 
those states. Finding it impossible to realise his project, 
he returned to Colombia in 1826, internal disturbances 
in that country demanding his prompt attention. 
Revolutions against his authority had broken out in 
Venezuela and various districts of Colombia, and in the 
following year a war ensued between Peru and Colombia, 
the former insisting that Bolivar had attempted to bring 
that country under Colombian authority. From 1827 
to the date of his death in December, 1830, the Liberator 
was the object of bitter enmity in Colombia, and was 
accused repeatedly of harbouring designs to found an 
imperial dynasty for his own benefit. He died a poor 
man, when only forty-seven, at Santa Marta, thoroughly 
disheartened by the turmoil of internal political dissen- 
sion which embittered his latter years. 

Immediately after the death of Bolivar, the Republic 
of Colombia broke up into the three divisions which 
now form Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, the last- 
named assuming at first the name of Nueva Granada, 
and after various intermediate changes, finally calling 
itself the United States of Colombia. At the first 
election in 1831 General Santander, who had been Vice- 
President under Bolivar, was chosen as chief magistrate, 
and during his term treaties were made with Venezuela 



28 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

and Ecuador to determine the frontiers of those states, 
and with the Holy See to secure the recognition of the 
republic. Panama and Colon were declared free ports 
for twenty years to all friendly nations, and a special 
treaty secured to the United States the privilege of 
transporting war material across the isthmus. In 
exchange the United States guaranteed Colombian 
sovereignty over the isthmus against any foreign 
government. That treaty was renewed in 1865. 

When Santander completed his term of office in 
1836, he endeavoured to secure the election of General 
Ovando as his successor in the Presidency, but his 
nominee was defeated by the civilian candidate Dr 
Marquez, and this brought about a friction of the different 
political parties which resulted in civil war from 1839 
to 1841, that ended in the triumph of Marquez. General 
Herran succeeded Marquez, and in turn was followed 
by General Mosquera. In 1858, under President Mariano 
Ospina, a Conservative, the seeds of discord between 
Liberals and Conservatives were sown in connection 
with the question of a Federal or Unitarian form of 
Government, and resulted in that political dissension 
which has embroiled Colombia in civil war lasting with 
short intermissions to the present day. 

The first President of Venezuela after the separation 
from Colombia in 1830, was General Paez, the hero of 
the War of Independence. Through his influence fairly 
peaceful conditions were maintained until 1847, when 
General Monagas, nominated by Paez, was elected. 
From that date until the accession to power of Guzman 
Blanco, the country was devastated by civil war pro- 
moted by ambitious politicians or military officers. 
President after President was deposed, the treasury 
depleted, industrial development paralysed, during the 
thirty years following the advent of General Monagas to 
the Presidency. 

Ecuador fared little better than Venezuela after 
separation from Colombia, for under the first President, 
General Flores, revolutionary movements were set afoot, 



1830] SOUTH AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 29 

but a compromise was effected, and until 1843 fairly 
tranquil conditions prevailed. The second President 
was Vicente Rocafuerte, an able and highly educated 
man of liberal ideas, and who attempted to organise a 
civil administration and a system of public education. 
During his term of office the independence of the 
republic was recognised by Spain. In 1839 General 
Flores was chosen once more, and was re-elected for a 
third term in 1843, but overthrown in 1845 by a 
revolutionary movement, which broke out at Guayaquil, 
and which was instigated by Rocafuerte. From now on 
Ecuador was torn by internal strife, only varied occasion- 
ally by disputes with Colombia and Peru, and her 
economic condition became lamentable in spite of the 
occasional efforts by such men as President Moreno to 
improve matters. Moreno, relying always on the support 
of the clergy in political affairs, made many enemies, and 
on August 6, 1875, he was assassinated at Quito. 

The first President of Peru was Jose de la Riva 
Aguero, who was appointed on February 26, 1823, while 
the Spaniards still controlled a large section of the 
country. He was deposed, and in 1827 General Lamar 
was elected and remained in office until 1829, when he 
was overthrown, and General Gamarra nominated in his 
stead. For the next fifteen years the Government was 
in the hands of various military cliques, whose leaders 
knew little of the principles of Civil Administration, 
and, as a consequence, internal strife was the order of 
the day, revolution following revolution in rapid succes- 
sion. The chief actors during this stormy period were 
Generals Gamarra, Santa Cruz, and Salaverry, and they 
or their nominees held power from 1829 to 1844. In 
that year General Ramon Castilla restored order in the 
republic, and in 1845 he was elected to the Presidency. 
During the term of Castilla many public works were 
undertaken and the national finances were placed on an 
improved footing. He was succeeded by General 
Echenique, who was deposed by a revolutionary move- 
ment in 1855 on account of certain unpopular measures 



30 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

introduced by him in connection with the internal indebt- 
edness. Castilla then returned to power, and remained 
in office until 1862, comparative peace being maintained 
for the seven years he governed. Two revolutions were 
attempted against his administration, but both were 
suppressed. He was succeeded in 1862 by Colonel 
Balta. 

Chile nominated General O'Higgins, the patriot leader 
in the War of Independence, as head of the Government 
after her emancipation from Spain in 1817, and he con- 
tinued in power until 1823. He was succeeded by 
General Freire, who held office for three years, during 
which period the country was a constant prey to internal 
dissension and armed insurrection, and here, as in 
Colombia, the nominal cause of these uprisings was the 
question of the adoption of a Federal or Unitarian form 
of Government. In 1827 General Pinto was elected, 
but resigned in 1829, and was succeeded by General 
Lastera. The opposition, headed by General Pinto and 
General Portales, successfully attacked the Government 
in December, 1829, and this brought Pinto again to 
power until 1831, when he was succeeded by General 
Prieto, under whose administration the present constitu- 
tion of Chili was promulgated in 1833. Prieto was 
re-elected in 1835, and continued in office until 1841, 
when General Bulnes was nominated to the Presidency, 
and remained at the head of affairs for ten years. 
During his term the independence of Chile was 
recognised by Spain. Various revolutionary outbreaks 
occurred against Bulnes, but all were suppressed, and in 
1851 his friend and supporter Don Manuel Montt was 
elected to the chief magistracy. 

After gaining her freedom, Bolivia in 1826 appointed 
General Sucre President for life, but repeated insurrec- 
tions occurred against his authority, and finally he was 
driven from the country in 1827. General Santa Cruz 
now succeeded to power until June, 1839, when he was 
overthrown by a Peruvian force under General Gamarra, 
and General Velasco was made head of the Government, 



1840] SOUTH AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 31 

but in turn was ousted by a revolutionary movement 
which brought General Ballivian into office in 1841. 
He likewise was deposed, and Velasco reappeared, but 
only to give place to General Belzu at the head of a 
successful revolt. In 1855 General Cordoba was pro- 
claimed President, but deposed in favour of Dr Linares 
in 1858, who was deprived of office by a military con- 
spiracy in 1861. General Acha was the next chief 
magistrate, and for four stormy years he maintained his 
position against his enemies, but in 1865 he was driven 
out by Belzu, who in turn was killed at La Paz when 
resisting an insurgent attack led by Colonel Melgarejo. 
The latter, although his position was assailed constantly, 
maintained himself in power until 1869. 

Uruguay elected Fructuoso Ribera as her first 
President in 1830, and his term of office was a record 
of internal turmoil which led to great sacrifice of human 
life. He was succeeded by Manuel Oribe in 1835, but 
he gave place to his brother Ignacio Oribe. Constant 
warfare against the Government was sustained by ex- 
President Ribera, Oribe being aided by the dictator of 
Buenos Aires, Juan Manuel Rosas. In 1838 Ribera 
succeeded in capturing Montevideo, Oribe taking refuge 
with Rosas in Buenos Aires. With the help of Rosas, 
the refugee invaded Uruguay in 1842, and laid siege to 
Montevideo in February, 1843. The city was defended 
by the Italian and French legions, and a Brazilian 
regiment commanded by Garibaldi, and the conflict was 
maintained until 1851, Oribe then being completely 
defeated by the Argentine General Urquiza, who had 
advanced against him with a strong body of troops from 
Eutre Rios. It was not until the disappearance of Oribe 
that any semblance of peace came to Uruguay, and that 
was of short duration, for a conflict arose with Great 
Britain, France and Italy over claims for damages done 
to foreign residents during the revolution. President 
Berro was forced to give way to the demands, and by 
doing so, incurred the hostility of his countrymen, but 
he remained in office until the expiry of his term, and 






32 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

in 1864 was succeeded by Anastasio Aguirre, a member 
of the Blanco Party. 

Argentina was better prepared for self-government 
than the other South American states, but here, as else- 
where on the continent, the liberty gained by emancipa- 
tion from Spanish rule was imperfectly understood. 
Such men as Puyredon, Eivadavia and Moreno were 
statesmen capable of directing the destinies of a nation 
far more advanced in civilisation than the La Plata 
provinces, but they did not estimate accurately the char- 
acter of their own countrymen when it expanded after 
the abrupt cessation of despotic control. Eivadavia 
succeeded Puyredon, being formally appointed President 
in 1825, and it was during his term of office that the 
question of Unitarian or Federal Government, which 
caused such serious dissensions in Colombia and Chile, 
first took definite shape. He failed to grasp the fact 
that in allowing this important point to drift he opened 
the door for a controversy that subsequently formed 
the pivot round which a struggle arose and caused a 
heavy sacrifice of life, and seriously checked the develop- 
ment of the resources of the country for more than half 
a century. Eivadavia was in favour of Unitarian 
Government, but at that period this meant the absolute 
supremacy of Buenos Aires, and so was rejected by the 
provinces. Lopez in Santa Fe, Bustos in Cordoba, and 
Quiroga in the western territories, declined to recognise 
the right of Buenos Aires to predominate in Argentine 
affairs, and were ever ready to throw obstacles in the 
way of the administration there, even to the extent of 
refusing to send deputies to the National Congress, or 
assisting in the war with Brazil then in progress. Under 
these circumstances Eivadavia resigned office and was 
succeeded by Vicente Lopez, and a compromise was 
established between the parties. The centre of Govern- 
ment was moved from Buenos Aires to Santa Fe, where 
a treaty of peace proclaiming the independence of 
Uruguay was made with Brazil. 

While the question with Brazil was open the various 




Juan Martin de Puvredon 



[Face page 32. 



1832] EOSAS AS DICTATOR 33 

political parties had agreed to some sort of unity, but the 
moment that incident closed the friction was renewed. 
The Unitarians again demanded the supremacy of 
Buenos Aires, and in December, 1828, under the leader- 
ship of General Lavalle, they seized the Government 
Palace. Dorrego, a Federalist, then at the head of the 
administration, marched to Santa Fe to ask support 
from Congress, but he was overtaken by Lavalle and 
shot. For the next two years a fierce conflict raged 
between the Federalists under Lopez and Quiroga and 
the Unitarians led by Lavalle. It was during this period 
that Juan Manuel Rosas, at the head of a body of 
Gaucho cavalry, lent valuable aid to the Federalist 
cause. 

In December, 1829, after Rosas had defeated Lavalle, 
the Federalists appointed him Governor and Captain- 
General of Buenos Aires. Shortly afterwards the 
Unitarians were defeated in Entre Rios and Cordoba, 
and when Rosas opened the legislature in 1832 the 
majority of the provinces pronounced in favour of the 
Federal cause. From now on the power of Rosas 
became absolute, and the Unitarians were hunted down 
like wild beasts. But Rosas became suspicious of his 
own generals, and one by one they disappeared. Quiroga 
was assassinated at Cordoba. Lopez died suddenly in 
Buenos Aires ; and Cullen, Reinafe and Heredia were 
sentenced to death. Although Rosas now exercised 
dictatorial power he was not satisfied, and on March 8, 
1835, he arranged for a plebiscite which put all public 
authority into his hands. 

Rosas attempted to close, and for a time succeeded 
in closing, the River Parana to foreign commerce, and 
this led to the blockade of Buenos Aires by an English 
and French fleet in 1845 and the forcing of the passage 
of the river ; but he realised the uselessness of such pro- 
ceedings, and in 1849 he signed a convention agreeing to 
the free navigation of this waterway and also to the 
independence of Uruguay, which country he had 
endeavoured to annex to Argentina. These negotia- 



34 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 

tions the French Chambers refused to ratify in 1851, 
and went so far as to authorise the despatch of an 
expeditionary force to ensure the protection of the 
rights of French settlers and French commercial 
interests. 




Tho limbnrgt & 



JaW3artlio]omf-w-A Co. 



_ 



_ 



AMERICA 

ratify in 1851, 
despatch of an 
Section of the 
ch commercial 




CHAPTER II 

THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Savage Brutality of Rosas. Revolution against Rosas. Economic 
and Social Conditions. Ambition of the Provinces to Dominate 
Buenos Aires. Wish of Buenos Aires to Secede. Determina- 
tion of Buenos Aires to Appeal to Arms. Revolution under 
General Mitre. Victory of the Insurgents at Pavon. General 
Mitre Installed as President. The National Capital. Revolu- 
tionary Movements. Aggressiveness of Lopez. War with Para- 
guay. Political Consequences of the War. Cholera in Buenos 
Aires. Election of Dr Sarmiento to the Presidency. Educational 
Progress. Efforts to Advance Industrial Development. Yellow 
Fever Epidemic. The Administration of Sarmiento. The 
Political Situation in 1874. Cordoba and the Presidential 
Election of 1874. Election of Dr Nicolas Avellaneda. The 
Presidential Election of 1871. Mitre and Revolutionary Pro- 
jects. Conspiracy against the Government. Seditious Out- 
breaks. Political Aims of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Avellaneda. 
Position in 1878. Propaganda of the Cordoba League. Meet- 
ings in Buenos Aires. The "Tiro Nacional." Buenos Aires 
and Coi'doba. National Government Alarmed. Minister of 
War and the " Tiro Nacional." President determines to Sup- 
press the " Tiro Nacional." Popular Demonstrations in Buenos 
Aires. Troops Protect the National Authorities. Compromise 
between President and Citizens. Second Mass Meeting in 
Buenos Aires. Advice of Dr Sarmiento. Conference between 
Governor of Buenos Aires and President. Temporary Compro- 
mise. Presidential Election of 1880. Issues of Electoral Cam- 
paign. Presidential Candidates. General Roca. Dr Pellegrini 
as Minister of War. The Cordoba League. Popular Excite- 
ment. Situation Strained. Buenos Aires buys War Material. 
Military Preparations. Delay in arrival of Arms and Ammuni- 
tion. 

The lengthy period for which General Rosas exercised 
absolute control over Argentina produced many evil 



36 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

results. At a time when a steady advance in civilisa- 
tion and a due respect for law and order should have 
developed, the reverse actually occurred, for Rosas had 
strangled collective and individual initiative in public 
and private life. 

Under the tyranny of Rosas human life had small 
value. If any man was a danger to the dictatorial 
regime he was murdered by a band of assassins retained 
for this purpose. Expression of public opinion was 
thus rendered impossible. Men dared not think for 
themselves, much less put into words their abhorrence 
of the savage brutality of the Dictator. With all his 
grim ferocity Rosas was not devoid of a sense of humour. 
When relations were critical between his Government 
and the British Minister, he made a wager that the latter 
would be doing menial work in his household before 
many hours elapsed. His daughter Manuelita aided 
the plot. Next day the Minister entered the Palace 
courtyard and found Manuelita in tears and pounding 
maize for "masamora." H.M.'s representative con- 
doled with her on her father's harshness in forcing 
such drudgery on his daughter, and begged leave to 
assist her. While the Minister was busily breaking up 
the corn Rosas appeared "with a group of friends and 
claimed payment of *lhe wager. It was in the province 
of Buenos Aires, the wealthiest and most populous 
section of the Confederation, that the ferocity of the 
tyrant was felt with greatest severity, and it was from 
Buenos Aires that Rosas most feared an uprising ; 
therefore was he ruthless in his treatment of city and 
province. After all, however, it was from the interior 
provinces that the movement emanated which finally 
overthrew his tyrannical power. But that did not come 
until he had held the country in his iron grasp for 
eighteen years. 

When the revolutionary forces under General Urquiza 
entered Buenos Aires in 1852 Rosas fled the country. 
When he found his power broken and his life in peril 
he turned to the British Minister for protection. He 



1852] DOWNFALL OF ROSAS 37 

lay concealed through the day at the Legation, then, 
disguised as an English sailor, he slipped after nightfall 
on board a British man-of-war and was conveyed to a 
place of safety. Until his death on March 14, 1877, he 
lived on a farm near Southampton. His daughter Manu- 
elita survived him, and died in London in 1892. Under 
this man's dictatorship social and economic conditions 
had sunk low compared to the standard of civilisation 
elsewhere in South America. The people had been so 
ground down by Rosas that there was little public spirit 
left to come to the front when participation in political 
affairs once more became possible. He left city and pro- 
vince prostrate, and the provincial representatives, whilst 
entertaining most vindictive feelings towards Rosas, had 
no real sympathy with the Portenos, as the inhabitants 
of Buenos Aires were called. The up-country provinces 
were as eager as Rosas had been to dominate Buenos 
Aires. They wanted her resources to sustain an Ad- 
ministration of which they held the control. The people 
of Buenos Aires were opposed naturally to this policy. 
They wished to be the leading element in the Confedera- 
tion, or, failing this, to secede and be independent. 
Equally determined was the Provincial Party to prevent 
control or secession. 

The immediate effect of the downfall of Rosas was a 
feeling of intense relief in Buenos Aires, and at first no 
efforts were made to safeguard the position of the 
Portenos in the Administration. This condition was 
only of short duration, for the people soon realised that 
it was necessary to bestir themselves if they did not 
wish their interests to be subordinated completely to 
ambitious provincial politicians. Between 1852 and 
1860, however, the direction of public affairs was con- 
trolled by General Urquiza in spite of various attempts 
by Buenos Aires to assert her position. It was the 
dictatorship of Urquiza following that of Rosas, but in 
modified form. From time to time revolutionary out- 
breaks occurred, but were premature and unsuccessful, 
and meanwhile Buenos Aires rapidly gained strength. 



38 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Evidently a serious struggle between the Portenos and 
the rest of the Confederation must come. 

In 1860 the tension between Buenos Aires and the 
provinces became unbearable, and Buenos Aires deter- 
mined to appeal to arms to settle the position it was to 
occupy in the future. Amongst the prominent Portenos 
was Colonel Bartolome Mitre. To this officer was 
confided the organisation and command of the forces 
raised. Preparations for this struggle had been in 
progress for years before the actual outbreak, and funds 
had been freely subscribed for purchasing arms and 
ammunition. For once the Portenos were united. The 
defence of the National Government was in the hands 
of General Urquiza, who spared no effort to stem the 
tide of insurrection. The feeling in the province of 
Buenos Aires, however, was unanimous when hostilities 
began in 1861, and the position of the Federal or 
National Government at once became untenable. Both 
city and province were evacuated by it, and the head- 
quarters transferred to Rosario in the province of Santa 
Fe. General Mitre moved northwards to attack the 
national troops, and at Pavon a decisive victory was 
gained by the revolutionary forces in October, 1861. 
This led to the evacuation of Rosario by Urquiza, and 
practically ended the campaign. Peace was established 
shortly afterwards, and General Mitre installed in the 
Presidency. 

After the victory at Pavon, Buenos Aires had her 
opportunity to decide her future position in regard to 
the rest of Argentina. General Mitre did introduce 
some modifications of the National Constitution. 
Nothing was done, however, to restrict the action of the 
Provinces. Precautions were not taken to assure the 
proper representation of Buenos Aires in the national 
policy in after years, nor were any practical efforts made 
to settle the vexed problem of the site of the national 
capital. 

This question of the seat of the central administra- 
tion was consequently provocative of constant friction 




Jose J. de Ukquiza. 



[Face page 38. 



1861] PRESIDENT MITEE 30 

between the provincial government of Buenos Aires 
and the national representatives. President Mitre 
was aware of the jealous feeling aroused in connection 
with the claim of the National Government to permanent 

lence in Buenos Aires, but he allowed the matter to 
drift. Unexpected complications arose in other direc- 
tions to occupy public attention, and this troublesome 
source of inquietude remained unsolved for another 
twenty years. 

Disturbances now occurred in several of the 
provinces. The Provincial Administrations foresaw 
that if the Portenos were allowed to remain long in 
control of the National Administration the result would 
be such an addition to their power that the national 
policy would be dictated by Buenos Aires, and it was 
heck portmo influence that the majority of the 
provinces joined hands against Mitre. They fomented 
seditious outbreaks to hamper development and progress 
in the country as a means to an end. 

In addition to the complications from unsettled 
internal conditions Mitre was confronted by a new 
difficulty in the aggressive attitude of General Lopez, 
the dictator of Paraguay. The belligerent policy of 
Lopez was apparent between 1860 and 1865, but the 
Argentines, in common with Brazil, were inclined to 
underestimate the strength of this small inland state. 
Events showed, however, that warlike operations against 
Paraguay were inevitable in the near future, and so 
negotiations for the joint action of Argentina, Uruguay 
and Brazil, against Paraguay, were set afoot. An 
agreement was reached, and it was determined to use 
force to defeat the ambitious projects of Lopez. In 
1865 the hostile proceedings of the Paraguayan dictator 
decided the three Governments to invade Paraguay, and 
the events of the war will be described under the 
section devoted to Paraguayan history. They were 
destined to produce important consequences to the 
Portenos, for they distracted the attention of Mitre 
from internal affairs, and permitted the provinces to 



40 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

undermine the political strength of Buenos Aires. The 
long absence of Mitre in Paraguay, where he was 
commander-in-chief of the allied army, and his inability 
to attend to his presidential duties, enabled provincial 
politicians to counteract his personal influence. There- 
fore, as the time approached for the fresh presidential 
term it became evident that the victory of Buenos Aires 
on the battlefield of Pavon in 1861 was not enough to 
ensure to the Portenos the preponderating power in 
Argentine politics. 

A severe visitation of cholera fell upon the city and 
province of Buenos Aires in 1868, and proved to be 
an important factor in the presidential election. For 
months Buenos Aires was almost deserted, a calamity 
that favoured the efforts of the provincial organisations. 
So when the election was held in 1868, Dr Sarmiento, a 
native of San Juan, obtained a substantial majority. 
An attempt was made to dispute the validity of the 
election, but the opposition was feeble, and the new 
President assumed office on October 12, 1868. 

Small fault could be found with the attitude and 
policy of Sarmiento, and the animosity of the Portenos 
quickly subsided when he became better known. 
Sarmiento's most bitter opponents were forced to admit 
that his Government was characterised by upright deal- 
ing, and a desire to promote the best interests of 
Argentina. During his presidential term he established 
a system of public education of wider scope than existed 
anywhere in South America. Unfortunately this educa- 
tional development was not maintained in later years, 
but the measures taken between 1868 and 1874 bear 
testimony of his broad-minded policy in national affairs. 

Amongst other difficulties confronting the Adminis- 
tration, not the least was the final settlement of the 
Paraguayan question. The sacrifice in blood and 
treasure during the conflict had been heavy, but the 
full effect of this expenditure was not thoroughly 
appreciated until after Dr Sarmiento acceded to power 
and the struggle was ended. To expand industrial 



1871] PRESIDENT SARMIENTO 41 

enterprise in Argentina was the only remedy for the 
situation, and the development of the great natural 
pastoral and agricultural resources was never lost sight 
of by Sarmiento. For the first time in Argentine 
history the fact that peace and prosperity travel hand 
in hand was borne home to the minds of the people. 

In 1871 an epidemic of yellow fever made its 
appearance and spread rapidly. The population of 
Buenos Aires was then estimated at 300,000 persons, 
and the number of victims created panic so acute that 
five-sixths of the residents left the town. For months 
commercial business was paralysed. According to 
official returns the deaths in Buenos Aires between 
January and June of 1871 reached 24,000. Two 
members of the Municipality, Dr Hector Varela and 
Dr Roque Perez, were conspicuous for heroic efforts to 
alleviate the terrible distress. The conduct of these 
two officials was depicted by Sefior J. M. Blanes in a 
painting showing them entering a small room in the 
poorer section of the city. On a bed lies the dead 
father ; on the floor is the body of the mother, and 
near her an infant crying for food. It is to the credit 
of the European medical men in Buenos Aires that they 
remained to fight the disease. Recovery from the 
disturbance occasioned to commerce and trade by this 
disaster was slow, and the evil results crippled the 
efforts of President Sarmiento to place economic condi- 
tions on a satisfactory basis. 

In 1874 Sarmiento's Presidency terminated. In 
spite of all difficulties, progress since 1868 had been 
substantial. Education had advanced ; railways had 
been extended, and respect for law and order had 
increased. The administration of justice had also 
improved, and there was a revival of confidence in 
commerce and industry. Public attention now turned 
to the question of Sarmiento's successor. Bitter feeling 
was exhibited by both Portefios and representatives of 
the provinces in the new election. The provinces fully 
realised that if the choice for the Presidency lay with 



42 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Buenos Aires, the Porteiios would dominate the national 
policy, and they therefore united to defeat the porteno 
candidate. 

The political status of Argentina in 1874 was very 
different from that now existing, for then the Confedera- 
tion was a loosely jointed organisation of fourteen States, 
each enjoying sovereign rights under the national Law 
of Constitution, and each inevitably jealous of control 
by the National Government. Danger of secession con- 
sequently existed always, and was the principal cause 
of civil war in this section of South America. The 
question of any change in the constitutional law was a 
matter of constant dispute. A proposal for Unitarian 
in place of Federal Administration raised a storm of 
protest, and so acute did the controversy become during 
the dictatorship of Rosas, that the motto used by the 
supporters of the tyrant, and appearing on many official 
documents, was — Viva la Confederation Argentina. 
Mueran Ids Salvages Unitarios (Long life to the 
Argentina Confederation. Death to the Unitarian 
savages). This party cry was emphasised by the 
assassination of prominent persons in favour of a 
Unitarian system. Attempts were made by Mitre and 
Sarmiento to unite the Confederation more closely, but 
without success, for the suspicious nature of the pro- 
vincial politicians prevented any cordial understanding 
between themselves and the Porteiios. Moreover, the 
people of Buenos Aires were afraid that closer union 
with the remainder of Argentina would tend to augment 
provincial influence. Another impediment was the diffi- 
culty of communication between the different provinces. 
There were few railways, no roads, no telegraphs. A 
journey from the interior provinces to the city of 
Buenos Aires was a matter of weeks, sometimes months. 
Amid such conditions it is easy to appreciate how 
restricted the intercourse was, and how distorted 
rumours gave rise to misunderstandings. 

The city of Cordoba was the headquarters of the 
provincial political organisations. It was by Cordoba 





President Mitre. 



President Sarmiento. 





Leandro Alem. 



Aristobulo del Valle. 



[Face page 42. 



1874] PROVINCIAL POLITICS 43 

that Sarmiento had been elected in 1868, and round 
this centre the provincial representatives rallied in 1874. 
The provinces claimed official aid in the presidential 
campaign. President Sarmiento had been their candi- 
date, and by South American ethics must render them 
assistance for the election of their nominee ; but here 
the provincial leaders reckoned without their host. 
Sarmiento refused to make use of his official position. 
Nor did he evince any marked sympathy for the aims 
of the Provincial Party. During his term of office he 
had realised that the antagonism between Buenos Aires 
and the rest of Argentina was the greatest obstacle to 
the progress of the country. He considered a more 
compact form of government with Buenos Aires at the 
head was the true solution of the problem. The pro- 
vincial representatives were not opposed to a consolidated 
National Administration, but only on condition that the 
provinces had sufficient representation to outvote Buenos 
Aires. Cordoba was disappointed at the attitude of 
Sarmiento, but did not lose heart, and the President 
was so far influenced that he promised to remain neutral, 
and strictly maintained this pledge. Other high officials 
in his Administration had no such conscientious scruples. 
They used all their influence in favour of the Cordoba 
clique. It was, therefore, a surprise to nobody when 
Dr Nicolas Avellaneda, a native of Tucuman, was 
elected. 

The situation after the election of 1874 was full of 
complications. The Portenos were dissatisfied. They 
claimed that General Mitre, the porteno candidate, had a 
majority of votes, and that the returns had been falsified 
Not improbably this was the case. 

It is certain the representatives of Buenos Aires with 
their allies from other provinces ought to have carried the 
day. On the other hand it was not clear that the pro- 
vincial contingent promising aid to the Portenos kept 
faith with Buenos Aires when the voting took place. 
Once the election of President Avellaneda had been 
announced by the Congress there was no means short of 



44 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

armed force by which the decision could be reversed. 
The relations between Buenos Aires and the provinces 
were so strained that many Portenos strongly advocated 
a revolutionary movement. General Mitre was not in 
favour of a rising, and, as no other strong man was forth- 
coming to take his place, the conspiracy did not assume 
a really serious character. It was promptly suppressed 
by the Government. 

Many revolutionary disturbances, however, signal- 
ised the first three years of the Avellaneda Administra- 
tion. In some instances these outbreaks originated in 
local circumstances, and had no connection with the 
National Government. In others they arose from the 
disposition of the Administration to intervene unduly in 
provincial affairs. Buenos Aires and the provinces were 
alike convinced the critical struggle for the final control 
of the Confederation would take place at the next pre- 
sidential election. Preparations were made by both 
parties to resort to arms if necessary. 

The two factors in the political situation were the 
Portenos of Buenos Aires, supported by the province of 
Corrientes, and the National Administration representing 
the remainder of Argentina. Buenos Aires and her one 
sympathiser in point of population and resources were a 
match for the rest of the Confederation if competent 
leaders could be found. 

Avellaneda relied on a show of force to deter 
seditious conspiracy from blazing out into open revolt 
and involving the country in Civil War. The national 
army was strengthened by recruits from the inland 
sections of the republic. Supplies of arms and ammu- 
nition were obtained, and other precautions observed as 
the situation became more strained. Each party was 
inclined to underrate the strength of the other, but the 
attitude of the leaders on both sides was so aggressive 
as to leave small hope of a peaceful solution of the 
controversy. Ostentatious parade of military strength 
was made to intimidate the Portenos, and the position 
was complicated further by the provincial politicians 



1880] BUENOS AIRES AND PROVINCES 45 

proposing to form the city of Buenos Aires into a Federal 
District. The po7 % teno population was determined to 
resist this proposition. A meeting of citizens was held, 
and included General Bartolome Mitre ; Dr Carlos 
Tejedor, the Governor of the province ; Colonel Arias, 
the representative of the province of Corrientes ; General 
Martin Gainza, and General Emilio Mitre. After lengthy 
discussion of ways and means for Buenos Aires to defend 
her rights, it was decided to found an association for rifle 
shooting. All able-bodied men were urged to become 
members of this club, which was incorporated as the 
"Tiro National." In reality it was a military volunteer 
organisation for training those who would be called to 
arms when hostilities began. The enthusiasm of the 
younger men in Buenos Aires for the " Tiro National " 
was unbounded. Every Sunday thousands attended the 
parade grounds to undergo instruction. It was placed 
in charge of Colonel Julio Campos, an able and energetic 
officer. 

The National Government was alarmed at the 
development of the " Tiro National." Avellaneda called 
a council of ministers to consider what steps should be 
taken to counteract its effect. It was decided that the 
Minister of War should demand an explanation from the 
principal military officers associated with the movement 
On February 13, 1880, he accordingly requested the 
attendance at his office of General Mitre, his brother 
Emilio, Colonel Arias, Colonel Julio Campos, Colonel 
Lagos, and other officers. The views of the National 
Administration concerning the attitude of Buenos Aires 
were stated, and the officers were informed that their 
association with revolutionary societies laid them open 
to a charge of treason, and that in supporting the action 
of the Portenos they were conspiring against the Govern- 
ment they served. The answer by these officers was the 
resignation of their commissions. They asserted that 
separation from the national service absolved them from 
any ties binding them to the Administration. Hot words 
followed, and Colonel Julio Campos left the minister in 



46 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

no doubt as to the course to be taken by Buenos Aires. 
Before the meeting closed, he explained the situation in 
these words : — •■" If there are rebels it is the National 
Government who are the instigators of sedition. You 
are striking at the liberty of Buenos Aires and the 
Argentine Confederation. It is our duty to defend 
both with all our strength." 

Avellaneda thereupon determined to use force to 
suppress the Buenos Aires military organisation. On 
February 15, 1880, 2000 members of the "Tiro 
Nacional " were to assemble at Palermo on the outskirts 
of Buenos Aires. A division of the regular army was 
encamped near the Chacarita cemetery, and orders were 
issued by the Minister of War for these troops to take 
up positions to command all roads leading to the parade 
ground of the "Tiro Nacional." Batteries of artillery 
were stationed to cover the approaches from Buenos 
Aires. The leaders of the "Tiro Nacional" were 
advised of this movement, and changed the rendezvous 
to the Plaza Lorea. A demonstration through the 
streets of Buenos Aires followed, and was supported 
enthusiastically by the whole population of the city. 
The Government was frightened, and orders were issued 
for the troops at Palermo to march into Buenos Aires. 
A collision between the two factions appeared inevi- 
table. Later in the day, however, a compromise was 
effected. The troops were withdrawn beyond the city 
limits, and the Portenos quietly dispersed. 

On February 16, the day following this excitement in 
Buenos Aires, a meeting of prominent citizens was sum- 
moned, at which violent denunciations of the Administra- 
tion were made. Then Dr Sarmiento advised Buenos 
Aires to disarm on condition that the other provinces con- 
sented to similar measures ; but the Portenos refused to 
accept this proposal, alleging that disarmament would 
place Buenos Aires at the mercy of the Cordoba clique. 
The result of the meeting was the nomination of a com- 
mittee composed of Senor Felix Frias, Senor Rufino 
Varela, and Dr Aristobulo del Valle to confer with the 



1880] THE AVELLANEDA ADMINISTRATION 47 

Governor of the province, Dr Carlos Tejedor, and arrange 
a modus vivendi between the National and Provincial 
Governments. At this conference, the Governor de- 
manded that the army should be withdrawn from the city 
of Buenos Aires, and fair representation for the Portenos 
be given in all questions of national policy. The Presi- 
dent inquired if Buenos Aires would disarm if the 
conditions asked were granted. He was told that dis- 
armament would not be accepted, but that no parade of 
military strength would be attempted. Avellaneda was 
not strong enough to force an open rupture, and he 
therefore agreed to the proposals of Tejedor in order to 
gain time to mature his plans for future action. Thus 
for the moment open warfare between the Portenos and 
the National Administration was averted. 

Public attention now centred upon the choice of a 
successor to Avellaneda. The issue at stake was 
whether Buenos Aires or the provinces, as represented 
by the Cordoba clique, should dominate Argentina. 
General Bartolome Mitre was the porteno leader, and 
Buenos Aires would have nominated him for the Presi- 
dency, but he refused. His attitude led to the selection 
of Dr Carlos Tejedor as the porteno candidate. Dr 
Tejedor had been Governor of the province of Buenos 
Aires since 1878, a position which had ranked as equal 
to the President of the Republic. General Julio Roca 
was the candidate nominated by the provinces. He 
was destined to become a prominent character in 
Argentine history. 

General Roca was an officer who had distinguished 
himself in campaigns against the Indians and in com- 
mand of troops employed to suppress revolutionary out- 
breaks. He was born in 1843 in Tucuman, but educated 
in Cordoba. In his professional career he had shown 
ability for organisation and tact in dealing with his 
colleagues. The Portenos therefore regarded his 
military influence as a dangerous element in the present 
situation. His prestige gained against the Indians in 
the south of the province of Buenos Aires in 1879 was 



48 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

on the other hand, a powerful weapon in the hands of 
his political supporters in the election. The result of 
this southern campaign had been to open to colonisation 
a vast area of territory extending as far as the Rio 
Negro, beyond which lay the unexplored regions of 
Patagonia. It was claimed for Roca that he was a 
national benefactor, but his friends credited him with 
little knowledge of politics. In this respect, however, 
they considered him all the more suitable, because they 
wanted a leader who would not be afraid to show a bold 
front to any movement the Portenos might set afoot. 
Roca was not slow to see that existing circumstances 
offered many opportunities for his own advancement, 
and at once accepted the situation, although he under- 
stood more clearly than his supporters that conflict with 
the Portenos must be decided by an appeal to arms. 
Accordingly, his attention in 1880 was devoted to the 
better organisation of the national army. 

Amongst the supporters of Roca was Carlos Pelle- 
grini, then a comparatively young man, having been 
born in Buenos Aires in 1847. As Minister of War 
under Avellaneda, he had held high political office, and 
as Secretary to the Chambers he had acquired know- 
ledge of political methods. Through his father, Pelle- 
grini inherited Italian blood, and on his mother's side he 
was connected with Mr John Bright. He was educated 
at Harrow. It was Pellegrini who protested against the 
resignation of Avellaneda when the national authorities 
were threatened by Buenos Aires in February, 1880, 
and it was Pellegrini again, when Minister of War, who 
advocated the use of the troops by the National Govern- 
ment to crush any attempt of the Portenos to enforce the 
demands made through Dr Tejedor. His resourceful 
character made him an invaluable ally to the Cordoba 
clique in their struggle for supremacy, and they displayed 
a keen knowledge of human nature in inducing the pro- 
vincial representatives to combine the political ability of 
Pelligrini with the soldierly qualities of Roca in the 
contest. In the former they had a clever organiser and 



1880J THE CORDOBA LEAGUE 49 

a shrewd adviser, who understood the weak points of 
his fellow-countrymen. In the latter, they could depend 
upon an able soldier to whom the national army was 
devoted. 

The " League," as the Cordoba clique was generally 
called, comprised many remarkable men. Possibly they 
were not over- scrupulous in their methods ; but indi- 
vidually and collectively they possessed far more energy 
and acuteness than the Portenos. The most prominent 
names in the " League " where Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, 
afterwards President of the Republic ; Dr Marcos Juarez 
Celman ; Dr Iriondo, the Governor of Santa Fe ; Dr 
Antelo of Entre Rios ; Dr Muiiecas of Tucuman ; Dr 
Almonacid of La Rioja ; Dr Viso of Cordoba ; Dr 
Navarro of Catamarca ; Dr Dardo Rocha, and many 
others who played leading parts subsequently in Argen- 
tine politics. The " League " was afforded assistance 
and protection by Avellaneda, and this official influence 
was a source of undoubted strength. 

As the date of the election approached, excitement 
increased. The National Party in Cordoba openly 
advocated the confiscation of the city of Buenos Aires, 
and its conversion into the federal capital. Although it 
had long been understood that this policy was the aim 
of the provinces, it had not been definitely announced as 
one of the issues of the electoral campaign, but the fact 
that the election of Roca inferred the immediate execu- 
tion of this scheme tended to irritate the Portenos to an 
extent which threatened an immediate outbreak. It 
was to this point the Cordoba " League " wished to drive 
their opponents. They were convinced they could cope 
successfully with any armed conflict, because they were 
better prepared than their adversaries in military organi- 
sation and warlike stores. 

In April of 1880 it was evident the Portenos must 
accept the Cordoba programme or fight, and the majority 
were in favour of fighting. War would therefore have 
been declared against the National Government without 
hesitation if the necessary supplies had been forthcoming, 

D 



50 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

but notwithstanding the fact that money was available 
for the purchase of artillery, rifles, and ammunition, the 
Buenos Aires leaders had neglected to obtain the 
requisite material. Orders, however, were despatched 
to Europe for military equipment, and little could be 
done pending its arrival. Meanwhile another effort was 
made to avoid hostilities. General Campos was sent to 
Cordoba to endeavour to persuade the "League" to 
withdraw the candidature of Roca for the Presidency, 
and to substitute some person to be mutually agreed 
upon by representatives of both political factions. 
Colonel Lagos went to the northern provinces to attempt 
to induce the politicians of that section to declare in 
favour of this policy of conciliation. These missions 
proved futile, and both delegates returned to Buenos 
Aires convinced that the only alternative to complete 
submission to the political supremacy of the provinces 
was open warfare. Preparations for the struggle were 
now pushed ahead. The able-bodied men of Buenos 
Aires were organised into regiments, and many thousands 
of recruits from all grades of society came forward to 
fill the ranks. A small portion of the arms and ammuni- 
tion arranged for reached the porteno leaders in the month 
of May, 1880, and it was stated that the remainder was 
expected shortly. Under the impression that it would be 
delivered, the Buenos Aires Government refused an offer 
of 10,000 Remington rifles. Failure to take advantage 
of this opportunity to increase the stock of arms proved 
a fatal error of judgment, for, in spite of most urgent in- 
structions, one delay after another occurred to prevent 
the arrival of the war material, which was accordingly 
not available when the crisis culminated. 



CHAPTER III 

the argentine republic — continued 

Military Preparations. Attempt to seize Cordoba. National Troops 
in Buenos Aires. Provincial Authorities and the Minister of 
War. Rioting in Buenos Aires. The National Government and 
the Provincial Administration. Avellaneda abandons Buenos 
Aires. Hostilities Commence. Strength of National Troops. 
Preparations for Defence of Buenos Aires. Disposition of 
Provincial Forces. Scarcity of War Material in Buenos Aires. 
Leaders of the Rebellion. Political Dissensions. Dr Pellegrini. 
Skirmishing between National Troops and Revolutionary Forces. 
Colonel Arias and the Volunteers. Engagement near Olivera. 
Colonel Arias reaches Lujan. Defence of Buenos Aires. Attack 
upon Buenos Aires. Hostilities on July 21. Ammunition 
exhausted in Buenos Aires. Conference of Revolutionary 
Leaders. Armistice on July 23. Peace Negotiations. Terms 
of Surrender. Buenos Aires declared the National Capital. 
General Roca elected President. The New Administration. 
Cordoba and Roca. Buenos Aires and the New President. The 
National Policy. Absolute Power of Roca in 1881. Restraint 
on Military. National Feeling. Improvement in Means of 
Communication. Railway Construction. Foreign Immigration. 
Assisted Passages for Immigrants. National Land Sales. Public 
Works. Revolutionary Outbreaks. Expansion of Agricultural 
and Pastoral Industry. Foreign Loans. Dr Pellegrini appointed 
Minister of War. Political Intrigues. Discontent in Buenos 
Aires. Attitude of the Administration in Electoral Matters. 
Foundation of La Plata. The Port of Ensenada. Presidential 
Election. Presidential Candidates. Economic and Industrial 
Progress. Financial Policy. Suspension of Specie Payments. 
Inconvertible Currency. 

While the military preparations were in progress in 
Buenos Aires in May, 1880, a coup d'etat was attempted. 
This was to seize the city of Cordoba and make prisoners 



52 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

of the most prominent members of the "League." It 
was a bold scheme. 

In Cordoba a certain section of the inhabitants were 
opposed to Avellaneda. It was with this discontented 
faction that the porteno leaders arranged their plan of 
action. The conspirators in Cordoba agreed to advise 
Buenos Aires when the time was ripe. Nothing 
occurred to interfere with the project, and in due 
course notice was given that all now required was a 
determined man to direct the outbreak. Colonel 
Lisandro Olmos and a few companions went to Cordoba 
to head the plot. 

The National Authorities were not ignorant of the 
conspiracy. But the details of the proposed coup 
rfetat had been carefully concealed, so that the Govern- 
ment had no definite information to act upon, and no 
measures were taken to prevent the arrival of Colonel 
Olmos at Cordoba. After, however, a cursory examina- 
tion of the conditions, Olmos found that the support he 
could count upon was limited, and the extent of discon- 
tented feeling exaggerated. The Governor, Dr Viso, 
and his right hand man, Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, 
were unpopular ; but the real dissatisfaction did not 
reach beyond a desire to be rid of these two men. In 
spite of this Olmos determined to make an attempt to 
fulfil his mission, hoping that the feeling against the 
Governor would bring support if his first efforts were 
successful. Accompanied by a dozen fellow-conspirators, 
he sallied into the streets. Each man was armed with 
a carbine, but had only twenty rounds of ammunition. 
The point of attack was the " Cabildo," or Government 
offices, where the Governor and Juarez Celman were 
known to be. The building was occupied, and the 
Governor and other officials captured. Thus for the 
moment the revolutionary party controlled the situation. 
Colonel Olmos thereupon insisted that Dr Viso and Dr 
Juarez Celman should resign their posts, but while the 
negotiations were proceeding firing was heard in the 
central square. This came from the provincial troops 



1880] POLITICAL CONDITIONS 53 

called to the assistance of the authorities. Olmos and 
his followers endeavoured to defend the Government 
buildings, but their supply of ammunition ran short; 
they were overpowered and imprisoned for several 
months. 

The Cordoba incident naturally increased the strain 
between Avellaneda and the Portenos. The troops in 
Buenos Aires committed many outrages without being 
checked. In consequence of friction between the 
soldiery and the inhabitants, the Governor demanded 
the withdrawal of the 7th regiment, but his request 
passed unnoticed. Porteno officials now refused to hold 
further communication with the Minister of War. 
Neither side, however, was ready for open hostilities. 
The National Government ordered the concentration of 
all available troops, but did not wish to move until a 
strong force in the field gave confidence of success. On 
the other hand, the Portenos awaited further supplies of 
arms and ammunition to equip several thousands of 
volunteers, but the acquisition of this war material 
became more difficult as the vigilance of the National 
Authorities increased. 

In June, 1880, a climax was reached. A riot occurred 
in the streets of Buenos Aires between the presidential 
escort and a group of residents. Shots were exchanged 
before the interference of the police quelled the dis- 
turbance. The incident was magnified into an attempt 
to assassinate Avellaneda, and the National Government 
demanded the immediate punishment of the Portenos 
concerned. This brought the final rupture. Arms were 
served out to the volunteers. It was arranged that 
Tejedor should seize the President and his Ministers, 
but Avellaneda received warning of the intended move- 
ment ; and with the troops stationed in the city he 
managed to join the main body of the army a few miles 
beyond the municipal limits. With his departure from 
Buenos Aires war commenced. 

The Government forces numbered between 7000 and 
8000 men, recruited principally from the interior pro- 



54 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

vinces. A large proportion of these troops had been 
employed on active service in campaigns against the 
Indians, and were seasoned soldiers. General Roca 
commanded and was seconded by Dr Carlos Pellegrini, 
the Minister of War. Care had been taken to see to the 
efficient equipment of the army, and the artillery com- 
prised Krupp field batteries, while the small arm was 
the Remington rifle. In addition to the forces in the 
vicinity of the city of Buenos Aires reserves were held 
in readiness at Cordoba, Rosario, and other places. On 
the River Plate were several gunboats, which, while not 
formidable fighting machines, rendered valuable aid by 
cutting off supplies. Buenos Aires city itself was 
unfortified, and depended for safety on the measures the 
porteno leaders might improvise after the outbreak of 
hostilities. All the advantages were thus with the 
National Government, and Roca was confident that the 
reduction of the city could be accomplished. 

When the rupture with the National Government 
was announced, the Portehos prepared for the defence 
with enthusiasm. Intrenchments were thrown up at all 
likely points. Some 15,000 men were armed, and Colonel 
Arias was despatched to the outlying districts to raise 
additional forces. The organisation of the cavalry was 
confided to Colonel Hilario Lagos. Money was plentiful 
but of little use, as further supplies could not be 
purchased. The cry everywhere was for more arms and 
ammunition, but these two essential factors were only 
forthcoming in limited quantities. 

The leaders of the "Tiro Nacional" movement now 
assumed control in Buenos Aires, and the people looked 
to General Mitre for guidance in the present crisis. 
Colonel Julio Campos was placed in command of the 
military operations, and no efforts were spared by this 
officer to strengthen the defences of the city. His task 
was not easy, for the porteno troops lacked military 
training and discipline, a want which proved a source of 
continual weakness throughout the campaign. The civil 
authorities of Buenos Aires rendered little aid, were in 




President Roca. 



[Pace page 54. 



1880] CIVIL WAR BEGINS , 55 

some ways rather a hindrance, for Governor Tejedorancl 
his companions allowed political discussions to breed 
dissension. A section of porteno politicians believed 
that the show of force already made by Buenos Aires 
would secure the resignation of Avellaneda and the with- 
drawal of the candidature of Roca for the Presidency, 
Others argued that the real chance of success lay in 
attacking the national troops before they were joined by 
reinforcements known to be expected. The majority of 
the military officers favoured this bold course. Wrang- 
ling and vacillation then ensued, and a decision was 
deferred pending news from Colonel Arias as to the 
outcome of his recruiting expedition. 

Conditions in Buenos Aires were known to Roca and 
Pellegrini, and nobody could judge better the weak points 
of the Portenos than the Minister of War. A native of 
Buenos Aires, he was cognisant of the character and fibre 
of the local political disputes, and therefore counselled 
bringing up reinforcements to make a general assault on 
the city, urging that with the capture of Buenos Aires 
all resistance would end. Roca agreed with Pellegrini 
on this point, and Colonel Racedo was ordered to advance 
from Rosario with 2500 men ; but a delay was necessary 
to execute these plans, and hence it was not until the 
middle of July that serious skirmishing took place 
between the national troops and the Portenos. The 
suburb of Flores, to the north of the city of Buenos 
Aires, was forthwith occupied by the national troops, 
and communication cut between the city and the pro- 
vince. 

Colonel Arias had succeeded better than he expected, 
and sent word to Buenos Aires that he had recruited 
10,000 able-bodied men, ready and willing to fight as 
soon as arms and ammunition were provided. Colonel 
Charras accordingly left the city with an escort conveying 
a small supply of military equipment. Knowledge of 
this move reached the enemy, who acted with such vigour 
that the train conveying Colonel Charras was stopped 
near the railway station of Lamis, the Colonel wounded 



56 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

and captured and the convoy seized. Colonel Arias 
now decided to march to Buenos Aires with his contingent 
and endeavour to break through the investing lines. 
When near Olivera, some fifty miles from the city, Arias, 
however, found himself in the vicinity of the troops from 
Rosario commanded by Colonel Racedo and marching 
to Buenos Aires, and in the encounter that followed both 
sides claimed the victory. Arias at any rate succeeded 
in accomplishing his immediate object — that of reaching 
Lujan, and from there the road to Buenos Aires was 
comparatively clear. Once at Lujan he resolved to push 
forward and enter Buenos Aires through Flores, attack- 
ing the national troops at that point, and he accordingly 
asked that simultaneously a sortie from the city should 
be made. The porteno leaders, however, in Buenos 
Aires, did not approve his plans, and instructions were 
despatched to him not to attempt the Elores road, but 
to make his entry by the Alsina Bridge, because a very 
strong force of the enemy occupied Flores. 

This advance of Arias upon Buenos Aires was the 
signal for the general action that decided the campaign. 
Carrying out his instructions from portefio headquarters, 
Arias left Lujan and marched in a southerly direction 
to pass to the westward of Elores and cross the 
Riachuelo River at the Alsina Bridge. By a rapid 
movement the revolutionary division was able to avoid 
contact with the main body of the national troops, and 
the only fighting during the march was a series of 
unimportant skirmishes. The vicinity of the Riachuelo 
was thus reached without serious hindrance, and com- 
munication established with the garrison of Buenos 
Aires. Supplies of arms and ammunition were again 
requested, and a small quantity was received. The 
main positions of the defence were the Alsina Bridge, 
the Barracas Bridge, both crossing the Riachuelo River, 
and the point known as the "Meseta de los Corales." 
Covering the former was Arias and the men he had 
brought from outside ; at the second was Colonel 
Morales with several battalions, and at the " Meseta de 



1880] BUENOS AIRES ASSAULTED 57 

los Corales" Colonel Lagos was stationed with the 
revolutionary cavalry and some detachments of infantry. 
So far as possible these positions were strengthened by 
entrenchments and such other defensive measures as the 
scanty supply of tools and material permitted. 

Meanwhile the national army was making prepara- 
tions to attack, and the arrival of Colonel Racedo 
brought its available strength up to 10,000 men, a 
number, in the opinion of Roca, sufficient. It was there- 
fore decided to attack on July 20, 1880, and a disposition 
of the forces was made accordingly. The principal 
resistance was expected at the Barracas Bridge, and on 
the high ground in the vicinity of the " Meseta de los 
Corales," the latter position acting as a support to the 
bridge. For the assault at these two points, a strong 
division was commanded by Colonel Lavalle. Another 
force was detailed to attack Arias near the Alsina 
Bridge, with instructions to make an entry into the city 
from that quarter. If this could be done, the positions 
at the "Meseta de los Corales" and the Barracas Bridge 
would be untenable. 

The assault commenced early in the morning, and 
shortly after daybreak the porteno picquets were driven 
in. The national troops found, however, the entrench- 
ments at the Barracas Bridge more formidable than 
anticipated. They were first checked, then compelled 
to retire and await reinforcements, and the division 
detached to rush the position held by Arias near the 
Puente Alsina met no better fate. Repeatedly the men 
advanced to the attack, but the defence stubbornly 
resisted their onslaughts, and at the close of the day 
no permanent advantage had been gained by the national 
forces. On both sides the losses had been heavy, but 
specially so on that of the Portenos, and for them also 
the question of ammunition had become most serious. 
On the part of the National Government the measures 
taken ensured the necessary supplies, but the Portenos 
had no reserve stores, and therefore, in spite of the 
heavy casualty list amongst the national troops, condi- 



58 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

tions were in their favour when the attack was resumed 
on July 21. 

The instructions to Colonel Lavalle now were to 
force the passage of the Barracas Bridge at all costs, 
and so open a way into the city. Repeated attempts 
were accordingly made to carry this position, but the 
defence rendered it no easy matter. Colonel Morales 
knew that if he could not stop the advance of the enemy 
into Buenos Aires, the porteno cause was lost. There- 
fore every effort was made by the defenders, and all avail- 
able reinforcements were brought up. A foreign legion, 
principally Italians, was posted near the bridge, and did 
excellent service throughout the day. After a concen- 
tration of fire by the field batteries late in the afternoon, 
Lavalle ordered another infantry charge. By this time 
the defence had been so weakened as to be unable to 
withstand this final assault, and the bridge was carried 
at the point of the bayonet. The Italian regiment 
defended it to the iast, and was almost annihilated. 

At the Puente Alsina the situation was more 
favourable for the Porteiios, for there Colonel Arias had 
held his position against superior numbers during 
the early part of the fight, and so vigorously was the 
defence maintained that the national troops showed 
signs of demoralisation. Arias saw his advantage, and 
sent to Campos for reinforcements in order to make a 
sortie, but by the time this request had reached head- 
quarters news had been received from Colonel Morales 
that he considered his position at the Barracas Bridge 
untenable. General Campos accordingly ordered Colonel 
Arias to fall back over the Puente Alsina, and with the 
capture of the Barracas Bridge by Lavalle fighting 
ceased for a day. All advantage thus remained with 
the National Government. 

In the two days' fighting, the casualties amongst the 
national troops amounted to 2000 officers and men killed 
and wounded, but this heavy loss was not sufficiently 
serious to interfere with the resumption of hostilities. 
The defence had suffered more severely, for the number 



1880] CAPITULATION OF BUENOS AIRES 59 

of all ranks dead and injured was calculated at 3000. 
A factor, however, of greater importance to Buenos 
Aires than loss of men was the scarcity of ammunition. 
The gaps in the ranks could be filled without difficulty, 
but the limited reserve of ammunition for the small 
arms and artillery was barely sufficient to carry on the 
conflict for another twenty-four hours. In these circum- 
stances it was deemed advisable to call a conference of 
the porteno leaders to discuss the situation. On July 
22 both sides rested. A little skirmishing between the 
outposts took place, but no attempt was made to force 
another general engagement. 

The meeting of the porteno leaders resulted in a 
lengthy discussion as to the possibility of further effective 
resistance. Opinions were divided, but the final out- 
come was that the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Gigi 
Mattera, and the German Minister, Baron von Holleben, 
were authorised to arrange an armistice to allow the 
initiation of peace negotiations. A suspension of 
hostilities was immediately announced, and communica- 
tion opened between the leaders. 

The National Government thoroughly understood 
that Buenos Aires was powerless, and consequently the 
terms the Portenos were forced to accept deprived the 
city and province of any power. The conditions 
were : — 

" 1. The separation of the leaders from positions of 
authority. 

" 2. Disbandment of the Buenos Aires forces, and 
surrender of arms and war material. 

" 3. Participators in the revolt not to be liable to 
legal procedure, but if in official employment to be 
dismissed. 

" 4. Pending a normal situation personal rights to 
be respected, except where a modification was necessary 
in consequence of the state of siege declared in force." 

Onerous as these conditions were, the people of 
Buenos Aires had no alternative but to accept them. 
The National Government had conquered, and the 



60 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Portenos could raise no objections. Dr Jose M. Moreno 
was nominated Governor of the Province in place of Dr 
Tejedor, the other officials in the Provincial Government 
were changed, and quiet was once more restored, while 
the Provincial Legislature was dissolved. 

The National Government now had a free hand to 
proclaim the city of Buenos Aires the federal capital 
of the Republic. A National Congress assembled a few 
weeks after the conclusion of the revolution, and one 
of the principal measures it passed was a law making 
the municipality of Buenos Aires the Federal District. 
This was sanctioned on September 21, 1880. The Con- 
gress also ratified the election of Roca to the Presidency, 
and thus the Cordoba " League " had accomplished all 
they had set out to do. They were masters of the 
political situation ; they had wrested Buenos Aires from 
the Portenos, and insured the election of their candidate 
for the Presidency. 

With the accession of General Roca the political 
situation changed. Previous to 1880 practically each 
province was independent. The right of the National 
Government to exercise authority was recognised only 
when such intervention was supported by armed strength, 
for the same feeling that led Buenos Aires to open 
resistance was dominant in the provinces. 

The Cordoba clique had succeeded in creating 
jealousy between the provinces and Buenos Aires to 
the end they should combine to crush her. This action, 
however, did not infer the right of the National Govern- 
ment to exact obedience and respect in disputes with 
Provincial Administrations. Continual political friction 
was one of the principal obstacles to economic develop- 
ment. No national policy was possible in such circum- 
stances. This had been recognised and appreciated in 
Buenos Aires. It was this fact that helped to bring 
about the revolt in 1880. The Portenos wished to 
dominate the Republic or separate from the Confedera- 
tion. On the other hand, the provinces as represented 
by the Cordoba clique desired to crush Buenos Aires, 



1880] EOCA ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY 61 

but had no intention that their action should produce 
a strong central administration which they would be 
forced to obey. The result of the struggle was a strong 
central government, the real aim of the porteno policy. 
It was attained by the support accorded to the National 
Administration by the provinces to serve other purposes. 

To reduce chaotic conditions to order ; to consolidate 
provincial interests and ensure unquestioned allegiance 
to the National Administration ; to teach the people of 
Argentina that they were Argentines — this was the task 
that Roca set himself. 

Roca was an unknown political quantity to friends 
and foes. The Cordoba politicians saw in him a soldier 
who had been necessary to their cause, and who, from 
motives of expediency, they had selected as their presi- 
dential candidate. These provincial representatives con- 
sidered that, as he had reached power through their 
influence, he would be their instrument in all matters 
affecting their interests ; while the Portehos regarded 
him as a man who would have no consideration for his 
conquered enemy, and be dictatorial where Buenos 
Aires was concerned. They realised, also, that they 
were unable to protest against any policy he initiated. 
How far both parties misjudged him was soon demon- 
strated. He astonished his supporters and opponents 
alike by the regime he established. 

President Roca was reserved in manner, but a close 
and shrewd observer of affairs and men. He never 
forgot services rendered him publicly or privately, and 
yet he seldom quarrelled with his opponents. Appar- 
ently slow to act, he kept his ear to the ground waiting 
his opportunity, an attitude that earned him the sobriquet 
of " el zorro " (the fox). It was appropriate, as his 
opponents frequently discovered. His military experi- 
ences had taught him to handle men and exact obedience. 
The Portefios criticised him on account of many cautious 
traits of the Argentine gaucho he showed in dealing 
with complicated questions. This tendency was not a 
matter for regret. It enabled him to appreciate fully 



62 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

intrigues against his Administration. The President 
had visited the greater portion of Argentina, and been 
deeply impressed with the enormous undeveloped 
resources. How to populate these fertile lands, was a 
subject to which he devoted careful consideration, and 
the foundation of his policy was the expansion of the 
national wealth. So long as friction between Buenos 
Aires and the rest of the Republic constituted an open 
sore, no broad-minded measures for the general advance- 
ment of Argentina were practicable, and Roca saw that 
political ambitions must be sacrificed for the future good. 
Buenos Aires had attempted, and failed, to solve the 
difficulty, and Roca decided it was sound policy to 
deprive the Porteilos of all power for further effort to 
obtain political supremacy. Naturally, this caused irri- 
tation in Buenos Aires, an irritation which found 
expression in the repeated, though ungrounded, charge 
of vindictiveness made against the President by the 
Portenos. Confronted with a complicated political 
situation at the outset of his Administration, he was not 
dismayed, nor did he ever forget that the ultimate con- 
ciliation of the Portenos was expedient and necessary. 
Therefore, no undue harshness was shown to the Buenos 
Aires politicians, and they had no real cause for com- 
plaint. Roca, by his handling of this delicate situation, 
demonstrated clearly that underlying the ability he had 
shown as a soldier, and which had been instrumental 
in bringing him so prominently before the country, he 
possessed many statesmanlike qualities. 

In 1881 Roca's power throughout Argentina was 
absolute. The army was unanimous in his favour, 
officers and men alike prepared to support any action 
his Administration proposed. This knowledge might 
well have led to oppressive measures, but nothing of the 
kind occurred, and militarism was never allowed to 
become obnoxious to the general public. The federalisa- 
tion of the municipality of Buenos Aires was denounced 
as arbitrary by the Portenos. But it was the price of 
victory, and doubtless it was intended also to humiliate 



1881] A NATIONAL POLICY ESTABLISHED 63 

the vanquished. Roca enjoyed greater freedom from 
outside pressure than former Presidents, and was at 
liberty to consider the interests of the whole Republic 
in laying down the basis of the national policy. He 
was therefore in a position to exercise more power than 
Rosas could boast of in the most secure days of his 
dictatorship, and his acts, reviewed after a lapse of 
twenty years, reveal no desire to establish a despotic 
regime. Under Roca national feeling displaced the 
local bickerings which had been constantly in evidence 
and retarded progress. Hence from 1881 Argentina 
entered on a stage of evolution destined to create unity 
out of the former loosely -jointed confederation of semi- 
independent States. Roca established a strong central 
Government and a national policy based on the needs 
of all classes. It was a complete unmooring from the 
conditions existing when Cordoba and Buenos Aires 
were the two poles round which an inchoate Argentina 
revolved. 

Lack of adequate means of communication had been 
one of the principal obstacles to a close union of the 
Argentine provinces. In revolutionary outbreaks, weeks 
often elapsed before national troops could reach the 
scene of disturbance. This fact was conducive to rebel- 
lious practices. The difficulty of communication served 
also to exaggerate local feeling, and lessen interest 
in the progress of the country as a whole. Sarmiento 
had recognised these conditions, and endeavoured 
to remedy them by railways and roads, but the time 
was not opportune for the inauguration of great public 
works, and his ideas were carried out only to a limited 
extent. Under Avellaneda, however, the railways pro- 
jected by Sarmiento were opened to public service, 
but the stormy political era between 1876 and 1880 
deterred capitalists from further ventures. Roca de- 
cided that the only efficient method of holding tjhe 
provinces in check was to establish means whereby the 
National Government could despatch military contin- 
gents to disturbed localities at short notice. He accord- 



64 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

ingly proposed linking up and extending the existing 
railway system, and this railway extension throughout 
Argentina was a notable feature in his policy. As a 
result of it every province of the Republic is at the 
present time within easy access of Buenos Aires. 

Together with his policy of railway extension, Roca 
devoted close attention to foreign immigration. Agencies 
were opened in European centres for spreading informa- 
tion of the advantages that Argentina offered to settlers. 
Assisted passages were provided for desirable immi- 
grants, and arrangements made to ensure occupation 
for fresh arrivals. The lands to the south and west of 
the province of Buenos Aires in the possession of the 
National Government were sold by auction at low rates 
to open them to civilisation. Public works were inaugu- 
rated. Docks were built at Buenos Aires, and the 
water supply and drainage of the federal capital was 
undertaken. 

Industry grew apace now that the National Govern- 
ment was able and willing to lend a helping hand 
towards the material welfare of the people. The petty 
jealousies of various political groups which had kept the 
country in a state of turmoil were restrained, and the 
instigators promptly called to account. It was tran- 
quillity that Argentina needed to allow the development 
of her vast natural resources. Both agricultural and 
pastoral enterprise rapidly expanded. Foreign capital 
was attracted to the country. The changed conditions 
were due to Roca's initiative. When the Cordoba 
politicians had selected him as their candidate they had 
no thought of a national policy, nor was any such idea 
in the minds of the Portenos when they attempted the 
overthrow of Avellaneda. 

To permit of Roca's progressive policy ample funds 
were required, and in 1884 Dr Carlos Pellegrini visited 
London to explain existing circumstances in Argentina 
and negotiate for an issue of bonds. He was able to 
demonstrate satisfactorily the economic and industrial 
progress under Roca, and a loan was made for £8,333,000. 



1881] PELLEGRINI AS MINISTER OF WAR 65 

Credit was due to him for his tact in these financial 
negotiations, and on his return to Buenos Aires in 1885, 
in recognition of his services he was offered, and 
accepted, the portfolio of Minister of War, which he 
had held before under the old administration. His 
appointment tended further to strengthen the position 
of President Roca, for the country had not forgotten 
the part the new Minister had played in a similar 
capacity under Avellaneda in 1880. 

In view of the general prosperity, it would seem that 
politicians could have small scope for opposition to the 
Administration. There was, however, a discontented 
element in the community. Unsuccessful candidates for 
official offices, or those who found no pickings from the 
existing situation, were ready to make trouble. In 
Corrientes and Catamarca, in Santa Fe and Entre Rios, 
disturbances of a revolutionary character were attempted, 
but the prompt action taken by Roca never allowed 
matters to assume serious dimensions. In the province 
of Buenos Aires, however, where the bitter feelings 
aroused in 1880 had not yet died away, the situation in 
1885 threatened to culminate in open rebellion. The 
bone of contention was interference in the elections, and 
the Provincial Administration assumed an aggressive 
attitude towards the National Authorities, but in the 
end the Portefios abandoned their pretensions. 

In 1881 the Government of the Province of Buenos 
Aires had selected La Plata as the site of the provincial 
capital. There was no settlement in the vicinity, a few 
mud cottages only denoting the locality of the future 
city. Plans were drawn up on a magnificent scale. All 
public buildings were to be of large dimensions and 
costly in construction, and before they were finished the 
liabilities incurred were £10,000,000. Nor did this 
satisfy the province. Having lost control of the port of 
Buenos Aires its Administration determined to create 
another shipping centre within the sphere of provincial 
authority ; and in furtherance of this design a series of 
docks were constructed at Ensenada, five miles from La 

E 



66 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Plata. Before the work was concluded an additional 
£4,000,000 had been expended. The vanity of the 
Portenos could only be appeased by thus squandering 
the provincial resources ; but in this folly of the Provincial 
Administration Roca had no part, although the con- 
struction of both capital and port is frequently laid at 
his door. 

In 1885 the question of the next presidential election 
again came up. In Argentina, as in most Latin countries, 
there is much talk of free voting, but official influence 
with a near semblance to coercion is in the majority of 
cases the practice. Naturally, therefore, in the present 
instance it was stated by the Portenos that Roca would 
not hesitate to make use of his opportunities to his own 
advantage, and he thought it expedient to issue a public 
declaration that he would maintain absolute neutrality 
in regard to the Presidency. 

The possible candidates were Dr Mignel Juarez 
Celman, Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, Dr Benjamin Gorostiaga, 
Dr Leandro Alem and Dr Dardo Rocha. The first had 
been prominent for some years in Cordoba, and was a 
member of the National Congress. Mention of him has 
already been made in connection with the abortive 
attempt of Olmos to obtain control of Cordoba in 
February, 1880. Dr Celman and General Roca had 
married sisters, and on the ground of this relationship he 
was regarded as sure of Roca's influence ; so the fact 
that Roca had declared his intention of neutrality carried 
little weight. That the Administration should abstain 
from exerting its influence was foreign to tradition in 
Argentina. In 1886 Dr Juarez Celman was therefore 
before the country to all intents and purposes as the 
official candidate, and if Roca did not actively assist the 
Cordoba representative he did little to alter public 
feeling. This tacit acceptance of the popular idea con- 
cerning the candidature of Dr Celman was tantamount 
to lending him official countenance. It was an attitude 
that Roca subsequently had reason to regret. 

Of the others the best known were Dr Bernardo 



1885] PEESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN 1886 67 

Irigoyen and Dr Leandro Alem. The former had held 
office as a Minister under Roca, and, although widely 
separated on various points of policy from the Admini- 
stration in power, he was not out of touch with the 
National Authorities. Dr Alem was a totally different 
character. He was a Radical leader, advocating drastic 
methods to ensure greater purity in public life, urging 
that no means, even that of armed revolution, should be 
left untried to attain reforms. Alem, however, was not 
in favour with the majority of the electors, and his chance 
of success in the contest was hardly considered as a 
serious factor, but he came to the front so prominently 
at a later date that his appearance on the scene in 1885 
is worthy of record. The fourth aspirant was Dr 
Benjamin Gorostiaga, a judge of the Supreme Court, 
and a man widely respected for his common - sense 
political views ; but although accorded some support, at 
no period of the campaign had he any real prospect of 
success. The remaining candidate was Dr Dardo Rocha, 
who had been Governor of the Province of Ruenos 
Aires. His followers were carpet-baggers, keenly alive 
to the benefit of holding office for the sake of the spoils. 
Little sympathy was extended to him. 

The five years of Roca's Administration had given 
ample time for the country to judge him. From a political 
point of view there was no reason for dissatisfaction. 
The attitude of the President towards the Provincial 
Governments had brought happier results than was 
expected. Economic progress and industrial develop- 
ment had made substantial advances. The weak point 
was his financial policy, and more particularly was this 
the case in January, 1885, in connection with the bank- 
note circulation, when the notes issued amounted to 
$61,000,000. These were principally for the account 
of the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires, although some small sums belonged 
to the provincial banks of Cordoba, Santa Fe, Salta, and 
some private concerns. These notes were convertible 
into gold on presentation. In the latter part of 1884 



68 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

the President was induced to assent to a decree 
declaring this note issue inconvertible for a period 
of two years. The grounds taken were that the banks 
would be in financial difficulties if this relief was not 
afforded. Roca resisted for a time, but in the end 
allowed himself to be won over, and in January, 1885, 
authorised the suspension of specie payments. Congress 
was not in session when these decrees were published, 
but the measure was approved and ratified by Senate 
and Chamber on October 5 of the same year. Whatever 
the influences used to bring about this result, there can 
be no question that a grave error was committed, for 
the door was thereby opened to the jobbery from which 
the country suffered severely in after years. Roca may 
have been convinced in his own mind that specie pay- 
ments would be resumed at the date mentioned in the 
decrees. But, knowing his countrymen as he did, he 
must also have been alive to the dangerous nature of 
the weapon he placed in their hands. At the time this 
sinister stroke was proposed Dr Victorino de la Plaza 
was Finance Minister. When he placed the scheme 
before Roca the President refused to consider it, saying 
" I will cut off my right hand before I sign any such 
decree." Yet in a few weeks he had signed and pro- 
mulgated the law out of which such mischief grew. 



CHAPTER IV 

the argentine republic — continued 

Presidential Election. The Cordoba Clique and the Provisional 
Governors. Dr Juarez Celman. Cordoba supports Celman. 
Celman Elected. Roca and Celman. Uneasy Feeling. Currency 
Conversion. Paper Money Issues. Carpet-bagging Politicians. 
Political Conditions. Corruption in National Administration. 
Concessions and Monopolies. Corrupt Provincial Governments. 
Position of Pellegrini. Administration and Banking. Provincial 
Loans. Sale of Gold Reserves. Financial Necessities. The 
" Union Civica." Dr Alem. Aristobulo del Valle. Bernardo 
Irigoyen. Dr Lopez. Lucio Lopez. Provincial Branches of 
" Union Civica." Feeling against Celman. The Mortgage 
Banks. Policy of the Administration. Foreign Residents. 
Meetings of "Union Civica." Indictment of National Adminis- 
tration. The "Union Civica" and Celman. The "Union 
Civica" and Revolutionary Measures. The Army and the " Union 
Civica." Date fixed for Revolt. Revolution of July 26, 1890. 
Action of National Authorities. Attack on the Plaza Lavalle. 
Numerous Casualties. Scarcity of Ammunition. Naval Action. 
Bombardment of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Foreign Warships. 
Reinforcements from Northern Provinces. Consultation of Rebel 
Leaders. Majority favour Negotiation. Armistice Arranged. 
Peace Propositions. Advice of Roca and Pellegrini. Peace 
Concluded. Dispersion of Revolutionary Forces. Casualties. 
Resignation of Celman. Public Temper in Buenos Aires. 
European Opinion. Accession of Pellegrini. 

As the date for the presidential election approached, it 
was clear there would be no contest. The supporters 
of Dr Mignel Juarez Celman had matters their own way, 
and the Portenos made no attempt to challenge the 
issue. 

In Argentina the selection of the President rests with 



70 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

electors chosen by ballot throughout the provinces and 
the federal district. Each province- and the federal 
district nominates a body of electors equal to twice the 
number of representatives returned to the National 
Congress. These representatives assemble on June 12 
of the last year of the presidential term, and vote for 
President and Vice-President. The record of the voting 
is signed by the electors and sent to the President of the 
Senate. Copies are deposited also with the Presidents 
of the provincial legislatures, and in the federal capital 
with the President of the Municipality. The returns 
from the provinces are opened by the President of the 
Senate in the presence of Congress. Four members 
form a committee to scrutinise the ballot papers, and 
this committee announces the number of votes accorded 
to each candidate. The scrutiny and announcement of 
the result must be completed in one sitting of Congress, 
but for all practical purposes the election is decided 
when the electors are nominated in the provinces, the 
subsequent votation being a matter of form only. 

In 1886 a combination of provincial governors of 
different provinces was arranged by the Cordoba clique 
to decide the presidential question, and the official 
influence exerted by the provincial authorities ensured 
the success of the Cordoba candidate. In this situation 
the Opposition was powerless, and toleration of such 
conditions by Roca gave grounds for complaint on the 
part of the Portenos. Buenos Aires alone amongst the 
provinces had been warned the previous year that 
attempts to make use of her official influence in electoral 
matters would be severely punished. 

No sooner were the electors chosen than Dr Celman 
became an object of solicitous interest to numbers of 
politicians and others with favours to ask. A banquet 
at which 500 guests attended was organised in his 
honour. These manifestations continued in rapid suc- 
cession, and unlimited adulation was showered upon 
him, on a man unusually susceptible to flattery. As 
Governor of Cordoba, Celman had shown no adminis- 




President Juarez Celman. 



[Face page. 70. 



1886] ELECTION OF JUAREZ CELMAN 71 

trative ability, nor subsequently in the National Congress 
had he been distinguished for legislative capacity. There 
was thus little really to recommend him, and he had 
been selected by his Cordoba friends as a pliant tool to 
serve their purpose. 

In Spanish, as in some other, countries, interest is 
quickly diverted from the setting sun to the rising star ; 
so, naturally, the attention hitherto devoted to Roca 
was now transferred to Juarez Celman. On October 
12, 1886, President Roca completed his six years of 
office. Taking a broad view, there can be small doubt 
that his Government between 1880 and 1886 was a 
decided advance, for the main lines of Roca's policy 
were directly beneficial to the Argentines, and the fact 
was patent to everybody that the country had progressed 
wonderfully under his guidance. In 1880 he had found 
the Confederation composed of hostile units, and he 
left it knit together by strong ties to the Central 
Government. The mistakes he made in connection 
with financial legislation, and his attitude in regard to 
the election of his successor, were both errors of judg- 
ment. They mar the record of his Administration, but 
with these two exceptions there is no cause to cavil at 
his direction of public affairs. 

It was supposed that Roca would be the power 
behind the throne during the Celman Administration. 
Many persons who disliked the new President refrained 
from expressing their feelings on account of their con- 
fidence in the influence Roca would still exert in the 
national policy. Dr Juarez Celman was not devoid of 
cleverness, and in all probability he would have sought 
the advice of Roca under other circumstances, but his 
head had been turned by the servility shown to him. 
His shallow nature was overcome with vanity when he 
found himself safely seated in the Presidency, and Roca's 
moderate views became irksome to him. Imagining 
himself fully capable of managing national affairs by his 
own initiative, he soon chafed at the idea of any 
restraining hand ; and in his desire to break loose from 



72 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

control he was deftly encouraged by political adventurers, 
who regarded Roca as an obstacle ' to their designs. 
Amongst such surroundings it was only a question 
of time for a disagreement to spring up between the 
ex-President and his successor. No open breach 
occurred, but in 1887 it was apparent that a coolness 
had arisen, and that Roca would no longer dominate 
Celman's Administration. When this stage was reached, 
anxiety as to the future course of the National Govern- 
ment was expressed in many directions. 

Sober-minded citizens had reason for alarm. In 
November, 1886, the President applied to Congress 
for authority to postpone the date of the bank-note 
conversion. The Chambers agreed to a measure defer- 
ring it indefinitely, and a decree fixed two years from 
January 9, 1887. Meanwhile the Provincial Bank of 
Buenos Aires was authorised to issue a further $7, 000, 000, 
bringing the total in circulation to $85,294,000 according 
to an official statement in 1887. This increase in the 
volume of bank-notes, with no addition to the gold 
reserves, went far to destroy hopes of sound financial 
legislation. 

An epoch of carpet-bagging politicians now developed. 
The Cordoba clique had failed to mould Roca to its 
wishes, but it succeeded with Juarez Celman. No 
sooner had Roca's influence been thrown aside than the 
true situation became apparent. Political adventurers 
filled every lucrative post, and elections for senators 
and deputies were manipulated, and the developments 
in 1887 proved the adage that to the victors belong the 
spoils. Cordoba obtained absolute control of the 
Government, and the "clique" exploited the country 
for its individual benefit. Bribery and corruption 
characterised the Administration to such an extent 
that no business was possible with official departments 
without palm-oil. Concessions for railways or other 
public works, grants of national lands, monopolies for 
industrial undertakings, were scattered widecast. The 
national resources were squandered in appointments 



1887] FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 73 

and pickings for the host of greedy political followers 
who swarmed from the provinces. It was a debauchery 
of the public credit. 

The example of the National Administration was 
naturally copied by the Provincial Governments. Cor- 
ruption of former days sank into insignificance beside 
the orgy which now dominated local official institutions. 
The restraining influence of Roca had kept provincial 
authorities within bounds. His attitude and example 
lent no encouragement to extravagant folly ; but under 
Celman all was changed. Local politicians were able 
to go their way without fear of after consequences, and 
the good work Roca had accomplished during his six 
years of office was threatened with obliteration, and no 
wonder that the spirit of anarchy so marked previous to 
1880 showed signs of revival in an insolent assumption 
of sovereign rights by provincial governors. They main- 
tained large bodies of troops and levied taxation in a 
manner wholly inconsistent with the Law of Constitution. 

Pellegrini at this juncture of affairs was an enigma. 
He had been elected to the Vice-Presidency in 1886, and 
in that capacity was also President of the Senate. The 
important part he had played in Argentine politics 
marked him as a man of ability and strength of char- 
acter. It was felt that he should protest against the 
conduct of the National Administration, but he made 
no effort to avert the ruinous situation into which the 
country was rapidly drifting. The fact of his silence in 
regard to Celman's policy was a blot on his public 
career which can never be eradicated. 

Celman, untrammelled, reached the climax of folly 
when, in November, 1887, he asked Congress to sanction 
the establishment of banks of issue throughout the 
Republic, whose notes should be guaranteed by national 
bonds. Congress, absolutely servile, approved the pro- 
position, and the Banco Nacional, thirteen provincial 
State banks, and six private banking concerns, all came 
under the new law, in virtue of which the inconvertible 
notes were increased immediately to $161,700,000, and 



74 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

shortly afterwards still further augmented by an addi- 
tional S3 5, 000, 000, emitted by the Banco Nacional for 
account of the National Government. In order to comply 
with this law the banks were required to purchase 
national bonds from the Government, the latter retaining 
in specie the value received. To obtain the necessary 
cash the Provincial Governments borrowed abroad. 
Celman was pressed for funds to meet the ever-increasing 
expenditure, and forthwith utilised the specie thus 
amassed and lying in the vaults. Soon the whole of 
the cash was exhausted, and the National Government 
was responsible for a note issue of $196,000,000. In- 
directly it was liable also for the amounts owing by the 
provinces to their foreign creditors. 

The action of the President in this matter is the 
keynote to his methods in the direction of public affairs. 
His aim was to obtain money to satisfy his vicious 
political circle, no matter how much he prostituted the 
national credit in doing so. His action in connection 
with the banks of emission was one of deliberate fraud 
upon the country, and one from which Argentina is 
still suffering. 

In many directions mutterings of discontent were 
heard, and the more conservative element looked with 
dismay upon the conduct of the Administration. This 
feeling was not confined to Buenos Aires. It spread 
throughout the Republic, and by the close of 1887 was 
unanimous except among the clique controlling the 
President. As this spirit of dissatisfaction increased, it 
became evident that only a rallying-point was required 
for a reaction to set in. Meetings were held to discuss 
the situation, but the discontented centres were not 
sufficiently in touch with one another to ensure com- 
bined action in event of a revolutionary outbreak. 
Moreover, the troops of the National Government and 
of the provinces supporting Celman were armed with 
modern weapons and well supplied with ammunition, 
while the Opposition were without rifles or cartridges, 
and the acquisition of war material required time and 



1888] FOUNDATION OF "UNION CIVICA" 75 

money. After many consultations the leaders of the 
movement against the President determined to act 
entirely within their constitutional rights. A central 
league was formed with branches in the provinces, and 
an agitation begun for the establishment of a National 
Administration free from corruption and jobbery. 
Prominent in connection with the foundation of this 
league, hereafter known as the "Union Civica," were 
Dr Leandro Alem, Dr Aristobulo del Valle, Dr Bernardo 
Irigoyen, Dr Vicente Lopez, Dr Lucio Lopez, Senor 
Leonardo Pereyra, and Dr Oscar Liliedale. 

It was Alem who undertook the principal work of 
organisation, and his energy fitted him for this difficult 
task. His personality merits some description. The 
father of this remarkable man had opposed the tyranny 
of the Dictator Hosas, and was executed as a conspirator. 
The son never forgot his father's fate. He vowed 
vengeance against all authority not within the letter of 
the Law of Constitution, and in memory of his vow 
dressed invariably in black. Tall and slim, with a 
beard reaching to his waist, his striking appearance 
always attracted attention, while his agreeable manner 
secured him many admirers and friends. In this 
organisation of the " Union Civica " he saw a possible 
means to avenge his father's death, and lie threw 
himself into the work with untiring zest. 

Dr Aristobulo del Valle was a man of quite different 
mould. He was a lawyer, and widely trusted and 
respected, whose power as an orator was admitted 
by friends and foes. In giving his services to the 
"Union Civica" he was actuated by purely patriotic 
motives. His acts are evidence of the honesty of 
purpose that impelled him to participate in the move- 
ment against the Celman Administration. Dr Bernardo 
Irigoyen, also closely connected with the "Union 
Civica," was wealthy and well-known in political and 
social life. He had held office under Roca, and was 
another prominent citizen not actuated by personal 
considerations. 



76 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Dr Vicente Lopez and his son, Dr Lucio Lopez, 
were both lawyers of high standing' in Buenos Aires, 
They, too, joined the Opposition to Celman as the only 
means of saving their country from financial and political 
ruin. Seilor Leonardo Pereyra lent his aid from similar 
motives, and his wealth and social influence made him 
invaluable, especially as he was never backward in 
supplying resources for the campaign. Dr Oscar 
Lilieclale was Alem's right hand in the work required to 
build up the " Union Civica." An able lawyer, Liliedale 
resigned his usual occupations to devote himself to 
these new duties. 

With the assistance of such men there was little 
reason to fear failure. The decision to form the " Union 
Civica" was reached in the end of 1887, and throughout 
the two following years the work of organisation was 
pushed forward with energy. The headquarters of the 
association were in the city of Buenos Aires, but in 
nearly every town and village throughout the country 
local clubs were founded to propagate the doctrines and 
ideas emanating from the central committee. Meet- 
ings were held in different localities, and all classes of 
society were urged to attend. Dr del Valle and other 
prominent men made frequent speeches to explain 
the present condition of the Republic, and the object 
of the "Union Civica" in raising opposition to the 
National Administration. Pamphlets were also circu- 
lated calling upon all Argentines to protest against 
the danger threatened to their rights by the policy of 
Celman. 

In the city and province of Buenos Aires the inhabi- 
tants promised active support to the "Union Civica," 
and in Santa Fe and other provinces adhesion was 
given. At the beginning of 1889, there was no longer 
doubt that public feeling was aroused, and it became 
more marked every day. So the work of the " Union 
Civica " was pushed all the more vigorously under these 
hopeful indications until, at the close of 1889, the 
organisers of the movement found they could count on 



1889] DEVELOPMENT OF "UNION CIVICA " 77 

the moral support of the majority of the population in 
any action they took. 

It is not to be supposed that this development of the 
" Union Civica " was allowed to pass unmolested by the 
National Authorities. Meetings were broken up, fre- 
quently by armed force, on the ground that they were 
convened for seditious purposes. Newspapers were 
gagged, and editors threatened who dared to criticise 
the doings of the Executive. Members of the " Union 
Civica " were insulted by the police and soldiery. This 
attitude was taken by Celman in the hope of terrorising 
his enemies, but, blinded by his vanity, he under-rated 
the strength of the feeling against himself and his 
methods, and failed to realise that he was driving the 
people to extremes, jeopardising his own future by not 
temporising with the Opposition. 

The last straw to break down public patience was 
the policy adopted by the President in regard to the 
Mortgage Banks. These institutions had been launched 
for legitimate purposes — to make advances to land- 
owners against real estate. Loans made by them were 
secured on one half the market value of the pledged 
properties. Under Celman, however, these banks 
became political instruments of corruption. A note to 
the manager signed by a high political personage, 
ensured satisfactory negotiation of large loans on repre- 
sented, not actual, property valuations, and the result- 
ing issue of '"cedulas" was naturally almost unlimited, 
threatening serious disaster to financial credit. In the 
case of the National Hypothecary Bank the bonds 
were guaranteed by the National Government ; and for 
those of the Provincial Mortgage Bank the Provincial 
Government was responsible. By the former institution 
$135,000,000 was emitted, by the latter $374,000,000. 
These loans were made, principally, between 1887 and 
1890, and for the most part they were the outcome of 
political influence brought to bear upon the directors. 

The members of the " Union Civica " were convinced 
of the justice of their cause, and determined to uphold 



78 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

their principles. Their opposition to the National 
Government was conducted and organised upon lines 
which left the authorities no valid excuse for inter- 
ference. 

There is no doubt that both Pellegrini and Roca saw 
clearly the danger of the situation, but their advice was 
not asked by Celman. The President also was aware 
of the general discontent with his direction of public 
affairs apart from the opinions of the leaders of the 
"Union Civica," where no attempt at concealment was 
made. He, however, regarded public sentiment with 
contemptuous indifference, relying on the armed forces at 
his disposal to quell any outbreak against his authority. 
His ministers and political intimates assured him that 
his position was impregnable, and that the wave of dis- 
satisfaction would disappear completely. Their repeated 
assertions that no real cause for alarm existed dispelled 
his anxiety, and he made no effort to check the glaring 
abuses of his Administration. 

The attitude of the foreign residents in this crisis is 
interesting. In the city of Buenos Aires they numbered 
one half of the inhabitants. Throughout the Republic 
the population was estimated at 4,000,000, and of these 
no fewer than 2,000,000 were aliens, or of foreign 
extraction. In electoral questions these people had 
no legal standing, but in their hands was the great 
source of national wealth, as regards both agricultural 
and pastoral industry. The railways were owned by 
foreign companies, and creditors abroad held the public 
debt. Therefore the conduct of the National Govern- 
ment was a matter of grave concern to foreign resi- 
dents and European investors. The attitude of President 
Celman threatened imminent danger to these important 
interests, and when matters were approaching a crisis 
in 1890, foreign sympathy was given unanimously to 
the cause of the "Union Civica." This condemnation 
of the Administration by the foreign element lent addi- 
tional strength to the Opposition. It showed clearly 
that Celman's methods were considered intolerable 



1890] FOREIGN OPINION 79 

by a numerous class removed from local Argentine 
politics, and that any decisive action for reform would 
be regarded as a necessary measure worthy of en- 
couragement. 

Early in 1890 several popular meetings were held in 
Buenos Aires by the "Union Civica." At one of these, 
attended by 10,000 people at the Buenos Aires Fronton, 
feeling against Celman reached a culminating pitch. An 
address was delivered by Alem in which he recapitulated 
the object of the "Union Civica "and denounced in 
violent terms the policy of the National Government. 
A more moderate speech by Dr Vicente Lopez explained 
the injustice practised towards Argentina. The crux 
was reached when Dr del Valle, in temperate terms, drew 
up an indictment of the National Authorities. Their 
corrupt methods were specified in detail, the deliberate 
sacrifice of the national interests to allow the President 
and his friends to secure wealth was described, and the 
right of the inhabitants to save their country from ruin 
urged. Also the determination of the "Union Civica" 
to obtain redress was emphatically expressed. This 
speech was received with enthusiastic applause. It 
roused public appreciation of the situation. 

This meeting at the Buenos Aires Fronton was con- 
sidered a declaration of open hostility to the Celman 
Administration, both by the " Union Civica " and the 
supporters of the President. In view of the specific 
charges of corruption and mal-administration preferred 
by Dr del Valle, it was thought that some attempt would 
be made by the Government to amend the worst faults 
to which public attention had been called. Quite the 
reverse actually occurred, for Celman and his followers 
became still more autocratic, and corruption was more 
undisguised. No opportunity was lost either to inter- 
fere with the "Union Civica." The President clung to 
the idea that he could maintain his position by force of 
arms ; and additional troops were brought to Buenos 
Aires and at the same time the police was increased. 
On the one side was the tyrannical power of a small 



80 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

group of office-holders ; on the other, the spontaneous 
protest of public opinion. 

The determination of the Administration to attempt 
no reforms resulted in further conferences of the prin- 
cipal members of the " Union Civica " to decide a course 
of action. An uprising was advocated. Assertions 
were made that in the present state of the public temper 
Celman and his gang would be driven from office at the 
first announcement of a revolutionary outbreak. But 
before reaching a definite decision it was determined to 
ascertain the feelings of the military officers in Buenos 
Aires. Moreover, to ensure the success of any popular 
rising it was necessary to have a store of arms and 
ammunition, for it was thought improbable that the 
downfall of the President could be accomplished without 
some bloodshed. Now the "Union Civica" had no 
control of warlike material, the movement hitherto 
having been conducted strictly within the legal rights 
of the members as citizens, and it was only by the seizure 
of one or other of the national arsenals that arms could 
be acquired. During June, 1890, the military and naval 
officers in Buenos Aires were therefore sounded in 
reference to participation in a revolt. The navy showed 
no reluctance to give active support, but with the army 
negotiations were not so happy. In many individual 
instances assistance was promised, and in the case of 
the artillery at the arsenal and barracks of the Plaza 
Lavalle adhesion was assured. This was of vital import- 
ance to the plans of the "Union Civica," since it meant 
a supply of rifles and 550,000 rounds of ball cartridge, 
besides a battery of field guns with ammunition. So in 
July, 1890, the "Union Civica" decided the time was 
ripe, and the movement from that time developed into a 
conspiracy against the Administration, whose leaders 
only waited an opportune moment to proclaim a 
revolution. 

July 26 was fixed finally for the revolt. To ensure 
against opposition from the officer in command at the 
Plaza Lavalle arrangements were made to drug him on 



1890] REVOLUTION IN 1890 81 

the previous evening. Before daybreak the leaders of 
the "Union Civica" and a number of the Opposition 
joined the garrison at the arsenal, and the revolutionary 
forces, numbering in all some 1500 men, then took 
possession of the Plaza, which was converted into a 
military camp. Arms were served out to the volunteers, 
and other preparations made to repel attack by the 
Government troops — barricades thrown up and guns 
posted to command the approaches, etc. The rebels 
then determined to await developments, believing the 
position in the Plaza Lavalle sufficiently strong to resist 
assault. This inactivity was an error of judgment, for 
the way to the Government Palace was unimpeded, and 
the distance less than a mile, so that the rebels could 
easily have seized it and placed themselves in a much 
more favourable situation. Opinions, however, in the 
revolutionary camp were divided as to tactics, with the 
result that no move from the Plaza Lavalle was 
attempted. Information soon reached the National 
Authorities of the outbreak ; and the police and the 
garrison were called to arms. A part of the national 
force was immediately marched to the Plaza Libertad, 
situated only some three hundred yards from the Plaza 
Lavalle, and a strong detachment was stationed in the 
Plaza Victoria to protect the national buildings. Skir- 
mishers were likewise posted on the housetops with 
orders to shoot down all persons suspected of connection 
with the revolt. When daylight broke Buenos Aires 
was transformed, and signs of armed conflict were 
everywhere in evidence. 

The insurgents had not long to wait before they 
were aware of the proximity of the troops, for shortly 
after 8 a.m. the attack upon the Plaza Lavalle began in 
earnest. National forces advanced from the Plaza 
Libertad, and, after a few rounds from a field battery, 
attempted to storm the rebel barricades, but these were 
defended staunchly, and in spite of repeated assaults, 
the troops were unable to break through the insurgent 
lines. At mid-day the attacking force was withdrawn 

F 



82 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

from the streets leading into the Plaza Lavalle. On 
both sides the firing was wild, and the execution done 
was not in proportion to the expenditure of ammunition, 
but the assailants were much exposed in their efforts to 
force the barricades, and suffered more heavily than 
the defenders. Casualties, however, were sufficiently 
numerous to show the men in the Plaza Lavalle that 
no child's play was intended. 

Reinforcements were now sent by the Government 
to the Plaza Libertad with instructions to renew the 
attack and carry the rebel position at all costs, and next 
day repeated attempts were made to render the situation 
of the insurgents untenable. But the defence was well 
maintained, and although the list of killed and wounded 
was long, the defendants were able to hold their 
entrenchments. The rebels, however, now discovered 
that the small arm ammunition was running short. 
Only 30,000 rounds remained, and investigation showed 
that in place of 550,000 rounds of ball cartridge in the 
arsenal when hostilities commenced there had been but 
200,000. The wild and continuous firing by civilian 
volunteers during the past two days had resulted in the 
expenditure of 170,000 cartridges. This failure of 
ammunition made necessary an immediate consultation 
of the leaders. 

Meanwhile the fleet had endeavoured to assist the 
rebel cause. On July 27 the ships opened fire on the 
city of Buenos Aires, ostensibly to bombard the Govern- 
ment buildings where the President and his Ministers 
were known to be, but the shells flew wide of the mark, 
and while the Government Palace was untouched 
several private dwellings and one hotel in the vicinity 
were struck. Then the officers in command of the 
foreign warships decided that the bombardment was 
unjustified, and the senior officer of the Argentine 
vessels, Captain O'Connor, was notified that if the 
firing did not cease the commanders of the foreign men- 
of-war in port would use force to prevent its continuance. 
Captain O'Connor, much against his inclination, therefore 



1890] GOVERNMENT REINFORCEMENTS 83 

suspended further action. Steps were now taken by 
the National Government to strengthen the garrison by 
bringing troops from the northern provinces. The 
Governor of Cordoba was Dr Marcos Juarez Celman, 
a brother of the President of the Republic. Cordoba 
maintained an armed force of 4000 men, and Dr Marcos 
Celman lost no time in despatching 2000 of these to his 
brother's assistance. Further reinforcements of 1000 
men were brought from Tucuman, and these two con- 
tingents were ready to enter the city of Buenos Aires 
on the morning of July 28. The prompt manner in 
which this support from the provinces was hurried to 
the National Capital was not without moral effect on 
sympathisers with the "Union Civica," and it deterred 
open adherence to the revolution on the part of the 
unarmed civilian section of the population. Further- 
more, with the arrival of these troops Celman believed 
his position secure. He estimated that the strength of 
the Opposition was the comparatively small group in 
the Plaza Lavalle, and he left out of his calculation the 
deep-rooted feeling of discontent against himself and 
his methods throughout the Republic. 

The leaders in the Plaza Lavalle were informed of 
the arrival of the national reinforcements, and an 
immediate decision as to future tactics became an 
imperative necessity. Some of the military officers were 
in favour of an attempt to cut a way through the 
Government lines, and continue the revolt outside the 
National Capital. In this proposal a few prominent 
civilians acquiesced, but the principal members of the 
"Union Civica" were in favour of opening negotiations 
with the National Authorities to ascertain on what terms 
a modus vwendi could be arranged. A somewhat acri- 
monious discussion then took place, but in the end the 
majority decided to treat with the National Government 
for the re-establishment of peace on condition that certain 
concessions were granted to the participators in the 
revolutionary movement. 

Accordingly, on July 28 an armistice was arranged 



84 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

to allow negotiations. Dr Maximo Paz, the Governor 
of the Province of Buenos Aires, acted as mediator, and 
Celman called upon Pellegrini and Roca for their advice 
as to the course he should take. The terms proposed 
by the "Union Civica" were that Dr Celman should 
resign office, and that an amnesty be granted to all 
persons actively participating in the revolt. When this 
proposition was communicated to the President he was 
inclined to treat it with contempt. He called attention 
to the fact that the garrison had been strongly reinforced, 
and it was only a question of a few hours when the 
unconditional surrender of the insurgents must take 
place unless they were to be absolutely annihilated. 
For the rebels to demand concessions, he added, was to 
recognise them as victors in the struggle. The more 
sober-minded, however, among the advisers of the 
President obliged him to listen to a different view of 
the case. They said that the suppression of the armed 
force in the Plaza Lavalle offered no great difficulties, 
but that this was only a fractional part of the movement, 
since feeling throughout the Republic was so embittered 
that his continuance in office would assuredly lead to 
civil war. In the face of these plain truths Celman's 
attitude changed. The confidence he had expressed of 
his ability to hold his own in the face of popular opinion 
disappeared, and after further discussion the represen- 
tatives of the " Union Civica " were informed their terms 
would be accepted with slight modifications. On July 
29 the negotiations were concluded, and the insurgents 
dispersed after delivering up their arms to the National 
Authorities. Thus the " Union Civica " had forced the 
resignation of the President. 

When the comparatively small number of combatants 
is taken into consideration the casualty list on both sides 
was abnormally high. The number of Government forces 
engaged was under 3000, and the loss in killed and 
wounded was 700 officers and men, and the strength of 
the rebels, counting the armed civilians and the detach- 
ment of the army participating in the revolt, was about 



1890] RESIGNATION OF OELMAN 85 

1500. Of these 400 were killed or injured, and a few 
civilians having no part in the quarrel were shot down 
by the armed police. Little trouble was taken to verify 
the intentions of any casual wanderers through the 
streets during the hostilities. The usual treatment for 
these inoffensive persons was a volley in their direction. 
It is deserving of mention that several leading doctors 
joined the rebels in the Plaza Lavalle to lend their pro- 
fessional services to their compatriots. 

On July 30 Celman's resignation was officially an- 
nounced. It was not until this event was known publicly 
that the real extent of the opposition to his Administra- 
tion could be gauged. A scene of the wildest excitement 
ensued, and by common consent holidays were kept for 
three days. . Everywhere evidence was seen of satisfaction 
at the turn events had taken. The depressing influence 
of the past two years was eliminated, and Dr Juarez 
Celman disappeared completely, few persons caring 
what became of him. With the downfall of the Presi- 
dent the power of his political clique was broken. In 
no quarter was a good word heard for any official act of 
the recent Administration. 

In Europe, where keen interest was taken in Argen- 
tine affairs in consequence of the heavy investments at 
stake, the agitation promoted by the " Union Civica" 
was regarded as the uprising of a deeply injured people 
against a tyrannical and corrupt system of Government, 
and was approved accordingly. That Celman had been 
compelled to resign was accepted as evidence of a 
determination in Argentina to insist on honesty in the 
conduct of national affairs. 

As Vice-President of the Republic, Pellegrini acceded 
to the duties vacated by Celman. He had already 
acquired a varied experience in connexion with public 
administration, and his advent was hailed with general 
satisfaction. Yet Pellegrini had many political enemies 
in Buenos Aires, where the part he played as Minister 
of War under Avellaneda was not forgotten, and his 
conduct in making no protest against the proceedings of 



86 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

the Celman clique had served also to bring him discredit. 
On the other hand, he claimed a wide circle of personal 
friends, and could rely on them for support. The public 
also recognised in the new President a man of ability. 
He had no desire for the Presidency, but accepted it as 
a duty. The responsibility of reducing chaos to order 
offered indeed little inducement, for the administrative 
departments were in the utmost confusion. A complete 
reorganisation of the governmental machinery was 
necessary, and this could not be an easy task. 




President Pellegrini. 



[Face 'page SO. 



CHAPTER V 

the argentine republic — continued 

Ministry under Pellegrini. Attitude of Roca. Public Opinion. 
National Finances. Political Situation. Economic Conditions. 
Cedula Issues. Inconvertible Currency. Policy of Pellegrini. 
Depreciation in Currency. Argentina and Baring Brothers. 
Suspension of Foreign Debt Service. Banking Crisis. Patriotic 
Loan. Banco Nacional and Banco de la Provincia. Attempted 
Assassination of Roca. Pellegi'ini's Administration. Discontented 
Feeling. Influence of Mitre. Mitre returns from Europe. 
Cordoba and Mitre. Roca and Mitre. The " Union Civica 
Radical." A new State Bank. Pellegrini and the "Union 
Civica Radical." Nomination of Dr Luis Saenz Peha. Dr 
Bernardo Irigoyan and the " Union Civica Radical." Political 
Situation in 1892. State of Siege. Arrest of Alem. Alem 
Deported. Dr Luis Saenz Peha elected President. Dr Jose 
Uriburu. Roca resigns Portfolio of Interior. Saenz Pefia 
accedes to Office. Public Opinion and Pellegrini. Loss of the 
Rosales. Officers of the Rosales sentenced to Death. Saenz 
Pefia and Congress. Ministerial Crisis. Obstruction in Con- 
gress. Ministry of Dr del Valle. Alem and Political Agitation. 
Congress and the Administration. Excitement in Buenos Aires. 
Revolt in San Luis. Revolutionary Preparations in Buenos Aires. 
National Government and Governor Costa. National Troops and 
Revolutionary Forces. Alem in Santa Fe. Rosario captured by 
Insurgents. Roca commands in Santa Fe. Surrender of Alem. 

The first duty of Pellegrini was to form a ministry that 
would conciliate the angry passions aroused by recent 
events. It was no easy matter to combine a representa- 
tion of the principal political elements with such inde- 
pendent strength as would ensure respect for law and 
order. 

An attempt at reaction from Cordoba was possible, 

87 



88 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

and it was necessary to guard against any danger from 
this source. The Ministry of the Interior, therefore, was 
undoubtedly the most important portfolio in the Cabinet. 
It was also the most difficult to fill. One man combined 
the necessary qualifications — General Roca. To induce 
the former President to re-enter public life in a sub- 
ordinate capacity, Pellegrini urged patriotism. He asked 
Roca to aid in restoring the national prestige, and that 
statesman ultimately consented to undertake the duties 
until the danger from provincial politicians had passed. 
The provincial representatives could raise no objection 
to this appointment. Roca had been their own choice 
for the Presidency in 1880, and his Administration had 
been successful. Cordoba and other provinces now 
required a strong hand to check their political intrigues, 
and because this was the case Pellegrini appealed to his 
former chief for assistance. 

The other portfolio requiring special qualifications 
was Finance. The Exchequer was in dire confusion, 
and a reorganisation of the department was necessary 
to ascertain exactly the extent of the inroads upon the 
national purse under the late Administration. In 
appointing Dr Vicente Lopez to this post, Pellegrini 
acted wisely. Dr Lopez had no great financial ability, 
but he was a man of absolute integrity and untiring in 
his attention to detail ; his appointment was also a con- 
cession to the " Union Civica," and was fully appreciated 
by that association. 

No difficulty was found in filling the remaining port- 
folios, and on the whole this first ministry of Pellegrini 
was a happy combination of various political elements. 
Except by Cordoba satisfaction was felt on all sides. 
Relief at the suppression of the Celman Administration 
was everywhere else profound, and assured approval for 
any honest Government. That the evil influence of the 
past four years would take time to eradicate was patent 
to everybody, and no miracles were expected from 
Pellegrini, so that he assumed his presidential duties 
amidst general goodwill. 



1890] THE FINANCIAL SITUATION 89 

It was not until some weeks later that the compli- 
cations of the situation were understood. Celman had 
left an empty treasury and a legacy of indebtedness far 
beyond the resources of the country. Concessions 
carrying money guarantees for annual interest on capital 
invested had been scattered broadcast. Congress had 
been packed with representatives elected through official 
influence, and with neither capability or desire to legislate 
for the national interests. Had the "Union Civica" 
gained a complete victory in July the intention was to 
dissolve the Chambers. It was hardly within the 
province of Pellegrini to advise any such drastic proceed- 
ing, and he found himself confronted by a political 
representation lacking in intelligence and energy to 
initiate useful legislation to assist the country in this 
crisis. The economic situation was a source of even 
greater anxiety than financial conditions. Extravagance 
in public administration produced spendthrift habits in 
private life. Everywhere the shoe pinched now that 
credit was contracted, and the inflation in commercial 
concerns in Argentina between 1887 and 1890 had been 
disastrous to the sound economic progress of the country. 
Both the National and Provincial Mortgage Banks had 
made borrowing easy, but if the money obtained from 
the issue of " Cedulas " had been legitimately applied no 
harm would have been done. Unfortunately, in the 
great majority of cases where loans were made, the 
money was squandered, so that when the crisis came in 
1890 this profligacy further complicated the situation. 
Landowners could obtain no more advances. In these 
circumstances it was not surprising that real poverty 
was not infrequent. 

An examination of existing conditions by the new 
Finance Minister was productive of unpleasant revela- 
tions. The Government had no funds to meet the 
ordinary expenses of the Administration. Obligations 
contracted were overdue ; disorder was rampant in every 
department, and national bankruptcy threatened in the 
immediate future. Resources had been mortgaged to 



90 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC " 

such an extent that there was small hope of obtaining 
foreign financial assistance. In his dilemma the 
President listened to short-sighted advisers who proposed 
to issue large sums in inconvertible notes guaranteed 
by the National Treasury. To follow advice of this 
nature showed disinclination to face the difficulties in 
which the country was involved, and yet the public was 
willing to support Pellegrini in any policy for the full 
exposure of the corrupt system in vogue under Celman. 
Argentine credit abroad would not have suffered from 
such action. The President, however, averse to such 
thorough measures, cast about for a temporary reprieve 
from the day of reckoning, and in an emission of paper 
currency found the fatal way to defer any public explan- 
ation of the true state of affairs. He used the printing 
press and flooded the country with inconvertible paper in 
order to extricate himself momentarily from his difficult 
position, and in September, 1890, asked permission of 
Congress to issue notes for $60,000,000. This proposition 
was sanctioned and the emission made. It tended for 
the moment to relieve the embarrassments of the 
Administration, but unhappily and inevitably served 
also to shake confidence in the President and to pave 
the way for greater financial complications to follow. 

The immediate result of this note emission was a 
rapid depreciation in the purchasing value of the currency. 
Argentine credit suffered, and foreign creditors became 
more exigent for a settlement of outstanding accounts, 
so that the financial crisis was at once aggravated, and 
in proportion to its acuteness reacted uniformly upon the 
national resources. In the matter of the service of the 
external debt the Administration was largely in the hands 
of Baring Brothers, its financial agents in London. 
Other agents attended to the service of various provincial 
and municipal obligations, but it was to the Barings the 
National Government looked for assistance. In dealing 
with Argentina the Barings had become heavily involved, 
and when the depreciation of Argentine credit occurred 
they were naturally the first to feel the situation acutely. 



1891] SUSPENSION OF DEBT SERVICE 91 

So great did the pressure upon them become in conse- 
quence of their Argentine connection, that although, as 
it turned out, perfectly solvent, they were forced into 
liquidation in November, 1890. This catastrophe 
enormously increased the difficulties of Argentina, and 
when the Administration was called upon to provide 
funds to meet the service of the debt falling due on 
January 1, 1891, it could nowhere obtain the required 
accommodation. Matters dragged along until the end 
of the year, when, without previous notification, default 
was made. 

The full effect of the four years of Celman's Adminis- 
tration now became apparent. First of all the suspen- 
sion of the debt service drew public attention to the 
condition of the Banco Nacional, and disquieting rumours 
as to its stability were persistently circulated. It was 
urged that the Government must support the bank, and, 
on the other hand, argued that if the Administration 
was unable to meet the national obligations no money 
would be forthcoming if the bank's own resources were 
insufficient to meet its liabilities. While arrangements 
with the foreign creditors were pending the crash came. 
During March, 1891, the depositors in nearly all the 
banks became uneasy, and large sums were withdrawn, 
more especially from the Banco Nacional and the Banco 
de la Provincia de Buenos Aires ; and in the beginning 
of April the alarm became general, until it developed 
into panic, which forced the Banco Nacional and the 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires to close their 
doors, several private banks following suit. The re- 
sources of the London and River Plate Bank and the 
English Bank of the River Plate were severely taxed, 
but the former promptly met every obligation. The 
English Bank also faced the run at the time, but failed 
immediately after pressure relaxed. Pellegrini attempted 
to save the Banco Nacional from bankruptcy. An in- 
ternal loan was raised, and $38,000,000 subscribed, but 
this assistance was of no avail, and as a banking con- 
cern that institution ceased to exist. The Banco 



92 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

National was afterwards declared in liquidation, but the 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires struggled on 
for a time, although if possible more completely ruined. 
This banking crisis violently disturbed the economic 
situation, and increased the difficulty of Pellegrini's 
position. 

Early in 1891 an attempt was made to assassinate 
Roca. It was never clearly ascertained if the would-be 
assassin was prompted by political motives, or whether 
the crime was the outcome of the misery and poverty 
now a common feature. Roca was in his carriage, when 
a shot was fired, and the bullet slightly wounded him in 
the back, but inflicted no serious injury. The man was 
arrested, but refused any account of his motives other 
than that he had intended to kill the ex-President. 
There was at this time a very strong sentiment against 
Roca, as the populace held him responsible in great 
measure for the hard conditions now ruling. They 
attributed their sufferings to him on the ground that 
through his influence Celman had been elected to the 
Presidency. 

It was evident to close observers that Pellegrini was 
discouraged by the obstacles in his path. He felt that he 
was only a stop-gap in the presidential office, and that 
his short tenure was inadequate to admit any measures 
he initiated maturing. Therefore no drastic reforms 
were attempted by him. The Government just drifted 
without definite policy aiming at a permanent solution 
of any economic and financial problems, and naturally 
this attitude did not satisfy the country. In less than 
twelve months from the date of Pellegrini's inauguration, 
all signs of the popular enthusiasm with which he had 
been greeted disappeared, and public opinion in Buenos 
Aires and many other sections of the Republic rallied 
round General Bartolome Mitre as the only man able to 
save the situation. 

Mitre had been abroad when the revolutionary out- 
break occurred in 1890, and did not return until May, 
1891, when the landing of the leader of porteno political 



1891] GENERAL MITRE RETURNS 93 

life was made the occasion of a remarkable exhibition 
of public rejoicing. By common consent the clay was 
observed as a holiday, and more than 50,000 persons 
assembled near the docks and in the streets to bid him 
welcome. The way to his residence was strewn with 
flowers. A meeting was convened in the Plaza San 
Martin, and a petition presented to him to become a 
candidate for the Presidency. At first Mitre demurred 
on the grounds of old age, but in view of the unanimous 
support tendered he finally consented. For the moment 
the political horizon cleared, and the public became con- 
tented to allow the remaining eighteen months Pellegrini 
had to serve to drag out without further indication of 
hostile feeling. 

It was soon evident, however, that Cordoba would 
not accept the porteno representative, because Mitre in 
power would block the ambitions of the " clique." 
Roca was the traditional political enemy of the Portenos, 
and it was intimated to him that every effort, even civil 
war, would be used to prevent the election of the porteno 
leader. A meeting was therefore arranged between 
Mitre and Roca. They held a conference known as 
11 El Acuerdo" which resulted in Mitre withdrawing on 
condition that a non-party candidate was nominated, 
and that the provincial politicians should support him. 
This agreement again changed the situation, and was 
subsequently the cause of important political events. 

Dr Leandro Alem was the central figure of the 
opposition to the agreement between Mitre and Roca. 
He immediately organised a campaign against the 
"Acuerdo," but the "Union Civica" was divided on the 
question, and the two sections separated, the partisans 
of Dr Alem forming the " Union Civica Radical." The 
others continued as the "Union Civica," but quickly 
dropped into obscurity. Associated with Alem were 
Irigoyen, Leonardo Pereyra, Oscar Liliedale, and other 
prominent citizens. The principles followed by Alem 
and his colleagues were to insist upon registration of 
voters and endeavour to obtain an election in which no 



94 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

compulsion or official influence was used. It was a 
policy which attracted the younger section of the popu- 
lation, and many recruits flocked to the new platform. 
As Alem found his support increasing, he enlarged his 
sphere of operations, and before the end of 1891 there 
was not a district in the Republic where branches of 
the "Union Civica Radical" had not been established. 

The cause of the "Union Civica Radical" was 
strengthened by the financial legislation initiated in 
October of 1891. Finding that all attempts to revive 
the Banco Nacional were abortive, Pellegrini determined 
to found a new bank, which he named the Banco de la 
Nation Argentina, and it was launched with an additional 
note issue of $50,000,000. State banking had conduced 
to bring about the existing economic and financial 
difficulties, and had enabled Celman to squander the 
national resources. No wonder, then, that the new bank 
was regarded as but another method to revive those 
practices, and adverse comment was heard from every 
quarter. Discontent with the Administration was inten- 
sified, and served to bring converts to the "Union 
Civica Radical " with its cry for economic and political 
reform. 

One effect of the agitation promoted by Alem was 
to throw the influence of the Government in favour of 
the agreement between Roca and Mitre. This changed 
the position of the "Union Civica Radical." At first 
it was only opposed to the " Acuerdo," but now it became 
the centre of opposition to the National Government, 
and was credited with revolutionary designs whenever 
a new publication attacking the national policy was 
issued or a meeting summoned. Occasionally seditious 
measures were advocated, but seldom of such character 
as to warrant police interference. Yet at various times 
the meetings were dispersed by armed force, and more 
than once volleys were fired by the police into the head- 
quarters of the association. 

After many vacillations the "Acuerdo" Party decided 
to nominate I)r Luis Saenz Pefia for the Presidency. 



1892] THE "UNION CIVICA RADICAL" 95 

Other names were brought forward and rejected, and 
Dr Luis Saenz Peha combined the conditions of the 
"Acuerdo." A Judge of the Supreme Court for many 
years, Dr Pena was removed from political controversies. 
In his high judicial capacity he had won the respect of 
Argentines and foreigners. He was sixty-eight years 
of age, and with his experience of men and matters 
it was thought that the national welfare would be safe 
in his hands. 

Under other conditions it is possible Alem and the 
"Union Civica Radical" might have supported the 
candidature of Saenz Pena. He and his followers, 
however, found fault with the system that had brought 
Dr Pena forward, and they refused to accept him. 
They argued that the machinery at work for the presi- 
dential election was a continuance of the practice 
previously in vogue in Argentina, when the outgoing 
President named his successor. This was claimed to 
be at the root of the political trouble in the past, and 
in these circumstances the " Union Civica Radical " put 
forward Dr Bernardo Irigoyen as their candidate. 

At the beginning of 1892 there were only two 
political parties. On one side were Mitre, Roca, and 
the Administration, and on the other Alem and the 
"Union Civica Radical." Had Alem expressed himself 
more moderately as to the means he proposed to employ 
to obtain electoral and other reforms he would have 
secured many more adherents, especially amongst the 
higher social classes. 

As the election drew closer, Alem saw his efforts 
thwarted by the official influence of Pellegrini, and this 
evoked violent speeches in favour of armed rebellion 
which frightened people with large vested interests at 
stake. They preferred to support the candidate of the 
" Acuerdo " rather than risk a revolutionary outbreak. 
Pellegrini was quick to see how the drift of events 
enabled him to control the situation, and he had no hesi- 
tation in acting promptly when an opportunity occurred 
for a decisive move against Alem. 



96 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Soon, therefore, it became evident that no real 
contest would take place over the presidential election, 
because no opportunity would be allowed for the 
opposition to vote. The "Union Civica Radical" 
would not be debarred from going to the polling 
stations, but it was understood their vote was to be 
returned in the minority. This tempted Alem and his 
friends to advise a revolutionary rising as the only 
means of protesting against such injustice. That an 
insurrectionary movement could succeed was regarded 
as only a remote possibility, but Alem argued that such 
action would strengthen his cause. The intention of 
the Opposition was reported to Pellegrini, who forth- 
with determined on a sensational course to checkmate 
Alem. In April rumours of impending revolutionary 
tactics were circulated, but the National Authorities 
apparently gave little heed to them, although in reality 
the Government was completing its arrangements. 
Orders were issued to confine all troops to barracks. 
A Cabinet meeting was summoned at which a short 
decree was drawn up declaring the city and province of 
Buenos Aires in a state of siege. This suspended 
constitutional privileges, and the chief of police was 
instructed to arrest Alem and his friends as dangerous 
to the public peace. Within a few hours the leaders of 
the Opposition were in prison. For three days the 
Government kept control of the telegraphs, and travellers 
were allowed only to enter and leave the national 
capital under surveillance, so that the discontented 
faction could make no movement towards rebellion. 
Then it was decided to place the prisoners on board a 
transport, where they were confined for some weeks. 
When all danger of a rising was over, a proclamation 
was issued exiling Alem and his colleagues from 
Argentine territory pending the President's pleasure ; 
and by such high-handed action was the growing power 
of the " Union Civica Radical " paralysed. 

In due course Saenz Pena was elected, but he had 
no hand in the action taken to prevent an electoral 



1892] ELECTION OF SAENZ PENA 97 

contest, and never expressed any keen desire to occupy 
the Presidency. Urged by Mitre and Roca, he accepted 
the nomination, and, except among the "Union Civica 
Radical " sympathisers, the presidential question was re- 
garded with comparative apathy outside the " Acuerdo" 
circle. Most people were adverse to developments 
which might raise again the standard of armed 
revolution, and were satisfied if the election of Pena 
conduced to freedom from political disturbances. The 
" Acuerdo " policy was viewed as expedient to save 
friction between the Portenos and the Cordoba clique. 

In accordance with this policy, a man with no 
marked political tendencies, Dr Jose Uriburu, was 
nominated for the Vice-Presidency. For twenty years 
he had been absent on diplomatic missions, and at the 
time of his selection was Minister in Chile. The choice 
was influenced by the fact that relations between Chile 
and Argentina were strained in connection with the 
delimitation of the frontier between the two countries, 
and it was held to be advisable to have Uriburu's 
experience at hand in case grave complications 
occurred. 

With the election of Pena, Roca's work in the 
Administration ended, and he announced his resignation. 
There can be little doubt that his services during the 
two years he was Minister of Interior were of immense 
value. The provinces, always inclined to be turbulent, 
would have resumed gladly the quarrel with the Portenos 
after the resignation of Celman, but Roca prevented an 
outbreak. Whenever revolutionary practices were 
threatened he struck promptly and decisively, but with 
the action against the leaders of the "Union Civica 
Radical " he had small connection, although the matter 
properly came within his jurisdiction. 

On October 12, 1892, Saenz Pena assumed his pre- 
sidential duties, and Dr Pellegrini left the Government 
Palace after the usual ceremony almost unnoticed. 
The wildest enthusiasm had greeted him when he took 
the place of Celman two years before, and now the 

G 



98 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

changed temper of the populace was marked. Excep- 
tional difficulties had beset his Administration, and that 
he should overcome them completely was not to be 
expected. Nobody, indeed, anticipated that the disas- 
trous results of the Celman period could be eradicated 
immediately, but all required a clear statement of the 
condition of affairs so that the complications might be 
boldly faced. Pellegrini hesitated to take this straight- 
forward course, and his efforts to temporise served to 
plunge the country deeper into the mire. His patch- 
work policy aggravated the difficulties and alienated 
the sympathy of the more wealthy classes, who saw 
in his acts danger to their interests. His treatment 
of Alem and his associates was likewise viewed with 
little favour because it savoured too much of the old 
despotism. 

In 1892 an incident occurred in connection with the 
Argentine navy that merits mention. A squadron was 
ordered on a cruise, and amongst the vessels was the 
torpedo - catcher Rosales, commanded by Commander 
Victorica, with Commander Funes acting as second in 
authority. Off the coast of Uruguay a heavy gale was 
encountered, by which the ships were separated. Next 
day the officers of the Rosales landed and reported that 
the torpedo-catcher had foundered and that the crew 
had been embarked in boats and life-rafts belonging 
to the ship. At the time it was remarked that the 
officers had come ashore together instead of being dis- 
tributed amongst the boats, but no doubt was cast upon 
the facts as related by the two commanders, Victorica 
and Funes. All the greater, therefore, was the sensa- 
tion excited a few days later when a fireman of the 
Rosales stated that the officers had deserted the vessel 
during the storm, leaving the crew to perish. At first 
the story received little credence, but an investigation 
was ordered, and a categorical statement obtained from 
the fireman of an appalling nature. According to this 
witness, when the gale was at its height the Rosales 
showed signs of distress, whereupon the officers ordered 



1892] WRECK OF THE ROSALES 99 

the crew below, and rations of rum were served out. 
Whilst the men were drinking the hatches were battened 
down. No attention was paid to their cries, andthe 
attempt made to force the hatches was for some hours 
without avail, but finally they made their way on deck, 
only to find the ship in a sinking condition and aban- 
doned by the officers. All boats and life-rafts had dis- 
appeared, the crew were helpless, and the Rosales sank 
soon after they reached the deck. This one fireman had 
clung to some wreckage when the ship foundered, and 
been washed ashore next day. Forthwith the arrest of 
Victorica and Funes was ordered, but both had influen- 
tial friends, the former being a son of the Minister of 
War, and pressure was put upon the judge before whom 
the case was tried to bring in a verdict of acquittal. 
To his credit the judge stood firm, and the two officers 
were condemned to death, but the sentence was delayed 
and in the end not executed. The affair had an impor- 
tant bearing subsequently upon the Pena Adminis- 
tration. 

Saenz Peiia's accession to the Presidential Chair 
brought to the front political conditions previously 
unknown in Argentina. Hitherto the National Con- 
gress had represented the political affinities of the 
President, but the new President had no political follow- 
ing upon whom he could depend for support. At first 
the new position thus created was not understood either 
by Pena or Congress, and his idea was to administer 
public affairs for the general good without reference to 
political exigencies. This had been the ostensible plat- 
form of the "Acuerdo," but Pena did not appreciate 
the character of Congress, and unforeseen obstacles arose 
to paralyse his efforts. Both Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies were opportunist, and wanted benefits for them- 
selves, to secure which they sought an excuse to embar- 
rass the President. His first Cabinet needed but a few 
months of office to satisfy it of the practicable impos- 
sibility of carrying out his policy. The President was 
unversed in political life, and unprepared to use his 



100 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

official position to influence the opinions of others. For 
thirty years he had been a member of the Judiciary, and 
his long experience in the Supreme Court had imbued 
him with a habit of routine which made him endeavour 
to conduct political business on hard-and-fast rules, a 
method doomed to failure. Concessions were expected 
in return for support, and without such inducement 
Congress was more inclined to throw obstacles in his 
path than to consider any executive act upon its merits. 
In vain ministers urged the necessity of using the Presi- 
dential prerogative to create a political majority in 
Congress. The President stolidly clung to his resolve 
to make no effort in this direction, socially or politically, 
and rumours were soon afloat that the Cabinet would 
resign on the pretext that a group in Congress had 
determined on a policy of obstruction. This political 
opposition took definite shape in the begining of 1893, 
and shortly afterwards the Ministry found its position 
untenable. 

To form a new Cabinet was no easy matter, for the 
men eligible for ministerial appointments were disinclined 
to come forward, and so acute did the political crisis 
become, that the question of the resignation of the 
President was discussed as the only way out of a dead- 
lock. But Dr Saenz Pena refused to entertain the idea 
of leaving office, and announced that no consideration 
would induce him to alter his determination. 

After, however, some weeks had elapsed, Dr Aristo- 
bulo del Valle, well known in connexion with the move- 
ment of the "Union Civica" previous to 1890, extricated 
the President from his dilemma, by forming a Cabinet 
moderate in respect to the opinions held by the various 
Ministers, but with a predominant porteno influence. 
Forthwith, provincial members of the National Congress 
assumed a hostile attitude. 

It was, however, from another cause than the porteno 
preponderance in the Cabinet that the most violent 
opposition arose. Alem returned from exile and was 
elected to represent the Federal District in the National 



1893] CONGRESS AND SAENZ PENA 101 

Legislature. The leader of the " Union Civica Radical " 
had not forgiven Dr del Valle for his acceptance of the 
" Acuerdo " policy, and lost no opportunity of attacking 
his former colleague. The " Union Civica Radical " was 
reorganised. The treatment of Alem and his com- 
panions in 1892 added incentive to strike a blow at the 
Administration. Alem was not in accord with the policy 
of the provincial members of Congress, but as a matter 
of expediency he joined hands with them whenever 
occasion offered to embarrass the Executive, and again 
there came a deadlock. 

In Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and San Luis, the spirit 
of revolution developed rapidly, aided by the fact that 
their Governors had raised local troops in defiance of 
the Law of Constitution. These armed forces were 
enrolled for the sole purpose of preventing any attempt 
of the residents to insist upon just treatment on electoral 
questions or resistance to the illegal taxation levied by 
the Provincial Governments. The worst offender was 
Dr Costa, Governor of Buenos Aires, who, in spite of 
repeated protests from the National Government, per- 
sisted in maintaining a force of 3000 men, and the leaders 
of the " Union Civica Radical " urged action against him, 
arguing that if the Administration was too feeble to 
enforce obedience to constitutional laws, it was time for 
all good citizens to rise in arms and demand respect for 
their rights. In the excited condition of public opinion 
the Governor thought it wise to promise acquiescence to 
the demands of the National Government, but he made 
no move to fulfil his pledge. 

A revolutionary rising in San Luis set the match to 
the train. Tired of waiting for action by the National 
Administration, the people there took matters into their 
own hands and ejected the Governor, an example Buenos 
Aires was not slow to follow. Near Campana and other 
places not far from the National Capital, thousands of 
citizens assembled to take up arms against the Provincial 
Governor ; and in Barracas, a suburb of the city of Buenos 
Aires, a revolutionary committee was formed and such 



102 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

arms as could be obtained served out. By the beginning 
of August, 1893, the Opposition to Costa counted on 
15,000 able-bodied men anxious to take the field, and 
the limited supply of rifles and ammunition alone pre- 
vented an immediate movement upon La Plata. Excite- 
ment ran so high at the turn of events as to force the 
Administration to take action. The revolutionary leaders 
had explained to the National Government that the 
movement was solely against the Provincial Administra- 
tion, and expressed willingness to lay down their arms 
if the resignation of Costa was assured, and the provincial 
troops disbanded. The National Government saw no 
other course open than to accept these terms, and an 
ultimatum was despatched to La Plata ; but before a 
settlement could be effected, a misunderstanding occurred 
between the national troops at La Plata and the revolu- 
tionary forces, resulting in a fight and a number of 
casualties on both sides. No sooner, however, was the 
news of the disbanding of the provincial troops and the 
resignation of Costa known than the insurgents dispersed 
to their homes, leaving the National Government to take 
temporary control of the province, which it placed in 
charge of Dr Lucio V. Lopez. 

In Santa Fe discontent was stronger than in Buenos 
Aires, and the leaders of the "Union Civica Radical" 
hoped to convert the rising there into a general rebellion 
against the National Government. "Union Civica 
Radical "agents had conveyed supplies of arms and ammu- 
nition to convenient localities not far from the city of 
Rosario, and arrangements had been made through Colonel 
Espina for a section of naval officers in Buenos Aires to 
seize some of the torpedo flotilla and other vessels lying in 
the Tigre River, and assist in the capture of Rosario, at 
which town it was proposed to establish revolutionary 
headquarters. At first the outbreak in Santa Fe thus 
arranged for was successful, and after severe fighting the 
insurgents captured Rosario. This thoroughly frightened 
the National Administration, and it begged Roca to 
command the troops. To this request he acceded, and 



1893] REVOLT IN BUENOS AIRES 103 

after, as usual, making deliberate preparations, he took 
the field, advancing with a strong force upon the revolu- 
tionary positions. The immediate collapse of the in- 
surgents followed, and Alem and other leaders of the 
movement surrendered. They were exiled to State 
Island, an Argentine penal settlement, for the term of 
one year. In 1895 they were permitted to return to 
Buenos Aires, and there Alem died in 1896. With his 
disappearance the " Union Civica Radical " lost all power 
as a political factor. 



CHAPTER VI 

the argentine republic — continued 

Political Conditions in 1893. Financial Policy of Saenz Peha. Atti- 
tude of Congress. The Executive and the Chambers. The 
Provincial Mortgage Bank. Dr Lopez and Colonel Sarmiento. 
Death of Lopez. Hostility to Saenz Peha. Ministerial Crisis. 
Position in December, 1894. Death Sentence upon Officers of 
Rosales. Resignation of Saenz Peha. Dr Jose Uriburu. The 
New Administration. Chilian Boundary Question. Argentine 
Authorities Alarmed. Secret Sessions of Congress. Credit of 
Fifty Million Gold Dollars. Congress and Railway Guarantees. 
Financial Policy of Uriburu. Cash Payments on External Debt. 
Political Situation in 1897. Presidential Candidates. Nomina- 
tion of Roca. Roca Elected. Dr Quirno Costa Vice-President. 
Roca and the Buenos Aires Merchants. The Puno de Atacama. 
Chilian Ultimatum. Arbitration. The Chilian Question. Pur- 
chase of War Material. Legislation during Uriburu Administra- 
tion. Roca assumes Presidency. Contrast between 1880 and 
1898. Expectations from Roca. Arbitration and the Puno de 
Atacama. Meeting between Roca and Errazuriz. Visit of Roca 
to Patagonia. Welsh Colony at Chubut. Congress in 1899. 
Roca and the administration of Justice. Magnasco and Judicial 
Reform. Composition of the Chambers. Journey of Roca to 
Brazil. Rumours of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with 
Brazil. Commercial Treaty with Brazil. Complications in the 
Provinces. Irigoyen and the Buenos Aires Legislature. Inter- 
vention in Buenos Aires. Outbreaks in La Rioja and Catamarca. 
Roca and National Legislation. The Conversion Law. Roca 
and Public Works. Visit of President of Brazil to Argentina. 
Area of Argentina. Population. Immigration. Foreign Resi- 
dents. Italians. Spaniards. Basques. Other Nationalities. 
Predominance of Latin Blood. Climate. Growth of Cities. 
Gregarious Nature of Argentines. Landed Proprietors. Crowded 
Centres. Education. Minister Magnasco. Incompetency of 
Teachers. Lack of Discipline in Scholastic Establishments. 

104 



1894] POLITICAL CONDITIONS 105 

Missionary Efforts for Education. Administration of Justice. 
Roca and the Argentine Courts. Codified Law. Tedious Pro- 
cedure. Corrupt Lower Courts. Religious Conditions. The 
Catholic Church. Report of Sir John Hunter Blair. National 
Character. Hospitality. Agricultural and Pastoral Industry. 

Quiet was re-established at the end of September 1893, 
but the events in Santa Fe had tended to shake confi- 
dence in the stability of the National Government, and 
it became evident, from the general state of public 
opinion and the aggressive attitude of Congress, that the 
Administration of Saenz Peria would soon be disturbed 
by further political complications. For one thing the 
President was determined to, effect economies in the 
national expenditure, and in accordance with this policy 
the estimates submitted to Congress for 1894 proposed 
to cut down expenses. Revolutionary troubles had been 
the cause of extraordinary charges upon the exchequer, 
and had prevented any very substantial reductions. 
Congress opposed this policy, and the budget was not 
sanctioned until it had been so far altered that the out- 
goings for 1894 were higher than for the previous year. 
The President had no alternative but to accept this 
action of Congress, but he took care to explain that he 
was not bound to expend in full the amounts sanctioned. 
This incident showed the strained relations between 
Saenz Pena and the Chambers, and demonstrated clearly 
that he had no political following to rely upon in carry- 
ing out his proposed reforms. 

During the latter part of 1893 and the beginning of 
1894 the province of Buenos Aires was administered 
by the representative of the National Government, Dr 
Lucio V. Lopez, and order was restored in the official 
departments. One duty assigned to Lopez was an 
investigation into the condition of the Provincial Mort- 
gage Bank, in connection with which many accusations 
had been made against Dr Julio Costa. A careful 
examination of the books resulted in evidence of colossal 
frauds. Millions of dollars had been advanced against 
worthless security, loans having been effected through 



106 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

the direct influence of high officials, and prosecutions 
were ordered by Lopez in consequence of the facts 
brought to light. Amongst these facts was a loan to 
Colonel Sarmiento, an officer in the National Army, then 
stationed in the province of Entre Rios, where he received 
news of a warrant issued against him. On his return 
to La Plata some weeks afterwards he was arrested and 
confined in the provincial prison, where he lay for several 
months, until tried and acquitted. No sooner was he 
at liberty than he grossly insulted Lopez, thus provoking 
a duel. Although full particulars were known to the 
police, no effort was made to hinder the encounter, which 
took place in December, 1894. Lopez was shot through 
the liver, and died the same evening. Colonel Sarmiento, 
nominally a prisoner for a few days, was permitted to 
go unpunished. 

Throughout 1894 uneasy political feeling became 
more accentuated, and in Entre Rios, Corrientes, and 
Santiago del Estero disturbances took place that required 
national intervention to restore order. These outbreaks 
were caused by dissatisfaction with the local authorities, 
but more or less were a constant source of anxiety to 
the Administration. 

When Congress met, in June, 1894, the attitude of 
Senators and Deputies was soon apparent in marked 
hostility to every act of the Executive. This opposition 
was not founded on political principles. At the root of 
it lay the fact that Saenz Peiia was not identified with 
any party in Congress. He had made no effort to 
organise a following, wishing to leave himself a free 
hand to initiate reforms ; but in Argentina, as elsewhere, 
it is impossible to govern without a controlling influence, 
political or dictatorial. A President is therefore forced 
either to use his prerogative to secure a majority in the 
Chambers, or to impose his will by force. During the 
last six months of 1894, Congress did no legislative work, 
and both Chambers were waiting their opportunity 
to bring about the resignation of Saenz Pena. This 
deliberate hostility of Congress did not at first alter the 



1895] RESIGNATION OF SAENZ PENA 10? 

President's determination to retain office, but a ministerial 
crisis opened Pena's eyes to the gravity of the situation, 
and he found the utmost difficulty in the formation of a 
Cabinet. 

The budget for 1895 had not been voted in January 
of that year, so its omission left the President without 
legal authority for the expenditure of public monies. 
This was the issue for which the Chambers had waited, 
and the impeachment of the President was advocated 
if he disbursed public funds without the sanction of 
Congress. Another incident occurred to increase the 
friction. The two senior officers of the Rosales had 
been condemned to death, and the sentence required the 
President's approval before it could be executed. At 
the end of 1894 no further excuse for delay in this 
matter could be found, and when the subject was brought 
before the Executive the President insisted that the 
verdict was just, and that no extenuating circumstances 
existed to mitigate the sentence. Ministers were divided, 
and two members of the Cabinet resigned. Interpella- 
tions in Congress followed, and a majority in the Chambers 
opposed the death penalty. Saenz Peha remained un- 
shaken in his conviction that the verdict must be con- 
firmed. Excitement ran high, and friction between 
Congress and the President was intense, indications 
pointing towards an armed outbreak against the Presi- 
dent if the execution of the two officers was approved. 
Saenz Pena carefully considered his position, and con- 
cluded that it was untenable. He therefore called a 
special meeting of Congress and presented his resignation, 
which was immediately accepted. The sentence on the 
two officers was commuted to a term of imprisonment. 

Saenz Pena accompanied his resignation with a 
dignified message addressed to Congress explaining his 
reasons. He pointed out he had been nominated on a 
non-party platform, and that he had endeavoured to 
conduct his Administration in such manner as to give 
the country time to recuperate from recent violent 
political disturbances ; but he was now convinced an 



108 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Administration without a strong political following was 
impossible. He showed that the financial situation had 
improved since he assumed office, and that his Adminis- 
tration had been conducted honestly and economically, 
and, finally, his only thought to have been the just 
performance of his duty towards Argentina, and that 
rather than provoke violent extremes he retired into 
private life. This message, moderate in tone, casting 
recriminations at no particular persons, accurate as to 
facts, was generally well received. With his resignation 
Saenz Pena disappeared completely from public life. 

The unfinished portion of the presidential term was 
three years and nine months, and there was a widespread 
belief that Dr Uriburu, who at once took the vacant 
post, would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, 
since the new President was no better acquainted with 
political methods than Saenz Pena, and had spent much 
of his life in foreign countries, so that few personal 
friends existed to rally round him. Unexpected influ- 
ences, however, came into play, for Roca and Pellegrini 
understood that a repetition of the Pena fiasco would 
assuredly bring disastrous consequences, and mutually 
agreed to support the Administration. This made 
certain a working majority in the Chambers. 

President Uriburu was hardly settled in office before 
serious international complications threatened to involve 
Argentina in a struggle in which her sovereignty over 
large sections of outlying territory was at stake. The 
boundary between Argentina and Chile had been a 
subject for diplomatic negotiation for several years, and 
a protocol signed in 1884 had laid down that the 
frontier should be established where " the highest peaks 
of the Andine ranges divide the watershed." This 
wording gave rise to constant misunderstanding. The 
Argentine representatives insisted the line should run 
from highest peak to highest peak, while the Chilians 
argued that the term "highest peak" inferred only the 
highest points in the watershed. The origin of the 
dispute lay in the fact that the idea of the framers of 




President Uriburu. 



[Face page 108. 



1895] BOUNDARY QUESTION WITH CHILE 109 

the treaty was that the Andine chain ran north and 
south in one compact and massive range of mountains, 
and not in separate and distinct ridges as is the case. 
In view of the difficulty of the boundary commissioners 
to agree, the matter was referred to the respective 
governments, and in 1895 angry recriminations were 
indulged in by both nationalities. Chile was accused 
of assuming an aggressive attitude, and the Argentine 
authorities became thoroughly alarmed at the turn 
affairs had taken, and it was finally decided by the 
Cabinet to request Congress to convene secret sessions 
at which the Executive could explain the gravity of the 
complications. These explanations were that the 
Chilian Government threatened war unless their 
demands were satisfied, and Congress was further 
informed that the National Administration was advised 
that Chile was preparing for war. It was pointed out 
that Argentina lacked reserves of arms and ammuni- 
tion. The excitement in Congress was intense when 
these disclosures were made, and the outcome was a 
credit of fifty million gold dollars for defensive purposes. 

Early in 1895 a settlement was reached between 
Argentina and Brazil, in regard to the territory of 
"Misiones." After intermittent negotiations over a 
period of fifteen years this question had been submitted 
to arbitration. In March, 1895, President Grover 
Cleveland gave his verdict, by which the pretensions of 
the Argentine Government were disallowed, the award 
admitting Brazilian claims in full. Anger at this result 
was expressed in many quarters, but the Government 
accepted it without demur. 

One of the most disturbing political questions in 
1895 arose from the action of Congress in reference to 
the guaranteed railway companies. When default had 
been made in the service of the public debt the subven- 
tions to the companies also fell into arrear, and in 
several cases traffic was insufficient to earn enough 
income to provide for the maintenance of the roads. 
Uriburu recommended to Congress the issue of 



110 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

$50,000,000 in bonds to enable the Government to 
compound with the companies for past and future 
claims. Violent debates ensued in the Chamber of 
Deputies, during which many members expressed 
undisguised hostility to the undertakings because they 
were owned by foreigners, and it was only by the 
insistence of the Administration, supported by Roca 
and Pellegrini, that measures were finally sanctioned of 
a kind calculated to enable the Government to come to 
terms with the companies. 

Next year was occupied chiefly in endeavours to 
consolidate the financial position of the National 
Government. A bill was sent to Congress for power to 
unify the provincial external liabilities through the issue 
of national bonds. This assumption of the provincial 
external indebtedness was a necessary step towards the 
rehabilitation of Argentine credit abroad, and was a 
proof that the Executive was honest in its intention to 
meet all obligations the Republic had contracted. By 
the beginning of 1897 the financial position was so far 
in order that Uriburu was able to resume cash payments 
on the whole foreign debt, and the country now began 
to recover from the disastrous consequences entailed by 
Celman's administration. No sooner was this accom- 
plished than the presidential election again began to 
occupy public attention, but the various political parties 
were so divided that it was no easy matter to find 
anybody except Roca or Pellegrini able to command a 
really important following. The majority favoured 
Roca, and although hostile feeling still existed against 
him on account of his connection with Celman, it had 
considerably toned down, and the foreign residents 
unanimously supported him. Pellegrini again was 
popular amongst a large circle of political and social 
friends, but his former Administration had made 
influential people sceptical of the views he held in 
regard to financial questions. Soon, however, it 
became evident that if Roca accepted the nomination 
no serious opposition would be attempted. He did so ; 



1898] ELECTION OF KOCA 111 

the vote of the country was unanimous in his favour, 
and after the usual formalities he was declared elected. 
For the Vice-President the choice fell upon Dr Quirno 
Costa, a representative member of a well-known family 
in Buenos Aires, and a man who had rendered important 
services to the Republic in connection with the boundary 
question with Chile. 

Barely was the electoral question settled before 
another excitement arose. For several years the boundary 
commissioners had been at work on the northern frontier 
line between Argentina and Chile, and the general 
impression was, that since the strained relations in 1895, 
the Argentine and Chilian representatives had been on 
amicable terms. But in July, 1898, a controversy arose 
in connection with the delimitation of the district known 
as the Puno de Atacama, and the commissioners could 
not agree. The Chilian representative claimed the 
district absolutely for his Government on the grounds 
it was in Chilian occupation. In itself this territory 
had small intrinsic value. Some borax deposits and the 
prospects of minerals comprised all the visible wealth, 
but the policy of Chile was not to give way in any 
direction where territorial expansion was concerned. 
The Argentine Government was convinced it had right 
on its side, and in Buenos Aires the territory had been 
regarded as Argentine, although there was some doubt as 
to whether Bolivia might not lay claim to a portion of 
it. A treaty had indeed been made with the Bolivian 
Government deciding the partition of the Puno de 
Atacama so far as the portion on the Atlantic slopes 
of the Andes was concerned, and it was in connection 
with the part allotted to Argentina by this arrangement 
that Chile objected. So hot waxed the dispute that in 
August, 1898, the relations between Chile and Argentina 
became critical, and war appeared likely. Both sides 
pushed forward preparations for hostilities, but towards 
the end of August an ultimatum was delivered by 
the Chilian Government demanding arbitration. The 
Administration at first hesitated, but finally, acting on 



112 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

the advice of Roea, the demand was accepted and war 
averted. 

Such conditions were arranged with Chile that no 
further trouble ought to have been possible. The 
agreement provided for the submission of the Puno de 
Atacama dispute to arbitration by the United States 
minister in Argentina with one Chilian representative 
and one Argentine commissioner, and the two republics 
decided to refer the southern frontier question to Her 
Britannic Majesty, Queen Victoria. Notwithstanding 
these arrangements, an uneasy feeling still prevailed 
that hostilities might break out, and neither State made 
any pretence of stopping military and naval preparations. 
Orders for arms, ammunition, and warships were not 
countermanded, and men on both sides of the Andes 
began to declaim strongly against the heavy expenditure 
thus entailed. The reply to such remonstrances 
invariably was that until the question of the boundary 
was settled, it was necessary to maintain both powers 
on a war footing. Thus the resources of Argentina and 
Chile were strained to the utmost, and public works 
neglected in order that funds might be forthcoming to 
pay for guns and ships bought in Europe. 

Uriburu left the Presidency in October, 1898. His 
was a stop-gap administration from which little impor- 
tant legislation had been expected. Some useful 
measures, however, were passed between 1895 and 1898, 
and the financial arrangement in regard to the provincial 
external indebtedness marked one important step in the 
rehabilitation of Argentine credit abroad, and the settle- 
ment of the railway guarantees another. The quiet 
dignity with which the adverse award in the " Misiones " 
boundary dispute had been accepted was a matter for 
congratulation, and in the negotiations with Chile the 
purpose was to avoid armed conflict. These episodes 
served to make patent the fact that Uriburu was acting 
for the true interests of Argentina. In all important 
questions the way was thus left clear for the ensuing 
Administration, and perhaps the most satisfactory change 



1898] ROCA ACCEDES TO OFFICE 113 

was that Congress abandoned the irresponsible attitude 
assumed under Saenz Peiia. Both Chambers had been 
inclined to continue against Uriburu the tactics pursued 
with his predecessor, but the influence of Roca and 
Pellegrini prevailed, and through their efforts obstruc- 
tion to useful legislation was avoided. 

Koca assumed the Presidency once more in October 
1898. Eighteen years had passed since he had first 
taken control of Argentine affairs, and the contrast 
between then and now was most marked. In 1880 he 
was a man untried in politics, and cordially disliked by 
a large section of the population, but in 1898 it was 
by the almost unanimous wish of the country that he 
returned to power. On all sides he was assured that 
his direction of national affairs was an absolute necessity 
in view of the complications of the boundary question. 
It was felt that the Republic needed a man who could con- 
trol both Congress and the Provincial Administrations, 
and the idea predominated that Roca's return to office 
portended a wave of prosperity throughout the country. 

The boundary question was the most important 
matter confronting him at the outset, and arrangements 
were made for the necessary representation before the 
Arbitration Tribunal in England. Dr Moreno was 
selected for this post in view of his great experience as 
the Chief of the Boundary Commission. Early in 1899 
all preliminary preparations for an examination of the 
different claims were completed, and first of all the 
dispute concerning the Puno de Atacama was submitted 
to the Commission, as noted above, with a representative 
of the Argentine Republic and one Chilian commissioner, 
the initiation of proceedings being left to the United 
States minister, Mr Buchanan. In case of disagree- 
ment the vote of the majority was final. 

Minister Buchanan followed a plan, novel but 
effective. The documents were subjected to careful 
investigation, and a map was marked with a line between 
the two Republics in such localities as he considered 
just on the evidence before him. This sketched boundary 

H 



114 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

was divided into sections and the Commission then 
summoned, to whom the United States Minister ex- 
plained his ideas. There was much opposition on both 
sides to his conclusion, for the boundary line he inserted 
cut off Argentine pretensions in some directions and 
Chilian in others ; but Mr Buchanan found a simple way 
out of the difficulty, by proposing that a vote should be 
taken concerning the line in each zone. Where the 
boundary was adverse to Chile the Argentine com- 
missioner voted for it, and Mr Buchanan siding with 
him gave a majority against the Chilian representative. 
Where the conditions were reversed, Mr Buchanan agreed 
with the Chilian commissioner. In this manner the 
work was concluded in three days. The justice of this 
course was questioned, but in the end it was conceded 
that the matter had been treated from a practical and 
common-sense standpoint, and both Governments ac- 
cepted the award. 

The better understanding now established with Chile 
induced Roca to propose a personal meeting with Presi- 
dent Errazuriz to discuss the situation, and it took place 
at Punta Arenas in the Straits of Magellan. Roca, 
escorted by a squadron of the Argentine navy, met the 
Chilian President there, and at their conference there 
was much diplomatic fencing, each seeking to ascertain 
the other's opinions as to future developments. But one 
most practical and enlightened resolve was come by. 
The question of expenditure on naval and military arma- 
ments was discussed, and a mutual understanding reached 
to restrict additional expenses in this direction. Promises 
were also made that every endeavour would be used for 
a peaceable solution of all causes of international trouble. 

During this journey to the south, Roca visited some 
of the colonies recently established in Argentine territory, 
and among others the Welsh settlement on the river 
Chubut. The colonists were asked to state any cause 
of complaint, and the establishment of better means of 
communication with the north was the principal request 
preferred. The President promised to give this matter 



1899] ROCA AND ERRAZURIZ CONFER 115 

his earnest attention, a pledge he subsequently made 
good. Several minor abuses were suppressed, and the 
right of the National Guard to drill on week days instead 
of Sunday was granted, a concession made because of 
the majority of the settlers being Protestants. Visits 
were paid also to settlements on the Gallegos and Santa 
Cruz rivers, and altogether the interest shown by Roca 
in Patagonia gave decided encouragement to residents 
there. Hitherto the welfare of these southern colonies 
had been neglected, as they had never been regarded as 
a factor of national importance ; but this action of Roca 
brought to notice the fact that civilisation was spreading 
to them, and that great areas of land, formerly regarded 
as worthless, were now producing live stock and cereals. 

Roca severely criticised the administration of justice 
in Argentina in his message to Congress in May 1899, 
and pronounced the existing condition of the courts to be 
disgraceful and in need of drastic measures of reform. 
A discussion in Congress ensued, and the Minister of 
Justice, Dr Magnasco, was called upon for his opinion 
concerning the direction reforms should take. In 
response, he laid bare some of the flagrant abuses 
practised in the Federal Courts, and made charges 
against certain judges, which, when proved, led to a few 
of the worst offenders being turned out of office. 

The attitude of Congress in this question of justice 
was typical, for the debates showed clearly that members 
of both Senate and Chamber cared little for the interests 
they represented, but much for the monthly salary of 
$1000, an inducement of no small importance to pro- 
vincial politicians. When to this is added incidental 
expenses in the shape of travelling allowances and 
other extraordinary charges, the income derived is of a 
sufficient amount to make the post eagerly sought after. 
However, the influence of Roca was strong enough to 
ensure sanction for Government measures, although 
intelligent initiation of legislative action by senators 
and deputies to assist national progress was rarely 
attempted. Under existing conditions the President is 



116 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

responsible, not only for all executive acts, but also for 
every legislative development. 

In July 1899 the President determined, from motives 
never clearly stated, on an official visit to Brazil. Some 
hostile feeling still remained there as a result of the 
bitter recriminations of the Argentine press over 
the arbitration award of the " Misiones " territory, and 
one object of the visit undoubtedly was to eliminate 
any remnant of this hostile sentiment. Moreover, 
the Chilian squadron, en route from Europe to South 
America, had made a lengthy call at Rio de Janeiro in 
1897, and the voyage of Roca was to some extent a set- 
off against the closer relations established subsequently 
between Brazil and Chile. It was the first time in South 
American history that an official visit had been paid by 
one president of a republic to another. Early in 
August of 1898, the squadron escorting Roca and his 
suite arrived at Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilians were 
lavish in their hospitality, making the occasion more like 
a royal progress than an exhibition of republican 
simplicity. Rio was en fete for fourteen days, but, so 
far as practical results went, little was achieved. A 
commercial treaty, to be sure, was signed, but the details 
had been settled by the representatives of the respective 
Governments before the visit of the Argentine President 
took place. 

A complicated situation meanwhile arose in Buenos 
Aires province, where, in succession to Dr Udaondo, 
the choice for Provincial Governor in 1898 fell upon Dr 
Bernardo Irigoyen, whose attempt at reforms roused 
the enmity of many members of the Provincial Legisla- 
ture. So, presently, the local Chambers refused to 
sanction measures proposed by the Governor, and this 
led Irigoyen into acts of an illegal character, although 
admittedly necessary in the conduct of the provincial 
affairs. When, therefore, the elections for the provincial 
Chamber of Deputies took place in 1899, a scrutiny of- 
the returns proved that the vacancies had been filled by 
candidates of the party in opposition to the Governor. 



1899] PROVINCIAL POLITICAL UNREST 117 

This did not satisfy Irigoyen, who pronounced the 
returns falsified and ordered new elections. Taking no 
notice of this order the Chamber of Deputies assembled 
to allow the usual oath to be taken by the new members, 
whereupon the Governor ordered a battalion of con- 
stabulary to occupy the legislative buildings, and resist 
the ingress or egress of any person not specially 
authorised by the Executive. Some members of the 
Chamber were in the building before this order was put 
into force and were detained inside. Both Governor 
and Opposition appealed to the National Government 
to intervene, and after much hesitation Roca agreed to 
this request, so that for some months the Provincial 
Administration remained under national control, pending 
fresh elections for the local Chambers. The result of 
the voting again showed a majority for the Opposition, 
and it was supposed Irigoyen would now resign, but, 
through the influence of Roca and Pellegrini, a modus 
vivendi was established, in virtue of which he remained 
in office to complete his triennial term, the representative 
of the National Government being withdrawn. The 
incident showed that provincial politics were still a 
cause for anxiety. 

Nor was Buenos Aires the only quarter in which 
these provincial disturbances occurred, for subversive 
movements were attempted in both La Rioja and 
Catamarca, and the matter became so serious in Cata- 
marca as to necessitate a strong force of national troops 
to restore order, but before normal conditions were 
re-established a collision took place. In both States the 
bone of contention was electoral, the Opposition main- 
taining that official influences were used to prevent any 
free voting, and that the returns were invariably falsified 
if unfavourable to the authorities. This was probably 
true enough, but in all these provincial disputes Roca's 
usual policy was to support the Governors. 

During his first two years of office Roca attempted 
little new legislation, but the initiative of Uriburu in 
regard to the provincial external iodebtedness was 



118 THE AEGENTINE REPUBLIC 

followed, and the last of these liabilities arranged for in 
1900. A measure was brought before Congress by 
Pellegrini in August, 1899, and supported by Poca, for 
dealing with the currency question. It masqueraded as 
a law of conversion, and by it complicated provisions 
were to be made for the accumulation of funds for the 
repayment of the inconvertible paper money ; but its 
real object was to check a too rapid appreciation of the 
notes, and for this purpose the official premium on gold 
was fixed at 127 per cent. The excuse urged for this 
law was that wages and other charges were based on a 
high gold premium, and that if the value of the dollar 
suddenly increased, the producing industries of the 
country, and especially agriculture, would be ruined 
before readjustment of general prices could take place. 
After sharp criticism, the measure was sanctioned, and 
the official value of the dollar became fixed at forty-four 
cents gold for all government purposes. 

The policy which Pocahad followed in regard to public 
works during his first Administration was not neglected 
during his second term, and in several directions efforts 
were made to provide better means of communication 
with outlying districts, especially in opening up facilities 
of transport in Patagonia. It is due to him also that 
port works at Rosario are in course of construction. 

In October, 1900 the President of Brazil, Dr Manoel 
F. Campos Salles, paid a visit to Buenos Aires, and as the 
aggressive policy of Chile had been clearly demonstrated 
shortly before, special care was taken to make his recep- 
tion as imposing as possible, to encourage belief that an 
entente existed between Argentina and Brazil. To this 
end, three public holidays were declared, and entertain- 
ments, illuminations, and decorations were arranged at a 
cost of $2,000,000. Out of all this display and junketing 
the only result was a proposal for the elimination of the 
war debt due to Brazil and Argentina by Paraguay. 
Both Governments agreed to consider the matter. 

The Arbitration Tribunal in London practically 
concluded the investigation of the Argentine and Chilian 



1901] RELATIONS WITH CHILE 119 

frontier claims at the end of 1901, but the final settle- 
ment of the boundary dispute was not reached without 
considerable difficulty and excitement. In both Argen- 
tina and Chile feeling gained ground that exception 
would be taken to the award and lead to the finding 
being rejected, thanks to extravagant rumours circulated 
about the sections of territory claimed by each country. 
Thus the latent jealousy between the two nationalities 
was fanned to fever heat, and the understanding arrived 
at in 1899 for restricting purchases of additional arma- 
ments was forgotten. Both Governments began warlike 
preparations on so extensive a scale that throughout 
December, 1901, a rupture of diplomatic relations was 
daily anticipated. Senor Alcorta, the Argentine Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, stated roundly he would not give way 
to Chilian pretensions, and indications in January, 1902, 
all pointed to war. 

No wonder, therefore, that representatives of the 
principal British interests in both Republics appealed to 
our Government to use its influence for a friendly 
solution of the impending trouble. In response to this 
appeal energetic action was taken, and Sir Thomas 
Holdich was sent to inspect the disputed territory. He 
reached Buenos Aires at the end of February, Argentina 
and Chile being meanwhile warned that if hostile 
preparations were continued His Majesty, King Edward 
VII., would refuse further participation in the questions 
now under consideration by the Arbitration Tribunal. It 
was left to H.B.M.'s Ministers in Buenos Aires and San- 
tiago to impress on the two Governments the disastrous 
effect on Argentine and Chilian credit if His Majesty 
was obliged to withdraw his good offices as arbitrator. 

While the issue of peace or war was still hovering in 
the balance, Senor Alcorta died suddenly. He had been 
the strongest opponent of a conciliation policy, and his 
death left the President free to deal with the question. 
Roca's position during the critical stage of the negotia- 
tions with Chile was most difficult. His countrymen 
were excited and insisted on military preparations to 



120 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

resist Chilian demands, no matter to what extent such 
warlike demonstrations tended to complicate the 
situation. On the other hand, constant pressure was 
brought to bear by the British Government to prevent 
an outbreak of hostilities. Between these two currents 
of influence Roca steered his way with consummate 
tact. In the end he was obliged to give way to Chile 
on certain points, but he did so in a manner that left 
the Argentines small cause for complaint, and only 
made such concessions as were necessary to ensure 
British influence being used in Santiago to facilitate an 
equitable settlement and restrain extreme Chilian pre- 
tensions. Roca deserves a large meed of credit for his 
quiet energy and dignified bearing during this crisis in 
the national fortunes. He decided for peace, and nego- 
tiations were immediately opened for a treaty to restrict 
further armaments. The treaty was signed in June, 
1902, and immediately ratified, and when, some months 
later, the award of the Arbitration Tribunal was made 
public, it was accepted unreservedly by both Governments. 
President Roca completes his term of office in 
October, 1904, and in June of this year the election of 
his successor takes place, but on this occasion there is 
no cut and dried issue to the presidential campaign. 
The principal candidates are ex-President Uriburu, Dr 
Quintana, Dr Udaondo, and, possibly, ex-President 
Pellegrini ; all four are able men, but the latter disap- 
pointed public expectations when he assumed control 
after the disastrous administration of Dr Juarez Celman. 
Many people assert that none of the four candidates 
mentioned will be successful, but that a " dark horse " 
will be elected.* 

* On June 12, 1904, Dr Manuel Quintana and Dr Jose Figueroa 
Alcorta were elected President and Vice-President of the Republic. 
Dr Quintana is 68 years of age, a native of Buenos Aires, a well- 
known politician, and the legal adviser of several of the principal 
railway and other companies in Argentina ; Dr Alcorta is aged 42, is 
a National Senator, and a native of Cordoba ; the friendly influence 
of President Roca was an important factor in the election of both 
candidates. 



1900] MOVEMENT OF POPULATION 121 

The area of Argentina is 1,212,000 square miles, and 
the population by the census of 1895 was 3,954,911. 
This is a density of only 3 '3 persons to the square mile. 
A fertile soil and kindly climate offer inducements for 
expansion to ten times the present number, but the 
increase of population has not been rapid in Argentina 
in spite of many natural advantages for settlement. 
In 1869 the number of inhabitants was returned at 
1,837,000, and [by 1882 they had risen to 2,942,600. 
Between that date and 1895 the census showed an 
increase of only 1,000,000. The disturbed conditions 
prevailing between 1870 and 1880 drove many foreigners 
away, and the economic crisis in 1890 was responsible 
for the exodus of many settlers who had come with the 
intention of making a home in the country. Between 
1857 and 1897 the number of immigrants was 1,597,299. 
When these figures are compared with the total popu- 
lation at the close of the nineteenth century, it is easy to 
form an idea of the many persons frightened away by 
troublous times. 

Yet the racial features of Argentines are changing 
with the influx of foreign blood, although this is not so 
marked in the more isolated provinces as in Buenos 
Aires or other centres. In the Andine territories the 
original Spanish and Indian types remain, while in 
Mendoza, Tucuman, Salta, and Jujuy the wealthy classes 
are not unlike the people in the more inaccessible dis- 
tricts of the Spanish Peninsula. In these localities the 
labouring classes are typically Indian. 

Of foreign residents Italians are numerically the 
strongest, numbering 800,000. As labourers for railway 
construction, agriculture, wherever manual labour is 
necessary, it is the Italian who is employed. In retail 
trade and minor industrial undertakings they have 
become an established factor. Next in numerical 
strength is the Spanish colony of 250,000. They are 
engaged in all classes of industrial and commercial 
occupations, and form a thrifty, orderly, and sound 
element in the population. After the Carlist War 



122 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

many Basques emigrated to the River Plate, and a large 
proportion of these people are now wealthy and influ- 
ential. The French colony of 70,000 persons are prin- 
cipally engaged in wholesale and retail trading, or as 
employees and servants. There are likewise 25,000 
Germans connected with commercial undertakings, and 
British subjects, although only 35,000 in number, form 
a powerful element as owners of property and repre- 
sentatives of British investments. 

An analysis of the population shows that only 70,000 
persons are not of Latin origin, or do not inherit Latin 
blood through father or mother. This is not surprising 
when the recruiting grounds for immigration are con- 
sidered. It shows conclusively that Latin traditions and 
customs are destined to prevail in the future in this 
section of South America. Italy, Spain, and, to a lesser 
degree, France are the main sources of immigration, and 
the incomers from these countries are easily assimilated. 
With the existing population of 4,000,000, essentially 
Latin in thought and habit, it is reasonable to suppose 
that immigration will fail to affect the national char- 
acteristic features of to-day to any marked extent. The 
result may be to leave the impress of Italian or French 
civilisation more apparent than the traits of the Spanish 
original stock ; but it will be none the less Latin. 

The growth of cities and towns in Argentina has 
been out of proportion to the increase in the population. 
The census of 1869 gave the inhabitants of Buenos 
Aires city as 177,800, and by 1882 they had increased 
to 295,000; but the returns of 1900 showed 812,000 
living within the municipal limits. This means that 
more than one -fifth of the entire population reside in 
the metropolis, a massing together which by no means 
indicates a healthy condition. Buenos Aires is not a 
manufacturing district, nor has it other attributes to 
justify a concentration of the population, whose effect 
is to hinder economic development. The principal 
industries are pastoral and agricultural, and therefore 
every man withdrawn from farm work is a loss to the 



1900] GREGARIOUS PROPENSITY 123 

producing power. In a country where land is lying 
idle this gregarious characteristic of the population is 
all the more to be regretted. 

This disposition of the people to reside in crowded 
centres rather than the country districts, is also apparent 
in Rosario, Cordoba, Tucuman, and all other cities. Too 
often the owners of valuable properties are content to 
mortgage their land to obtain means to dwell in the 
towns. In many cases the rate of interest paid is out 
of proportion to the rental a property yields. If any 
portion of this borrowed money was expended on the 
land some progress would be made, but this is not the 
case ; these loans are squandered, and the properties 
starved, to permit the proprietors to eke out existence 
in some local centre of civilisation. But until the bulk 
of the land is alienated from the present owners to 
people prepared to work on it, present conditions will 
continue to check progress. Gradually, however, the 
alienation of property from large holders is taking place, 
and it is principally to this change that we owe the ex- 
pansion in agricultural and pastoral industry which has 
become visible during the past decade. 

Probably no one element in the economic situation 
is deserving of greater attention than primary and 
secondary education, yet it is no exaggeration to say 
that no subject arouses less general interest. During 
the administration of President Sarmiento, from 1868 
to 1874, the initiative of the Executive was conducive to 
a liberal policy in regard to public instruction. The 
President was deeply interested in the problem, and his 
attitude caused the necessity of the establishment of 
schools, especially of a primary character, to be con- 
sidered. Many grants-in-aid were made by the National 
Administration, and teachers were imported to inculcate 
more advanced methods. Provincial and municipal 
authorities also were encouraged to establish an efficient 
system, and the work of Sarmiento took root in the 
country. In the six years of his administration the 
cause of both primary and secondary instruction made 



124 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

substantial progress, but subsequent Presidents showed 
no such interest, and gradually the ideas of Sarmiento 
have dropped. Occasionally some agitation is set afoot 
for more adequate public schools, but hitherto small 
support has been accorded to such movements. The 
proposal of Dr Magnasco, Minister of Justice and 
Public Instruction in 1900, to give more practical form 
to the educational course by suppressing certain estab- 
lishments maintained for secondary education in order 
to substitute technical schools, was rejected by Congress. 
At bottom, however, the little public interest shown 
in educational questions is responsible for the absence 
of an effective system of instruction. A smattering of 
many subjects is taught, a sound knowledge of any one 
is the exception. It is not that pupils are deficient in 
intelligence, but rather that teachers are lacking in 
experience and ability. Nor can any other result be 
expected under existing circumstances. The payment 
of officials is inadequate, and frequently salaries are 
months in arrear, while lack of discipline in primary, 
secondary, and higher education is conspicuous. Pro- 
visions for the orderly exercise of authority in colleges 
and schools are also most defective. Not long ago 
regulations were enacted at the University of Buenos 
Aires restricting the practice of smoking, and by way of 
protest against these the students refused to attend any 
classes. Lately, however, an interesting experiment in 
elementary education has been commenced in Buenos 
Aires by private missionary effort, and it promises to 
develop into a movement of national importance. A 
Protestant clergyman, Mr Morris, established in 1897 
a school based on lines similar to those of the so-called 
ragged schools in London. He met with many obstacles, 
and little success was anticipated for this new departure, 
but he persevered, with the result that to-day he has 
three schools and a mission hall for his work, and these 
are attended by 1000 pupils of the poorest classes in 
the city. All instruction is in Spanish and is non- 
sectarian. Extracts from the Bible are read daily, and 



1900] EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 125 

certain moral precepts inculcated without interfering 
with any creed. Voluntary contributions support this 
movement, and its expansion has only been checked by 
lack of additional buildings and teachers. The Catholic 
clergy in Buenos Aires attacked this experiment on the 
grounds that it tended to proselytise the children of 
Catholic parents, but the National Administration did 
not take this view, and the movement received en- 
couragement in official quarters. In 1899 the Minister 
of Justice and Instruction, Dr Magnasco, in his annual 
memorial to Congress recommended the adoption of Mr 
Morris's ideas so far as to constitute the reading of the 
Bible part of the daily instruction in every national 
school. 

Administration of justice in Argentina leaves much 
to be desired. A quarter of a century ago the reputa- 
tion of the Supreme Court was excellent. It was noted 
for freedom from bribery and corruption, but this 
standard has not been maintained in recent years. 
President Koca in his message to Congress in May of 
1899, called special attention to the subject, and certain 
notoriously venal judges were removed from office, but 
there the matter dropped. The legal system is based 
on Spanish law, and the civil, criminal, and commercial 
statutes are codified, but procedure is cumbersome and 
tedious, leading to unnecessary delay in litigation, and 
heavy expenditure. In the minor branches opportunities 
for corrupt practices are widespread, and complaints 
are heard in all quarters of the ignorance and venality 
of magistrates and minor officials. To some extent this 
is due to the scanty and irregular payment of judicial 
representatives, for the salaries are insufficient for the 
duties assigned to these officials. 

The practice of religion in Argentina is free to all 
creeds, the State imposing no restrictions on the 
establishment of places of worship. To the Roman 
Catholic Church, however, the National Government 
lends strong support, and the influence of the Catholic 
clergy is powerful amongst the lower classes. Super- 



126 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

stitious dread of the unknown induces reverence towards 
the outward symbols of Christianity, but even amongst 
educated Argentines clerical influence has gained ground 
of late years, especially with the women. That the 
Roman Catholic Church in Argentina is on a satisfactory 
footing is, nevertheless, an open question. Sir John 
Hunter Blair was sent a few years ago to report on the 
general standing of the Argentine clergy, and the fruit 
of his investigations was not flattering to the priesthood. 
Protestants, moreover, have a strong following in Buenos 
Aires and other parts of the republic, supporters of this 
form of Christianity representing a large proportion of 
the wealth of the country. Scotch, American, and Greek 
colonies all have well-supported places of worship in the 
national capital, and even the Salvation Army has 
established headquarters in Buenos Aires with branches 
in other cities. 

Argentine national character bears the impress of 
Spanish traditions, and the conservative tendency ap- 
parent in the Spanish Peninsula still militates against the 
rapid evolution of civilisation in these newer countries. 
The provincial inhabitants cling to the customs of their 
forefathers with persistent disregard of the benefits of 
more advanced ideas. In the Argentine, as in the 
Spaniard, there is a dislike to close attention to detail 
in public and private life. Hospitality is a characteristic 
trait in all classes of Argentine society, alike in city and 
country, and rich and poor never fail to offer to the chance 
guest the best that their home contains. In the more 
isolated districts the people are simple and superstitious 
to an unusual degree. Quick to resent real or fancied 
injury, the Argentine is prone to be equally impulsive 
in forgetting any cause of dispute. No better example 
of these characteristics could be found than the facts 
in connection with the many outbreaks of civil war 
and revolutionary disturbances, and the comparatively 
small amount of bad blood these conflicts have left 
behind. 

The past two decades have seen a complete change 



1900] INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 127 

in the conditions of industrial development in the 
Argentine Republic. In the year 1880 the exportation 
of produce was confined to wool, tallow, grease in 
various forms, hides, and horns, and agricultural pro- 
duction was barely sufficient to supply the home demand. 
Occasionally an abundant maize crop left a surplus for 
shipment abroad, but previous to 1880 wheat and flour 
were purchased in foreign countries to meet the deficit 
for home consumption. Agricultural industry was con- 
fined to the western section of the province of Buenos 
Aires, the cost of transport in other districts being 
prohibitive ; but the policy of railway extension initiated 
by Roca in 1881 rapidly altered all tills, and in the five 
subsequent years the development of agricultural industry 
substantially increased. Not only did production suffice 
for local wants, but a surplus became available for export 
to Brazil and Europe, and from 1885 until the present 
date, such a steady expansion has taken place, that in 
1900 the total yield of wheat exceeded 100,000,000 
bushels, of which 75,000,000 bushels was exported to 
foreign markets. The cultivation of maize and linseed 
has augmented, so that agricultural products, which 
formed so small a proportion of the national wealth 
twenty years ago, are now a most valuable export. 

Sheep-farming is another of the principal sources of 
wealth, and the province of Buenos Aires is the main 
centre of the industry. Within its boundaries the flocks 
contain 70,000,000 head. Entre Rios, Cordoba, the 
territories of the Pampa Central, the Rio Negro, and 
parts of Patagonia also possess fair sheep lands, some 
20,000,000 head being scattered over these districts. 
The conditions of this branch of Argentine farming have 
undergone marked changes during the last two decades. 
Formerly wool was the only product to which the sheep- 
farmer paid attention, the tallow and skins exported 
being only by-products. A radical improvement, how- 
ever, was made in the class of the stock between the 
years 1880 and 1890, and in 1890 the question of the 
export of mutton began to occupy public attention. 



128 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 

Experiments in this direction had been in progress for 
some time, and from 1890 the exportation of frozen 
meat rapidly increased. 

Cattle -ranching is confined to no particular districts. 
In every province and national territory are esiancias 
(live stock farms) with larger or smaller herds. An 
accurate return of the number of horned cattle has not 
been compiled, but the estimate of 25,000,000 is accepted 
as not far from the mark. This calculation is based on 
the number of hides exported, and the relative numbers 
of animals shipped abroad or slaughtered for the 
saladeros, frozen meat and butchering establishments. 
That the increase in the herds has been large of late 
years is proved by the additional areas of land recently 
stocked, and there is small reason to suppose this 
increase will cease in the immediate future in view of 
the great extension of natural pasturage still unoccupied 
and the greater grazing capacity of the settled districts 
brought about by the sowing of alfalfa (lucern). 

Previous to 1880 value was placed on horned cattle 
only in connection with the saladero establishments 
where the meat was converted into tasajo (jerked beef), 
or for the hides and horns. The idea of selling 
Argentine beef in Europe had not penetrated to the 
River Plate, but between 1880 and 1885 Durham and 
Hereford bulls were imported, and these gave excellent 
results when crossed with native cows. Then owners 
of herds began to think seriously of exporting Argentine 
cattle for European consumption, and many herds were 
refined year after year to such an extent, that in 1890 
there were many thousands of pure Durhams or 
Herefords, and hundreds of thousands of half or three- 
quarter bred animals. 

In 1889 the first trial shipment of live cattle was 
sent to Europe, but the animals were not well selected, 
and the result was not encouraging as a business trans- 
action. The exporters determined, however, to fully 
test the idea of placing live stock in foreign markets. 
Cargo after cargo was despatched between 1889 and 



1900] PASTORAL INDUSTRY 129 

1893 to such good purpose that the trade was estab- 
lished. Fine stock was poured into the country to 
improve the herds, and met with ready sale, and from 
1895 to 1900 the animal export of beeves exceeded 
130,000 animals, valued at £2,000,000 sterling. 



CHAPTER VII 

PARAGUAY 

Origin of the Paraguayan War. Political Disturbances in Uruguay. 
General Flores lands near Salto. Severe Measures increase Rebel 
Popularity. Strained Relations between Uruguay and Argentina. 
Complications between Brazil and Uruguay. Entente between 
Uruguay and Paraguay. Proclamation by Lopez. Mission of 
Conselheiro Saraiva. Invasion of Uruguay. The Villa del 
Salto. The Brazilian Flag Insulted. Brazil supports Revolt. 
Siege of Paysandii. Murder of Colonel Gomez. Attitude of 
Argentina. Uruguayan Expedition to Rio Grande. March of 
Brazilians and Rebels upon Montevideo. Montevideo Capitulates. 
Withdrawal of Brazilian Army. Attitude of Lopez. The 
Marques d'Olinda. War between Paraguay and Brazil. In- 
vasion of Matto Grosso. Engagement at Neuva Coimbra. Para- 
guayan Administration in Matto Grosso. Consternation in Rio. 
Brazil prepares for War. Schemes of Lopez. Paraguayan Con- 
gress. Lopez and Urquiza. Paraguayan Army in 1865. Attack 
upon Corrientes. Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes. Excite- 
ment in Buenos Aires. Proclamation of General Mitre. Alliance 
between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Warlike Preparations. 
Phases of the War. Importance of the Parana and Paraguay. 
Plan of Campaign. No forward movement possible before June. 
Distribution of the Paraguayans. Lopez neglects to advance 
beyond Corrientes. The Paraguayans in Corrientes. Capture of 
Corrientes by the Argentines. Battle of the Riachuelo. Para- 
guayan Advance towards Uruguay. Operations near San Borge. 
Invasion of Rio Grande. Mutiny in Entre Rios. Flores appointed 
to command the Allied Vanguard. Conditions in Uruguay. Para- 
guayans march down the Upper Uruguay. Battle of Yatay. 
Defeat of the Paraguayans. Occupation of Uruguayana. Sur- 
render of Colonel Estigarribia. Preparations for Defence of 
Paraguay. Modification in Plan of Campaign. Advance of 
Allied Forces. Matto Grosso. 

The war between Paraguay and the allied forces of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay is one of the most re- 




[Face page 130. 



1863] ORIGIN OF PARAGUAYAN WAR 131 

markable events in South American history. It con- 
vulsed the south-eastern portion of the continent for 
several years, and was ended only by the annihilation 
of the male population of Paraguay. The origin of the 
struggle requires explanation. 

A political party known as the Blancos had gained 
control of Uruguay by a successful revolution against 
President Flores, who was driven out and sought asylum 
in Buenos Aires. In April, 1863, Flores with a few 
companions, incited by the cold-blooded murder of a 
number of Colorado prisoners at Quinteros, landed at 
Salto, and there raised the standard of revolt. Collect- 
ing a force of 1700 men, he succeeded in defeating a 
column of Government troops in the vicinity of the Rio 
Negro. This success brought Flores many recruits. In 
March, 1864, the Blancos elected Dr Aguirre to the 
Presidency, and the severe measures taken against all 
persons suspected of revolutionary tendencies increased 
the popularity of the revolt. 

Relations between Argentina and Uruguay there- 
upon became strained, and President Aguirre openly 
accused the Argentine authorities of aiding the rebels. 
Complications were also threatened between Uruguay 
and Brazil, in consequence of the ill-treatment of 
Brazilians for their supposed sympathy with rebel out- 
breaks. Being thus on bad terms with both Argentina 
and Brazil, the Uruguayan President thought to 
strengthen his position by establishing an entente with 
General Lopez, the Dictator of Paraguay. Lopez had 
organised a formidable army, and was credited with the 
ambitious design of conquering the Brazilian province 
of Rio Grande do Sul, thus to obtain an outlet to the 
sea for Paraguay. Naturally, therefore, the proposals 
of President Aguirre were received by Lopez in friendly 
spirit, and help was promised in case of hostile action 
by Brazil against Uruguay. Brazil threatened to send 
troops into Uruguayan territory if protection for resident 
Brazilians was not accorded, and when this communica- 
tion was known to Lopez, he issued a proclamation to 



132 PARAGUAY 

the effect, that if an invasion of Uruguay took place 
Paraguay would declare war against Brazil. 

Scant courtesy was extended to Conselheiro Saraiva, 
the envoy credited by Brazil to Uruguay in connection 
with the complaints of Brazilian residents, in spite of a 
squadron sent to Montevideo and an army of 4000 men 
concentrated on the northern frontier to emphasise the 
Brazilian demands. Relations between the two 
Governments became further strained, and finally 
Conselheiro Saraiva was instructed to return, his 
mission having failed. The army concentrated in Rio 
Grande was marched into Uruguay to protect Brazilian 
interests, but the Uruguayan troops retired from the 
northern districts. Then the Brazilian Government 
ordered a suspension of the advance in the belief that 
President Aguirre would come to terms now, when the 
serious nature of the situation had become plain. But 
other events meanwhile happened to bring the dispute 
to an acute stage. Admiral Tamandare with a 
squadron of three men-of-war ascended the river 
Uruguay, where he encountered the Uruguayan warship 
Villa del Salto, upon which he opened fire, forcing her 
to seek shelter at Concordia in Argentine waters. The 
Uruguayan vessel afterwards attempted to run past the 
Brazilians and make for Paysandii, and being in danger 
of capture was set on fire by her commander. Immedi- 
ately the news of this incident reached the President he 
cancelled all exequaturs of Brazilian Consuls ; all 
treaties between the two Governments were burned in 
public, and the Brazilian flag was insulted and dragged 
through the streets. Brazil at once ordered General 
Menna Barreto, in command of the Brazilian forces in 
Uruguay, to join hands with the revolt under General 
Flores against Aguirre and attack both Montevideo and 
Paysandii. Admiral Tamandare with one steamer and 
four gun-boats was also instructed to aid the operations 
against the latter town. 

Paysandii was held by 2000 men under Colonel 
Leandro Gomez, and every possible precaution was 



1864] EVENTS PRECEDING THE WAR 133 

taken for the defence of the city. The attacking force 
consisted of 5000 rebels, 1200 Brazilian troops under 
General Netto, and the squadron under Tamandare, 
from which a small naval brigade was landed. The 
assault commenced on December 6, 1864, and continued 
throughout the day, but on December 7, hostilities were 
suspended at the request of the naval officers in 
command of several foreign warships in order to allow 
women, children, and non-combatants to be conveyed to 
a place of safety. Then the bombardment of the 
city was resumed. News that a column of Uruguayan 
troops under General Saa was advancing to relieve 
Paysandii was received on December 9, and General 
Flores, with the approval of the officers of the 
besieging army, decided to move out and give it 
battle. But the two forces did not meet, for 
President Aguirre ordered General Saa to return to 
Montevideo to aid in the defence of that city. Flores 
accordingly went back to Paysandii, where, meanwhile, 
Colonel Gomez had obtained fresh supplies of ammuni- 
tion and provisions, and was prepared to make a 
desperate resistance. Fighting recommenced on 
December 31, and the garrison attempted to cut through 
the investing lines, but was driven back. Reinforce- 
ments of Brazilian troops arrived on January 1, 1865, 
and on January 2 the place was carried by assault, 
Colonel Gomez falling into the hands of the Brazilian 
contingent. To avoid being sent to Brazil as a prisoner, 
Gomez begged he might be delivered to the division 
under General Flores. This request was granted, but 
he was no sooner given up than he was murdered in 
cold blood, without the knowledge of Flores. After 
the fall of Paysandii the rebels under Flores and the 
Brazilian forces marched to form a junction with the 
army under Generals Menna Barreto and Osorio to attack 
Montevideo. The squadron under Admiral Tamandare 
sailed down the river to land the sick and wounded in 
Buenos Aires, thence to proceed to assist in the opera- 
tions against the Uruguayan capital. 



134 PARAGUAY 

The attitude of Argentina, while these events were 
passing in Uruguay, had an important bearing upon 
subsequent developments in regard to Paraguay. 
President Mitre, the head of the Administration, was a 
personal friend of General Flores, and had extended a 
large measure of protection to the latter during his 
exile in Buenos Aires. Many Argentines had joined 
the revolutionary cause in Uruguay with Plores, and 
these influences drew Argentine sympathy towards the 
rebellion. Nominally, Argentina was neutral in the 
conflict ; but, in reality, Buenos Aires and other points in 
Argentine territory formed the base of operations for 
the revolution. 

President Aguirre, to deter an immediate advance 
upon Montevideo after the capture of Paysandu, 
despatched an expedition to the eastern section of Rio 
Grande do Sul, a move also prompted by promises of 
assistance from General Lopez. Aguirre relied on an 
army from Paraguay invading the western section of 
Rio Grande, simultaneously with the entry of Uruguayan 
troops into the eastern districts. This expedition was 
commanded by Colonel Munoz and Colonel Aparicio, 
and it crossed the Brazilian frontier near the Lake 
Mirim, occupying the town of Yaguaron. The utmost 
cruelty was practised towards the Brazilians, and neither 
life nor property were respected. But the continued 
occupation of this Brazilian district was impossible, 
because the aid Aguirre looked for from Paraguay was 
not forthcoming, and Colonel Munoz was obliged to 
retreat after defeat by a Brazilian force commanded by 
Colonel Fidelis. Alarmed at the threatened invasion 
by Lopez, the authorities of Rio Grande called out 
29 battalions of the National Guard, and this 
force was the nucleus of the army taking part in the 
Paraguayan War at a later date. 

While these events were happening on the borders 
of Rio Grande, the march of the Brazilian and rebel 
forces upon Montevideo continued. Many recruits had 
joined the revolutionary cause, so that when the com- 



1865] PARAGUAY DECLARES WAR IBS 

bined forces invested the capital in February, 1865, 
they numbered 14,000. The position of President 
Aguirre was untenable when the blockade was 
established, and accompanied by a small group of 
followers he sought refuge in Buenos Aires ; but before 
his flight he issued various proclamations, in one of 
which the perfidious conduct of the Paraguayans was 
denounced in bitter terms. With the flight of the 
President from Montevideo active resistance ceased. 
Dr Villalba, President of the Senate, opened peace 
negotiations with General Flores, and on February 22, 
1865, Flores entered the capital. Shortly afterwards he 
was proclaimed President of the Republic. The 
Brazilian army was withdrawn after the capitulation. 

Meanwhile, General Lopez had made good his 
menace and revealed his ambitious designs by declaring 
war against Brazil. A Brazilian vessel, the Marques 
(fOlinda, bound for Matto Grosso, and carrying a new 
Governor for that province, was seized at Asuncion, the 
capital of Paraguay, the official arrested, and the ship 
incorporated into the Paraguayan fleet. The Brazilian 
Minister, Viana de Lima, was given his passports, and 
the invasion of Matto Grosso followed. Previously 
12,000 men had been concentrated near Cerro Leon in 
the north of Paraguay. From these troops a division 
was detached under General Barrios and embarked for 
Matto Grosso on December 13, 1864. 

A fortnight later this expedition arrived off Nueva 
Coimbra, an old Portuguese fort situated in the extreme 
south of Matto Grosso. It stood on high ground 
commanding the river, and was garrisoned by 150 
soldiers. Its surrender was demanded, but refused. 
Bombardment followed, and troops were landed to 
assault the position on December 30, but the attack 
proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the commandant 
decided that further resistance was useless, and during 
the night embarked his men on the Amambahy and 
escaped. 

After the capture of Nueva Coimbra the expedition 



136 PARAGUAY 

advanced up the river. No resistance was made, and 
the towns of Albuquerque, Tage, Miranda, Dourado, 
and Corumba were occupied, so that by the middle of 
January the southern portion of Matto Grosso was in 
the hands of the Paraguayans. A Provincial Admini- 
stration was established, the name of the province being 
changed to Alto Paraguay, and the emancipation of the 
slaves proclaimed, General Lopez thinking such action 
would induce the negroes to make common cause with 
the Paraguayans against the Brazilians. In this he was 
mistaken and gained few recruits. 

Lopez had good reasons for making his first campaign 
against Brazil in Matto Grosso. There was no strong 
force in this province to hinder the Paraguayan advance. 
From Asuncion to Matto Grosso was only a ten days' 
voyage, whilst from Rio de Janeiro it necessitated a 
journey of eight weeks through a country difficult for 
transport. Then, again, a dispute existed between 
Brazil and Bolivia concerning the boundary line between 
the two countries, and Lopez hoped this fact might 
cause Bolivia to join with him against the Brazilians. 
An alliance with Bolivia and possession of Matto 
Grosso were strong points before invading Rio Grande. 
With Argentina no quarrel was intended when Lopez 
first conceived the idea of conquering new territory for 
Paraguay. As matters eventually developed the com- 
bination which Lopez relied upon failed. The occupation 
of Matto Grosso proved a severe strain upon Paraguay, 
and Bolivia refused to join in hostilities against Brazil. 

It was some time before news of the invasion of 
Matto Grosso reached Rio de Janeiro, but when it 
became known there that Lopez had seized a section of 
Brazilian territory, popular excitement became intense. 
Hitherto the threat of Paraguay to open hostilities if 
the Brazilian troops were sent into Uruguay had not 
been taken seriously, but now military and naval pre- 
parations were immediately undertaken for an expedition 
of sufficient strength to enable Brazil to avenge the insult 
offered to her flag. The army in Rio Grande was re- 



1865] BRAZIL PREPARES TO ATTACK 137 

inforced, and instructions given it to be in readiness 
to attack Paraguay. But to reach Paraguay it was 
necessary to cross Misiones, and permission for this was 
requested from Argentina. General Mitre, then Presi- 
dent of Argentina, replied that the rivers Parana and 
Uruguay were open to both parties to the conflict, but 
that no license could be granted to the belligerents to 
traverse Argentine territory. Simultaneously with this 
Brazilian request came one of like character from General 
Lopez, which was answered in the same terms. This 
refusal was a greater disadvantage to Paraguay than 
Brazil, for the latter was the stronger in naval equipment. 
Moreover, an army of 20,000 men under General Robles 
had been concentrated by order of Lopez at Candelaria, 
ready to invade Rio Grande. Paraguay met with little 
outside support. Peru and Chile to some extent 
sympathised with the object Lopez had in view, but lent 
no active assistance, and President Melgarejo of Bolivia 
had already notified the Paraguayan Government that 
he would take no part in the struggle. Argentina had 
shown clearly that the attitude of Paraguay was un- 
favourably regarded, while the Administration of 
General Flores in Uruguay was prepared to render all 
possible aid to the Brazilian cause. Paraguay was 
therefore surrounded on all sides by hostility to the 
aggressive policy of Lopez. 

A Congress was now called in Asuncion for the 
nominal purpose of voting supplies and passing resolu- 
tions for the continuance of the war. It conferred on 
Lopez the title of Marshal of the Army in place of 
Brigadier- General, but all such meetings under Lopez 
were absolutely subservient to his personal influence, 
and every act approved, or resolution passed, was by his 
direct instructions. He possessed absolutely dictatorial 
powers before this Congress was held, but it suited his 
purpose to be proclaimed publicly the supreme authority 
in all matters connected with the war. 

Lopez now began negotiations with General Urquiza 
for a combination against the Color ados in Uruguay and 



iS8 PARAGUAY 

the Brazilians, the compact including the assistance of 
General Urquiza in the passage of the Paraguayans 
through the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre 
Rios. The position of General Urquiza at this time was 
one of declared hostility to President Mitre, and he was 
a strong factor in the situation on account of his powerful 
armed following. 

When the crisis in 1865 was reached, the Paraguayan 
army was on a stronger footing than that of any other 
South American State. The force under arms consisted 
of 12,000 troops of six years' service ; 6000 men who 
had served with the colours and passed to the reserve ; 
22,000 national guards under the leadership of trained 
officers ; and 20,000 in recently raised levies undergoing 
instruction. Altogether, the army comprised 45,000 
infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 5000 artillery, and the 
supply of war material was large, purchases having been 
effected abroad and establishments for its manufacture 
founded at home. With these conditions in his favour, 
Lopez boldly determined to take the offensive and 
endeavour to carry out his policy. 

In view of the hostile attitude of Paraguay two 
Argentine warships, the 25 de Mayo and the Gaule- 
guaij, had been despatched to Corrientes to watch events, 
and on April 13, 1865, a Paraguayan squadron of five 
steamers attacked them and bombarded the city of 
Corrientes. Taken by surprise both vessels were cap- 
tured. The city attempted resistance, but being in no 
condition for defence presently surrendered also, and six 
days later an expedition of 22,000 men under General 
Robles was in possession of the whole province of 
Corrientes, and a base of operations secured for an 
advance upon Uruguay and Rio Grande. This suc- 
cess encouraged Lopez, and he cared little what the 
effect of his invasion of Argentine territory might be 
when the news reached Buenos Aires, relying on the 
fact that the Argentine Government was unprepared 
for war. 

The Argentines, however, had no intention of sub- 



1865] INVASION OF CORRIENTES 130 

mitting quietly to the outrage committed by the Para- 
guayan Dictator. After the first surprise, the inhabitants 
of Buenos Aires held a mass meeting and marched to 
the Government Palace to demand prompt chastisement 
of the enemy. It was a difficult situation, for the regular 
army consisted only of 6000 men scattered over the 
different provinces. The President, however, issued a 
proclamation calling for volunteers to take the field in 
a few weeks, and in other directions the effect of the 
occupation of Corrientes was more far reaching than 
could have been anticipated by Lopez. President 
Flores of Uruguay crossed to Buenos Aires to confer 
with Mitre, and offered to make common cause against 
Paraguay, and the Brazilian Minister, Senhor Almeida 
Rosa, assured the Argentine Government of the wish 
of Brazil for joint action. General Urquiza, although 
known to be on most friendly terms with General Lopez, 
also offered his services. The result of the deliberations 
between Mitre, Flores, and Almeida Rosa was an offensive 
and defensive alliance between Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Argentina. President Mitre was given the chief com- 
mand of the allied forces, because warlike operations 
had begun in Argentine territory, but it was provided, 
in case hostilities should change to Brazilian or 
Uruguayan soil, that a general of one or other of these 
nationalities should assume the command. All naval 
operations were confided to Admiral Tamandare. The 
allies agreed not to withdraw from the conflict until 
after the conquest of Paraguay, and then only by 
common consent, but the independence of Paraguay 
was to be respected after the war, and the free naviga- 
tion of the rivers Parana and Paraguay was to be 
established for commerce and warships. Paraguay was 
to be held liable for the cost, and the boundaries between 
Brazil and Paraguay and Argentina and Paraguay were 
also defined in the treaty, which was signed in Buenos 
Aires on May 1, 1865. A protocol was subsequently 
agreed to, by which provision was made for razing the 
fortifications of Humaita, and the distributions of all 



140 PARAGUAY 

loot and trophies captured, an easy victory being taken 
as a thing of course. 

Don Francisco Solano Lopez, whose ambition had 
brought on this drama of blood, was born in 1827, and 
was, therefore, in the prime of manhood when this crisis 
occurred. His father, Don Carlos Lopez, was President 
of Paraguay at his death in March, 1857, and the son 
succeeded him. As a young man Francisco Lopez had 
travelled in foreign countries, and he received his educa- 
tion in Paris. It was in France that he met Madame 
Lynch who became his mistress, and, returning with 
him to Paraguay, fostered in his mind the ambitious 
policy that resulted in this disastrous war. Lopez had 
unbounded confidence in his own ability, regarding 
himself as the Napoleon of South America. 

Preparations for the campaign were matured rapidly 
in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The war assumed 
three distinct phases, and it is under these that the long 
struggle can be most conveniently reviewed. The first 
stage was confined to the operations in Corrientes, Rio 
Grande, and Matto Grosso ; the second to the fighting 
on the rivers Parana and Paraguay ; and the third to 
the desperate effort of General Lopez to maintain his 
position in Paraguay. Ultimate victory was only 
achieved by the allies through the facilities afforded by 
the rivers Parana and Paraguay, which permitted naval 
operations in concert with the land forces, and gave 
means of transport for men and supplies. Yet the 
struggle lasted from 1865 until 1870, it being prolonged 
by the difficult nature of the country. In favour of the 
Paraguayans was the thick forest, and local topo- 
graphical knowledge enabled Lopez both to draw the 
allied forces into ambush and to make rapid marches 
by ways unknown to them. In many of the districts 
where the invaders encamped, the air was charged with 
malaria, which told its tale in the heavy mortality, and 
it was aggravated by constant exposure to tropical 
rains. 

Under their first plan of campaign, the allies concen- 



1865] WARLIKE PREPARATIONS 141 

trated all available Argentine troops in Entre Rios and 
the south of Corrientes. The Brazilian squadron was 
to proceed up the river Parana and aid the land forces, 
while General Urquiza was despatched to Entre Rios 
to organise an irregular cavalry division. Both the 
Brazilian and the Uruguayan contingents were to be 
thrown upon the banks of the river Uruguay with 
instructions to march northwards, cross the river in the 
vicinity of Candelaria, and thence move upon Asuncion, 
the capital of Paraguay, as soon as the Argentines had 
driven the enemy out of Corrientes. The strength of 
the allied army was : — Brazil 45,000, Argentina 25,000, 
and Uruguay 5000 men. Near Concordia, in Entre 
Rios, a camp of instruction was formed. It was con- 
sidered probable that Lopez would make a dash into 
Rio Grande and attempt to reach Montevideo, so, to 
prevent surprise, observation posts were established 
between Paysandu in Uruguay, and San Borge in the 
north of Rio Grande. In Rio Grande national guards 
were under arms and volunteer cavalry regiments had 
been raised. These troops were commanded by Generals 
Netto and Cannevaro, and were to join the army when 
the movement to the north was begun, but unexpected 
circumstances arose to prevent the execution of this 
plan of campaign. The equipment of the troops was 
deficient, transport was difficult, and supplies scarce. 
Therefore it was not until the end of June that prepara- 
tions had advanced sufficiently to warrant a forward 
movement. 

The distribution of the Paraguayan army consisted 
of 6000 men in Matto Grosso ; 22,000 troops in the 
north of the province of Corrientes ; a third division of 
20,000 strong encamped at Cerro Leon and Humaita 
in a position to support the forces in Corrientes ; and a 
fourth division of 17,000 men mobilised as a final reserve. 
After occupying Corrientes in April, 1865, Lopez hesi- 
tated to advance further, it is difficult to say why, since 
at the end of April there was no force between Corri- 
entes and the frontier of Rio Grande to offer resistance. 



142 PARAGUAY 

Anyhow, the fact that no advance was made enabled 
the concentration of the allied forces. A probable 
explanation lay in the fact that the inhabitants of Corri- 
entes showed a bitter hostility, which, combined with 
the defection of General Urquiza in Entre Rios on 
whose assistance Lopez had counted, increased the 
danger of a forward movement. Moreover, the reports 
from Matto Grosso were not encouraging, and General 
Barrios stated that the unfriendly attitude of the natives 
there made reinforcements necessary if the sphere of the 
Paraguayan influence was to be extended. 

The main body of the Paraguayans in Corrientes 
was concentrated near the river Riachuelo, and in June, 
1865, a force of 2000 men under General Paunero 
opposed their advance. To draw Paunero into a fight, 
Lopez ordered the Paraguayan forces to make a feint 
of retiring, at the same time sending a cavalry division 
to outflank the Argentines. General Paunero was not 
caught in this trap. He embarked his troops on the 
Brazilian squadron, proceeding up the Parana until 
opposite Corrientes, the garrison of which had been 
reduced, and then decided to endeavour to seize the 
town. A force of 800 troops was landed, supported 
by a strong detachment of marines from the warships. 
On the morning of May 25, the positions outside the 
city were assaulted, and before nightfall the town was 
captured, but not without severe fighting which involved 
a loss to the Paraguayans of 500 officers and men killed 
and wounded, besides 80 prisoners and three guns, with 
a quantity of arms and ammunition captured. The 
casualties on the Argentine side were 23 officers and 
250 men killed and wounded. Next day outposts 
reported the Paraguayans advancing in force towards 
the city, so General Paunero re- embarked his troops in 
view of the overwhelming odds by which he was 
threatened. Many of the residents took advantage of 
this opportunity to escape, and the squadron dropped 
down the river to a section of the province not invested 
by the enemy. This victory helped to counteract the 



1865] A NAVAL BATTLE 143 

impatient feeling in Buenos Aires caused by the delay 
in the advance of the allies from Concordia. 

Lopez now made plans for the destruction of the 
Brazilian squadron on the Parana. Twenty Brazilian 
war vessels were anchored off the mouth of the Ria- 
chuelo on June 11,1865, when, without warning, a hostile 
fleet of eight steamers and six gunboats was seen 
approaching. These Paraguayan ships passed the 
anchorage of the Brazilians without discharging a shot, 
then circled round and opened a heavy fire with 
artillery and musketry. Although inferior in numbers, 
the Paraguayan squadron was well equipped, and 
the action continued with heavy losses on both 
sides for ten hours. At one time the Paraguayans had 
every prospect of victory, and the commander of the 
only Brazilian ironclad recognised that the sole hope of 
saving the day was to sink some of the hostile vessels. 
He accordingly steamed into the thick of the enemy's 
squadron and successfully rammed four of the Para- 
guayan ships. This turned the day in favour of the 
Brazilians, and the engagement ended with the total 
defeat of the Paraguayans, four of their steamers and 
six gunboats being sunk and a thousand officers and men 
killed or wounded. The commander of the Paraguayan 
squadron escaped, but was imprisoned by General Lopez, 
and the four Paraguayan steamers left afloat retreated 
to Humaita and took no further part in the war until 
two years later. In this engagement the Brazilians lost 
two vessels, and the remainder of the fleet was so much 
damaged that it had to be taken to Esquina for repairs. 

Simultaneously with the attack on the Brazilian 
squadron, 12,000 Paraguayans under the command of 
Colonel Estigarribia and Major Duarte were despatched 
from Candelaria to Misiones. This force arrived at San 
Borge, a place only weakly garrisoned, on June 15, 1865. 
Colonel Asumpcao was in command, and after a siege 
of five days he capitulated. The city was sacked. 
Colonel Estigarribia did not delay at San Borge, but 
pushed southwards distributing his division on both 



144 PARAGUAY 

banks of the river Uruguay. The Brazilians made no 
attempt to check the invasion, but occasionally a 
reconnaissance in force led to skirmishes with the 
invaders. In the most important of these the Brazilians 
were defeated and suffered heavy casualties, besides 
losing much valuable equipment. Lopez had anticipated, 
that his appearance in Rio Grande would be the signal 
for a general rising of the slaves, to whom he had pro- 
mised freedom; but his expectations were disappointed, 
the negroes showing no desire to revolt. 

Lopez left no stone unturned to ensure the success 
of the march through Brazilian territory. Knowing the 
hostility of the natives of Entre Rios to Brazilians, 
emissaries were sent to the camps of the irregular 
cavalry raised by General Urquiza to stir up seditious 
feeling. This was not difficult, and suddenly news 
reached the headquarters of the allied forces in Con- 
cordia that the Entre Rios contingent had mutinied. A 
council of war was summoned, at which General Urquiza 
promised to proceed to the camp and put matters right. 
By what influence his conduct was guided, whether by 
jealousy of General Mitre or disgust at the attitude 
of his followers, is not clear, but he left Concordia 
apparently to fulfil his promises, and instead of 
doing so, retired to his estate, declining to take 
further part in the campaign. Left without a leader, 
the men of the Entre Rios contingent dispersed to 
their homes. 

Urquiza's defection made it necessary for the allies 
to appoint an officer in his place. Urquiza had com- 
manded the vanguard of the invading army, and General 
Flores, the representative of Uruguay, begged for the 
position, proposing that the Uruguayan contingent 
should form the vanguard. The offer was accepted by 
Mitre and his colleagues, and at the end of June the 
Uruguayan division of 5000 men under Flores marched 
from Concordia to support General Paunero, the main 
body of the allied army remaining at Concordia. 

In Uruguay the Blancos saw in the Paraguayan 



1865] BATTLE OF YATAY 145 

troops a means to regain the control they lost when 
Aguirre was ousted. Their leaders, accordingly, assured 
Lopez that when his forces entered Uruguayan territory 
they would rise and make common cause with the 
Paraguayans against the Uruguayan Government. An 
outbreak in Uruguay, moreover, would have entailed 
serious complications for the allied forces at Concordia, 
for it meant that the flank of the army resting on the 
river Uruguay would be open to attack. This was not 
lost upon Lopez, and he ordered Colonel Estigarribia to 
move with all speed down the banks of the Upper 
Uruguay. 

The two columns of the Paraguayan army, marching 
on either side of the river, made quick progress, and by 
the second week in August, 1865, the division under 
Colonel Estigarribia on the left bank had reached a 
position close to Uruguayana, a town only a few miles 
from the frontier. Here he ordered the column on the 
right bank to make preparations to cross the river. 
General Flores with his 5000 men was encamped on the 
east bank of the Uruguay River at Yatay, nearly opposite 
Uruguayana, and when informed of the Paraguayan 
advance he at once arranged to give battle, imagining 
the approaching force to be the main body of the 
Paraguayan army. Word was sent to General Paunero, 
then in the south-west of the province of Corrientes, to 
move up to his support. Paunero responded by a series 
of forced marches, and joined Flores on August 15. 
Next day the Paraguayan column under Major Duarte 
was sighted, and on August 17 the opposing forces 
collided in a hard-fought battle that ended in the rout of 
the invaders. The action is described in the following 
terms by Colonel Palleja : — 

The troops were paraded at an early hour and quickly marched 
off in parallel columns. The General-in-chief gave me command of 
four regiments of the Uruguayan brigade. Moving in the formation 
mentioned we arrived in sight of the town. The irregular cavalry of 
the enemy were concentrated near some farms at a distance of half a 
league from Restauracion (Yatay). The General ordered a halt and 

K 



i46 PARAGUAY 

summoned a council of war to determine how the action should be 
fought. My brigade was ordered to deploy by battalions, covering 
the advance with a line of skirmishers, and to attack the enemy's 
front. The Brazilian and Ai'gentine columns followed in rear, inclin- 
ing towards the left to outflank the enemy. The Paraguayans 
occupied a slope which fell away until lost in a swamp about a league 
in extent formed by the Uruguay and another stream. The Para- 
guayan skirmishers and sharpshooters were posted in trenches near 
the ridge of the hill. The effective strength of the force under Major 
Duarte comprised 3000 men, consisting of three regiments of infantry 
and two of cavalry. 

My brigade deployed, the 24th Regiment in the centre, the 
Florida Regiment on the right, and the " Voluntarios Garabaldinos " 
on the left. The " Libertad " Regiment acted as skirmishers in front 
of the line. The band played the national hymn and we moved for- 
ward to the attack. The enemy's sharpshooters in the trenches 
received us with a heavy fire, but did not check us. We succeeded 
in occupying the first line of the Paraguayan defence, inflicting severe 
loss on the defenders. The Florida Regiment cut off the retreat of a 
detachment of the enemy. When this first line was driven in we 
discovered the main body of the Paraguayans in strong positions, and 
were exposed to a storm of musketry fire. My men charged and 
drove the Paraguayans back to their encampment. Here the enemy 
attempted to re-form, but were prevented by another bayonet charge 
and by the attack of our cavalry on both flanks, with the result that 
they fell back to the edge of the swamp. At this period of the fight 
sevei'al Argentine regiments came up on the left in support of the 
24th Regiment and the " Voluntarios Garabaldinos." The Florida 
Regiment now broke through the Paraguayan line and made prisoners 
of a section of infantry and cavalry. The remainder of the enemy 
dashed into the swamp and attempted to wade or swim to a place of 
safety on the other side, but unsuccessfully. About a hundred of the 
enemy swam out into the Uruguay and succeeded in reaching an 
island in mid-stream. At 2.30 p.m. the fight was over. Some 250 
Paraguayans were left dead on the field, the majority of the remainder 
taken prisoners. Our losses were 1 officer killed, 10 wounded, 
and 250 men killed or wounded. The wounded were numerous on the 
part of the enemy, and special care was taken by General Flores to 
see that they were given proper attention. 



This defeat of the Paraguayan forces was the most 
serious reverse Lopez had so far encountered, and 
practically put an end to his plan for the invasion of 
Rio Grande. 

When news of the disaster to Major Duarte reached 
Colonel Estigarribia he occupied the city of Uruguayana 



1865] OCCUPATION OF URUGUAYANA 147 

and made preparations to hold that place pending further 
instructions from Lopez. The allied forces determined 
to invest it, and a Brazilian division under General 
Cannevaro consisting of 8000 mounted troops, 1500 
infantry, and eight guns, took up a position north of the 
town. General Flores, with 1400 men, was detached 
to aid in the siege, and Argentine forces under General 
Paunero also assisted. The Paraguayans were thus 
hemmed in so completely that unless help came their 
surrender was only a question of a few weeks, for their 
provisions and ammunition were scarce. To make 
certain they should not escape, a further reinforcement 
of 1000 men was brought up at the end of August by 
Mitre, and on September 11, 1865, Dom Pedro II. and 
his son-in-law the Conde d'Eu appeared with still more 
troops. Up to then Colonel Estigarribia had refused to 
entertain any proposals for capitulation, relying on aid 
being sent to him by General Lopez ; but when, on 
September 16, the Emperor made another proposition 
the Colonel decided to accept it, although it was uncon- 
ditional surrender. On September 18, Estigarribia and 
his troops therefore marched out of the city as prisoners 
of war. Eight guns, seven standards, and all the mili- 
tary equipment of the Paraguayan army of invasion 
was captured, and when Lopez was informed of it 
all, he declared Estigarribia to be a traitor to his 
country. 

And well he might, for the loss of this division of 
the Paraguayan army was a severe blow. Not only did 
it reduce the troops available for active service, but all 
hopes of an occupation of Rio Grande were annihilated, 
and the project of controlling Uruguay by a revolution 
of the Blancos against Flores was frustrated. But the 
Paraguayan dictator did not despair. Recognising the 
many difficulties attending an invasion of Paraguay by 
the allies, he forthwith turned his whole attention to the 
problem of resisting it. The strong positions on the 
north bank of the Parana were fortified and garrisoned 
by trustworthy troops. Near the Parana were 27,000 



148 PARAGUAY 

Paraguayans under General Robles with 60 guns, and 
General Barrios, with 10,000 men, was in the neighbour- 
hood of Candelaria. A force of 5000 men was in 
Corrientes, and Lopez himself was at the strongly 
fortified position of Humaita, from which central point 
he was able to keep in touch with the progress of 
events. 

The destruction of the column under Colonel Esti- 
garribia and Major Duarte on the Uruguay modified 
the allied plan of campaign. The route proposed for 
the advance upon Asuncion entailed a long and tedious 
march through difficult country, in which few supplies 
could be obtained. General Mitre therefore proposed 
that joint action should be taken by the army on shore 
and the squadron on the river. The plan was to drive 
the enemy out of Corrientes and then advance across 
the Parana into Paraguay, while the squadron was to 
keep the river open for transport purposes. After 
some opposition this plan was accepted and prepara- 
tions for the advance were commenced, although lack 
of transport animals was such a severe hindrance, that 
not until November could the allied army of 40,000 
approach Corrientes. Small opposition was en- 
countered on the march from the river Uruguay. A 
few skirmishes took place with small bodies, but the 
enemy always fell back, and when the allied army 
appeared near the city of Corrientes, Lopez ordered all 
Paraguayan troops to withdraw across the Parana, 
Thus, at the end of 1865, the enemy had entirely 
evacuated Argentine territory, and the failure of General 
Robles to make any effective resistance to the advance 
of the enemy through the province of Corrientes so 
irritated Lopez that he ordered his arrest. Six months 
after he was shot. 

Affairs in Matto Grosso were just as unsatisfactory 
to Paraguay, for the inhabitants had risen against the 
Lopez Administration, and the position of the army of 
occupation became precarious, the more so as Lopez 
was obliged to withdraw a large proportion of troops in 



1865] EVACUATION OF CORRIENTES 149 

order to strengthen his line of defence on the Parana. 
It thus came about that at the end of 1865 the Para- 
guayan forces in Brazilian territory were only strong 
enough to make Paraguayan authority respected in such 
towns as were garrisoned. 



CHAPTER VIII 

Paraguay — continued 

Public Feeling in South America. Consultation of Argentine, 
Brazilian, and Uruguayan Representatives. Corrientes the Base 
of Operations. Defences of the Parana. Engagement at Paso 
de la Patria. Conduct of the Argentine National Guard. Raid 
to Itati. Reconnaissance of Paraguayan Positions. Paso de la 
Patria. Crossing of the Parana. Over-confidence of Allies. 
Surprise of Allies. Advance into Paraguay. Battle of May 20. 
Camp at Tuyuti. Lines of Rojas. Discontent in Allied Army. 
Engagements, July 15 and 20. Arrival of Reinforcements. 
Expedition against Curupaiti. Engagement at Curuzu. Garrison 
of Curuzu. Conference between Mitre and Lopez. Effect of 
Peace Proposals. Attack upon Curupaiti. Inefficient Recon- 
naissance. Paraguayan Victory. Breakdown of Plans. Military 
Changes. Public Opinion in Argentina and Brazil. Paralisation 
of the Operations. Revolution in Mendoza. Marshal Caxias' 
Invasion. Arrival of General Osorio at Tuyuti. Forward move- 
ment. Occupation of Rio Hondo. Advance under Marshal 
Caxias. Situation in Matto Grosso. General Mitre. Attack 
upon Convoy at Humaita. Squadron forces passage at Curupaiti. 
Unsatisfactory situation of the Fleet. Difficult Transport. 
Operations at Humaita. Effort of Paraguayans to recapture 
Tayi. Attack of Paraguayans upon Tuyuti. Heavy Losses. 
Revolt in Argentina. Assassination of Flores. Squadron forces 
the Humaita Passage. Attack on Humaita. Squadron reaches 
Asuncion. 

The retreat of the Paraguayans across the Parana 
caused a revulsion of feeling in Argentina. Hitherto 
public sentiment had demanded strong action against 
Lopez, but when the enemy had been expelled from 
Argentine territory the standpoint taken was that the 



1866] BRAZIL REJECTS PEACE PROPOSALS 151 

national honour was satisfied, and further sacrifice of 
blood and treasure unnecessary. 

Urquiza was in favour of immediate peace negotia- 
tions with Lopez, and his influence was not without 
effect on public opinion. In Uruguay also the Blancos 
agitated for a suspension of hostilities, and Chile and 
Peru intimated to Argentina that they considered action 
against Paraguay had gone far enough. The United 
States, Great Britain, and France were of the same 
opinion, and a discussion took place between the repre- 
sentative's of the allies, but Brazil decided the policy to 
be followed. The Emperor declined to treat with Lopez. 
He reminded the Argentine and Uruguay representatives 
of the treaty, and particularly called attention to the 
clause stating that warlike operations should not cease 
until the Paraguayans had been driven out of all 
territory invaded. It had also been stipulated in the 
treaty that no one party to the compact could retire ex- 
cept by mutual consent, and in conclusion Dom PedroII. 
declared that as the Paraguayans were still in the 
Brazilian province of Matto Grosso he felt the necessity 
of continuing the campaign, and that in case Argentina 
and Uruguay decided for peace he should abdicate in 
favour of his daughter, as a protest against any such 
policy. This determined attitude carried the day, and 
the invasion of Paraguay was undertaken. 

For this, the second phase of the war, the base of 
operations was the city of Corrientes, where large 
deposits of war material and stores were collected and 
hospitals erected. The allied army was distributed 
along the left bank of the Parana from the town of 
Corrientes to Misiones. In the arrangements the 
squadron played an important part, being allotted the 
duties of keeping the river free for navigation, making 
constant reconnaissances as far north as Humaita, and 
providing transport. 

During these preparations the Paraguayans were 
not idle. The defence of the right bank of the river 
was strengthened. Reinforcements were brought up to 



152 PARAGUAY 

resist the passage of the Parana, and a body of troops 
was in readiness for a raid into Corrientes. At the end 
of 1885, information was brought into the Paraguayan 
camp that the vigilance of the allies had been relaxed 
at the Paso de la Patria. General Hornos was the 
officer in command at this point, and it was owing to 
his over-confidence in safety from attack by the Para- 
guayans that a raid was possible. On January 1, 1866, 
1000 Paraguayans crossed the river and drove in the 
Argentine picquets. The main body of this division 
was then brought into action, and a desperate fight 
ensued. The Paraguayans, reinforced, continued the 
attack for the greater part of the day, but a bayonet 
charge by the National Guard forced them finally to 
retreat. On the side of the allies the casualties were 
returned as 402 officers and men killed and wounded, 
and the Paraguayans lost about 1000 men. This 
engagement excited particular attention in Buenos Aires 
for the reason that the rank and file of the National 
Guard, upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting and 
the majority of the casualties, were recruited from well- 
known families in that city. 

In February, 3000 Paraguayans were sent on another 
expedition which crossed the Parana to Itati, where the 
vanguard of the allied army was encamped. General 
Elores was absent, having left General Suarez in charge. 
The Paraguayans were inferior in strength to the 
division under Suarez, but the latter received orders 
from General Mitre to avoid any engagement, and fell 
back upon San Cosme. No attempt was made by the 
enemy to follow ; they simply destroyed the camp and 
looted the town. 

March was spent by the squadron in sounding the 
river in the neighbourhood of Paso de la Patria and 
reconnoitring the Paraguayan defences. Occasionally 
skirmishes occurred between the ships and the shore, 
but no serious engagements. The defences of the Paso 
de la Patria consisted of a fort called Itapiru, situated 
on a high point known as Diamante. To the left was 



1866] ENGAGEMENTS NEAE THE PARANA 153 

the mouth of a stream where two barges, mounted with 
artillery, a steamer, and a number of canoes were placed. 
In front of Paso de la Patria were two long islands, the 
western of which was commanded by the guns of the 
Itapirii fort. On April 5 a Brazilian detachment seized 
this latter island and fortified it. Five days later a 
force of 1200 Paraguayans was despatched by Lopez to 
retake the position, but failed, being driven back at the 
point of the bayonet, losing 800 killed and wounded. 
The Brazilian losses were also heavy, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Cabrita and several officers and men being killed, and 
a large number wounded. 

During the first two weeks in April, preparations for 
the passage of the Parana had matured. The allied 
army consisted of 75 battalions of infantry, 70 squadrons 
of cavalry, with 8 batteries of light and 2 of heavy 
artillery, and the plan was to effect the passage at Paso 
de la Patria while the squadron bombarded the Itapiru 
fort to distract attention. On the morning of April 16, 
186(5, a Brazilian contingent commanded by General 
Osorio was landed on the Paraguayan bank of the river. 
The Argentine division under General Mitre followed, 
and this combined force drove back the Paraguayans, 
who retreated to a strongly entrenched camp a little to 
the north of Fort Itapiru. Next day an attack in force 
was made on this camp, the squadron bombarding the 
position before the assault, and, after resisting success- 
fully for several days, the Paraguayans set fire to the 
camp, destroyed all ammunition and provisions they 
were unable to remove, and evacuated it. Thus, by 
April 25, the allies were in possession of the right bank 
of the Parana, an advantage gained with trifling loss. 
From this position it was possible to realise some of the 
difficulties of a march to Asuncion. Between the Parana 
and the strongly fortified position of Humaita was a 
heavily wooded mountain range. To the west was thick 
scrub and undergrowth bordering on the river Paraguay, 
and to the east the almost impenetrable swamps of the 
Estero Vellaco. All advantage was with the defenders, 



154 PARAGUAY 

No wonder that the difficulty of transport was carefully 
considered by General Mitre before deciding when the 
advance should take place. 

Yet the ease with which the passage of the Parana 
had been accomplished and the retreat of the Para- 
guayans from Fort Itapiru made the allies over-confident, 
as was illustrated by the position selected by Flores for 
his division. It was chosen more with a view to general 
convenience than for strategic purposes, and picquets 
were thrown out in forest country where observation 
was difficult. The Paraguayans were quick to see the 
weak points of this situation, and Lopez sent a force of 
6000 men to advance through the forest from different 
quarters, with the result that at mid-day on May 2, the 
outposts of the allies were surrounded and cut to pieces. 
The Uruguayan brigade was the first to get under arms, 
and it checked the assault before the encampment of the 
main body was reached, but matters grew desperate, 
and to save the situation Colonel Palleja ordered 
the Florida regiment to fix bayonets and charge. He 
was not supported and the regiment was surrounded, 
but after an hour of desperate fighting the main body 
came into action and the Paraguayans were repulsed. 
When pursuit was attempted the allies were brought 
face to face with extensive entrenchments, known as 
the " Lines of Pojas," and the cause subsequently of 
severe fighting. In this engagement the Paraguayans 
lost 3000 men killed and wounded, and abandoned 4 
field guns in their retreat. The allies had 800 casual- 
ties, and 4 Brazilian guns were captured and carried 
off. 

On May 20 the general advance into Paraguay began, 
but progress was slow, and four days later, while the 
allies were throwing up entrenchments, a sudden assault 
was made upon them by 9000 Paraguayans, who attacked 
in three columns, advancing against the centre and the 
two flanks. To the right were the Argentines, in the 
centre the Uruguayans under Flores, on the left the 
Brazilians. The column attacking the centre was de- 



1866] ALLIES ADVANCE INTO PARAGUAY 155 

layed by unexpected obstacles, only arriving after the 
action had begun on the right and ■ left. Flores was 
better prepared, therefore, to resist than the other 
divisions. The Paraguayans made a desperate attempt 
to break through his lines, but were repulsed. The 
Argentines, however, were surrounded on the right, and 
on the left the enemy succeeded in breaking through the 
Brazilian defences and reached the outskirts of the camp. 
In this emergency Flores detached two regiments to 
support the left wing, when suddenly an outburst of firing 
was heard in rear of the allies. This proved to be a 
fourth Paraguayan column which had crept round the 
flanks whilst the allies were occupied in repelling the 
frontal attack. The cavalry contingent under General 
Netto from Rio Grande was in rear of the main body, 
and upon it fell the brunt of this fresh attack, but 
the Paraguayans were repulsed finally at all points with 
a loss of 5000 killed and wounded and 4 guns and 5 
standards. The casualties of the allies were 400 killed 
and 1500 wounded. 

These two engagements opened the eyes of General 
Mitre to the real difficulties of the situation. The army 
was some distance from the river and unable to co- 
operate with the squadron, and it was hampered by the 
sick and wounded. Convoys from the Parana were con- 
stantly attacked, and the nature of the country rendered 
long marches an impossibility. Little resistance had 
been anticipated south of Humaita on the river Paraguay, 
and at this point the aid of the squadron would facilitate 
land operations, but calculations made before the advance 
had proved erroneous, and nothing had been known of 
the " Lines of Rojas," which now confronted the allies. 
What wonder then that the army generally was dis- 
heartened at the obstacles before it. In the councils 
of war two courses were discussed — either to retire to 
the Parana, or to entrench the camp and hold the 
position until the "Lines of Rojas" were captured. 
The first proposition was abandoned on the ground that 
it would entail political complications, and the second 



156 PARAGUAY 

adopted. Trenches and fortifications Avere constructed 
to ensure the camp against surprise. Preparations were 
made for reducing the Paraguayan position by bombard- 
ment, and no assault was to be attempted until the 
arrival of the reinforcements now en route under the 
Brazilian General Porto Alegre. 

All this time Lopez was at Humaita elaborating 
defensive measures against the invasion. The heavy 
losses of the Paraguayan army during the first year of 
the war were made good by enlisting all males capable 
of bearing arms, this including boys of fourteen and men 
of sixty years of age, and the misery this caused was 
widespread. But the Dictator was determined to resist 
the advance of the allies as long as he could obtain men 
to fight. 

Discontent now broke out between the allies, and 
General Osorio resigned his command. Flores threatened 
to follow this example unless supplies and reinforcements 
were forthcoming from Montevideo. In the second 
week of July there was no sign of General Porto 
Alegre and his 12,000 men, but to prevent the mischief 
from spreading Mitre decided to go on without him. 
So, on July 15, the 4th Infantry Division under General 
Guillermo Souza, supported by the Argentine Division 
under Colonel Conessa, attacked at daybreak and carried 
the Paraguayan trenches after severe fighting. Beyond 
the trenches was an open space defended by a redoubt 
and communicating with the fortifications protecting the 
Paraguayan camp. The Brazilians attempted to advance 
and storm this redoubt, but were driven back with heavy 
loss. Beyond some cannonading and skirmishing nothing 
further occurred until the 18th, when the allies again 
attacked the Paraguayan defences and the redoubt was 
captured, but at great sacrifice of life. Amongst the 
killed was Colonel Palleja, the officer commanding the 
Uruguayan brigade. After several days' further skirmish- 
ing the Paraguayans were forced to retire within the 
" Lines of Rojas," but General Mitre did not consider 
his force strong enough to advance, for the prolonged 



1866] PARAGUAYAN DEFENCES 15? 

fighting had cost the allies 2000 officers and men killed 
and wounded. 

Another period of inactivity therefore followed until 
the arrival of General Porto Alegre in August, when the 
unsatisfactory results at Rojas led to a proposal to send 
an expedition up the river Paraguay to attack the 
fortified town of Curupaiti in combination with the 
squadron thence moving northwards against Humaita. 
Success in this, it was argued, would compel Lopez to 
withdraw his forces from Rojas to support Humaita, 
upon which the allied army could then converge. 
General Porto Alegre with 9000 men, and accompanied 
by six cruisers, was accordingly told off to carry out this 
plan, and started on September 1. An example now 
illustrated the faulty information of the allies concern- 
ing the nature of the Paraguayan defences. On the 
first day the warships and transports advanced up the 
river Paraguay they were checked by heavy artillery and 
musketry fire, and obliged to seek shelter behind some 
islands in mid-river. Then it was discovered that in a 
clear space in the scrub a fort had been erected com- 
manding the river, and a force of 2000 men forthwith 
landed below this position, another 1000 strong being 
disembarked as a support, the squadron covering all by 
bombarding the Paraguayan position. Aided by this 
cannonade the Brazilians endeavoured to advance 
towards the fort, and as they did so the squadron was 
obliged to cease firing for fear of hitting its own side, 
whereupon the Paraguayans at once attacked the 
invaders. Fighting continued for several hours, and 
then reinforcements of 3000 men were landed. Next 
morning the assault upon this fortified position, known 
as Curuzu, was renewed, and shortly after fighting had 
begun a torpedo launched from the river bank exploded 
under the ironclad Rio de Janeiro, which foundered with 
the majority of her officers and crew. The vessel had 
cost 7,000,000 francs, and was considered the finest ship 
in the Brazilian navy. The Paraguayans stubbornly 
defended their position, but were out-numbered and in 



158 PARAGUAY 

the end retreated, leaving the fort in the hands of the 
invaders. Pursuit was continued by the Brazilians up 
to the walls of Curupaiti, but this place was so strongly 
held that they returned to Curuzu. It was a dearly- 
bought victory, for the expedition lost 1000 men killed 
and wounded, in addition to the disaster to the Rio de 
Janeiro. Lopez was furious when he learned that 
Curuzu was taken, and immediately ordered one half of 
the officers and ten per cent, of the other survivors to 
be executed. General Porto Alegre now requisitioned 
reinforcements to attack Curupaiti, but the commander- 
in-chief hesitated to accede to this request, on the 
grounds that to weaken the force opposite Rojas would 
expose the army to serious danger. All the Brazilian 
generals, however, were in favour of the attack upon 
Curupaiti as a means to open the road to Humaita. 
Admiral Tamandare, on the other hand, opposed an 
immediate advance, asserting that he was not prepared 
to risk the loss of another cruiser. So General Porto 
Alegre entrenched his camp at Curuzu and awaited 
developments. 

Meanwhile Lopez had sent a flag of truce to Mitre 
proposing terms for peace. These were rejected by the 
allies after a conference between Mitre, Flores, and the 
Paraguayan representative. The senior Brazilian officer, 
General Polidoro, was invited to be present, but refused, 
stating that his Government had instructed him to make 
war against the tyrant of Paraguay and not to cease 
until the Dictator was overthrown. Lopez's proposal 
was to make peace with Argentina and Uruguay, but 
not with Brazil. The discussion was of short duration, 
the first condition laid down by Mitre for any negotia- 
tions being the absolute separation of Lopez from further 
participation in the Government of Paraguay. When 
this was made clear to the representative of Lopez, he 
refused to treat. 

Although General Mitre had brusquely cut short the 
peace negotiations proposed by Lopez, they influenced 
his judgment of the position, leading him to see in the 



1866] LOPEZ PEOPOSES PEACE 159 

fact that Lopez had taken the first step, the sign of a 
lessened confidence in his absolute power to resist as 
expressed at the commencement of hostilities. Many 
councils of war were then held, at which the Brazilian 
generals continued strongly in favour of supporting 
General Porto Alegre in Curuzu, and from that point 
making the advance northwards to Curupaiti and 
Humaita. In the end Mitre agreed to this plan of 
campaign, and arranged that the camp at Tuyuti, the 
position so long occupied by the allies, should be 
entrusted to General Polidoro, and that Flores with the 
Uruguayan division should keep open communication 
between Tuyuti and Curuzu. Mitre with the Argentine 
troops immediately proceeded to Curuzu. When the 
advance to Curupaiti was begun General Polidoro was 
to assault the Paraguayan position at Rojas. 

The march to Curupaiti commenced on September 22. 
Scouting parties sent out previously had reported 
the vicinity clear and the main road between the two 
places free from all obstacles, except a few entrench- 
ments near the Paraguayan positions. Owing to recent 
rains the difficulty of transport was increased, especially 
in regard to artillery, and it was found necessary to 
reduce the number of guns. The squadron was in- 
structed to take up a position on the river opposite 
Curupaiti and prepare the way by bombarding the forti- 
fications, but the remembrance of the disaster to the 
Rio de Janeiro was fresh in the mind of Admiral 
Tamandare, and to avoid any possibility of a repetition 
of this misforture he ordered the ships to lay off at a 
distance to ensure safety from torpedoes. As a matter 
of fact the squadron kept so far away that the naval 
guns did no damage to the fort or garrison. This 
aroused bitter recriminations by the military officers. 

It was a tedious march. A mile from the Para- 
guayan fortifications the road was cut by a fosse twelve 
feet deep and extending across country for three miles. 
The Argentine troops forming the left wing were able, 
however, to cross this impediment without great diffi- 



160 PARAGUAY 

culty, but on the far side another surprise was in store. 
The intervening space to the fortifications was marshy 
ground full of pitfalls and entanglements, the whole 
commanded by artillery, which opened fire to such good 
purpose that the column was forced back. The guns of 
the allies were now brought into action, and under cover 
of their fire another attempt was made to storm the 
position, but it proved useless and the allies were 
repulsed. Mitre retreated to Curuzu with a loss of 
5000 killed and wounded. The casualties of the 
defenders of Curupaiti were trifling. 

The operations assigned by General Mitre to Flores 
and Polidoro had also miscarried. General Flores had 
failed to establish communication with Curuzu, and 
Polidoro did not dare to attack the position at JRojas 
until connection with Curuzu was assured. At the end 
of September, 1866, therefore, the position was most un- 
satisfactory, the more so that Lopez strengthened the 
garrison of Kojas. Several changes in the higher posts 
of the allied army now took place. Mitre returned to 
Tuyuti, Porto Alegre resuming command of the forces 
at Curuzu, and Flores left Paraguay for Montevideo, 
while the Brazilian Government recalled Admiral 
Tamandare. 

Indignation was aroused in Argentina and Brazil 
at the mishaps to the allies, and discontent with the 
policy of the two Governments in continuing the war 
rapidly spread. The loss of life and heavy expenditure 
were the principal reasons urged for peace with Paraguay, 
but the Emperor of Brazil would not listen to any such 
proposition, and a further contingent of 10,000 men of 
the Brazilian National Guard was embodied. More 
ships also were fitted out, Marshal Caxias was given 
command of the Brazilian forces, and Admiral Ignacio 
ordered to replace Admiral Tamandare. In the middle 
of December these two officers reached Tuyuti. 

Another long period of inactivity now ensued, and 
the result of many conferences was the conviction that 
no further advance was possible without strong rein- 



1867] WAITING FOR REINFORCEMENTS 161 

forcements for both army and navy. Despatches were 
sent by Caxias and Ignacio to the Brazilian Government 
stating what troops and vessels they considered necessary 
to attempt a forward movement, and meantime the work 
of the allies was confined to reconnaissance of the 
Paraguayan lines at Rojas, and preparations for the 
advance when reinforcements did come. An interrup- 
tion, however, from an unexpected quarter occurred to 
complicate matters, for a revolution broke out in the 
Argentine province of Mendoza, and developed to such 
formidable extent that Mitre was obliged to order 
Paunero with 3000 men to embark immediately for 
Rosario, and thence march against the rebels. Soon 
affairs became so serious that Mitre himself decided to 
take the field, and left Paraguay for that purpose. 

The suppression of this revolutionary movement in 
Argentina directly concerned the war against Paraguay, 
for its leaders insisted on the conclusion of the war, the 
denouncement of the alliance with Brazil and Uruguay, 
and, finally, the secession of the State of Mendoza from 
the Argentine Confederation. San Juan, San Luis, and 
La Rioja provinces joined the movement, and the rising 
threatened imminent danger to the National Government. 
Hence General Mitre, as President of Argentina, felt 
obliged to abandon command of the allies to go and 
face the storm by which his administration was con- 
fronted. He gone, the post of Commander-in-chief of 
the allied army devolved upon Marshal Caxias. 

The army now had a total effective strength of 
35,000 men, and reinforcements of 10,000 more were 
expected. So Marshal Caxias decided to attempt to 
outflank the Paraguayan position at Rojas, certain 
weakly guarded sections along the lines of the enemy's 
trenches having been discovered. Therefore, when in 
July, General Osorio, with reinforcements of 7000 men, 
reached Tuyuti — his march from Candelaria having been 
delayed by an outbreak of Asiatic cholera — Marshal 
Caxias saw no reason to wait any longer. 

He began his campaign on July 22, 1867, and a 

L 



162 PARAGUAY 

division of 6000 men was thrown forward under General 
Osorio as a vanguard, 22,000 men under the Marshal 
himself following. A force of 9000 men was left at 
Tuyuti with General Porto Alegre. The advance was 
to the east of the fortified positions at Pojas, through 
swampy country, and the Paraguayans, abandoning 
their trenches, marched parallel to the allies. By night- 
fall Caxias reached the village of Pio Honda, a few 
miles to the north of Humaita, where he cut the telegraph 
line between that place and Asuncion. A road was 
now opened to Tuyuti to allow transport of provisions, 
and strong protection given to this line of communica- 
tion. Humaita was thus cut off from the remainder of 
Paraguay, the only other connection with Asuncion 
being by water, and that too was to be closed by the 
advance of the squadron. 

This move of the Marshal's was the turning-point of 
the war. For fifteen months the allies had failed to 
push forward, but now the dangerous, if skilful, tactics 
of the Brazilian Commander-in-chief proved successful, 
and obliged Lopez to withdraw his outlying posts 
towards Humaita. Marshal Caxias was quite aware of 
the animosity that would be stirred up should he be 
forced to abandon his advantageous position, and every 
precaution was taken. 

Meanwhile, in Matto Grosso the cause of Paraguay 
had steadily lost ground. A fight took place between 
two Brazilian ships and three Paraguayan, in which the 
latter were worsted. Senhor Coelho Magalhaes, the 
Brazilian Governor of Matto Grosso, thereupon ordered 
his ships to Corumba and demanded its surrender. It 
was refused, but after severe fighting the city capitulated. 

General Mitre resumed command of the allies on 
July 28, the revolutionary movement in Mendoza having 
been suppressed, leaving the President of Argentina 
free to take the field again. The last days of July and 
the beginning of August passed with occasional skir- 
mishes between detachments of the invading army and 
scattered groups of Paraguayans, and on August 11 



1867] THE ADVANCE TO HUMAITA 163 

some excitement was caused by an attempt to capture a 
convoy of the allies on its way from Tuyuti. The fact 
that the Paraguayans waited until only a small escort 
was despatched proved them to be well informed of the 
movements of their enemies, and in this respect they 
showed superior organisation to the allies. A small 
force of 400 men was sent by Lopez to intercept a 
valuable provision train, and the Brazilian escort was 
surprised, but some of the men escaped and gave informa- 
tion of the disaster. General Porto Alegre immediately 
set out with a strong force to the scene of the mishap, 
and eventually recovered a portion of the stores. 

The allies now proposed closing in upon Humaita 
towards the south. To accomplish this the squadron 
was ordered to ascend the river Paraguay to a position 
near Humaita, and did so on August 15, but its position 
was not satisfactory or free from danger. In front were 
the guns of Humaita, and the passage was blocked by a 
great iron chain stretching from shore to shore. In 
rear, towards the neighbourhood of Curuzu, heavily 
armed batteries were erected by Lopez to command the 
river below the squadron. To force the passage at 
Humaita was therefore no easy matter, and if any disaster 
occurred to the army, the ships would have to run the 
gauntlet of the guns at Curupaiti, as well as overcome 
the formidable obstacles of recent construction near 
Curuzu. 

Difficulty of transport now hampered the allies, 
especially in the matter of food supplies and medical 
stores. Large deposits had been accumulated in Corrie- 
entes, but carriage to Tuyuti and thence to the troops in 
the field was not easy. So to increase facilities of 
transportation every effort was made to establish 
communication with the squadron to the south of 
Humaita. This done, the positions of the Paraguayans 
below that point would become untenable, and the river 
be available for transport. Accordingly, the lines of the 
invading army were gradually pushed westwards towards 
the river, but progress was slow owing to the stubborn 



164 PARAGUAY 

resistance of the Paraguayan outposts, and because a 
large number of troops were required to the north of 
Humaita to prevent the re-establishment of communica- 
tion by land between Humaita and Asuncion. To 
isolate Humaita further a force under Generals Hornos 
and Barreto was sent to the north of the Rio Hondo to 
occupy Villa del Pilar, which was captured on September 
24, 1867. From this point an advance was made to 
Tayi, a town to the south of Villa del Pilar, and this 
was also captured after severe fighting, several batteries 
of heavy guns being mounted at this place by General 
Barreto to command the passage of the river, thus 
severing communication by water between Asuncion 
and Humaita. The Paraguayans made a desperate 
effort to retake Tayi. On the morning of November 2, 
three steamers and a barge conveying 3000 men appeared 
near the town and were disembarked, but General 
Barreto attacked this force and inflicted a severe defeat 
upon it. 

The knowledge that the allies were closing in upon 
Humaita induced Lopez to make a strong effort. He 
learnt that a valuable convoy escorted by three regiments 
of cavalry and three battalions of infantry would leave 
Tuyuti early in November, and determined to send an 
expedition to intercept it. The Paraguayans numbered 
6000 under General Barrios, and on the night of 
November 2, 1867, they lay hidden near Tuyuti. Recent 
successes had made the allies careless, and the presence 
of the enemy was unknown until the convoy and escort 
were suddenly attacked. Panic ensued, and the cavalry 
and infantry regiments were cut to pieces. The Para- 
guayans then moved forward in three columns upon 
Tuyuti, and entered it without opposition, shooting clown 
the troops, looting the camp, and capturing the whole 
position before daybreak, with the exception of an 
entrenched section in the centre. Here the remnants of 
the allies resisted until assistance arrived. The news of 
the disaster reached Marshal Caxias through refugees 
who escaped from the convoy, and all available troops 



1868] DISASTER AT TUYUTI 165 

were despatched to Tuyuti. For some hours after the 
arrival of these reinforcements the Paraguayans con- 
tinued the fight, but seeing themselves outnumbered 
they finally withdrew towards Humaita. The losses to 
the allied army in killed and wounded were 270 officers, 
3300 men, 500 prisoners, 3 standards, 10 pieces of 
artillery, and an immense stock of ammunition and 
stores. On the Paraguayan side the casualties were 78 
officers and 2271 men killed and wounded, and 151 
prisoners. The effect of this defeat was mitigated to 
the allies by the fact that Lopez could not follow up his 
advantage owing to lack of troops. 

Still this disaster at Tuyuti threatened to create 
complications similar to those in Mendoza. Urquiza 
raised the standard of revolt in Cordoba, demanding the 
dissolution of the alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay and immediate peace negotiations with 
Paraguay, and that revolutionary outbreak again required 
the presence of General Mitre in Argentina. Once 
more the chief command of the troops in the field was 
left to Marshal Caxias, the Argentine division being in 
charge of General Gelly y Obes. Matters in Uruguay 
also were not satisfactory, for the Blancos hatched a 
conspiracy there against the Administration, which 
resulted in the assassination of General Flores. 

Some weeks elapsed before the allies were able to 
resume active hostilities, but towards the close of 1867 
preparations were made to attack Plumaita, Curupaiti, 
and other places. It was decided that part of the 
squadron should force a passage past Humaita to co- 
operate with the land forces. The vessels available for 
action consisted of 43 ships of war, mounting 223 guns, 
and with a total complement of 702 officers and 3779 
men. On February 19, 1868, at 3 a.m., they steamed 
opposite the fortifications, where they were exposed to 
heavy fire from the batteries. The guns of the fleet 
were concentrated upon the two barges which sustained 
the ends of the great chain stretching across the river, 
and so effectual was their fire, that both barges were 



166 PARAGUAY 

sunk in a few minutes. This left the river free to 
navigation, and the vessels steamed ahead, meeting a 
hail of projectiles as they passed. During this firing, 
the cable by which the Bahia was towing the 
Alagoa parted, and thirty canoes filled with Para- 
guayans immediately surrounded and captured her. 
The remaining vessels reached the port of Tayi, but the 
Para and the Tamandare were so severely damaged 
as to be rendered unserviceable. Whilst the squadron 
was forcing the passage of Humaita the Argentines 
made an attack on the Paraguayan outposts on the 
eastern side. On the south-east General Osorio also 
advanced, while to the south General Argollo drove in 
the enemy's picquets, and on the north Marshal Caxias, 
with 3000 men, attacked the town of Timbo and 
captured this place with a loss of 600 officers and men 
killed and wounded. 

After this general attack there was a lull in the 
hostilities. The allied army had gained decided advan- 
tages, and the cordon round Humaita had been drawn 
much closer. Meanwhile the squadron steamed up the 
river and reached Asuncion, the Paraguayan national 
capital, on February 28. A few shots were fired, but 
the bombardment ceased on the arrival of a flag of truce 
from Senor Berges, the minister in charge of the 
Government, with a request not to fire on an unfortified 
city. A detachment was then landed to take possession 
of the town, but the men were shortly afterwards 
re-embarked, and the squadron proceeded down the river 
to Tayi. 



CHAPTER IX 

Paraguay — continued 

Paraguayan Attempt to Destroy Squadron. Capture of Rojas. 
Capitulation of Curupaiti. Concentration of the Paraguayans in 
Humaita. Bombardment of Humaita,. Attempt to Seize the 
Monitor Rio Grande. Assault on Humaita. Passage of Humaita 
again Forced. Evacuation of Humaita. Attack on the Allies. 
Booty in Humaita. Asuncion the Objective Point. Humaita 
the Base of Supplies. Paraguayans abandon Riverside Towns. 
The Allied Army leaves Villa del Pilar. Passage of the river 
Tibicuan. Paraguayans fall Back. Conditions at Tibicuari. 
Victims of Lopez. Paraguayans in Force near the river Carabe. 
Passage of the river Paraguay. Plan of Campaign. Attack 
upon Villeta. Renewal of Hostilities. Capture of Villeta. 

For Lopez the situation was now gloomy enough, but 
the Dictator of Paraguay was full of resources, and 
forthwith conceived a plan for the destruction of the 
portion of the allied fleet lying below Humaita. In the 
rivers Paraguay and Parana masses of verdure float 
with the current. These camalotes, or floating islands, 
usually excite little attention, and Lopez formed the 
idea of lashing canoes in batches of four and covering 
them with similar herbage. By embarking armed men 
in these canoes and floating them down the river 
amongst the" allied fleet, they might be able, when they 
reached the vessels, to board the ships and kill every- 
body offering resistance. On the night of March 1, 
1868, this extraordinary plan was put into execution, 
and at break of day the first of these batches of canoes 
was abreast of the cruiser Lima when a guard boat 

1G7 



168 PARAGUAY 

stationed a hundred yards off became suspicious and 
gave the alarm. The Paraguayans nevertheless boarded 
the Lima and killed a number of the men on deck, but 
the crew rallied after the first onslaught and regained 
possession of the vessel. The other ships of the fleet, 
now on the alert, opened fire on the camalotes as the}' 
drifted along, and few of the 1000 men in the canoes 
escaped death. 

Soon after this abortive attempt against the allied 
fleet, the weak points of the Paraguayan defence became 
more apparent. The remaining positions in the " Lines 
of Rojas" were captured by General Argollo, and all 
resistance in this district ceased. A few days later 
Curupaiti capitulated. This allowed a closer investment 
of Humaita, and the allies advanced their entrenched 
positions from the south, but this entailed severe fight- 
ing with the Paraguayan outposts, and 200 officers and 
men were killed and wounded. 

On March 22, 1868, the Paraguayan detachments to 
the south and east of Humaita concentrated inside the 
fortifications, setting fire to the different camps they 
evacuated. The allied army immediately invested the 
stronghold. Humaita was considered impregnable by 
the Paraguayans. Its parapets were of earth surrounded 
by ditches 15 feet deep and 10 feet wide, filled with 
water, and the approaches were commanded by 300 
guns. The iron chain across the river had been replaced, 
and at each end formidable batteries established. So, 
after withdrawing all outposts and issuing instructions 
for the defence, Lopez left for Tibicuari to construct 
another stronghold in that locality. 

In the beginning of April a steady bombardment of 
Humaita was commenced by the allies, and continued 
with little intermission for three months. At first the 
Paraguayans returned the fire, but after a few weeks their 
supply of powder ran short. Occasional sorties, how- 
ever, were made by the garrison, and, although unable 
to affect the position of the allied troops, considerable 
losses were inflicted. To shut off means of communica- 



1868] INVESTMENT OF HUMAITA 169 

tion between Humaita and the north, a division of 3500 
men of the allied army under General Ignacio Rivas 
was disembarked on the right bank of the river Paraguay 
to occupy the country between the town of Timbo and 
Humaita. A small column despatched to join General 
Rivas in May was surprised and cut to pieces by a 
Paraguayan force. In July the Paraguayans made an 
attempt to seize the monitor Rio Grande by again 
resorting to the device of embarking in canoes disguised 
as floating islands, and on this occasion they succeeded 
in reaching the vessel undiscovered, and wrought no 
small havoc amongst the crew before the other ships 
came to the rescue and drove them into the water. 

Marshal Caxias, becoming impatient, now determined 
to make an attempt to carry Humaita by assault. General 
Osorio was directed to detach 10 battalions of infantry 
and storm the section known as the Londres battery. 
He reached the parapets of the fort on July 15, but was 
driven back with heavy loss. The effort was repeated, 
but only to meet a similar fate. Osorio then despatched 
messengers to Marshal Caxias, asking for reinforcements, 
but was ordered to retire. A few days later another 
engagement occurred in which the allies suffered severely. 
Five battalions of infantry were en route from the head- 
quarter camp to join General Rivas, then near Timbo, 
when a sudden attack was made by the Paraguayans. 
The allies were thrown into confusion and the casualties 
.were heavy. Fortunately a detachment sent out by 
General Rivas arrived in time to render assistance, but 
the total losses of killed and wounded in this fight were 
500. 

On July 21, 1868, Marshal Caxias ordered the passage 
of the river Paraguay in front of Humaita again to be 
forced. The purpose was to search the river for three 
Paraguayan ships, and three vessels successfully carried 
out the movement without suffering serious damage. 
No sign of the hostile ships could be discovered, but 
the moral effect of again forcing the passage of the 
river was not without value. Five days later some 



170 PARAGUAY 

further skirmishing occurred, but it was evident from 
the lessening energy shown by the garrison that the 
defence of Humaita was weakening. 

Its collapse, indeed, was closer than the allies 
imagined, for during the night of July 26, the Para- 
guayans evacuated the town, using canoes to cross to 
the right bank of the Paraguay, where heavy forest 
concealed their presence. Next morning, the advanced 
picquets of the besieging army reported that positions 
usually occupied by sentries on the fortifications were 
deserted, and Marshal Caxias ordered the troops to be 
formed up in readiness for a general assault. The 
allies did not believe the evacuation was an accomplished 
fact, and every precaution was taken against surprise, 
but no resistance was offered. Humaita was aban- 
doned, the few remaining inhabitants disappearing into 
the forest to the north with the entrance of the allies 
into the town. More than two years had passed since 
the allied army had crossed the river Parana, and all 
progress had been checked by the stand at this place 
in combination with its auxiliary positions at Pojas and 
Curupaiti. 

But the occupation of Humaita did not prove to be 
the end of the fighting in this neighbourhood, for on 
the night of August 2, the left wing of the allies was 
unsuccessfully attacked in order to clear a way for 
some canoes laden with provisions. In the swamps, 
moreover, to the north of Humaita the effort of the 
allied forces to capture the Paraguayans led to sanguin- 
ary encounters, and General Pivas, to avoid further loss 
of life, sent a flag of truce to the senior Paraguayan 
officer proposing terms of surrender, but they were 
refused. A bombardment of the forest where the 
Paraguayans were concealed was ordered, and resulted 
in 1000 of the enemy being killed or wounded. On 
August 4 another flag of truce was sent to the Para- 
guayans, and two days later the capitulation was 
arranged, officers being permitted to retain their arms, 
and all ranks allowed to reside in the territories of 



1868] OCCUPATION OF HUMAITA 171 

the allies, except in the Argentine provinces of Corrientes 
and Entre Eios. The total number of persons who 
surrendered was 1230, many of them women and children. 
When Humaita was evacuated, the total had been 3730. 
Nearly 1000 had been killed or died of wounds, and 
1500 had escaped by swimming the river. 

Little was found in Humaita beyond a small stock 
of provisions and some ammunition. About two hundred 
pieces of artillery, all rendered useless for service, were 
left in the fortifications, and sixty guns were extracted 
subsequently from the river bottom. The great chain 
was cut into three lengths and delivered to the Govern- 
ments of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In accordance 
with the terms of the treaty of alliance the fortifications 
of Humaita were razed to the ground. The allies 
considered that once Humaita fell the end of the war 
was in sight, but Marshal Caxias differed from this 
opinion and insisted that the campaign was not nearly 
over. It was, however, only in the face of strong 
opposition in Buenos Aires and Brazil that the war 
was continued and the necessary expenditure for the 
army provided. Reconnaissance by the squadron dis- 
pelled all doubts as to the real situation. The popula- 
tion, undismayed by their misfortunes, were determined 
to continue the struggle, and all proposals for the 
establishment of a liberal form of government under 
representative administration were rejected. Whether 
love of country or dread of Lopez was the motive of 
this attitude of the Paraguayans has not been explained, 
but for the one reason or the other the population was 
fanatical in its determination to prolong the war. 

Consequently, the only course open to the allies was 
to push on towards the north, with Asuncion as the 
objective point, it being the general opinion that the 
occupation of the national capital would be accepted 
by the Paraguayans as the signal for surrender. With 
the squadron in control on the river, this advance pre- 
sented no very formidable difficulties, and the base of 
supplies was changed from Corrientes to Humaita. An 



172 PARAGUAY 

arsenal for naval purposes was constructed at Tayi, and 
the main body of the army was concentrated at Villa 
del Pilar in the middle of August, 1868. 

In view of the fact that Asuncion and other un- 
defended towns were at the mercy of the invaders, 
Lopez ordered the population on the river banks to 
abandon their houses and retire to the interior, and 
so great was his power that the Paraguayans obeyed 
this mandate without question, although it meant total 
ruin to them. To some extent Lopez was influenced 
by the belief that the allies would hesitate to proceed 
inland on account of difficulty of transport when separ- 
ated from the squadron. Another reason was that he 
required every available person to aid in the construction 
of the lines of defence he had planned. All the male 
population were enrolled already in the ranks, and re- 
course was necessary to the women and children for 
digging entrenchments, and as carriers for transporting 
ammunition and stores. 

On August 26, 1868, the allies marched from Villa 
del Pilar in a northerly direction, keeping in touch with 
the river Paraguay. The total number of troops was 
31,000. Marshal Caxias was Commander-in-chief, 
General Osorio in command of the vanguard, and General 
de Bettancourt of the rearguard. A garrison of 2000 
men was left at Humaita. The forward movement met 
with no resistance for the first two days. The rivers of 
Njembuca and Montuoso were passed, and it was not 
until arrival at the river Yacare that any sign of the 
enemy was visible. At this point a small fort formed 
the advanced post of the Paraguayan position on the 
river Tibicuari, but on the approach of the allies the 
garrison retired after firing a few shots, and the river 
Tacuari was reached on the 28th. On the northern side 
of this river the allies found a redoubt for the protection 
of the right wing of the Paraguayan defence. Flanking 
this were trenches, and here 13,000 men had been con- 
centrated by Lopez. Marshal Caxias expected to meet 
with a determined resistance, and decided to make a 



1868] LOPEZ RETIKES TO VILLETA 173 

general assault. The artillery prepared the way for the 
attack, and a heavy bombardment was commenced, but 
met with small response from the Paraguayans, so the 
troops moved forward to storm the position, and occupied 
the redoubt without difficulty. 

On September 1 the Paraguayans made a feint of 
attacking the allies, but retired without any serious 
engagement, and Marshal Caxias directed a general 
advance on the Paraguayan defences, whose lines were 
captured. From these the allies pushed forward to the 
main camp of the Paraguayan forces and found it 
deserted. Lopez had fallen back on strong positions at 
Angostura and Villeta. 

Explanation of the reason for the abandonment of 
the trenches at Tibicuari without a struggle was found 
in the camp. Dead and dying bodies strewed the centre. 
Some had died of bullet wounds, others from throat 
cutting ; lance and bayonet thrusts had caused death in 
many cases, and the groans of the mortally wounded 
added ghastly effect to the scene. A real or imaginary 
plot against the life of Lopez had, it seemed, been dis- 
covered, and he had wreaked a summary and terrible 
vengeance upon all persons he suspected of implication 
in this conspiracy. Amongst the victims were Senor 
Carreras, formerly Minister to Uruguay, and who signed 
the treaty in 1864 between Lopez and President Aguirre ; 
Senor Berges, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Bishop 
Palacios ; the Portuguese Consul, Senor Leite Pereira ; 
Colonel Alen ; Captain Fidanza ; the mother and wife 
of Colonel Martinez ; Senor Benigno Lopez, brother of 
the Dictator ; General Barrios, his brother-in-law ; and 
the priest Borgado. In addition to these well-known 
people were several merchants, some prisoners of war, 
and many Paraguayans serving in the army. It was a 
massacre of most ferocious character which stamped 
Lopez as a bloodthirsty tyrant unworthy of the slightest 
sympathy. He was a patriot ; he became an assassin. 
During the years of warfare against the allies many 
instances of his severe methods had come to light, and 



174 PAEAGUAY 

it was known that the penalty of death was enforced for 
trifling offences ; but such acts had been condoned in 
view of the necessity for discipline, essential in the 
management of large bodies of troops engaged in a 
desperate struggle against overwhelming odds. For 
this wholesale massacre no excuse can be found, and 
from this time forth public opinion in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay declined to accept any solution for the 
termination of the war that did not include the death 
of the Dictator. 

After a few days at Tibicuari, the allies marched 
towards Asuncion, where Marshal Caxias and his prin- 
cipal advisers thought small resistance would be offered. 
This proved entirely erroneous. On the arrival of the 
army at the river Canabe, the enemy was discovered in 
force in strong positions near Angostura and Villeta. 
Two weeks were devoted to reconnoitring these defences, 
and the information obtained convinced Marshal Caxias 
that the task of driving the Paraguayans from the 
neighbourhood would be no easy one. 

The towns of Villeta and Angostura were situated 
on the left bank of the river Paraguay. Both had been 
fortified by Lopez and were defended by artillery. The 
headquarter camp of the Paraguayans was to the south 
of Villeta, and 35 miles distant from Asuncion. Protect- 
ing the camp was the fortified position of Angostura, with 
similar characteristics to Humaita, and to the east of 
these positions was the ridge of hills known as the 
"Lomas Valentinas," covered with heavy forest. In 
front of Angostura and this range of hills was the river 
Canabe, the shores of the stream spreading out into 
extensive swamps. Through the eastern section ran the 
railway uniting Asuncion with Cerro-Leon and Villa 
Rica. On the north were a series of small rivers and 
large swamps, making any attack difficult. 

The strength of the Paraguayan position was un- 
expectedly exhibited on September 23, by a skirmish 
near the river Canabe, where a dam had been formed to 
flood the approaches to the trenches in front of Angos- 



1868] HEAVY FIGHTING ON THE CANABE 175 

tura. Here the allies met with strong opposition, and 
when reinforcements came were subjected to heavy 
artillery fire and compelled to retire. Marshal Caxias 
then ordered the squadron to force the passage of the 
river past the fortifications, the army at the same time 
advancing to attack the Paraguayans by land. Seven 
ships succeeded in passing the Paraguayan position, 
but not without a long list of casualties and some serious 
injuries to the vessels. Simultaneously Marshal Caxias, 
at the head of 20,000 men, assaulted the Paraguayan 
trenches, but met with most stubborn resistance. At 
one period of the fight the Paraguayans showed signs 
of giving way, and the allies seized some of the outer 
trenches. The Paraguayan artillery fire, however, 
became so severe, that the attacking force was repulsed 
with heavy loss. At the close of the day's fighting, and 
in view of the serious nature of the situation, Marshal 
Caxias summoned a council of war, at which it was 
decided that General Argollo, with 2000 men, should 
cross the river Paraguay, open a road northwards to 
Santa Helena, and remain there under the protection of 
the squadron. When the road was reported open troops 
were to be sent forward and the combined forces were 
to cross the river in the Paraguayan rear near Villeta, 
at the same time cutting communication between Lopez 
and Asuncion. General Argollo left on October 10, to 
carry out the first part of this plan. 

Lopez was well informed, and did not long remain in 
ignorance of the tactics of Marshal Caxias. Under- 
standing the difficulties in the way of the expedition to 
Santa Helena, he was satisfied to send isolated groups 
to act as guerillas and interfere with the construction of 
the road by firing on the working parties. The broken 
nature of the country served to protect these small 
parties from danger of capture. It was a land inter- 
spersed with swamps and divided by tributaries of the 
river Paraguay, where the thick undergrowth had to be 
chopped away before the column could advance. The 
tropical nature of the climate was adverse to severe 



176 PARAGUAY 

physical strain. Taking these factors into consideration, 
Lopez was convinced that the expedition would be 
months before arriving at its destination, but the Dictator 
in his turn was wrong. To his astonishment he learned 
at the beginning of December, that the road to Santa 
Helena was open. He was informed also that Marshal 
Caxias, with 2000 men, was to join Argollo at Santa 
Helena, and that General da Silva would arrive shortly 
at that place with 8000 troops. In the first week in 
December this force of 12,000 men was concentrated 
near San Antonio and ready to attack the Paraguayans 
at Villeta. 

The advance from San Antonio to Villeta necessi- 
tated the crossing of the river Itaroro, and the possession 
of the bridge over this waterway was essential. Aware 
of its importance, Lopez detached fourteen battalions of 
infantry for its defence. On December 6, 1868, the 
allies attacked. Marshal Caxias advanced towards the 
bridge, while General Gelly y Obes assaulted the trenches 
at Angostura, and General Osorio led his division 
against the fortified lines near the river Canabe. The 
attack by Marshal Caxias was energetically carried out, 
and the enemy compelled to retire before they destroyed 
the bridge, so that the troops were able to cross safely 
after severe fighting. To the south General Gelly y Obes 
occupied the outer lines of Angostura. General Osorio 
met with obstinate resistance near the river Canabe, but 
captured the outlying positions of the Paraguayans. 
When night fell the advantage to the north and south 
lay with the allies, whose intention was to reopen 
hostilities next morning at daybreak, but heavy rains 
prevented fighting for several days. 

Not until December 11 did the weather allow a 
renewal of the operations, and then the Paraguayans in 
all directions offered determined resistance to the 
advance of the allies. Marshal Caxias on the north, 
and General Gelly y Obes and General Osorio in the 
south, made every effort, and the losses in killed and 
wounded on both sides were heavy. But as the day 



1868] OPERATIONS RETARDED 17? 

wore away the attack from the north gained ground 
steadily, and before darkness set in Marshal Caxias was 
in possession of Villeta, the Paraguayans leaving twenty- 
three guns, eleven standards, and a quantity of stores. In 
spite, however, of repeated assaults on the positions at 
the river Canabe and Angostura, these remained under 
control of the Paraguayans. As evidence of the severity 
of this action, the allies lost 3000 officers and men killed 
or wounded. Amongst the injured were Marshal Caxias, 
General Osorio, and General Argollo. The Paraguayan 
loss was equally heavy, General Caraballo being severely 
wounded. Next morning opened with torrential rains 
which continued for seven or eight days, and rendered it 
impossible to resume hostilities, so that it was not until 
the 20th that the allies were able to follow up the 
advantages gained in the fighting on the 6th and 11th. 



M 



CHAPTER X 

Paraguay — continued 

Resumption of Hostilities on December 20. Work of Allied Cavaliy. 
Paraguayan Camp in the Valentine Hills. Action of December 
27. Defeat of the Paraguayans. Surrender of Angostura. 
Occupation of Asuncion. Disorderly Conduct of the Allied 
Troops. Delay in Operations. Mission of Senhor Parunhos. 
Provisional Government at Asuncion. A new National Capital. 
Concentration at Oscurra. Engagement at the river Manduvira. 
Arrival of the Conde d'Eu. Military Reorganisation. Opera- 
tions against Lopez in July, 1869. Fight at Sapucay. Attack 
on Peribebuy. Lopez evacuates Oscurra. Plan of Campaign 

of Conde d'Eu. Retreat of Lopez to Caraguatay. Engagement 
at Yagari. Action at Campo Grande. Lopez seeks Refuge in 
the Forests. Pai-aguayan Encampment near the Aquidaban. 
Colonel Silva Tavares and Major Oliveira. Death of Lopez. 
Madame Lynch. Treaty of Peace. Withdrawal of Argentine 
and Uruguayan Troops. Election of President Rivarola. 
Political Representation under the Constitution of 1870. Diffi- 
culties of President Rivarola. Vice-President Salvador Jovellanos. 
Assassination of Rivarola. Election of President Gill. Brazilian 
Policy in Paraguay. Assassination of President Gill. Sehor 
Uriarte. Election of President Baredo. Death of the President. 
Vice-President Saguier. Revolution in 1881. Saguier Deposed. 
General Caballero named Provisional President. General 
Caballero elected President. Election of President Escobar. 
Condition of Country. Election of President Gonzalez. 
Attempts at Reform. Deposition of President Gonzalez. Vice- 
President Morinigo takes Office. Election of President Egusquiza. 
Rupture with Uruguay. Election of President Aceval. Oligarchy 
in Control. Political Rights. Economic Conditions after 1870. 
Natural Causes and Reaction. Idleness of Male Population. 
Improvement in General Conditions. Population during Thirty 
Years. Immigration. Australian Socialistic Colony. Sicilian 
Colonisation. Educational System. 

The situation of the allied army after the severe 
fighting in December was unsatisfactory because the 



1868] HOSTILITIES RESUMED 179 

forces to the north and south of the Paraguayan position 
had failed to effect a junction, owing to the fact that 
lines of the enemy extended from the river Paraguay to 
the Valentine ranges, and so divided the army of invasion 
that communication was difficult. So Marshal Caxias 
again called a council of war, which was followed by an 
order to General Gelly y Obes to despatch to the north 
such reinforcements as could be spared, and to draw 
upon Humaita for fresh troops. In the opinion of 
Marshal Caxias, the positions at Angostura and the 
Lomas Valentinas were the last entrenchments Lopez 
had constructed to resist the advance. -If these were 
captured the Paraguayan Dictator would make terms, 
and with this end in view the Commander-in-chief 
issued instructions for all available forces to be brought 
into action when hostilities were resumed. 

They were resumed on December 20, when a move- 
ment from the north was begun against the positions in 
the Lomas Valentinas, with the object of cutting com- 
munication between that point and Angostura. From 
the south the attack was on the entrenchments at the 
river Canabe to break through the line and join Marshal 
Caxias. The first advantages gained were slight, but 
encouraging, and on the 21st Marshal Caxias pressed 
forward towards the Valentine range, General Menna 
JBarreto attacking the trenches of Canabe, where 
important progress was made. Barreto ordered a feint 
against both flanks of the Paraguayan position, and the 
enemy detached all available men to strengthen the 
defence at these points, leaving the centre of the line 
weakly held. Barreto now ordered his main body to 
advance, and the Paraguayan centre was stormed with 
comparatively small loss. Resistance broke down com- 
pletely after this, and Barreto was able to effect a 
junction with Marshal Caxias. 

Meanwhile valuable work was accomplished by the 
cavalry under the Marshal. The broken country to the 
east of Angostura had been thoroughly reconnoitred, 
and it was discovered that the Paraguayan position con- 



180 PAKAGUAY 

sisted of an entrenched encampment with 50 guns, in 
which the entire population of Asuncion was concen- 
trated. It was a formidable obstacle to face, and Caxias 
determined to delay the attack until all available troops 
could be collected. At daybreak on December 27, the 
allied artillery opened upon this camp, whose guns 
replied energetically, but parts of it, where wooden 
and straw buildings stood, were soon in flames, and 
presently the ammunition of the Paraguayans began to 
run short. A general assault was therefore delivered 
at midday, three columns attacking simultaneously. It 
met with stubborn resistance at first, but that did not 
last, and the Paraguayans gradually fell back into the 
forests at the rear, where they disappeared in the thick 
undergrowth. The casualties amongst the allied forces 
were 1000 officers and men killed or wounded, and the 
Paraguayan loss was heavy, but not accurately known. 

There now remained only the fortifications at 
Angostura to be reckoned with to leave the way free to 
Asuncion, but before attempting their assault Marshal 
Caxias sent a flag of truce with terms for the capitula- 
tion of the garrison. These were that the troops in 
Angostura should surrender with all the honours of 
war. In case of refusal a threat was made that the 
place would be assaulted and every officer shot. The 
commandant, Major Lucas Carrillo, asked for time to 
consider the proposal, which was granted ; and the 
Paraguayans determined to accej)t the proffered terms, 
marching out with flags flying and drums beating on 
December 30. Officers were allowed absolute liberty 
after taking oath not to bear arms again against the 
allies. A promise was also made by Marshal Caxias 
to them that they should be given commissions in 
the military service of Paraguay when the army was 
reorganised under the direction of the allies. 

Next day General Juan da Souza da Fonseca-Costa 
embarked with 1700 Brazilian troops in San Antonio, 
and arrived at Asuncion the same evening, occupying 
the city. The remainder of the army marched north- 



1869] OCCUPATION OF ASUNCION 181 

wards under Marshal Caxias, and reached the same 
place two days later; but before adequate police 
measures were adopted many outrages were committed 
by the soldiers. Houses were pillaged and stores looted. 
The foreign consuls were compelled to lodge a formal 
protest against this lawless condition of affairs, but 
order was at length established. 

Further operations against Lopez were impracticable 
immediately after the occupation of Asuncion. The 
troops, greatly reduced in numbers by heavy mortality 
from wounds and sickness, were worn out with fatigue ; 
and Marshal Caxias, tired with the long strain of the 
previous year, and not yet convalescent from the injury 
received in the attack upon Villeta, resigned command 
of the army. Admiral Ignacio (Conde de Inhauma) was 
also prostrated with illness, and died on his return 
journey to Brazil. General de Souza, who was left in 
command, after a careful consideration of the situation, 
decided to make no attempt to follow Lopez pending 
the arrival of the Conde d'Eu, who had recently been 
appointed to replace Marshal Caxias. 

During this cessation of hostilities a special repre- 
sentative of Brazil, Senhor Parunhos, arrived in 
Asuncion, with orders to inform his Government as to 
existing conditions, and organise a Provisional Adminis- 
tration. The latter task was difficult, for no civilians 
could be induced to fill official posts. In this dilemma, 
Senhor Parunhos decided to appoint officers from the 
Paraguayan Legion. These officers obtained a certain 
number of signatures to a petition praying for permis- 
sion to elect a Provisional Government and carry on 
the war against Lopez underthe Paraguayan national 
flag. The three principal signatories were Jose Diaz 
Bedoya, Bernardo Valiente, and D. F. Egusquiza. A 
conference was held and attended by Senhor Parunhos, 
representing Brazil, Senor Varela for Argentina, and 
Senor Rodriguez as delegate of Uruguay. On behalf of 
their respective Governments they signed a treaty giving 
the right of free election to all Paraguayans residing 



182 PARAGUAY 

in the liberated portions of the country, with power to 
constitute a Provisional Government. The Adminis- 
tration was to be independent so far as political and 
administrative affairs were concerned, but subject to the 
orders of the Commander-in-chief of the allies in military 
matters until the death or expulsion of Lopez from 
Paraguay. Under these provisions a Provisional Govern- 
ment was formed. 

The lull in hostilities gave Lopez time to reorganise 
his defence, and he proclaimed a new national capital 
at Peribebuy. From the war material remaining at 
Cerro-Leon and Villa Rica all available ammunition and 
stores were withdrawn to Oscurra, and new guns were 
cast. The position selected for the next stand was 
strengthened by carefully constructed entrenchments. 
While this work was proceeding no opportunity was 
lost to inflict damage upon the allies. Detachments of 
cavalry and infantry intercepted convoys and recon- 
noitring parties. General da Souza contented himself 
with reinforcing such of the garrisons as were most 
exposed to attack. He also despatched a squadron to 
explore the river Manduvira, as Paraguayan vessels 
had been reported lurking in that vicinity. The squadron 
ascended the river without knowledge of the local con- 
ditions of navigation, and found that it spread out into 
a lagoon, from all sides of which fire was opened. 
The ships attempted to retire, but the passage was 
blocked. After a desperate struggle, however, they 
succeeded in clearing away the obstruction and reached 
the Paraguay. By land and sea Lopez thus gave evi- 
dence of his intention to continue the struggle. 

On April 16, 1869, the Conde d'Eu "arrived at 
Asuncion to take command of the army. The military 
establishment needed reorganisation, and the following 
three months were occupied in necessary preparations 
before the troops could take the field. At the end of 
July arrangements were so far completed that the Conde 
d'Eu decided to begin another campaign against Lopez. 
The railway line running from Asuncion to Cerro-Leon 



1869] ATTACK ON PERIBEBUY 183 

and Villa Rica was made the base of operations on 
account of facilities for transport. On July 28 the 
vanguard under General Menna Barreto set out and 
reached Paraguari, a town ten miles to the south of 
Oscurra, without meeting resistance ; and on August 1 
the first and second divisions of the army under 
Generals Osorio and Polidoro moved to the front. Two 
days later the main body under the Conde d'Eu followed. 
A long flanking movement was necessary to the south- 
east to round the ridge of hills protecting Oscurra and 
the new capital of Peribebuy. The route was first to 
Sapucay, thence to Costa-Pocii and Valenzuela, and 
from the latter point to Peribebuy. At Sapucay a stand 
was made by a few Paraguayans, but they were com- 
pelled to retreat. Between August 7 and 10 the town 
of Valenzuela was occupied, the inhabitants deserting 
the place, and Peribebuy sighted. It was protected by 
entrenchments ; a deep fosse ran round the fortifications, 
and every sign was visible that a determined stand 
would be made. The defences, however, were badly 
located. Surrounding hills offered excellent positions for 
artillery, and the allies placed six batteries there during 
the night, intending to open fire upon Peribebuy at 
daybreak next morning ; but a delay was caused by a 
small detachment sent out on reconnaissance being 
surrounded and requiring the despatch of a body of 
troops for its relief. 

The action began at 4 a.m. on the 12th, by a con- 
centration of artillery fire on the trenches and paraioets. 
In spite of heavy losses the Paraguayans did not waver, 
and their guns were well served. For four hours the 
bombardment continued, the fire of the enemy slacken- 
ing and finally dying away as the superior artillery force 
of the assailants told. At 8 a.m. the order was given for 
a general assault, and the artillery of the allies continued 
to play upon the Paraguayan trenches until the advance 
of the infantry made further firing dangerous. In spite 
of most determined resistance the fortifications were 
carried, and the allied cavalry thrown forward and 



184 PARAGUAY 

charging through the camp completed the victory. The 
garrison made no effort to escape. There were but 1800 
of them, and of these 730 were killed, 600 wounded, 
and 400 taken prisoners. Women and children had 
joined in the attempt to repel the attack, and boys of 
eight and ten years of age were captured with guns in 
their hands. The casualties amongst the allied forces 
were 550 officers and men killed or wounded, and 
amongst the dead was General Menna Barreto. 

When the news of the capture of Peribebuy reached 
Lopez he decided on the evacuation of Oscurra and 
Caacupe. The Concle d'Eu with the main body of the 
army moved forward towards Oscurra and Caacupe 
after the victory at Peribebuy, but the bad state of the 
roads delayed his arrival until August 15, when he found 
both towns deserted except by the wounded and some 
women and children. These peoj)le were in a deplorable 
state, and had neither food nor clothing. In Caacupe 
some war material was found, Lopez not having had 
time to arrange for its transport in his hasty preparations 
for the evacuation. 

The plan of operations for this attack upon Lopez 
had been skilfully conceived, and if it had met with no 
contretemps would have concluded the war. Unfortun- 
ately, one section of the allied army failed in its duties. 
The Conde d'Eu had instructed General Jose da Silva 
to march from Asuncion to the ranges of hills lying to 
the north of Oscurra simultaneously with the advance 
of the main body from Sapucay towards Peribebuy, but 
owing to a miscalculation of distance and conditions 
he did not arrive at his destination until the 19th. By 
then Lopez had effected his retreat into the mountain 
ranges, where he imposed making another stand, 
choosing the neighbourhood near Caraguatay. 

The Conde d'Eu lost no time in pursuing, and on 
August 16 came in contact with the rearguard of the 
enemy near the river Yagari. Here the Paraguayans, 
to the number of 6000, attempted to stop the advance 
of the allies. Lopez spread his forces to cover a long 



1870] PURSUIT OF LOPEZ 185 

extension of the north bank of the river, and for a time 
held his own. At length the Conde d'Eu ordered a 
flanking movement on the enemy's right, which was 
successful. Once over the river this division moved 
down on the Paraguayans and opened a heavy artillery 
fire, followed by an infantry attack, before which the 
foe retreated, leaving 1000 men killed or wounded. 
The allies captured 700 prisoners and 21 guns. In 
the allied army the losses were 600 killed and wounded. 

But the road to Caraguatay was not yet clear, the 
Paraguayans taking up another defensive position near 
Campo Grande. Here 2000 men with 12 guns again 
endeavoured to stay the advance, but were surprised on 
the morning of the 18th, and beaten, the allies capturing 
the guns and many prisoners. After this defeat Lopez 
retired to the forest districts to the north, from there 
waging a guerilla warfare. 

For several months now the work of the allies was 
to keep the country patrolled by small detachments 
to prevent any concentration of the enemy, the opening 
of 1870 finding Lopez still at large. In February, in- 
formation was obtained that Lopez was encamped near 
a small river called the Aquidaban. With him was his 
mistress, Madame Lynch, his four sons, and a force 
of 400 men. In all his misfortunes Madame Lynch 
was his constant companion, and she was faithful to him 
in this last phase of his stormy career. Troops were 
despatched to attack the position Lopez now held, and 
arrived near the Paraguayan encampment at the end 
of February. To obtain accurate information as to the 
defences, two officers, Colonel Silva Tavares and Major 
Oliveira, determined to approach the lines without 
escort. They set out on the morning of March 1, 1870, 
and successfully eluding the Paraguayan outposts, 
reached the confines of the camp. The enemy suddenly 
discovered their presence, and imagining the allies were 
upon them, fled, panic-stricken, without attempting to 
ascertain the true state of affairs. Meanwhile the 
attacking force, becoming uneasy at the long absence 



186 PARAGUAY 

of the officers, had advanced and reached the camp 
when the panic was at its height. In the confusion 
Lopez, his Minister Caminos, and General Rasquin 
mounted their horses to escape to the forest. The 
broken ground prevented fast travelling, and enabled 
the assaulting force to make a dash to cut off the 
retreat of the three men. Caminos was killed by a bullet, 
and General Rasquin was surrounded, and surrendered 
after a promise that his life should be spared. Lopez 
made a desperate effort for safety by forcing his horse into 
the swamp formed by the Aquidaban, but the animal 
could make no headway in the soft mud. The Dictator 
was summoned to surrender by a corporal. His reply 
was a revolver shot. Then a lance- thrust caused him 
to fall from his horse, and he died a few minutes later. 
The body was given Christian burial. 

Madame Lynch, the mistress of Lopez, attempted to 
escape with her eldest son Sancho in a carriage, but the 
conveyance was detained by a Brazilian officer, whom 
Sancho shot at and severely wounded. Then a soldier 
made a thrust at Sancho with a lance and mortally 
wounded him. Madame Lynch was conducted to the 
senior officer on the field, General Jose da Camara, and 
courteously treated until set at liberty a few weeks later. 
Shortly afterwards she set sail for Europe, and lived for 
some years in Paris. 

With the death of Lopez the war was ended, and in 
July, 1870, a treaty of peace was signed with the 
Provisional Government. Argentina and Uruguay 
immediately withdrew their troops. Brazil largely re- 
duced the strength of her forces, but retained an army 
corps of 14,000 men to ensure order. A portion of the 
Brazilian squadron was kept also on the river Paraguay 
to facilitate communication between Asuncion and Rio 
de Janeiro. A law of constitution had been drawn up 
by the Provisional Government in 1869, and in accord- 
ance with it Senor Rivarola was declared President of 
the Republic in August, 1870. 

The struggle had lasted five years. On the one side 



1871] AFTEE THE WAR 187 

was the influence of Lopez, with sufficient power to induce 
the population of Paraguay to sacrifice their lives for his 
cause, and on the other, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay- 
faced terrible difficulties to reduce to submission a man 
regarded as a common enemy. They only accomplished 
their purpose after a conflict involving a vast expenditure 
in blood and treasure. How frightful the war was for 
the Paraguayans may be judged from the fact that in 
1863 the population was 1,337,489. In 1871 the returns 
showed only 221,079 persons resident in the Republic. 
This attenuated population comprised 28,746 men, 
106,254 women, and 86,079 children. The adult males 
were those who from infirmity or weight of years had 
been incapable of bearing arms. In other words, the 
whole able-bodied male population had been sacrificed. 
In the latter part of the struggle women had been utilised 
as beasts of burthen, and when no longer available for 
transport purposes were left to die by the roadside. 

Cursorily glancing back at the conduct of the war, it 
is not difficult to name the principal officers in the 
operations. At the beginning of the struggle General 
Flores (Uruguay) and General Paunero (Argentina) were 
especially prominent. Subsequently came the advance 
upon Humaita, in which Marshal Caxias (Brazil) and 
General Osorio (Brazil) played distinguished parts. The 
attack upon Angostura was directed by Marshal Caxias 
(Brazil), and his victory was clue to the able assistance 
of General Argollo (Argentina), General Menna Barreto 
(Brazil), General Osorio (Brazil), and General Gelly y 
Obes (Argentina). In the final phase of the war the 
success of the operations was owing to the skilful tactics of 
the Conde d'Eu. The squadron did not show to advan- 
tage during the campaign except in the combat off the 
river Riachuelo, Admiral Tamandare then commanding. 
About the merits of General Mitre in connection with 
the command of the allied forces, there is little to be 
said. During his presence in the field little progress was 
made, and several serious disasters occurred. On the 
other hand, Mitre was the organiser of the arrangements to 



188 PARAGUAY 

keep the army supplied with provisions and war material, 
and it was due to his action in this direction that Marshal 
Caxias was able to effect the capture of Humaita. 

Against these many Generals and the resources of 
three Governments, there was only the indomitable 
energy of one man. It was not a war with Paraguay, 
but one waged against the personality of Lopez. 

By the constitution promulgated in 1870, the legis- 
lative authority in Paraguay is exercised by a National 
Congress of two Chambers, the Senate and the House 
of Representatives. The Chambers are elected by the 
people, the law providing for one Senator for every 
12,000 inhabitants, and one Representative for every 6000 
persons. The remuneration fixed for Senators and 
Representatives is $1000 gold per annum. Provision 
is made for a Cabinet of five responsible Ministers, the 
departments being Interior, Foreign Affairs, Worship 
and Instruction, Finance and War, and Marine. 

The Administration of Cirilo Rivarola, the first 
President under the new regime, was not without many 
difficulties. Independent in name, the Government of 
Paraguay was subject to the control of Brazil at the 
cessation of hostilities after the death of Lopez. The 
Brazilian army corps left in Asuncion when the Argentine 
and Uruguayan forces were withdrawn dominated the 
situation. President Rivarola found this at variance 
with the exercise of Paraguayan initiative in national 
affairs, and he attempted to insist on his right to inde- 
pendent action under the terms of the treaty of 1869. 
He was opposed by the Brazilian military and civil 
authorities, and finding his authority undermined, re- 
signed in 1872. Seiior Salvador Jovellanos, the Vice- 
President, as provided in the Constitution, succeeded. 
Rivarola had made many personal enemies during the 
two years he was in power by his endeavours to establish 
order and efficiency, and in revenge for his attitude 
towards certain politicians he was assassinated soon after 
his resignation. 

Vice-President Jovellanos did little to make his 



1874] THE POLITICAL SITUATION i8& 

period of office remarkable, and matters drifted along for 
the following two years under the guidance of Brazilian 
influence. But the Brazilian army of occupation was 
withdrawn gradually in 1873 and 1874, so that when 
President Gill was elected to the Presidency in the 
latter year no foreign troops remained in the country. 

Ambitious politicians in Rio de Janeiro now dis- 
turbed the political calm by advocating the annexation 
of Paraguay, contending that the river Paraguay would 
be a satisfactory southern boundary line between Brazil 
and Argentina. Intrigues were set afoot in Asuncion 
to induce the Paraguayans to petition for annexation 
to Brazil. President Gill would have nothing to do 
with these proposals, and gave offence by his attitude. 
His expressed determination to eradicate corruption in 
the Administration increased his unpopularity, and in 
1875 a conspiracy resulted in his assassination. The 
Vice-President, Sehor Uriarte, took his place, and the 
next three years passed in comparative tranquillity, 
Uriarte allowing public affairs to drift, making no 
effort to introduce measures to improve the economic 
or political conditions. In 1875 this stop-gap Adminis- 
tration was ended by the election of Senor Baredo, but 
the new President had been only a few months in power 
when suddenly he died. It was asserted he was 
poisoned. 

The death of Baredo brought into office the Vice- 
President, Senor Saguier. For a time political condi- 
tions remained quiet, but gradually a spirit of militarism 
crept into the situation. Against this Saguier set his 
face, and friction consequently arose between the officers 
of the army and the Executive. In 1881 this feeling 
culminated in a revolution. Little violence occurred, 
but the army obtained control of affairs and immediately 
deposed the President. Pending a new election, General 
Caballero was chosen to act provisionally, and in the 
following year he was proclaimed President. The 
support of the army enabled him to remain in office 
until the expiration of the presidential term in 1886, 



190 PARAGUAY 

when Seiior Escobar was elected. The succeeding four 
years were uneventful, but the National Administration 
was conducted without consideration for the general 
welfare, and military influence dominated the political 
situation. No attempt was made to check corrupt 
practices in official departments. 

In 1890 Senor Gonzalez acceded to the Presidency. 
For a time all went smoothly, but presently the new 
President evinced a desire to introduce reforms, especially 
in connection with the spending of public moneys and 
the appointment of departmental officials. This made 
him unpopular, and matters were brought to a crisis in 
1894 by a conspiracy to turn him out of office. The 
story of his deposition is remarkable. 

One afternoon in May, 1894, the principal members 
of the opposition called a meeting to decide what action 
should be taken. Enquiries elicited the fact that the 
army was prepared to throw in its lot with the mal- 
contents. Two members of the House of Represen- 
tatives were then selected to wait upon President 
Gonzalez and inform him that his presence in Paraguay 
was not compatible with the public interests, and that 
he was to be deported. The delegates, revolver in hand, 
walked to the Government Palace and looked through 
the rooms for the President. Entering his private 
office, they found him engrossed in business, and having 
explained their mission, they presented their revolvers 
at his head and requested him to accompany them 
without noise or resistance on pain of instant death. 
President Gonzalez acceded to this demand. Marched 
to the barracks and handed over to the care of the 
troops, he was next day embarked on a steamer bound 
for Buenos Aires, and the advice was tendered to him 
not to return to Paraguay if he had any regard for 
his personal safety. Vice-President Mormigo was 
then installed in office for the few months necessary 
to complete the presidential term for which Gonzalez 
had been elected. 

In November, 1894, Seiior J. B. Egusquiza was 



1894] THE URUGUAYAN INCIDENT 191 

chosen President. Egusquiza was tactful in dealing 
with his opponents, and so far earned the respect of 
Paraguayans that he was able to introduce administrative 
reforms without creating marked hostility on the part 
of the officials most closely affected. During his presi- 
dency excitement occurred concerning the boundary 
question with Bolivia, and this led to a rupture of official 
relations with Uruguay in consequence of the Uruguayan 
minister in Asuncion stating to his Government that he 
considered the Bolivian claims just. This despatch was 
made public, and on the return of the minister from 
Montevideo he was refused permission to disembark at 
Asuncion. The affair was patched up subsequently, 
and relations re-established. In 1898 Egusquiza com- 
pleted his term, and was succeeded by Senor Emilio 
Aceval, who in turn gave place to Senor Juan B. 
Escurra in 1902. 

The Administration of President Aceval attempted 
no drastic reforms. Occasionally projects for the better 
dispensation of justice, the regulation of the national 
finances, or the extension of public education, were 
introduced. Such proposals gave rise to lengthy dis- 
cussions in Congress, which resulted in a general expres- 
sion of approval, but seldom crystallised into action. 
Legislation was confined to ways and means to pay 
salaries and military expenditure. Much more cannot 
be expected from the oligarchy which controls Para- 
guayan destinies. 

This short sketch of political events shows the con- 
ditions immediately after the dictatorship of Lopez. 
The administration of the country fell into the hands of 
a small group of politicians supported by the army, and 
whenever this support w T as withdrawn the Opposition 
ousted the Government. 

The mass of the people care little for the political 
liberties conferred by the Constitution of 1870. For 
them elections, presidential and congressional, have no 
significance. A candidate supported by the authorities 
is returned without question. Away from the towns, 



i92 PARAGUAY 

however, a horror of officials exists, and springs from 
reminiscences of former years when official interference 
meant cruelty and extortion. The people desire only 
immunity from too heavy taxation and freedom from 
military service. 

The economic condition of Paraguay after 1870 was 
pitiable. All industry had been abandoned, and agri- 
culture ceased as the male population was drawn from 
the fields by Lopez for military purposes. All the 
able-bodied men perished, so that when the war ended 
there were no husbands, fathers, or brothers to cultivate 
the deserted homesteads. The remnant of the popula- 
tion left alive had neither strength nor inclination to till 
the ground, and sustained life on wild fruits and roots 
of the forests. Orange groves scattered over the 
country side proved a valuable resource in this crisis, 
the mandate by the Dictator some years previously that 
every inhabitant should plant orange trees thus proving 
a boon to these starving people. The trees flourished in 
the midst of desolation, and now yielded abundant 
harvests. From outside no help was offered, nor did 
the three governments at Avar with Lopez make any 
pretence to assist the economic situation. The cattle 
and horses had nearly all been killed during the war, 
but Argentina and Brazil took no steps to supply this 
deficiency. Between 1870 and 1873, therefore, the 
Paraguayans existed more like wild beasts than human 
beings, and hopeless despair was the keynote of the 
situation. They did not understand the so-called 
liberation of their country, and feared the army of 
occupation more than they had ever dreaded the tyranny 
of Lopez. 

When prospects seemed darkest certain natural 
forces saved the Paraguayans from extinction. A 
majority of the population were women, many the 
mothers of young children. The instincts of maternity 
crushed all other feeling, and they determined on a 
supreme effort to alleviate their distress. Rather than 
see their babies naked and hungry, they set to work to 



1899] WOMEN SAVE THE SITUATION 193 

raise food stuffs for themselves and their families, 
selling the surplus to purchase the scanty clothing they 
needed. No leaders suggested this course to them. It 
was due to individual effort that they obtained a means 
of livelihood by active labour. This action wrought a 
rapid alteration in the economic conditions. The women 
cultivated such crops as Indian corn, mandioca, and 
similar products to meet their own necessities. They 
made long journeys afoot to market, and where manual 
work on the farms was impossible they manufactured 
lace and other articles for disposal in Asuncion. That 
heroic conduct, however, developed an unfortunate trait 
in the few men who survived the war. No inclination 
was exhibited by them to resume work when physically 
fit to do so. They were content with a life of idleness 
whilst the women laboured, and this condition has 
altered but slightly to the present day. 

Matters improved as agricultural industry revived. 
In 1876 the crops were sufficient to meet local demands. 
Minor industries sprang up, and the exportation of 
oranges to the Argentine markets brought some little 
money to the country. The trade in Paraguayan tea 
(yerba mate) increased. Tobacco cultivation gave con- 
siderable employment, and as industrial life expanded 
foreign capital came for investment. This alleviated 
poverty amongst certain sections of the population, and 
a fertile soil and a kindly climate greatly ameliorated 
the hardships of these miserable years. 

Notwithstanding all adverse influences, the population 
shows a substantial increase in the past thirty years. 
At the end of the war it was returned as 221,000. In 
1899 it was estimated at 460,000 souls, not including 
some 60,000 or 70,000 Indians classified as uncivilised 
and dwelling in the unexplored regions to the north. 
Foreign immigration has been limited, and the total 
number of foreigners now resident in the Republic does 
not exceed 10,000. Of these 300 are British, 38 Belgian, 
2000 Italian, 6000 classified as Argentines, Brazilians 
or South Americans, the remainder comprising natives 

N 



194 PARAGUAY 

of Spain, France, Germany, Switzerland and Scandi- 
navia. In 1893 an experiment was attempted by a 
group of Australians. A concession was obtained for 
colonisation purposes, and an expedition arrived from 
Australia to form a settlement under socialistic auspices. 
The basis of this New Australia was that all property 
should be in common, and work performed for the 
general, not individual, benefit. The experiment was 
not successful. Disputes arose in regard to the con- 
ditions the leader of the movement, one Lane, wished 
to impose, and in 1896 the colony was broken up, the 
lands reverting to Paraguay. Some of these Australians 
were induced by Lane to found another colony, this 
latter called San Cosme. Here the settlers gained a 
bare living by growing fruit and vegetables, supple- 
menting their incomes by working when opportunity for 
employment occurred. The terms upon which the land 
at San Cosme is held are, a free title for 80 acres to 
each individual after compliance with certain conditions 
of residence and area under cultivation. A further 
experiment in the direction of colonisation has been 
attempted by the introduction of 150 Sicilian families, 
the land for their occupation being provided by the 
Government. This latter departure has not proved 
satisfactory either, and many of the colonists deserted. 
There is no great inducement for Europeans to come to 
Paraguay under existing conditions. The climate is 
semi-tropical, and the bulk of the land, especially in the 
more favoured localities, has been alienated already to 
private individuals. 

Education in Paraguay has hitherto received little 
attention. Attendance at the schools is compulsory for 
all children between the ages of eight and fourteen 
years, but is not enforced, nor is it likely to be in the 
immediate future. The population is scattered over the 
country districts, and distance to the nearest school 
offers an insuperable bar to the peasant classes. In the 
towns the attendance is fair, and the official statistics of 
1898 showed that the number of public and private 



1899] EDUCATION IN PARAGUAY 195 

elementary schools was 358 and the aggregate of pupils 
23,000. Asuncion boasts of a national college with a 
staff of 15 professors and an attendance in 1898 of 205 
students. Little attempt, however, is made to impart 
sound mental or physical discipline. 



CHAPTER XI 



URUGUAY 

Colorados and Blancos. Flores refuses Re-election. Revolt of Colonel 
Fortunato Flores. Presidency of Dr Pedro Varela. Blanco 
Conspiracy. Assassination of General Flores. Execution of 
Rebels. General Batlle becomes President. Cholei'a Epidemic, 
1868. Forced Currency. Insurrections under Maximo Perez 
and General Caraballo. Blanco Revolution. Insurgent Suc- 
cesses. Engagement near Santa Lucia. Government Defeat. 
Engagement near Corralito. Retreat of General Caraballo. 
Insurgent Losses. Siege of Montevideo. Capture of the Cerro. 
Public Opinion in Montevideo. Sortie from Montevideo. Siege 
of Montevideo Raised. Operations near Puerto del Ingles. 
Decisive Battle. Government Victory. Reorganisation of Rebel 
Forces. Further Insurgents Defeat. Sefior Gomensoro accedes 
to Presidency. Restoration of Peaceful Conditions. Congres- 
sional Elections. Dr Jose Ellauri. Election of Dr Ellauri. 
Complicated Situation. Threatening Attitude of Military. Ad- 
ministration of Ellauri. Conspiracy of Colorados netos. Assassi- 
nation of Colonel Castillo. Revolt in Soriano. Municipal 
Election in Montevideo. Ministers Resign. Military Revolt. 
Deposition of Ellauri. Provisional Administration. Sefior Pedro 
Varela elected President. Unsettled Conditions. Political 
Arrests. Revolution in May, 1875. Revolutionary Committee 
in Buenos Aires. Military join Insurgents. Fighting in Soriano 
and Paysandu. Measures against the Rebels. Defeat of 
Insurgents. Financial Difficulties. Dictatorship of Colonel 
Latorre. Praetorian Administration Established. Public Edu- 
cation. Election of Latorre. Latorre Resigns. Dr Vidal as 
President. Colonel Santos. Attack on Independent News- 
papers. Increase of Militarism. President Vidal Resigns. 
Santos succeeds to Presidency. Discontent Spi - eads. Question 
with Italy. Irresponsible Administration. Paraguayan Debt. 
Preparations for Revolt against Santos. Dr Vidal again Elected. 



1865] POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 197 

Revolt in Western Part of Republic. Defeat of Rebels by 
General Tajes. Title of Captain-General granted to Santos. 
General Santos again President. Attempt to Assassinate Santos. 
Ministry of Dr Ramirez. Santos resigns Office. Suppression 
of Militarism. Decree exiling Santos. Election of Hen-era 
y Obes. 

Uruguay has experienced to a marked extent the unrest 
customary in South America, where armed revolution 
is the climax of discontent with the authorities, or the 
outcome of ambitious politicians seeking office. The 
Civil War of 1863-5 had overthrown the Blancos and 
brought in General Venancio Flores, a success due 
to the action of Brazil against the Uruguayan Govern- 
ment. With one exception, the revolutions since 1865 
have been attempts by the Blancos to regain office. So 
far as political principles go, there is little to choose 
between Colorados and Blancos. Uruguayans profess 
to be one or the other because their parents were so 
before them. The emoluments of office comprise every- 
thing the majority of politicians desire. Owing to the 
fact that the Blancos have taken no part in the govern- 
ment for thirty years, they are regarded as advocates of 
reform, but the methods they followed previous to their 
defeat in 1865 do not show that a Government under 
their auspices would differ greatly from one guided by 
the Colorados. 

In 1867, during the war with Paraguay, General 
Flores returned to Montevideo. The congressional 
elections were fixed for the close of that year. Under 
the Law of Constitution the choice of the President is 
left to the National Congress. General Flores informed 
the Colorados that he was not again a candidate for the 
Presidency. When the elections took place only the 
Colorados went to the polls, the Blancos making no 
effort to record their votes ; and the friends of General 
Flores, finding that no arguments would induce him to 
again accept the Presidency, incited his son, Colonel 
Flores, to organise a revolt to bring pressure to bear 
upon him, the Colonel's regiment being the only one in 



198 URUGUAY 

Montevideo. By it the Plaza Constitution was seized, and 
barricades thrown up. The President then appealed to 
his son to surrender, which he eventually agreed to do, 
and the leader and others principally implicated were 
sentenced to temporary exile. Congress assembled on 
February 15, 1868, and General Flores then vacated his 
office in favour of Dr Pedro Varela, the President of the 
Senate, who under the Law of Constitution was required 
to act as Chief Magistrate pending a new election. 

Tempted by the smallness of the garrison, the Blanco 
Party rose again, thinking they could seize the capital 
and bring on a general rising throughout the country. 
The conspirators proposed to seize the arms of the 
regiment, acting as a guard of honour at the opening of 
Congress on February 15, and then make prisoners of 
the Senators, Deputies, and other authorities, it being 
the custom of the troops to pile their arms in the 
barracks when the official opening of Congress was con- 
cluded. The authorities, however, had received notice 
of some mischief brewing, and the regiment on duty was 
ordered to remain under arms ; so the revolt was 
deferred for a few days, and other plans hatched. On 
February 19, a mob, led by Senor Bernardo P. Berro, 
attacked the Government Palace at mid-day, and 
obtained possession of the building ; and at the same 
time Colonel Freire assaulted the barracks , of the 
"Libertad" Regiment, effecting an entry after killing 
the sentries, but the regimental commander, Colonel 
Olave, rushed out sword in hand and cut down Freire, 
whereupon the soldiers rallied and regained control of 
the barracks and Government Padace. 

When General Flores was informed of the revolt he 
started for the Palace, but his carriage was stopped by 
a group of men in the street of Juncal, and the coachman 
shot. Flores then attempted to alight, but was stabbed 
to death by assassins, who at once dispersed and were 
never identified. During the attack on the barracks a 
body of armed rebels, headed by Major Mendoza, appeared 
in the outskirts of Montevideo, but were defeated by a 





General Venancio Flores. 



President Latorre. 




President Santos. 



[Fane page 19S. 



1S68] RIOTS IN MONTEVIDEO 199 

detachment of troops. Seilor Berro was taken prisoner 
and shot, in company with an accomplice by name of 
Barbot, a former commissary of police, and several other 
conspirators. This attempt of the Blancos was a com- 
plete fiasco. 

Congress proceeded on March 1, 1868, to elect the 
President. The three candidates were General Lorenzo 
Batlle, a soldier of long and meritorious service, Seiior 
Jose Candido Bustamante, and General Jose Gregorio 
Suarez ; and General Batlle was chosen. His Adminis- 
tration was confronted by numerous difficulties. A 
cholera epidemic swept over the country in 1868, and 
claimed many victims, causing also acute commercial 
and financial disturbance. During this crisis bank fail- 
ures involved the Government in serious financial straits, 
to relieve which a forced currency of notes was instituted. 
The commercial community strongly opposed this 
measure, and refused to accept the paper money with 
a resolution so obstinate that the Government drew 
back. 

The first two years of Batlle's Administration were 
further complicated by an outbreak under Maximo 
Perez, a man of considerable influence, and by a rising 
headed by General Caraballo, an officer of high standing 
in the Uruguayan army. The first of these was easily 
suppressed ; the second ended by the surrender of 
General Caraballo at Mazangano, a ford on the Rio 
Negro. Neither movement threatened serious danger, 
but both entailed expenses at a time when the Treasury 
was empty. 

Meanwhile the Blancos, or Whites, went on plotting 
against the Government, and perfected arrangements in- 
Brazilian territory or in the Argentine provinces of 
Corrientes and Entre Rios for a strong expedition to in- 
vade the Republic. War material — small arms, artillery, 
and ammunition — was accumulated, and early in 1870 
the leaders of the movement decided to take the field. 
Accordingly, on March 5, the authorities received infor- 
mation that Colonel Timoteo Aparicio had raised the 



^00 URUGUAY 

standard of revolt in the north-west of Uruguay, and 
was attracting volunteers in such numbers that in a 
few months he was at the head of 5000 men. The 
prestige of the insurgents was increased so much by 
several small successes over detachments of troops that 
the Government became seriously alarmed and made 
vigorous efforts to raise and equip an adequate military 
force. One army corps was organised under General 
Francisco Caraballo to operate in the north, and a 
second under General Suarez to protect the country 
lying to the south of the Rio Negro. 

The rebels came in touch with Suarez in September 
near the river of Santa Lucia Chico, and on the 12th 
an action was fought in which the Government forces 
were obliged to fall back towards Montevideo closely 
pursued by the enemy. Near Marohas, however, they 
received reinforcements, and General Suarez again pre- 
pared to take the offensive. Meanwhile General 
Caraballo in the north of the Republic had come in 
contact with another section of the revolutionary forces, 
and a series of indecisive skirmishes took place. But 
when Colonel Aparicio heard that Caraballo was pushing 
southwards to join General Suarez, he abandoned the 
position he had taken up in the Department of Monte- 
video and marched to the west to intercept him. The 
two forces met in the vicinity of Corralito, and a fight 
ensued in which heavy losses were sustained on both 
sides, especially by the Government cavalry. The troops 
were able, however, to hold the positions they occupied ; 
yet Aparicio now opened negotiations for the surrender 
of General Caraballo, who called a council of war after 
the cessation of hostilities on the evening of September 
29, at which it was decided to temporise with the 
rebel leader and, under cover of night, evacuate the 
positions and make towards the south. The over- 
confidence of the rebels allowed this to be done, and 
a forced march of 36 miles was accomplished before 
daylight. 

Colonel Aparicio pursued, and his force came up 



1870] THE CAPITAL BESIEGED 201 

with Caraballo as that commander's troops were crossing 
the Rio Negro. Attempting to prevent this, the revolu- 
tionists were met by a heavy fire from troops posted 
in the scrub adjoining the river bank and driven back 
with serious loss, leaving Caraballo free to cross and 
embark his men in steamers for Paysandu. Aparicio 
then marched towards the centre of the Republic in 
search of General Suarez, who, however, effected a 
junction with Caraballo at Paysandu, thereby leaving 
the entire country south of the Rio Negro in the hands 
of the rebels, who then decided to march upon Monte- 
video and besiege it. 

Recruits joined the rebels near Montevideo in such 
numbers that their strength rose to 7000 men, and their 
confidence to a height which made them deem the 
capture of the capital certain. The authorities, however, 
were not idle. Caraballo had been relieved of his com- 
mand, and the charge of all troops in the neighbourhood 
of Paysandu given to Suarez, who made such preparations 
to take the field without delay as to be able in November 
to inform the Government that he was ready. 

• At Montevideo meanwhile the resistance encountered 
by the insurgents was greater than Aparicio anticipated. 
On November 28 the fortress at the Cerro had been 
taken by assault after severe fighting, and on the 
following day a number of steamboats were seized and 
brought into the wharves near the Cerro fortress for 
use in a sudden descent on Montevideo, but that plan 
was frustrated. President Batlle thought strong action 
necessary to restore confidence, and decided to make 
a sortie from the city. Accordingly, on the 29th, a 
column led by the President moved out against the 
insurgent camp, which it at first surprised, but a rally 
was made, and severe fighting ensued, ending in the loss 
to the revolutionists of their position. The troops 
succeeded in forcing the insurgents to abandon their 
headquarters at the Villa de la Union. Elsewhere, 
however, they held their ground, and after some hours 
President Batlle ordered his troops to retire to Monte- 



202 URUGUAY 

video. But the object of the sortie had been attained, 
in so far as the enemy had been driven out of the Villa 
de la Union and the river steamers recaptured. 

Suarez now left Paysandu and marched to the relief 
of Montevideo, a move of which Aparicio was ignorant 
until the middle of December, when the troops from 
Paysandu had already crossed the Rio Negro, and the 
opportunity for opposing the advance at this strategic 
point been lost. The insurgent position now became 
untenable, since to continue the siege was to invite 
General Suarez to make an attack on its rear, supported 
by a simultaneous onslaught by the garrison in front, 
when the rebel army would be caught between two 
fires. Aparicio, therefore, raised the siege and moved 
out to meet Suarez, to assist whom reinforcements were 
sent by sea to Puerto del Ingles. The rebel leader 
heard of these reinforcements, and ordered a division 
of the insurgents to occupy this place, which it did, 
compelling the steamers to return to Montevideo with 
the troops. General Suarez, disappointed of this help, 
was now in a difficult situation confronted by the 
whole rebel army. If a defeat occurred the capture of 
Montevideo was certain, and the cause of the Colorados 
lost. So he decided upon a bold move, and on the 
night of December 23 led his troops round the flank 
of the insurgents, and by forced marches proceeded 
towards the city. Too late Aparicio ordered the rebels 
to pursue ; Suarez reached the capital. A bloody battle 
was fought on Christinas Day, both sides aware that 
the result would decide the fate of the revolution. At 
last the repeated attacks on the insurgents told and 
their line gave way, and Suarez pressing home his 
advantage, retreat followed, but not until most of the 
rebel infantry had been killed or wounded. The retreat 
became a rout before the day closed, Aparacio abandon- 
ing his artillery to save the remnant of his men, but 
the pursuit was not energetic. Had it been, not a 
rebel would have escaped. 

For some months after this little was heard of 



1871] REVOLT UNDER APARICIO 203 

revolutionary movements, but the authorities, satisfied 
with their victory, took no steps to prevent a reorganisa- 
tion of the rebel forces, and this apathy gave Aparicio 
opportunity to collect groups of insurgents, so that by 
June, 1871, he had again a force of 2500 men under his 
command. Some artillery had been saved in serviceable 
condition, and small arms and ammunition were fairly 
plentiful. This reconcentration of rebels was at Manan- 
tiales de San Juan, and, when information of their 
increasing strength reached the Government, a division 
under General Enrique Castro was sent to attack and 
disperse them. This he did on July 17, when, although 
the insurgent position was a strong one, he found the 
rebels still so demoralised from their recent reverses 
that no determined resistance was made. Their defeat 
was complete ; their guns were captured, most of the 
infantry killed, and many of the principal leaders as well. 
A number of the rebel cavalry escaped, however, and 
with these men Aparicio continued a guerilla warfare, 
but he did not again succeed in raising a force of suffi- 
cient strength to endanger the safety of the constituted 
authority. 

President Batlle, at the end of his term, was followed 
by Sefior Tomas Gomensoro, the President of the 
Senate, for no congressional elections could be held in 
1871, owing to the disturbed state of the country, and, 
therefore, no presidential election was possible until a 
year later. 

In the short Administration of President Gomensoro 
the smouldering revolutionary trouble was settled 
through the good offices of Argentina. An agreement 
between the National Authorities and the rebel leaders 
was signed on April 6, 1872. The officers implicated 
in the insurrection were restored to the grades they held 
before the outbreak, and a sum of $500,000 was distri- 
buted to the followers of Aparicio. The Blancos, 
furthermore, were allowed to nominate the jefes politicos 
of Canelones, San Jose, Florida, and Cerro Largo. 
Satisfaction at the establishment of peace was general, 



204 URUGUAY 

and the elections held for Senators and Representatives 
resulted in a representation of both political parties, but 
with the Color ados still in a substantial majority. On 
February 14, 1873, Dr Jose E. Ellauri was chosen 
President of the Senate, and, in virtue of this office, 
succeeded Gomensoro as temporary President of the 
Republic. 

The situation in Congress now changed. The prin- 
cipal political parties still were the Colorados and the 
Blancos, but the former split into two factions, the 
Colorados principistas and the Colorados netos, the former 
urging the introduction of certain reforms in the 
Government and a participation of the Blancos in the 
National Administration, and the netos wishing to 
maintain the system hitherto in vogue, by which the 
political party in power kept all offices and representation 
in the Chambers for their supporters. It was under 
these circumstances the presidential election took 
place. The Colorados principistas nominated Dr Jose 
Maria Mufioz ; the Colorados netos supported ex- 
President Tomas Gomensoro, but Mufioz was the 
popular candidate. 

The presidential election was fixed for March 1, and 
the supporters of both candidates worked with a will. 
Dr Mufioz was regarded as sure of victory, but a surprise 
was in store. A third candidate, the acting President, 
Dr Jose Ellauri, appeared on the scene. This gentle- 
man belonged to the same party as Dr Mufioz, and his 
chances of election were deemed remote, but the voting 
gave him a substantial majority. This totally un- 
expected result was due to the fact that the Colorados 
netos found themselves unable to elect Seiior Gomensoro 
and unanimously voted for Ellauri, by assisting whom 
they reckoned they could not be excluded from a share 
in the spoils of office. When informed of his election, 
Dr Ellauri sent his resignation to Congress, but, being 
pressed, in the end accepted. 

The new President started amid difficulties enough. 
He imagined when he accepted the Presidency that he 



1873] PRESIDENT ELLAURI 205 

would receive the support of the Colorados principistas, 
but soon discovered that his former political friends 
were little inclined to assist him. Again, therefore, he 
announced his resignation, but no sooner was this 
known than the senior officers in Montevideo revolted, 
paraded their regiments in front of the Chambers, and 
informed the Senators and Representatives that force 
would be used to ensure the rejection of the resignation 
when presented to Congress. So Ellauri had no help 
for it but to remain. That satisfied the military and the 
troops were withdrawn, but the incident left an uneasy- 
feeling and was the cause of grave disturbances in the 
end. And an unfortunate act of Ellauri's helped to 
strengthen military influence in politics. President 
Gomensoro had dismissed the officer commanding the 
1st Regiment of Cazadores in consequence of interference 
in elections, and the first decree published by Ellauri 
restored this officer, Major Lorenzo Latorre, to his 
command. 

Yet Ellauri succeeded in establishing an Adminis- 
tration generally beneficial to the Republic, and during 
1873 and 1874 the public finances were honestly managed 
and protection for life and property strictly enforced. 
Such policy was not to the taste of the more reactionary 
section of the Colorados netos, groups of whom began 
conspiring, with the result that at the end of 1874 Colonel 
Romualdo Castillo was assassinated in Paysandu. He 
was a strong supporter of the President, and had enforced 
respect for law and order. 

Other disturbances followed. Colonel Maximo Perez 
attempted an outbreak in the Department of Soriano, 
which was suppressed ; but in January, 1875, affairs took 
a more serious turn, the leaders of the Colorados netos 
being determined to embarrass the Administration. The 
election of an Alcalde for Montevideo gave them their 
opportunity. Owing to rioting on January 1, the election 
was postponed until the 10th, and this interval was taken 
advantage of by the conspirators to publish libellous 
statements about the policy and administration of Ellauri. 



206 URUGUAY 

The candidate of the more respectable portion of the 
community was Don Jose Varela, and the Color ados 
netos decided to prevent his election. Accordingly, when 
the supporters of Varela proceeded to the voting stations, 
they were met by armed men who opened fire upon 
them, killing and wounding a number of the most 
prominent citizens. Such supporters of Senor Varela 
as had arms returned this fire, and the shooting continued 
until the arrival of a body of troops commanded by Major 
Latorre. In consequence of this affair, several ministers 
resigned their portfolios, accusing the President of want 
of energy for not proceeding more severely against the 
instigators of the outrage. The Colorados netos insisted 
that the vacant ministerial posts should be filled from 
their ranks. Ellauri refused, and appointed Colorados 
principistas. This brought matters to a crisis. 

Five days after the riot the troops were marched to 
the Plaza Constitution. The senior officers drew up a 
manifesto in which they declared the authority of Ellauri 
at an end, and that they had determined to install a Pro- 
visional Government under Senor Pedro Varela pending 
a new presidential election. Dr Ellauri, powerless to 
resist, sought asylum on a foreign warship, and through- 
out the country the majority of the officials accepted 
unreservedly the Provisional Government set up in his 
place. The Blancos concentrated in Florida, placing 
themselves under the orders of Colonel Aparicio, to 
whom the Government sent envoys requesting his 
adhesion to the new regime, he meanwhile having in- 
formed Ellauri that the Blancos would lend him assist- 
ance to regain office. Ellauri declined this offer, and 
Aparicio then determined to recognise the Provisional 
Government. His reward was the rank of General. 

On January 22 the Chambers were convened in 
extraordinary session to elect a President of the Republic, 
but many dissentient members of the Senate and House 
of Representatives absented themselves, leaving the 
Government supporters in control. These duly elected 
Senor Pedro Varela to the Presidency. 



1875] PRESIDENT PEDRO VARELA 207 

The new chief magistrate's first acts did not inspire 
confidence, for the members of the Legislature who had 
not attended the extraordinary session were declared to 
have forfeited their seats, and a number of military officers 
and civilians were arrested and sentenced to exile without 
trial. They were placed on the Puig, an unseaworthy 
barque, and sent to sea, with instructions to the master 
of the vessel to proceed to Cuba, and were eventually 
disembarked on the coast of Florida, U.S.A., after many 
weeks of hardship. 

President Varela's conduct, and the fact that the 
influence of the Colorados netos became paramount in 
public affairs, provoked revolutionary feeling so much, 
that in May the standard of revolt was raised in the 
Department of Maldonado by Colonel Julian de la Liana, 
a man of considerable local influence and a Colorado 
principista. Seilor Enrique Yarza and Sefior Miguel 
Yarza, prominent citizens of Rocha, joined this move- 
ment, and many other recruits came forward, by whose 
leaders a committee was formed in Argentina to arrange 
for supplies of war material. It also appointed Colonel 
Angel Munis Commander-in-chief of the rebel army. 
In the Department of Salto the troops to the number of 
1000 officers and men under Colonel Atanasildo Saldaila 
joined the revolutionary cause, and in Paysandu Colonel 
Genuardo Gonzalez and other military officers took the 
same step. An expedition from Buenos Aires com- 
manded by Colonel Julio Arrue was disembarked in the 
Department of Colonia, and shortly afterwards the town 
of Mercedes was occupied and the National Guard of 
that district called out for service in the insurgent ranks. 
It was a revolution supported by Colorados and Blancos, 
without distinction of party. General Aparicio, however, 
remained loyal to the Government, and restrained many 
Blancos from volunteering their services to the rebels. 
The revolt became known as la revolution tricolor on 
account of the flag used. 

In October the rebels under Colonel Arrue gained a 
victory in the Department of Soriano, but this was 



208 URUGUAY 

counterbalanced by advantages of the Government 
troops in Paysandu, at Palonias, and in the neighbour- 
hood of Tacuarembo. General Aparicio, whose experi- 
ence gained in the Blanco revolution of 1870-2 was most 
valuable, was given command of an army corps, and 
allowed the insurgents little rest, while Colonel Latorre, 
now Minister of War, took charge of the Government 
forces in the north. At the beginning of 1875 he 
inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels in the Depart- 
ment of Minas, a reverse that practically ended the 
revolution, for the remnant of the insurgents scattered 
in various directions, many seeking refuge in southern 
Brazil. 

The stability of the Administration, however, was 
not established. Financial difficulties complicated the 
situation, and accusations of malversation of public 
funds were made against the Government. So wide- 
spread did the general discontent become that President 
Varela found his position rapidly verging on the 
impossible, and few prominent persons would accept 
office. This unpopularity was the opportunity Colonel 
Latorre had been waiting for, and considering the time 
ripe for action, he proclaimed himself Dictator of Uruguay 
on March 10, 1876. He was supported by the army, 
and Varela quietly submitted. 

Colonel Latorre's Government was a dictatorship 
with the support of the army. Civil rights were 
suppressed, liberty of the press restricted, political 
opponents arrested and imprisoned without trial, and 
mysterious assassinations of persons unfriendly to the 
authorities occurred. It was a reign of terror not 
unlike that in Argentina under Rosas. In some direc- 
tions, however, the influence of Latorre was exerted for 
the benefit of Uruguay. Brigandage, common in many 
districts, was suppressed, and security for the lives and 
property of the inhabitants not connected with political 
affairs was established. Attention was also given to 
public education, and in August, 1877, a decree was 
published providing a national school system, Senor 



1879] LATORRE AS DICTATOR 209 

Jose Varela, who had been Director of Schools in 
Montevideo since March, 1876, being nominated national 
inspector of public instruction. Special taxes were set 
apart to support the new department. After exercising 
dictatorial powers for three years, Latorre determined 
to be nominated Constitutional President ; so in 
February, 1879, a Congress was convoked which elected 
him for a term of four years from the first day of the 
preceding March. 

As President, the former Dictator made a strong 
effort to govern in accordance with the Constitution, but 
found his path beset by difficulties. The former political 
parties had been so crushed as to make Latorre dependent 
still on the military faction for any assistance he required, 
and that was poor material with which to reorganise 
republican institutions. For a year he struggled on, 
but lacked the ability to carry out his projects, and or/ 
March 13, 1880, to the general surprise, he presented' 
his resignation to Congress, declaring that he found th< 
country ungovernable. Congress accepted the resigna- 
tion and elected Dr Francisco A. Vidal, a well-known 
physician, but a man of small weight in political matters, 
for the remainder of the legal period. 

The new President was unfitted to deal with the 
complicated situation, and one of his first acts was to 
nominate as his minister and principal adviser Colonel 
Maximo Santos, an officer who had been prominent in 
the dictatorship of Latorre. In a short time Colonel 
Santos obtained complete control, President Vidal 
being only a figurehead. Under the last year of Latorre 
a certain degree of liberty had been accorded to the 
press, and independent newspapers had criticised public 
events. This independent criticism was now directed 
against Vidal and Santos, and the latter determined to 
suppress it. 

A mob in May, 1880, instigated from high quarters 
and led by military officers and other officials, attacked 
the offices of these independent news sheets and wrecked 
them. There was no redress, and all independent 

o 



210 URUGUAY 

criticism of the Administration ceased ; which was just 
what General Santos desired. Thenceforth, in the name 
of President Vidal, he allotted all lucrative posts to his 
friends and created many new offices to provide sinecures 
for a host of needy adventurers. Militarism became 
more rampant than ever, and in all ways he did his best 
to prepare the way for his accession to the Presidency 
at the end of Vidal's term. Vidal, however, did not 
wait for the end. Finding himself powerless, he 
determined to retire, and presented his resignation 
on March 1, 1882. It was accepted without demur, 
and on the same day the Chambers elected General 
Santos. 

Santos was unpopular outside his own clique, and 
discontent was so strong that the probability of armed 
revolution was widely discussed. For the moment, 
however, a scarcity of arms and ammunition prevented 
any rising. All departments were conducted on an 
irresponsible basis. The Treasury was mulcted to 
supply the personal needs of high officials ; the public 
debt was increased for the same purpose ; the rights of 
citizens were disregarded ; no redress could be obtained 
in the courts for wrongs inflicted under the guise of 
authority, and it needed an Italian squadron off Monte- 
video to insure the payment of compensation for torture 
and imprisonment inflicted on two Italians during the 
disturbances under Vidal. Santos's only act to benefit 
the people was the introduction of the civil marriage 
law ; but in 1884 he ordered the return to the Govern- 
ment of Paraguay of all trophies captured during the 
war, and he also cancelled the claim for the war 
indemnity, due under the treaty of 1865, between 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. 

Towards the end of 1885, the discontent took definite 
form. Many Uruguayans emigrated to Argentina, and 
there commenced military preparations for an insurrec- 
tion. Battalions of volunteers were enrolled and war 
material collected, and in view of these hostile prepara- 
tions President Santos increased the strength of the 



1886] GENERAL SANTOS 211 

army. His term expired on March 1, 1886, and 
influenced by him the Chambers elected ex-President 
Vidal as his successor. This meant that Santos intended 
to continue to be the real ruler of the Republic, and it 
is difficult to understand why Dr Vidal accepted the 
position after his former experience, but he was per- 
suaded to do so by the arguments and promises of 
General Santos. At the same session the Chamber 
appointed General Santos to be Commander-in-chief of 
the army with widely extended powers, and these events 
decided the revolutionary leaders to make their effort 
without further delay. 

On March 28, accordingly, an insurgent expedition 
disembarked at Guaviyu under command of General 
Enrique Castro and General Jose Miguel Arredondo. 
Recruits joined from various districts, and all omens 
pointed to a determined attempt to oust Santos from 
power. There was, however, a lack of organisation 
amongst the rebels, and when they were attacked by 
General Tajes on March 30 they were forced to retreat. 
Tajes followed up his advantage, and next day inflicted 
a decisive defeat, sending the captured rebels to Monte- 
video, where they were released. The failure of this 
attempt at revolution strengthened the position of 
Santos, who was now accorded by Congress the title of 
Captain- General of the army, and, contrary to the Con- 
stitution in regard to military officers, returned as Senator 
for the Department of Flores and nominated President 
of the Senate. In this post in virtue of his office he 
would succeed to the Presidency in the event of the 
resignation of Dr Vidal. Pressure was accordingly 
exercised upon that puppet, who resigned on May 24, 
Santos immediately assuming the duties of Chief 
Magistrate. 

In his second Administration, Santos made no 
pretence of constitutional government. Nominally the 
various official departments were in charge of Ministers ; 
but the President intervened directly in all, and dis- 
content grew apace when this became fully understood. 



212 URUGUAY 

On the night of August 17, 1886, as the President was 
alighting from his carriage in front of the Cibils Theatre, 
a man named Gregorio Ortiz fired at him, the bullet 
breaking his lower jaw. This attempt at assassination, 
combined with the resignation of his Ministers a few 
weeks later, and a revolutionary movement on the 
northern frontier, convinced Santos that his intention to 
be Dictator of Uruguay for life was not feasible, and he 
sought a way of escape by sending for Dr Jose Pedro 
Ramirez, a leader of the Opposition, and requesting him 
to form a ministry on strictly constitutional lines. At 
first Ramirez refused, and it was only after many 
promises from General Santos that he agreed to con- 
sider the matter. One condition imposed by Dr Ramirez 
as a sine qua non for his participation in the Government 
was that General Santos should retire from the Presi- 
dency on February 14, 1887. 

The new Ministry embraced such well-known men 
as Dr Aureliano Rodriguez Larreta and Dr Juan Carlos 
Blanco, and was known as the Ministerio de la con- 
ciliacion. It came into power on November 4, 1886. 
General Santos now announced his intention of making 
a journey to Europe, alleging ill health, and on November 
18 he placed his resignation in the hands of Congress. 
The Chambers nominated General Maximo Tajes to 
discharge the presidential duties until March 1, 1890. 
Tajes wished the Ministry presided over by Dr Ramirez 
to retain their portfolios, but a difference of opinion 
arose in regard to the policy of the new Government, 
and they resigned. 

President Tajes had no desire to see a continuance 
of militarism, and on December 28 issued a decree dis- 
embodying several regiments of the army, including 
those whose senior officers had been conspicuous for 
interference in political affairs. General Santos, on 
receiving this news, immediately embarked for Monte- 
video, but on his arrival in the River Plate, he was 
advised that Congress had passed a law exiling him 
from Uruguayan territory. Finding it impossible to land 



1890] ADMINISTRATION OF TAJES 213 

at Montevideo, he proceeded to Buenos Aires, where he 
remained until his death on May 10, 1889. 

Under General Tajes the Republic made substantial 
progress. He conciliated the Opposition, and permitted 
no military influence over the Executive. As a con- 
sequence peace was established, and opportunity allowed 
for the development of the natural resources of the 
country. Means of communication were improved, and 
the value of property rose rapidly. The better security 
for life and property also attracted foreign capital, and 
when Tajes retired after completing his term of office, 
Uruguay was in more thriving circumstances than at any 
previous time. As his successor, the Congress elected 
Dr Julio Herrera y Obes, a Colorado who had served 
as a Minister under Tajes. 



CHAPTER XII 

Uruguay — continued 

Foreign Capital in Uruguay. Corrupt Administration. Revival of 
Militarism. Extravagant Financial Policy. Discontented Feel- 
ing. Economic and Financial Crisis. Temporary Administration 
of Sefior Duncan Stewart. Election of Senor Borda. The Borda 
Administration. Revival of Corruption. Formation of Revolu- 
tionary Committee in Buenos Aires. Depots of War Material. 
Congressional Elections. Outbreak of Revolt. Aparieio Saraiva 
and Colonel Diego Lamas. Condition of Insurgent Forces. 
Engagement at Arbolito. Government Forces Augmented. 
Engagements at Tres Arboles, Cerro Colorado, and Cerros 
Blancos. Insurgent Expedition in Venus. Peace Negotiations. 
Assassination of Borda. Accession of Senor Cuestas. Fresh 
Peace Negotiations. Peaceful Conditions Re-established. 
Festivities in Montevideo. Death of Lamas. Policy of New 
Administration. Attitude of Congress. Cuestas dissolves the 
Chambers. Congress elects Cuestas to the Presidency. Military 
Revolt. Blanco Majority in Senate. Political Situation. Cuestas 
and Economic Situation. Climatic Conditions. Area of Territory. 
Density of Population. Foreign Residents. Immigration. 
Apathy regarding Education. Secondary and Higher Education. 
School of Arts and Trades. Administration of Justice. Criminal 
Courts. Uruguayan National Character. Influence of the 
Church. Means of Communication and Economic Progress. 
Industrial Enterprise. Cattle Breeding. Importation of Foreign 
Stock. Sheep Fai-ming. Export of Sheep. Agriculture. Viti- 
culture. Olive Orchards. Tobacco Cultivation. Industry and 
Taxation. Landed Proprietors, Values of Foreign Holdings. 
Tendency of Foreign Landowners to Decrease. 

President Herrera y Obes assumed his duties at a 
period when the attention of European capitalists was 
drawn towards South America in connection with rail- 



1891] PUBLIC DEBT AUGMENTED 215 

way construction and industrial enterprise. This new 
interest had centred chiefly in Argentina, but Uruguay 
shared it to some extent, and the Administration was 
not slow to profit by the ease with which funds could 
be acquired, so that the public debt was soon largely 
augmented. But the borrowed money was not applied 
to useful purposes, the greater part of it being absorbed 
by annual deficits caused by unnecessary expenses for 
political objects. The tendency of the Herrera Adminis- 
tration was to drift back to the methods of Latorre and 
Santos rather than to expand the reforms of President 
Tajes. To ensure the support of the Army many con- 
cessions were made to military officers, and gradually 
widespread corruption crept into the administrative 
departments, no effort being make to check abuses. 

The President was clever, but perfectly unscrupulous 
in politics and short-sighted in matters financial. 
Extravagant expenditure at the beginning of his rule, 
expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the 
Republic, therefore bore its natural fruit, and in 1891 the 
service of the external debt could not be met. No 
wonder that in these circumstances discontent gained 
ground, and when the financial and commercial crisis of 
1891-2 occurred, armed revolt was again rumoured. 
Unsuccessful efforts were actually made to incite the 
populace to strong measures. 

The population sank into lethargy under the weight 
of the trying economic situation which followed the 
collapse of financial and commercial business in 1890. 
After Herrera y Obes vacated the Presidency on 
March 1, 1894, and pending the new election, the duties 
were temporarily discharged by Senor Duncan Stewart, 
President of the Senate, and not until March 21 did 
Congress elect Senor Juan Idiarte Borda to fill the 
vacancy. 

The attitude of the new President at first was an 
agreeable surprise. He refused to tolerate abuses per- 
mitted by his predecessor, whose influence was eliminated. 
Reforms were introduced and corruption restricted, but 



216 URUGUAY 

unfortunately the Uruguayans were doomed once more 
to disappointment, for during his second year President 
Borda allowed matters to relapse into the old rut, until 
towards the end of 1896 corruption had become as 
common as ever. The national resources were 
squandered, taxation was increased, jobbery in con- 
nection with public works was condoned, election returns 
falsified, civil rights disregarded- — in fact, no considera- 
tion was shown except to the small circle immediately 
in touch with the Government. This could only end in 
revolution. Once more the Blancos saw an opportunity 
to regain the position they lost in 1865. The leaders 
were encouraged to action by the knowledge that Presi- 
dent Borda had estranged certain sections of the Golo- 
rados, and that friction existed between the Administra- 
tion and several influential military officials. Thus the 
probabilities were that while the Blancos would form 
the backbone of the movement, outside help would 
come from the dissentient Colorados and a portion of 
the army. These calculations were not far wide of the 
mark, for although little active support was given to the 
insurrection of 1897 by the Colorados or the military, 
there was a passive attitude of non-resistance in various 
directions that favoured the insurgent cause. The usual 
committee was formed in Buenos Aires to collect arms 
and ammunition and arrange for supplies when hostilities 
commenced. Recruits also, mostly Uruguayans, were 
enrolled in Argentine territory, and a depot of war 
material was formed at Bage, a Brazilian town near the 
southern frontier of Rio Grande do Sul, in whose neigh- 
bourhood men were to concentrate to invade Uruguayan 
territory. Certain points in Argentina were selected as 
the base of operations. 

The Congressional elections were held in November 
1896, when, in spite of solemn assurances that voting 
should be free, the ballot was so manipulated that in 
districts where the Blancos were known to be in a 
majority the result was returned in favour of the Colo- 
rados, fraud being resorted to wherever any doubt 



1897] RISING AGAINST BORDA 217 

existed as to the success of the official candidate. The 
Blaneos were indignant, and resentment against the 
Administration became more pronounced, one group 
going so far as to prematurely raise the standard of 
revolt, but dispersing again when ordered by the party 
leaders. But in February, 1897, the rebel forces entered 
Uruguay from the north under command of Aparicio 
Saraiva, other detachments from the west and south 
joining the main body a few days later. Colonel Diego 
Lamas, with a small following, came from Buenos Aires 
shortly after the commencement of hostilities, these two 
insurgent leaders being the men upon whom public 
attention was centred. The former was a brother of 
Gumersindo Saraiva, so prominent in revolutionary out- 
breaks in Rio Grande do Sul, and had accompanied his 
brother in the campaign against Marshal Peixoto. He, 
therefore, had some experience of warfare and an idea 
of the requirements of military organisation, but his 
knowledge of military tactics was confined to guerilla 
movements. Although a citizen of Uruguay, and owning 
property in the Republic, Saraiva was always con- 
sidered a Brazilian, his parents being natives of Rio 
Grande do Sul. He was a man of little education, but 
naturally shrewd and with considerable influence in the 
northern districts of Uruguay. 

Colonel Diego Lamas was a man of very different 
type. His father had been a prominent officer when 
the Blaneos controlled Uruguayan affairs previous to 
1865, and had emigrated to Argentina when the Color- 
ados gained the day. Educated in Buenos Aires, young 
Lamas had entered the Argentine army, in which he 
was a major when this revolution in Uruguay broke out. 
He at once volunteered on the rebel side, and was given 
the rank of Colonel, and placed in command of the head- 
quarter staff. In reality he directed all movements of 
the rebel forces, although General Saraiva was the 
nominal Commander-in-chief. He was considered ex- 
ceptionally intelligent in his profession, and his conduct 
throughout this campaign proved him to be so. 



2J8 . URUGUAY 

Within a few weeks of the outbreak the rebels 
numbered 3000 men with rifles and small arm ammu- 
nition, but no artillery. Many of the mounted men were 
armed only with lances and revolvers, but these proved 
useful weapons. For rations the insurgents depended 
on cattle and sheep, and they never hesitated to confis- 
cate such animals as they needed. Other necessities 
were obtained from the smaller villages, or smuggled 
from Argentina and Brazil. Horses for cavalry and 
transport purposes were appropriated wherever found. 
Firewood was often a difficulty, but when no timber was 
available the fencing posts on the grazing farms were 
cut down and used without compunction, so that the 
damage to property was heavy in all districts through 
which the insurgents passed. As similar practices were 
followed by the Government troops, the losses to the 
farmers often amounted to little short of ruin, but the 
sufferers attributed all their injuries to the Government 
and laid small blame on the insurgents, an unreasonable 
attitude characteristic of the temper of the people. 

The Government was aware of the movements of 
the insurgents before and after the declaration of the 
revolt, but there had been so many false alarms during 
1896 that it was inclined to underrate its foes. When, 
however, President Borda became convinced that the 
insurrection was serious, he lost no time in concentrat- 
ing all available troops, and in March, 1897, despatched 
an expedition to the north to attack Aparicio Saraiva. 
After long and tedious marches the two forces met at 
Arbolito, where the insurgent leader had been able to 
select his ground. This put the Government troops at 
a disadvantage, and their attack was a failure. They 
then retired to wait reinforcements, and under cover of 
night the insurgents slipped away, putting many leagues 
between them and the Government forces before the 
following morning. All this was so far favourable to 
the rebels that it encouraged not only those already in 
the ranks, but prompted offers of additional men and 
supplies. 





President Bord-y. 



President Cuestas. 





Aparicio Saraiva. 



Major Diego Lamas. 



[Face page 218. 



1897] SKIRMISHES WITH REBELS 219 

The check at Arbolito opened the eyes of Borda, 
who forthwith raised the strength of his forces until by 
June their total exceeded 10,000 men placed under 
General Villar as Commander-in-chief. The suppression, 
however, of the insurrectionary movement was no easy 
task, for the delay that occurred after Arbolito had 
given the rebels time to establish friendly relations with 
the inhabitants of the northern and western districts, by 
whose help swift and early information about all move- 
ments of the enemy became sure. 

Things dragged on through June and July, the j)olicy 
of the insurgents being no fighting except when able to 
select most advantageous positions, or when in greatly 
superior numbers. A few skirmishes occurred between 
outposts, and at Cerro Colorado, Cerros Blancos, and 
Tres Arboles, Aparicio Saraiva was forced into engage- 
ments to keep open the road to the frontier of Brazil, 
where the refuge of the rebels lay in case of disaster 
overtaking them in Uruguayan territory, but in none of 
these three engagements could either side claim a victory. 
The insurgents, however, were able to hold their own 
for a time, and then make good their retreat without 
great loss of life, while the Government troops obtained 
small benefit from the occupation of the positions the 
rebels temporarily defended. It was marching and 
countermarching, a kind of warfare where the services 
of Aparicio Saraiva were invaluable. He knew every 
inch of the country, having been engaged for several 
years in the business of driving cattle from Rio Grande 
do Sul to the markets of Montevideo. 

But in June the revolution suffered serious loss by 
the capture of an important expedition. The rebel 
plans were cleverly laid. Some 400 men embarked on 
board the steamer Venus in Buenos Aires, taking tickets 
as ordinary passengers for Montevideo. In their luggage 
was the equipment necessary for arming the force. No 
suspicions were aroused, and the Venus left dock at the 
usual hour. Clear of the harbour she was seized, and 
the captain ordered to make for a point on the Uruguayan 



220 UBUGUAY 

coast, the leader of the expedition informing him that 
after landing the insurgents he would again be given 
possession of the steamer. The captain altered his 
course accordingly, but a few miles from Buenos Aires 
an Argentine man-of-war was encountered, whose com- 
mander, seeing the Venus heading for Colonia instead of 
Montevideo, ordered her to heave-to and sent to ascer- 
tain if anything was wrong. On learning the truth this 
officer obliged the Venus to return to Buenos Aires, and 
there handed her over to the authorities. The insurgents 
were detained as prisoners for a few days and then 
released without punishment. 

At the end of July negotiations for peace were 
initiated by President Borda, with the revolutionary 
committee in Buenos Aires. No satisfactory terms were 
reached, the President refusing the claims of the Blancos 
to be allowed representation in Congress and the nomina- 
tion of political governors of districts in which the 
Blancos predominated. Borda demanded the uncon- 
ditional surrender of the rebels, and the confiscation of 
their arms and ammunition. To this proposal the 
revolutionary leaders would not listen. So the armistice 
proclaimed pending these negotiations was declared at 
an end in August, and hostilities recommenced. The 
President was blamed for not offering more lenient terms 
when this opportunity for restoring peace occurred. 

On August 25 the Uruguayan national holiday was 
held in Montevideo, a part of the official ceremony 
connected with which is a parade of troops and the 
attendance of the President, Ministers, and all other 
high authorities at a special Te Deum. President Borda, 
at the head of the procession, left the cathedral after 
the service, and had proceeded only fifty yards when 
a spectator fired at him from a distance of a dozen 
feet. The President fell mortally wounded, the bullet 
passing through his heart, death being almost instan- 
taneous. The assassin, who made no attempt to escape, 
was arrested, and gave his name as Avelino Arredondo. 
He stated he belonged to no political party, and had 



1897] ASSASSINATION OF BOKDA 221 

killed the President because lie considered the sufferings 
of the country were the direct outcome of the Borda 
misrule. Nor was any further explanation vouchsafed 
at the trial in 1899, when Arredondo was sentenced to 
two years imprisonment. 

Senor Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President of the 
Senate, now succeeded to the Presidency, a man well 
known as a lawyer, and although not personally popular 
with Colorados or Blanoos, respected by both as honest 
and straightforward. By tradition the President was a 
Colorado, but he had no violent feelings of partisanship. 

The news of the murder of Borda was received by 
the insurgents with mixed feelings. He had been the 
principal cause of the revolution, but the rebels had 
never advocated his assassination, and they feared his 
death would be attributed to their agency. Nor did 
they view with enthusiasm the accession to power of 
Sehor Cuestas, taking his temporary tenure of office to 
infer a continuance of the obnoxious regime of his pre- 
decessor. The rebels were mistaken. President Cuestas 
saw that peace must be re-established to avert ruin, and 
put himself in communication with representatives of 
the Blaneos to ascertain what terms the insurgents would 
accept. In September a Commission consisting of Dr 
Ramirez, Dr Larreta, Dr Berro, and other persons 
friendly to the revolutionary cause, visited the rebel 
headquarters and discussed with Aparicio Saraiva and 
other leaders the details of an agreement with the 
Government. A general amnesty was proposed for all 
persons concerned in the insurrection ; political governors 
selected from the Blaneos were to be nominated for 
certain districts ; a fair representation in Congress was 
guaranteed ; and, finally, a sum of $200,000 was to be 
distributed to the rank and file of the insurgent forces. 
On the other hand, the rebels were to surrender all arms 
and ammunition and disperse quietly to their homes. 
Pending the acceptance or rejection of these terms by 
Congress an armistice was declared. No time was lost 
in bringing this arrangement before the Chambers, both 



222 URUGUAY 

of which unanimously approved it, and before the end 
of September the arms of the insurgents were sur- 
rendered and the men disbanded. 

On the official ratification of peace a series of fes- 
tivities took place in Montevideo, and a great demonstra- 
tion was organised to welcome the revolutionary leaders, 
together with such citizens as had taken part in the 
campaign. The enthusiasm with which the townspeople 
of all social classes entered into the preparations for 
this reception proved how widespread was the sympathy 
extended to the insurrection. It was the more marked 
because all exhibition of feeling had been restrained by 
fear of unpleasant consequences so long as President 
Borda's Government had lasted. One event, though, cast 
a gloom over the popular rejoicings. A few weeks after 
the peace Colonel Lamas was riding through the out- 
skirts of Montevideo when his horse bolted. The Colonel 
was still suffering from a wound received in his arm 
during the campaign, and was able to use one hand 
only. The horse threw his rider, who died from his 
injuries. 

Many difficulties now confronted President Cuestas ; 
the chaotic financial condition required careful attention ; 
corrupt methods in the administrative departments had 
to be restrained, and military influence needed clipping ; 
and he faced them all boldly, so that before many months 
had elapsed the worst abuses were eliminated. In the 
reforms necessary to counteract the results of the Borda 
regime the new Administration raised hostile feeling in 
various quarters, especially amongst the more violent 
section of the Colorados and certain groups of military 
officers, but the Blancos had no cause for complaint, as 
the President kept his promises to them. They obtained 
a fair representation in both Senate and House of Keprc- 
scntatives. 

In February, 1898, however, the dissatisfied wing of 
the Colorados determined to obstruct the policy of Seiior 
Cuestas until the presidential election. The President 
saw clearly that if they were able to do so, all his good 



1898] PRESIDENT CUESTAS 223 

work would be undone, and to prevent this he dissolved 
the Chambers and suspended all constitutional guarantees 
on February 10, 1898, assuming dictatorial powers. 
This bold stroke took his enemies by surprise, and they 
made no further attempts to interfere. And when, late 
in February, 1899, Congress was convoked for the 
presidential election and Cuestas resigned office, the 
Chamber stamped their approval, of his action by electing 
him President for the ensuing term. 

Installed anew, Cuestas continued to devote himself 
to the reform of abuses, and ordered a large reduction 
in the military establishment, which met with determined 
opposition from a number of officers who, encouraged 
by the extreme wing of the Colorado?, resolved to 
organise a military revolt. It took place on July 1, 
when the mutinous portion of the garrison took pos- 
session of a section of Montevideo. The loyal troops 
then attacked the mutineers, and for some hours shot 
and shell screamed through the streets until the rebels 
surrendered. Some 200 men were killed or wounded 
before the fighting ceased. 

After 1899 President Cuestas did. not add to his 
popularity. Increased taxation created hostility to ward s 
him, and his insistence that official interference should 
not take place in regard to elections embroiled him with 
the Colorado*. That voting, however, was really free 
was proved by the fact that when, in November, 1900, 
six vacancies occurred in the Senate, five were captured 
from the Colorado* by the Blanco*, this victory giving 
the latter a majority there. 

On March 1, 1903, President Cuestas was succeeded 
by Sehor Jose Batlle y Ordonez, and it was thought 
that he would hold the balance between the two political 
parties in such manner as to prevent open frici 
Unfortunately this did not prove to be the case, and 
discontent spread rapidly amongst the Blanco*, who 
complained that the concessions granted to them, in 
189/ were infringed. Matters drifted from bad to worse 
during the summer and autumn of 1903, and then the 



224 URUGUAY 

Blancos determined to resort to armed rebellion to enforce 
their political rights. Under the leadership of General 
Aparicio Saraiva they took the field, plunging Uruguay 
again into that turmoil of civil war which has checked 
the devolopment of the republic ever since emancipation 
from Spanish dominion was secured. 

Uruguay has one asset which is beyond injury by 
any administrative action — the climate. There are no 
extremes of temperature in summer or winter, and 
topographical features lend themselves to desirable 
surroundings for the settler from northern countries. A 
rolling landscape rising to mountain ranges of 2000 to 
3000 feet effectually bars monotony; and in the valleys 
the streams, in most districts fringed with timber enough 
to provide fuel for domestic purposes, afford abundance 
of water for live stock. 

In spite of climatic advantages, the population of 
Uruguay is scanty. In 1823 an official estimate gave a 
total of 450,000 persons, and in 1897 it was estimated at 
but 827,485. A census of the republic, exclusive of Monte- 
video, was taken in 1899, and showed 599,364 ; while 
on January 1, 1900, that city and district was estimated 
to contain 252,713 inhabitants. The total population in 
the Republic at the beginning of 1900 was by this 
reckoning 852,077. As Uruguay covers an area of 
72,110 square miles, this makes the density of popula- 
tion under 12 to the square mile, or, exclusive of the area 
and population of Montevideo, 9 per mile. By the 
census of 1900 the foreigners, apart from those living in 
the city and department of Montevideo, were returned as 
90,199. Of these, only 1383 were not of Latin origin. 
It is therefore clear that immigration does not tend 
much to modify national characteristics, and proof of the 
strictly Latin character of the population is found in the 
immigration returns from 1867 to 1890. In that period 
54,000 immigrants, exclusive of Brazilians, landed in 
Uruguayan territory, of whom 1066 were British and 
1353 German, no fewer than 25,000 being Italians and 
14,000 Spaniards. 



1900] EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 225 

Public instruction in Uruguay has been neglected, 
partly in consequence of the apathetic attitude of the 
people, and partly because the National Treasury has 
been persistently pilfered to supply the greed of Govern- 
ment officials, leaving but little money available to meet 
the expenses incidental to an efficient educational system. 
The teachers in the public schools are underpaid and 
salaries usually months in arrear, although in this latter 
respect an improvement took place under Cuestas. 
Nominally, the attendance of all children between the ages 
of six and fourteen years is obligatory at the elementary 
schools, but small effort is made to enforce this law, and 
in many country districts the population is so scattered 
that distance makes a daily visit to a school-house 
impossible. According to official statistics for 1898, 
there were 540 public and 344 private elementary schools, 
the rolls of the former showing an attendance of 49,733 
pupils, and of the latter 22,509, while the numbers of 
teachers employed were respectively 1069 and 890. This 
shows one teacher to every 46 pupils in the public schools, 
and one for every 26 in the private. The total number of 
children who should have attended school in 1898 was 
estimated at 138,200, whereas the actual rolls of the 
public and private schools only accounted for 72,242. 
In 1898 the cost of public elementary education was 
$671,633 T 8 cRr, or $13ttto for each pupil. No adequate 
system of inspection is provided. 

For secondary and higher education the University 
at Montevideo was in 1898 equipped with a staff of 91 
professors and teachers for 684 students. The training 
at this establishment is not satisfactory on account of 
the superficial way all studies are pursued. Lack of 
attention to detail is the most defective point. In 
Montevideo there is also a School of Arts and Trades, 
maintained by the National Commission of Caridad 
y Beneficeneia Publico,, at which there were 243 
apprentices in 1898. All trades are taught, and classes 
are held for instruction in telegraphy, drawing and 
music. In addition to the official institutions for higher 



226 URUGUAY 

education, there are religious ones. Taking a broad view 
of the educational question, it may be said that for the 
richer classes there exist fair public and private facilities 
for instruction, but for the poorer people the opportunities 
are restricted in all directions, and the system of ele- 
mentary education especially calls for reforms. 

The administration of justice is another cause of 
constant complaints, procedure in both criminal and civil 
courts being tedious and costly. The criminal, civil, and 
commercial laws are codified, and if intelligently and 
honestly administrated, would serve. No discretion is 
used, however, in making judicial appointments, and the 
result is ignorant judges and magistrates. Necessary 
reform would entail the elimination of the personal 
influence candidates can bring to bear upon politicians 
in power, and this is unlikely at present. In the matter 
of criminal justice, no better example of the inadequacy 
of punishment for serious offences can be quoted than 
the sentence passed upon the murderer of President 
Idiarte Borda. The assassination was committed in cold 
blood, no extenuating circumstances were brought to 
light, and the verdict was one of two years imprisonment 
only. Nor is this an isolated case. Uruguayans and 
foreigners have been murdered on many recent occasions, 
and no severe penalties were inflicted as a deterrent to 
such crimes in the future. 

Uruguayan character is a curious mixture of narrow- 
minded conservatism, tempered occasionally with ambi- 
tion which inadequate mental training does not allow 
to crystallise into deeds. Jealousy of the foreigner and 
foreign enterprise is a marked trait. In the northern 
districts are many families of Brazilian origin, and with 
them all evolution is slow. They consider that what 
was good enough for their forefathers will serve to-day, 
and often a wealthy landed proprietor is content to dwell 
in a hovel rather than spend a small sum to obtain the 
commonest comforts of life. These descendants of 
Brazilians cling tenaciously to their landed property, 
and are loath to contract loans on their estates even for 



1900] URUGUAYAN CHARACTER 227 

permanent improvements. The lower class Uruguayan 
is intensely ignorant, and a prey to every description 
of superstition, especially in regard to religion, although 
generally apathetic as to the real tenets of Christianity. 
The influence of the Roman Catholic Church is far- 
reaching in Uruguay, and although the majority of the 
male population pay small attention to religion, they 
never rid themselves of a sense of fear of the conse- 
quences of direct disobedience to clerical authority ; 
but over the women the Roman Catholic clergy main- 
tain a strong hold. In the country districts the priest- 
hood can seldom claim a high standard of education, 
being often recruited from the small farmer class, 
amongst whom a knowledge of reading and writing 
passes as a claim to scholarship. 

To turn to other points of material interest : — Lack 
of means of communication has been one of the principal 
obstacles to the development of industrial enterprise, but 
in recent years the construction of railways has brought 
improvement in this respect. Much, however, remains 
to be done. At present there are 1200 miles of standard 
gauge railway open, the principal lines running from 
Montevideo to the river Uruguay, with the feeders north- 
wards to the southern frontier of Brazil. A new road 
taps the agricultural lands in the western districts 
towards Colonia. The capital invested in railways is 
$70,000,000, and if the various lines, already partly built, 
are completed, this will be increased to $97,000,000. 

Away from the chief towns practically no attempt 
has been made to build roads for wheeled traffic, and for 
this neglect there is no excuse. Stone can be obtained 
in all districts, labour is not abnormally expensive, and 
the amount of bridgework required does not constitute a 
serious obstacle. Many districts are inaccessible at the 
present time for any form of transport except horses or 
mules. 

Nature has been beneficent to Uruguay in regard to 
waterways, but the rivers and streams have been 
utilised only in haphazard fashion. The construction 



228 URUGUAY 

of a deep-water port at Montevideo is necessary to 
provide facilities for the transhipment of cargo from 
ocean steamers to river craft, and on the initiative of 
President Cuestas this work was begun. Meanwhile, 
the greater attractions afforded by Buenos Aires have 
drawn to Argentina a large proportion of the trade 
which belonged formerly to Uruguay. The river Plate 
on the south offers cheap carriage for all agricultural 
and pastoral produce if facilities for shipping were 
available. At only one place, however, the new port 
of Sauce, has any attempt been made to provide it. 
The river Uruguay on the western boundary has all 
the attributes for an excellent waterway, but want of 
energy in the Government has prevented any effort to 
dredge a channel through the shoals near Paysandu, so 
that when the river is low it becomes navigable only for 
craft of shallow draught. 

Hitherto pastoral industry has been the principal 
occupation of the Uruguayans, and in many respects 
ideal conditions exist for stock farming. The grasses 
are good, running streams obviate the necessity of 
expensive wells, the undulating character of the land is 
a safeguard against excessive damp, and the temperate 
climate is a guarantee against disease and pests. The 
northern half of the country is chiefly devoted to cattle, 
the south to large sheep farms. Of late years the breed 
of cattle has been improved by importation of Durham 
and Hereford stock, and to such an extent that strains 
of foreign blood run through all herds. Cattle are 
exported abroad, but the saladero (jerked beef) 
establishments provide the main outlet for the surplus 
stock, this term also including the extract of meat 
factory of the Liebig Company at Fray Bentos. In 
1896 the number of animals slaughtered at the saladeros 
was 703,000; in 1897, 670,000; and in 1898, 612,700. 
The exact number of horned cattle in Uruguay is 
difficult to ascertain. In 1898, returns showed 4,826,675, 
but a footnote states this to be probably far short of the 
real total. 



1900] INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION 229 

Few countries possess greater natural facilities for 
sheep-farming. The pasturage in the south and west is 
rich, the lands healthy, and Uruguayan wool is clean 
and preferred to Argentine. In 1898 there were 
15,536,889 sheep; the value of wool exported to 
European markets was $10,716,158, and the weight 
41,011,562 kilos. According to these returns, the 
approximate weight of fleece was six pounds — an 
exceptionally heavy average. Of late years flock- 
masters have improved the breed by the importation of 
foreign blood. Comparatively few live sheep are 
exported, only 114,093 in the year to which all these 
statistics apply. 

It is only in the past dozen years that agriculture 
has become important. As better transport facilities 
were established a marked development took place. 
Maize, long cultivated only for local use, has now 
become an important article of export. A few years 
ago the quantity of wheat grown was insufficient to 
supply home demand, and now Brazil draws a consider- 
able proportion of her breadstuff's from Uruguay. In 
1896 the shipments of maize were 89,895 tons ; in 1897 
they were 1377 tons ; and in 1898, 12,575 tons. During 
these same years the exports of wheat to foreign markets 
were 6390 tons, 12,548 tons, and 77,231 tons. In 1896, 
17,714 tons of flour were shipped abroad ; in 1897, 
11,454 tons ; and in 1898, 296 tons. The area sown with 
cereals was 1,500,000 acres in 1900. Of 22,000 farmers, 
about one-half are owners of the soil they till. 

Olives and vines are also cultivated. The first 
vineyard in Uruguay was planted in 1874, since when 
the industry has grown apace, so that by 1897 the 
number had increased to 824, covering 8916 acres, and 
containing 15,243,268 plants, whose total yield of grapes 
in 1898 reached 7388 tons. Of this crop, 2041 tons 
were sold as fresh fruit, and 5347 tons made into wine, 
besides 24,149 litres of grape and 9367 litres of wine 
alcohol. 

Olive orchards have been planted near Salto and at 



230 URUGUAY 

other places. So far the production is only sufficient 
for the local demand, but the supply is steadily increas- 
ing. The olive trees flourish in many districts, and are 
a profitable investment ; but the long wait before a return 
is obtained has hindered extension in the area planted. 
Recently, several farmers have grown tobacco with fair 
results, the amount sent into Montevideo in 1897 being 
165 tons, and 260 tons in 1898. 

The principal hindrance to development everywhere 
is the exceedingly heavy taxation, which makes every- 
thing required for the use of producers abnormally dear. 
Undertakings that in more favourable circumstances 
would show a fair profit, only leave a bare living wage. 
National taxes alone amount to $18 per head, and in 
addition there are municipal charges averaging less 
than $5 per head. No wonder, therefore, that industry 
is throttled, especially in a country where little wealth 
has been accumulated. 

In 1898 the total number of landed proprietors was 
returned as 67,112, and the value of real estate as 
$278, 704, 000. Of these owners 36, 579 were Uruguayans 
with lands worth $143,083,809, and 30,533 foreigners 
with estates valued at $135,620,606. Upon 2634 
properties mortgages were registered to the value of 
$5,501,610. The Italians are the largest foreign land 
owners, with holdings worth $35,000,000. The Spaniards 
follow with $32,000,000, then Brazilians with $30,000,000, 
and French with $16,000,000. The property of British 
subjects is valued at $10,000,000, Argentines account for 
$5,000,000, and Germans for $3,000,000, Portuguese for 
$1,500,000, and Swiss and North Americans for 
$1,000,000 each. This large proportion of foreign to 
native holders has a tendency to decrease, because many 
children of present proprietors are born in the country, 
and are, therefore, native citizens. The fact that there 
are no waste lands renders it unlikely that any rush of 
settlers from abroad can occur to counterbalance this 
natural shrinkage of the foreign ownership. 



CHAPTER XIII 

BRAZIL 

Brazil after the Paraguayan War. Influence of Dom Pedro II. His 
Reputation in Europe. Quick Recovery in Economic Conditions. 
Dom Pedro visits Europe. Immigration Projects. Personality 
of Dom Pedro. His wish to benefit Brazil. His Admiration 
for the United States. Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu. 
Church Influence and the Princess. Unpopularity of the Conde. 
Brazil and the Imperial Regime. Political Situation, 1870-1880. 
Effect of August Comte on Brazilian Character. Sao Paulo and 
Republican Doctrines. The Emperor and Republican Ideas. 
Rio Grande do Sul. Reason for German Settlements in the 
Southern Provinces. The Emperor and Railway Extension. 
Public Instruction. The Emperor and Higher Education. The 
Clergy and Education. Internal Development of Brazil. Third 
Visit of Dom Pedro to Europe. Abolition of Slavery. Acts in 
Relation to Emancipation. Treatment of Brazilian Slaves 
Troubles in Sao Paulo. Enmity of Plantation Owners to 
Emancipation. Seditious Feeling gaining ground. Return of 
Dom Pedro to Rio. Inconsistencies in the Parliamentary System. 
The Ouro Preto Ministry. Unpopularity of Cabinet. Ouro 
Preto supported by Dom Pedro. Political Position strained. 
Plot to overthrow Ministry. Younger Officers urge Deposition 
of Emperor. Seditious Feeling runs Riot. Military Conspirators. 
Generals da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto Leaders of the Move- 
ment. The Fete in Rio de Janeiro. The Palace surrounded. 
Arrest of Dom Pedro. Public Buildings occupied by Rebels. 
Barao de Ladario Wounded. Proclamation of General da Fonseca. 
Provincial Governors support Republic. Fonseca proclaimed 
Provisional President. Dom Pedro sent to Portugal. Country 
accepts Change with Indifference. Discontent in Sao Paulo. 
Monarchists and Public Life. Brazilians condone Revolution. 
Praetorian Administration. Reaction in Sao Paulo. Imaginary 
Plot against Government. Arbitraiy Measures. New Banking 
Laws. Misiones Question. Congress summoned. Law of Con- 
stitution. Presidential Election. 

The close of the Paraguayan war found Brazil exhausted. 
The seven years' struggle in Paraguay against the 



232 BRAZIL 

Dictator Lopez proved a heavy drain in men and money. 
Success had cost 50,000 lives, and to maintain the army 
Brazilian credit had been heavily mortgaged. Industrial 
progress was severely checked by the long war, and no 
direct benefit obtained to compensate for the expendi- 
ture of blood and money. Brazil had rid herself of a 
neighbour occasionally troublesome, but this was her 
only gain in joining forces with Argentina and Uruguay 
for bringing to an end the piratical tendencies of Lopez. 

The attention of both Government and people was 
required to set internal affairs in order, and the recovery 
was rapid. The central figure at this period was the 
Emperor, Dom Pedro II., and his influence at home and 
abroad was of paramount importance to the Brazilians 
in this crisis, for Dom Pedro inspired confidence in 
Europe and rendered foreign loans possible. At home 
also conviction of his probity induced many wealthy 
Brazilians to come forward to help the Government in 
its hour of need. A sense of security under his future 
guidance caused free investment of capital in business 
and industry. Soon a marked improvement was visible 
in the general economic conditions, so that by 1875 
the worst effects of the recent war were obliterated, 
and Brazil was again on the high road to substantial 
prosperity. 

Shortly after the war with Paraguay the Emperor 
decided on a journey to Europe. His object was two- 
fold. Dom Pedro considered his presence in London 
would assist certain financial arrangements then 
pending ; he wished also to obtain rest after the long 
strain imposed by the events of the preceding years. 
Europe received the Brazilian ruler with cordial 
sympathy, and his personality favourably impressed all 
who came in contact with him. Facts concerning Brazil 
and her people were explained, plans for European 
immigration perfected, and encouragement offered to 
European settlers to make a home in Brazilian 
territory. 

Brazil owes much to the personality of the late 




Dom Pedro II., Emperor of Brazil. 



[Face page 232. 



1875] ])<)M PEDKO II. 233 

Emperorl Dom Pedro II. was dignified in public and 
private life, gentle and considerate to an unusual degree 

in all his dealings with his fellow-men. His kindness 
of heart often, indeed, led him to condone acts on the 
part of his subjects deserving punishment and censure. 
His dislike of autocratic authority was mistaken by 
many people for weakness, and presumed upon at times 
to an unwarranted extent. The Emperor's customs 
were simple. He had no liking for ostentatious luxury. 
His tastes lay in the direction, of literary pursuits, and 
he wished rather to be known as savomt than to be 
thought of in the light of his imperial dignities. He 
attempted to master many subjects, but had insufficient 
leisure for constant study. Foreign travel, making the 
acquaintance of other nationalities, delving into the 
peculiarities of Europeans and Americans, attracted the 
Emperor's most lively interest. Attached to the Roman 
Catholic faith by association and education, Dom Pedro 
was yet broad-minded and tolerant on all points of 
theological controversy. In no country in the world 
was there greater freedom for discussion of doctrinal 
subjects than in Brazil under his rule. The Emperor 
was a thoroughly patriotic Brazilian, and loved to 
wander unattended through town and country, talking 
to this or that chance person as man to man. The 
problem of how best to further the civilisation and 
progress of Brazil was the keynote of Dom Pedro's 
policy. He made close and extended study of economic 
questions, calling to his assistance a variety of expert 
opinions abroad and at home. His conclusions were 
conservative, and he regarded gradual evolution as better 
fitted to Brazilian character than the violent changes 
that must follow wholesale adoption of American and 
European methods of thought and action. For the 
United States the Emperor had profound admiration, 
and he spoke with enthusiasm of his experiences in that 
country; but he quite realised that experiments so 
successfully carried out in North America were im- 
possible amongst his own people. 



234 BRAZIL 

In sharp contrast to the personality of the Emperor 
were those of his daughter Princess Isabel and her 
husband the Conde d'Eu. As heiress to the Imperial 
Throne public interest centred round the Princess and 
her consort. Many of the traits the Brazilians most 
loved in the father were lacking in the daughter, for 
Princess Isabel was autocratic and reserved in manner, 
and her ideas of religious tolerance were narrow-minded. 
Church influence was a strong factor in her life, and 
was unpopular so far as the more highly educated 
classes were concerned. The Conde d'Eu possessed 
few qualities acceptable to the people of his adoption. 
His cold demeanour in public, accentuated by slight 
deafness, repelled the majority of those with whom he 
was brought into contact, and his reputation of being 
close fisted in money matters did not add to his attrac- 
tiveness. The fact that he was a foreigner was a point 
which the people of Brazil were never quite able to 
overlook, and it made his position difficult. 

Possibly, feeling in regard to monarchical institutions 
in Brazil might have been modified if the Princess had 
chosen some scion of Portuguese royalty for her mate ; 
but as matters stood a quarter of a century ago the 
popular sentiment was decidedly lukewarm, if not 
actually hostile, to the legal successor to Dom Pedro. 
This condition of affairs was not of paramount import- 
ance whilst the Emperor was in the prime of life, his 
influence serving to counteract any decided discontent 
as to future prospects ; but the seeds of dissatisfaction 
were there, and they grew apace as old age crept over 
Dom Pedro. It was therefore no surprise to thinking 
people when the eruption took place in 1889, but that 
both Princess Isabel and her husband were misjudged 
in many respects is scarcely open to doubt. Both were 
charitable and determined to do their duty by Brazil ; 
but their personal unpopularity overshadowed all other 
considerations. 

Between 1870 and 1880 the political situation practi- 
cally hinged upon the two factors of the popularity of 



1880] PRINCESS ISABEL 235 

the Emperor and the growing dislike to Princess Isabel 
and her husband, from which came a development des- 
tined to alter the course of Brazilian history. The theory 
of positivism preached by Auguste Comte and his disciple 
Benjamin Constant found ready acceptance with the 
Brazilians. These doctrines as interpreted in South 
America were given a strong revolutionary and re- 
actionary character at variance with the distinctly 
conservative tendency hitherto a marked feature in 
Brazilian national character. Republican societies were 
formed, and republican principles strongly advocated in 
different quarters. The Province of Sao Paulo was the 
centre of the movement. It was stated by the sup- 
porters of this agitation that no attempt would be made 
to overthrow existing institutions during the lifetime of 
Dom Pedro, and these assertions were made in good 
faith at the time. 

The Emperor was aware of this spread of republican 
ideas, but took no steps to check the movement. He 
relied upon his personal influence to counterbalance the 
effect of subversive doctrines, and failed to realise that 
the object of the campaign was not intended to injure 
himself, but directed against the Princess. Thus he 
completely underestimated the strength and significance 
of the movement. 

Meanwhile, in certain sections of Brazil, local affairs 
were none too tranquil, and in the south trouble broke 
out. Rio Grande do Sul contained a turbulent popula- 
tion, whose revolt against the Imperial Authorities was 
frequent. The province was difficult for troops to reach, 
and the Uruguayan frontier afforded easy escape for 
insurgents when hard pressed by Government forces. 
Desultory skirmishing was checked only by occasional 
concessions, or by the rebellious faction tiring for a 
season of living in perpetual turmoil. Foreign immigra- 
tion to these southern provinces was encouraged by 
Dom Pedro as a check upon the turbulent spirit of 
these people. German settlements were founded in the 
neighbourhood of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul, 



236 BKA2IL 

at Blumenau in Santa Catharina, and at Curityba in 
Paranagua. In 1878 a truce was patched up with the 
Rio Grande insurgents, and for a time order was 
restored. 

In 1880 the Emperor sought fresh means to develop 
the natural resources of Brazil, and determined upon an 
extension of the railway system. It was decided to 
guarantee the interest on capital employed by foreign 
companies in the construction of the required works, 
and also to build certain lines at Government expense. 
The inauguration of this policy was not long delayed, 
and although not carried out as fully as originally 
intended, it has proved a great help to the producing 
power of the country. 

The Emperor took great personal interest in higher 
education, but the instruction of the labouring classes 
was neglected, economic conditions contributing to apathy 
in this direction. Slavery was still a legal institution, 
and the Church retained as far as possible the direction 
of educational progress. The priesthood in Brazil was 
bigoted and ignorant, and made small exertion to raise 
the intellectual level of the people. 

Between 1880 and 1886 the internal development of 
Brazil steadily continued, and the national credit rose to 
a high level which conduced to social stability. The 
main source of wealth was coffee-growing, but other 
industries began to show vigorous signs of vitality, 
especially in the direction of the manufacture of 
textiles. 

Dom Pedro determined, in 1886, on another visit 
to Europe, his third journey abroad since the close of 
the Paraguayan War. He went partly in connection 
with public business, and partly to recoup his health 
and indulge his love of travel and desire to keep in 
touch with foreign civilisation and evolution. Princess 
Isabel was granted the powers of E-egent during his 
absence. It was impossible for the Emperor to 
anticipate the momentous results arising from this 
journey to foreign lands, and he left Brazil confident 



1887] DOM PEDRO VISITS EUROPE 237 

he would find political affairs undisturbed, and economic 
prosperity satisfactorily assured, on his return. 

After the departure of Dom Pedro in 1887, the first 
important act of the Princess Regent related to slavery. 
The Emperor was an abolitionist, but he favoured the 
gradual extinction of slavery rather than its sudden 
suppression, for he feared that immediate freedom of 
the negroes without compensation to owners would 
entail grave difficulties. For one thing the financial 
situation did not permit of adequate monetary assistance 
to producers for the substitution of free for forced 
labour. The Princess thought differently. She was 
convinced the right policy to pursue was abolition 
throughout the Empire, leaving the labour question to 
be settled by demand and supply. Subsequent events 
proved her to be not far wrong, but she attached too 
little weight to the political aspect of the question. 

A law known as A Lihertacao do ventre (the freedom 
of the belly) had been enacted on September 28, 1871, 
and provided freedom for children of slaves born after 
that date. This measure was generally referred to as 
the Rio Branco law, the Visconde do Rio Branco being 
President of the Council when it was enacted. On 
September 28, 1885, a further law provided that all 
slaves attaining the age of sixty years were free. The 
Emperor intended to suppress slavery, but to allow the 
chauge to come gradually, so that slave owners could 
make the necessary arrangements to secure free labour. 
There was no great complaint that Brazilian slaves 
were specially maltreated, although cases of cruelty 
undoubtedly occurred at intervals, and not infrequently 
neglect was apparent in the supply of food and clothing. 
But these faults were the exception and not the rule. 
A disturbance, however, in 1887, in the province of Sao 
Paulo, brought the slavery question to the front. Many 
Italian immigrants had settled in the province, and 
these people held that slave labour interfered with the 
class of work they were fitted to undertake. They 
therefore encouraged desertion, and, as the local 



238 BRAZIL 

authorities were unable to enforce the return of runa- 
ways, an appeal was made to Rio de Janeiro for 
assistance. Troops were thereupon despatched to Sao 
Paulo, but the men in the ranks refused to serve when 
they understood the duty required. The Princess 
Regent took advantage of the incident to press for 
immediate abolition. In vain the Ministry warned her 
of the political danger, she turned a deaf ear to all 
remonstrance ; and when it was hinted that such action 
would undermine the security of the Throne, she said 
that her Throne might be lost, but the slaves should 
be free. Senhor Joao Alfredo Corr£a de Oliveira was 
President of the Council, and Senhor Rodrigo Augusto 
da Silva Minister of Agriculture, when this determina- 
tion of the Princess was taken, and upon them fell 
the duty of carrying into effect the royal wishes and 
commands. 

On May 7, 1888, the Minister of Agriculture 
requested the Secretary of the Chamber of Deputies to 
name a day and hour for presentation to the House of a 
proposition from the Executive Power. Next day at 
2 p.m. was designated, and the Committee appointed to 
receive the Minister then introduced him to the 
Chamber. After the usual formalities the Minister 
stated : — " August and worthy Representatives of the 
Nation, — I come by order of Her Highness the Imperial 
Princess Regent, in the name of His Majesty the 
Emperor, to present the following project : — 

" Art. 1. Slavery in Brazil is declared extinct. 

" Art. 2. All Acts to the contrary are revoked. 

"The Palace of Rio de Janeiro, May 8, 1888— 
Rodrigo A. da Silva.'" 

For three days the measure was debated in the 
Chamber of Deputies, strenuously championed by 
Senhor Joaquin Nabuco and opposed by Senhor 
Andrade Figueira on the grounds of the injustice of 
immediate emancipation without money compensation 
to the owners. But on May 10 the Act passed, and 
next day it was submitted to the Senate and sanctioned 



1888] ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 239 

after a discussion lasting for three sittings. The Royal 
Decree followed on the 15th, emancipating all slaves 
within the dominions of Brazil, and an immense show of 
jubilation followed, public holidays being proclaimed for 
a period of five days. 

According to the last census compiled previous to 
emancipation the total number of slaves in Brazil was 
720,000, and no less than 600,000 of these were said to 
be between the ages of eighteen and sixty years, classed 
therefore as effective for active work. The assertions 
made by the abolitionists that the total was only 
500,000, were proved to be inaccurate by Senhor 
Andrade Figueira in his speeches opposing the 
measure. 

Rejoicings were confined to the working classes of 
the population and to those having no direct interest in 
the slave question. But the great plantation owners 
and many others pecuniarily injured opposed emancipa- 
tion bitterly, and the effect upon this influential body 
of people was to draw them nearer to the republican 
propaganda which had been gaining strength for some 
time past. We may therefore say that the final deter- 
mination to abolish monarchy in Brazil dates from the 
passage of this Act. No violent display was made by 
the dissatisfied portion of the community; but sedition 
was wide sown and encouragement thenceforth lent to 
the ambitious group of military officers who saw in the 
establishment of a republican administration many oppor- 
tunities for advancement. Sao Paulo, the centre of 
disaffection, gave evidence from time to time that some 
upheaval might be expected, and occasionally rumours 
of a disquieting nature drifted down to the imperial 
capital. The leaders of the republican group were Dr 
Prudente de Moraes Barros and Dr Campos Salles, and 
allied with them was General Floriano Peixoto, an 
officer in the Brazilian army. Since the overthrow of 
the Empire each one of these three men has been 
President of the Brazilian Republic. It was not this 
republican caucus, however, that threatened the greatest 



240 BRAZIL 

danger to the imperial regime, but rather the subaltern 
officers of the army and the students at the military 
school at Rio de Janeiro. Upon this element the 
seditiously disposed senior military officers counted for 
active support in any outbreak of a revolutionary 
character. The insubordinate spirit amongst these 
juniors was therefore encouraged, until it soon became 
a menace to public order and military discipline. 

Only vague rumours of the unsatisfactory political 
situation reached the Emperor. There was no deliberate 
intention to keep him uninformed ; but he was in ill 
health, and his friends were anxious to spare him 
unnecessary worry, and, moreover, they failed to gauge 
the position accurately. Towards the middle of 1888, 
however, the fact that seditious feeling was spreading 
rapidly could not be disguised, and the return of the 
Emperor became imperative. How far Dom Pedro 
sanctioned the policy pursued by the Princess Isabel 
during his absence has never been made public, but he 
gave no outward sign of disapproval ; on the other 
hand, he was on no very cordial terms with the Conde 
d'Eu, the principal adviser of the Princess. 

In August, 1888, the Emperor returned to Rio de 
Janeiro, where an immense reception was organised to 
greet him, sincere enough among the majority of 
Brazilians. Throughout the festivities, however, there 
was a note of uneasy feeling, and probably enough the 
Emperor was aware of this discordant note in the pro- 
ceedings ; but he was surrounded by his family and 
intimate personal friends, and neither the Princess 
Isabel nor the circle immediately about the Court 
believed in any movement portending immediate danger. 
Besides, the military were prominent in assisting at the 
demonstrations of apparent loyalty and affection, and so 
little evidence was visible that anything in the nature of 
a conspiracy was afoot. Yet the plot was then hatched 
for the overthrow of monarchical institutions, and the 
conspirators only watched for a favourable opportunity. 
They had not long to wait. 



1889] THE POLITICAL SITUATION 241 

For years the parliamentary method of Government 
under the imperial regime had drifted away from the 
sound principles originally incorporated in the system. 
Various Cabinets assumed authority to intervene directly 
in many local affairs in a manner impolitic and irritating 
to the community. Both Liberal and Conservative 
Administrations were equally at fault in this respect. 
As a result, log-rolling and favouritism had crept into 
the life of both legislative chambers to an extent quite 
at variance with the best traditions of Brazil. The 
Ministry in power when the Act of Emancipation had 
been passed was popular with the masses, but out of 
favour with the former t slave-owners, and it resigned in 
May, 1889. A new Cabinet was formed on June 7, 
with the Vizconde de Ouro Preto as President of the 
Council ; but the Ministers were chosen from the Liberal 
Party, and were not popular with the powerful group of 
plantation proprietors. Ouro Preto was an able and 
loyal statesman ; but he was unable, or at all events 
made no effort, to check the abuses which had grown 
up in the administration of public affairs. The Opposi- 
tion, therefore, determined to oust this Cabinet without 
scruple as to the means employed. Dom Pedro liked and 
respected the Vizconde de Ouro Preto, and extended 
to him all 230ssible support without direct intervention 
in the political situation, but the position he assumed 
tended none the less to weaken his influence with 
certain sections of the Brazilians. Still, the same feeling 
which had controlled the action of the republican 
theorists in former days animated the minds of the 
majority now, and no desire was expressed to overthrow 
the imperial regime forthwith. But the political 
opponents of Ouro Preto became impatient when they 
found that constitutional agitation failed to induce his 
resignation, and some talk of a coup (fetat was heard, 
with the avowed object of turning out the Ministry. 
Certain officers of the army promised assistance, and 
the movement was deferred only until circumstances 
were propitious for its execution. 

Q 



242 BRAZIL 

The military element generally in Rio de Janeiro 
were not satisfied with the political plan as originally 
proposed. A majority of the younger officers wished 
to depose the Emperor, and determined to seize this 
occasion for a military rising, and proclaim a republic. 
Dom Pedro's personal kindness towards individual 
members of this revolutionary faction carried no weight. 
Past favours were forgotten in view of alluring future 
prospects, and ambitious sedition ran riot. These 
military conspirators, in short, were clever enough to 
see that in the existing political irritation no strong 
effort would be made to uphold the imperial regime, 
no matter how much regret might be felt personally for 
the Emperor. The idea of the chief movers in the con- 
spiracy was to seize control of public affairs in the name 
of a republic, and then dominate the country by a 
military administration under the guise of republican 
institutions. General Deodoro da Eonseca and General 
Eloriano Peixoto, two officers whose advancement in 
the military service was due to favours extended by the 
Emperor, were chosen as leaders of the military move- 
ment. For weeks before the rising occurred frequent 
discussions took place at meetings held in different 
quarters, and the inhabitants were prepared for an out- 
break at any moment. 

On the evening of November 14, 1889, Rio de Janeiro 
was en fete. The Emperor, then living with his family 
at the royal palace in Petropolis, was present at a great 
ball, to which all prominent residents of the Brazilian 
capital were invited, and the festivities continued until 
the early hours of the following morning, Dom Pedro 
and his suite retiring to Petropolis before the close of 
the entertainment. The military conspiracy determined 
to strike on this night, and at 5 a.m. next morning the 
Imperial Palace was surrounded by a detachment of 
soldiers, the officer in charge being instructed to permit 
access or egress to nobody until further orders. An escort 
was detailed to enter the palace and take possession, 
while a detachment despatched to Petropolis arrested the 



1889] THE EMPIRE OVERTHROWN 243 

Emperor and brought him to Rio de Janeiro. Mean- 
while the principal government buildings in the city 
had been occupied by the rebels. Practically only one 
official, the Baron de Ladario, Minister of Marine, raised 
his voice in protest against these revolutionary proceed- 
ings. He was in his office when the republican forces 
arrived, and was called upon to surrender ; but refusing, 
was shot at and wounded. He subsequently recovered, 
and no other bloodshed occurred. Early in the morning 
a proclamation was issued by General Deodoro da 
Fonseca, stating that the Emperor had been deposed 
and that a republican form of government would be 
created for Brazil. The imperial crown was cut out of 
the badges on official uniforms, and the present flag 
ordered to be used in place of the Royal Standard. 
Provincial governors were notified of the course of 
events, and without exception adhered to the movement. 
General Deodoro da Fonseca was then proclaimed 
provisional President of the Republic, and nominated a 
Ministry from the circle of his immediate supporters. 
He intended that the supreme power should rest with 
the military element, and in all these steps General 
Floriano Peixoto was his principal adviser. 

A few days after the military revolt, Dom Pedro and 
his family were sent to Portugal, and with the departure 
of the Emperor any idea in the minds of his friends of 
an immediate effort to reverse the events of November 15 
fell to the ground. The country accepted the change of 
government with the utmost indifference. In Sao Paulo, 
the centre of the real republican spirit, prominent 
politicians were not satisfied with the manner the change 
had been effected, but decided to await developments, 
and endeavour later to obtain fair representation in the 
Administration and Legislature. The supporters of 
monarchist principles made no sign, and practically 
dropped out of sight. 

No attempt was made to confiscate the property of 
Dom Pedro, and, subsequently, a pension was offered to 
him, but refused. Nor was there interference for the 



244 BRAZIL 

moment with monarchist families. They were regarded 
as a harmless factor in the situation. It must also be 
said, to the credit of the military conspirators, that no 
unnecessary indignities were offered to the Emperor and 
those who followed him into exile. The circumstances 
of the revolt were unjustified by the causes for existing 
discontent ; but many intelligent Brazilians condoned it, 
on the ground that it would have occurred in any case 
upon the death of Dom Pedro, and that if the change 
had been made after the accession of Princess Isabel, 
it would have entailed violence and bloodshed. As 
matters stood in November 1889, the majority of the in- 
habitants were satisfied that the upheaval had happened 
so quietly, and they were prepared to wait tranquilly to 
see the course that public affairs would take. 

This comparatively apathetic attitude in connection 
with the deposition of Dom Pedro received a severe 
shock when the true character of the men at the head 
of affairs became understood. Most Brazilians enter- 
tained an innate dislike to militarism, and for more 
than half a century under the kindly rule of Dom Pedro 
individual rights and civil liberty had been respected. 
A very different state of affairs now came to the fore. 
General Deocloro da Fonseca no sooner found himself 
securely installed as chief of the Provisional Government, 
than he instituted a system of praetorian administration 
at variance with all Brazilian traditions. Unbridled 
military despotism was apparent in every quarter, and 
officers of the army were appointed to all important 
official posts. An ignorant soldiery was permitted 
unwarranted license in cities and towns, but the 
inhabitants, galled and frightened, were too timid to 
make open protest against the injustice they suffered. 
In the province of Sao Paulo the reaction against this 
outburst of praetorianism was stronger than elsewhere ; 
but no open resistance was offered. But the political 
leaders of that province determined to make every effort 
to place their candidate in power at the first election for 
the Presidency. It was recognised that the outcome of 





Deodoro da Fonseca. 



Trudente de Moraes Barros. 





President Campos Salles. 



General Bittencourt. 



[lace page 244. 



1890] CHURCH AND STATE SEPARATION 245 

the military plot had succeeded beyond the wildest 
dreams of the conspirators, and that the men concerned 
had completely lost their heads in consequence. The 
country hoped and believed that this phase of despotism 
was only temporary, and that it would cease when the 
responsibilities of government were appreciated by those 
who presided over the direction of public affairs. 

On December 18, 1889, a drunken row occurred 
amongst a group of soldiers. This rioting was magnified 
into a seditious outbreak against the Provisional Govern- 
ment, and a decree was issued on the 23rd, imposing 
arbitrary Press restrictions, and providing a military 
tribunal with powers to try summarily cases of persons 
accused of treasonable conduct. Some arrests were 
made, but no proof discovered that any conspiracy was 
afoot. On January 7, 1890, the Provisional Govern- 
ment published another decree, by which the separation 
of Church and State was ordered. This measure created 
lively dissatisfaction, the majority of educated Brazilians 
contending that an Act so intimately connected with the 
internal conditions of the country should only be enacted 
after the consent and approval of a responsible Congress. 
Then followed measures in connection with banking 
laws and the emission of paper money, affecting seriously 
trade and commerce. Another unpopular Act, in 1890, 
was the despatch of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
Buenos Aires to negotiate the settlement of the Misiones 
boundary question with the Argentine Government. 
The treaty concluded by Minister Bocayuva conceded 
so many advantages to Argentina that Brazilians con- 
sidered that they had been duped. 

General Deodoro da Fonseca erected the former 
provinces of Brazil into autonomous states, and from 
these was summoned a Congress of national representa- 
tives. This body met in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 
1890, and a draft Law of Constitution was submitted by 
the Provisional Government for approval and ratifica- 
tion. After various modifications, this law was passed 
by Congress on February 24, 1891, one of its provisions 



246 BRAZIL 

being that the first President and Vice-President of the 
republic should be elected by the Congress. Next day 
the voting for these two offices took place. As the 
result, General da Fonseca was named President, and 
General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President. The total 
number of votes cast was 234, and of these da Fonseca 
received 129, and Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros 97. 
The latter represented the civilian republican element 
centred in Sao Paulo, and his defeat therefore implied 
the continuance of the existing praetorian system. 

With the Law of Constitution and the Presidential 
election the dictatorial authority which General da 
Fonseca had exercised unchecked for fifteen months 
nominally ended, but subsequent events show how little 
he allowed his actions to be controlled by the new law. 
His election was the result of pressure upon the first 
Brazilian Congress by the military party, and in no sense 
represented popular feeling. 

Under the Law of Constitution, the formal title of 
The United States of Brazil was adopted. Each of the 
former provinces became a state, administered without 
interference from the Federal Government save for 
defence, for the maintenance of public order, and for the 
execution of the Federal laws. Fiscal arrangements in 
connection with import duties, stamps, rates of postage, 
and bank-note circulation, belong to the Federal 
authority ; but export duties are exclusively the 
property of the various states. The legislative power 
is exercised by the National Congress, with the sanction 
of the President of the republic. Congress consists of 
two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. 
Provision is made for the Chambers to meet annually 
on May 3, without convocation, unless another day be 
fixed by law. The ordinary sessions last four months, 
but may be prorogued or convoked for extraordinary 
sittings. No member of Congress can contract with the 
Executive Power, or accept any commission or paid 
office, except such as are diplomatic, military, or imposed 
by law. If, under ordinary circumstances, the accept- 



1890] THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 247 



aiice of diplomatic or military employment would cause 
the loss of the legislative services of any member the 
consent of the Chamber to the appointment is required. 
No member of Congress is permitted to take part in the 
administration of any company drawing a subsidy from 
the Federal Government. Deputies and Senators 
receive a salary, but cannot be Ministers of State and 
retain their seats in Congress. Deputies must have 
been citizens for four years, and Senators must be above 
the age of thirty-five years and have been Brazilian 
citizens for six years. The Chamber of Deputies 
consists of members elected by direct vote, providing 
for the representation of the minority in proportion of 
one for every 70,000 inhabitants, as shown by a 
decennial census, but in such manner that no State 
shall have less than four representatives. With the 
Chamber of Deputies lies the initiative of all taxation. 
The franchise extends to all citizens above twenty-one 
years of age duly inscribed in the electoral registers, 
with the exception of beggars, illiterates, soldiers 
actually serving, and members of monastic orders under 
vows of obedience. 

The following table shows the number of Deputies 
from the various States and the Federal district author- 
ised by the Law of Constitution in 1891 : — 

States. Deputies. 

1. Amazones ... 4 

2. Para. ... 7 

3. Maranhao ... 7 

4. Piauhy . . .4 

5. Ceara . . .10 

6. Rio Grande do Norte 4 

7. Parahyba ... 5 

8. Pernambuco . .17 

9. Alagoas ... 6 

10. Sergipe ... 4 

11. Bahia ... 22 



12. 
13. 


States. 
Espirito Santo . 
Rio de Janeiro . 


Deputies 
. 4 
. 17 


14. 


Sao Paulo . 


. 22 


15. 


Parana 


. 4 


16. 


Santa Catharina 


. 4 


17. 


Rio Grande do Sul 


. 16 


18. 


Minas Geraes . 


. 37 


19. 

20. 


Goyaz 

Matto Grosso . 


. 4 
. 4 


21. 


Federal District 


. 10 



Total 



212 



Senators, sixty-three in number, are chosen by direct 
vote, three for each State and the Federal District, for 
nine years. One-third of the Senate is renewed every 



248 BRAZIL 

three years. The Vice-President of the Republic is 
President of the Senate. 

The Executive Authority is exercised by the Presi- 
dent of the Republic. He must be a native of Brazil, 
and have attained the age. of thirty-five years. His term 
of office is four years, and he is not eligible for the 
succeeding term. The constitution provides that Presi- 
dent and Vice-President are elected by the people 
directly by an absolute majority of votes. The presiden- 
tial election is fixed for March 1, in the last year of each 
presidential term. No candidate may be related by 
blood or marriage, in the first or second degree, to the 
actual President or Vice-President. The President has 
the nomination and dismissal of ministers, the supreme 
command of the army and navy, and, within certain 
defined limits, the power to declare war and make peace. 
With the consent of Congress the President appoints 
the members of the Supreme Federal Tribunal and the 
Diplomatic Ministers. No Minister can appear in Con- 
gress, but must communicate with the Legislature by 
letter or in conference with commissions nominated by 
the Chamber. Ministers are not responsible to Congress 
or to the Tribunals for advice tendered to the President 
of the Republic. The Constitution provides for six 
Secretaries of State at the head of the following depart- 
ments : — (1) Finance, (2) Justice, Interior and Public 
Instruction, (3) War, (4) Marine, (5) Foreign Affairs, (6) 
Industry, Communications, and Public Works. 

According to the new law each State must have its 
administrative, legislative, and judicial authorities dis- 
tinct and independent. The Governors and members of 
the Legislatures must be elected. Magistrates must not 
be elected or removed from office except by judicial sen- 
tence. The Federal Executive is not permitted to 
intervene directly in the local government of the States. 
In cases of infringement of the Federal constitution by 
State authorities the resource of the Federal Government 
is an appeal to the Supreme Tribunal of the Federal 
Districts. Provision is made for the administration of 



1890] EXTENDED LOCAL GOVERNMENT 249 

the Federal District by an elected council, the municipal 
authority being exercised by a Prefect appointed by the 
President of the Republic. 

This Law of Constitution was satisfactory theoreti- 
cally from a republican standpoint ; but in several ways 
it has proved impracticable in application. The country 
was unprepared for the institution of the local govern- 
ment conceded to it, independent authority in local 
matters led to corrupt practices, and often left the 
Federal Government powerless to correct most flagrant 
abuses. The position accorded to the States of being 
under no practical control by the Federal authorities 
was an act of too sudden transition from the former 
condition of dependent provinces. But the greatest 
error in connection with the new law in the opinion of 
many Brazilians was the formation of a Federal in place 
of an Unitarian system of administration. To have 
retained the new States in the category of Provinces, 
with Governors nominated by the Federal Administra- 
tion, would have reduced local expenditure and been 
equally effective for administrative purposes. 



CHAPTER XIV 
brazil — continued 

Autocratic Administration. Sao Paulo dissatisfied. Manifesto 
condemning Federal Authorities. Second Manifesto accusing 
the President. Severity of Praetorian Regime. Chambers 
Hostile to President. Congress refuses Supplies. Coup d'etat 
of da Fonseca. The Chambers Dissolved. Martial Law. Presi- 
dent da Fonseca as Dictator. Monarchist Conspiracies. The 
Public and the President. General Peixoto becomes Prominent. 
Sao Paulo disappoints Public Expectation. Rio Grande against 
the Dictatorship. Para follows the lead of Rio Grande. Naval 
Revolution in Rio. Arrests of Prominent Persons. President 
Resigns. Vice-President Peixoto succeeds to the Presidency. 
Riots in the Capital. Congress Re-assembles. Death of Dom 
Pedro II. New Electoral Law. Militarism Dominant. Mutiny 
at Santa Cruz. Intervention in Local Affairs. Question of New 
Presidential Election. Protest of Officers. President and Con- 
gress. Military Despotism. Insurrection in Rio Grande do Sul. 
General Peixoto and Governors of States. Resignation of Marine 
and Finance Ministers. Affairs in Rio Grande do Sul. Admiral 
Wandelkolk and the Insurgents. Naval Revolt. Government 
surprised. Admiral de Mello. Prolonged Conflict not expected. 
Determination of Peixoto. Defence of Rio de Janeiro and 
Nictheroy. Rebel Squadron and Resources. Bombardment of 
Rio. Panic amongst Inhabitants. Italian Incident. Indemnity 
Paid. Rebel Ships leave Rio. Object of sending Expedition to 
South. Formation of Provisional Government. Situation in Rio 
Harbour. Villegaignon joins Revolt. Explosion at Gouvernador 
Island. The Aquidaban and Esperanga leave Harbour. Saldanha 
da Gama joins Revolt. Supporters of Peixoto assert da Gama 
attempting Restoration of Monarchy. 

President Deodoro da Fonseca had learned little 
from his experience whilst holding dictatorial power. 
The Federal authority continued to intervene in local 



ji jst 




252 BRAZIL 

short-sighted policy of not conciliating the Opposition 
resulted in exasperating public feeling during the first 
half of 1891, and when Congress met for the annual 
session in June, 1891, it was evident a political explosion 
could not be long deferred. The situation was the 
more strained on account of distrust in regard to the 
Baron Lucena, then Minister of Finance. 

In the unpopularity of President da Fonseca lay the 
opportunity of General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President 
of the Republic. Peixoto was ambitious, for in case of 
the resignation or decease of President da Fonseca, he 
would accede to the Presidency. Prominent in the 
revolution against the Emperor he could count on a 
strong following amongst the military element, and for 
the moment he attracted the support of the civilian 
section of Congress as the most convenient means of 
ousting Fonseca from office. Without declaring his 
intentions, General Peixoto became the centre of the 
intrigue against the President. The plan adopted to 
force the hand of Fonseca was simple. Every measure 
sent into Congress by the Administration was blocked, 
judicial and other appointments made by the Provisional 
Government between 1889 and 1891 were declared 
illegal on the grounds they were not sanctioned by the 
Legislature, amendments to the Constitution were pro- 
posed to curtail the presidential powers, and the 
Chambers refused to vote supplies that the President 
considered necessary. 

In November, Congress was still in session, and 
the relations between President and both Chambers 
became so strained that Fonseca realised his position 
was becoming untenable, and he determined upon a last 
effort to make himself master of the situation. So on 
the 3rd of the month Brazil was startled by the 
publication of two decrees. The first was : — 

The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, in 
view of his explanation in a manifesto to the country, decrees : — 

1. The National Congress, elected on September 15, 1890, is 
dissolved. 



1891] STATE OF SIEGE DECLARED 253 

2. The Nation is convoked to choose new representatives at a 
date hereafter to be designated. 

3. The Government will for this purpose issue electoral regulations, 
ensuring entire freedom to the country in the choice of members of 
the Chambers. 

4. The new Congress will revise the Constitution of February 24, 
of the present year, in regard to points to be made known in the 
decree of convocation. 

5. The revision will in no case relate to the constitutional 
provisions establishing the Federal Republican form of Government, 
and the inviolability of liberty and personal safety. 

Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. 
Tristao de Alencar Araripe. 

The second decree established a state of siege and 
martial law in the Federal District and the city of 
Nictheroy, the capital of the State of Rio. It was : — 

Whereas, facts and circumstances related in the manifesto addressed 
to the country, and from which it is evident there is imminent danger 
to the preservation and stability of the republican form of Government 
adopted in the Constitution of February 24 of the present year. 

Whereas, it is most urgently necessary to check the movement for 
restoration of monarchy and the dishonour and ruin of our country 
which has commenced, and is clearly perceptible. 

Whereas, the safety and security of the new institutions, which 
are giving such progress and prosperity, demand prompt and extra- 
ordinary measures to meet the exceeding grave danger now 
threatening. 

The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil 
decrees : — 

1. The Federal District and the city of Nictheroy are declared in 
a state of siege, and constitutional guarantees suspended for a space 
of two months. 

2. Any acts or demonstrations contrary to public security and 
order will be severely punished. 

3. The Government will appoint a commission to try summarily 
the enemies of the Republic and those persons' who in any way 
contribute to the disturbance of public order. 

4. Citizens who may be deported for the sake of public safety and 
the stability of the republican form of Government, shall be sent 
without delay or trial to such place as may be hereafter determined. 

5. The Government in due course will render Congress an 
account of the exceptional measures adopted. 

Federal Capital, November 3, 1891, third year of the Republic. 
Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. 
Antonio Luiz Affonso de Carvalho. 



254 BKAZIL 

By these two decrees General Fonseca arrogated to 
himself dictatorial rights. He was again in the position 
he seized when, as leader of the military revolt on 
November 15, 1889, he deposed Dom Pedro II. The 
manifesto to which reference is made in the decree was 
a long document of 5000 words, in which the President 
recounted the attitude of Congress towards himself and 
the impossibility of administering public affairs. He 
endeavoured to justify his action by declaring that the 
Government had clear proof of monarchist plots, and 
that the conspirators had determined to take advantage 
of the restless feeling produced by economic and 
financial causes to raise the standard of armed revolution. 
In reality, the President had very little to say in defence 
of his coup d'etat. His assertions of monarchist 
conspiracies deceived nobody, and the population 
extended neither sympathy or support to the course he 
had taken. The President and General Floriano Peixoto 
were now the two central figures in the Brazilian 
political world, and each was playing for his own hand. 
The President hoped by his coup d'etat to overwhelm 
his adversary, but General Peixoto had succeeded in 
splitting up the military following upon which da Fonseca 
mainly relied for support, and was in touch also with 
the Opposition in Congress. 

Sao Paulo was where the principal opposition to 
Fonseca was anticipated ; but all hopes in this direction 
were disappointed. On the return of the State repre- 
sentatives an attempt was made to influence public 
opinion against the dictatorial policy of the Federal 
authorities ; but the people were cowed by a show of 
force. Yet in the lower Chamber of the local legislature 
a vote of censure was carried by 16 votes to 11. In the 
Senate a similar motion was proposed, but the arrival 
of a detachment of soldiery induced the Senators to 
change their proposition to a vote of confidence in the 
President. Although martial law had not been pro- 
claimed in the State or city of Sao Paulo, the Governor, 
a nominee of Fonseca, exercised autocratic authority. 



1891] RISING AGAINST GOVERNMENT 255 

From the south came the real resistance. On 
November 9, the garrisons at Rio Grande, Bage, Pelotas, 
and other points in the State of Rio Grande do Sul 
declared against the action of the Federal Government. 
On the 10th, the regiment stationed at Santa Anna de 
Livramento revolted, and the troops at Jaguarao, Caca- 
pava, Alegrete, and Uruguayana followed. Generals 
Osorio, Tavares, and Astrogildo assumed command of 
these opposition forces and occupied all important points, 
and two days later, Governor Julho de Castilhos was 
forced to resign office. A committee consisting of Dr 
Assis Brazil, Dr Barros Casal, and General Rocha 
Osorio was then appointed to administer the State, the 
National Guard was called out, and by November 23 
the number of men under arms prepared to dispute the 
authority of Fonseca was 50,000. A flotilla of five small 
vessels was also organised and the entrance to Rio 
Grande harbour closed. 

In Para armed resistance against the President was 
determined upon, but in the remaining States no active 
opposition was made, although his course in regard to 
Congress was generally disapproved. 

In Rio de Janeiro the navy took up the defence of 
the Chambers. Admiral Wandenkolk and Admiral 
Custodio de Mello were both National Deputies. They 
decided to resort to armed force to counteract the 
Government decrees of November 3, and the naval 
officers of the squadron joined the movement. A 
raid was made on the 21st upon one of the stations 
of the Central Railway, and a quantity of material 
and stores seized by the insurgents. The Govern- 
ment, becoming seriously alarmed, ordered the arrest 
of several prominent naval officers, amongst these 
Admirals Wandelkolk and Guimaraes ; but that did 
not stop the rising, and next day Admiral Custodio 
de Mello boarded the cruiser jRiachuelo and assumed 
command of the war vessels. On the morning of the 
23rd the squadron steamed into position before the 
city. A rumour of bombardment caused a panic, but 



256 BRAZIL 

only a few shots were fired, one of which struck the 
Candelaria Church. 

The fact that the navy was in opposition was re- 
garded by the President as proof that the game was lost, 
so he held a hasty consultation with his ministers, and 
determined to resign. This resolution come to, he sent 
for Vice-President Floriano Peixoto and gave orders for 
the release of Admiral Wandenkolk, at the same time 
issuing a manifesto announcing his resignation, together 
with the following decree : — 

General-in-Chief Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca/ President of the Re- 
public of the United States of Brazil : — 

In the interests of the Nation, resolves to resign into the hands of 
his legal substitute the charge of President of the Republic. 

Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. 
T. de Alencar Araripe. 

Some riotous scenes followed, and two newspaper 
offices, the Diario de Commercio and Novidades, were 
wrecked. The municipal building was raided in search 
of the Prefect, Senhor Jose Felix, who had made himself 
specially obnoxious by strict enforcement of recent 
arbitrary orders, and outbursts of minor importance 
occurred in the city. These conditions, however, were 
of short duration, and normal quiet was restored in a few 
hours. General Floriano Peixoto, in virtue of his office 
as Vice-President of the Republic, assumed the Presi- 
dency, and Fonseca retired into private life for good and 
all, forgotten until his death in August 1892. 

Peixoto's accession gave promise of better things. 
Brazilians were aware of the part he had taken in the 
overthrow of his predecessor, and quite understood that 
his action was dictated by personal motives, and did not 
forget that the Vice-President was connected with the 
military element, which had caused much misery in the 
past two years. The experiences, however, the country 
had passed through since the deposition of Dom Pedro 
II. inclined people to anticipate that the new Administra- 
tion would be conducted on constitutional lines, and 



1892] INCREASE OF MILITARISM 257 

militarism restrained. President Peixoto's first steps in 
forming his ministry, and the abrogation of the decree 
of November 3, dissolving the Chambers, helped to 
strengthen this hopeful feeling, and the reassembling of 
Congress on December 18, 1891, further assisted to re- 
store confidence. On December 5 had come news of the 
death of Dom Pedro II. It evoked such expressions of 
regret in Rio de Janeiro and other prominent cities, as 
served to reveal the small part that the general public 
had taken in his deposition in 1889. 

Political interest was now concentrated upon 
Congress, and the relations between the Legislature and 
President Peixoto. Matters went smoothly at first, 
the President bringing no undue pressure to bear upon 
the Chambers. A new electoral law was passed to 
provide for an election in case of the death or resignation 
of the President within two years of assuming office. 
This point (Article 42 of the Constitution) is important, 
for the reason that round it centred a bitter dispute at a 
later period. Congress rose on the 21st of January 1892, 
after passing a vote of confidence in the Administration, 
and recommending that stringent measures be taken to 
avoid a recurrence of internal political disturbances. 

Peixoto, now free from the control of Congress, 
soon showed signs of perpetuating many of the worst 
abuses of his predecessor. Militarism became more 
marked than at any previous period, and unmitigated 
hostility was shown towards the Governors of States 
who had not openly pronounced against General da 
Fonseca when he made his coup dtdtat on November 3 
preceding. Towards the close of January a mutiny 
occurred at the fortress of Santa Cruz, situated near the 
entrance to the harbour of Rio de Janeiro ; but the 
outbreak was suppressed by two battalions of infantry, 
this force assaulting the fort and sustaining heavy loss 
in the attack. The President believed that the rebellious 
act was promoted by his enemies, and cherished bitter 
feeling towards all opposed to him, which led him into a 
course of action carrying in its train many tragic results. 

R 



258 BRAZIL 

He surrounded himself with a clique, and to ensure the 
adherence of these supporters, corrupt practices were 
condoned and public monies inadvisedly expended. 
Absolute obedience to his will was demanded, both 
from his immediate following and from the Governors 
of the States, and he intervened persistently in State 
Government affairs, going so far in February, 1892, as to 
depose the Governors of Ceara, Amazonas and Matto 
Grosso. 

As the severity of this praetorian system became 
more unbending, popular feeling against Peixoto 
developed, and that same month the Jornal do Comercio, 
the leading newspaper of Brazil, expressed the general 
sentiment by calling attention to Article 42 of the 
Constitution. The President ignored this attack, on the 
grounds that the election of General da Fonseca and 
himself to the offices of President and Vice-President 
had been effected by Congress under special circum- 
stances, and that ordinary law did not apply. But next 
April his answer to a protest made by 13 officers of high 
rank, who appealed to him for a fresh presidential 
election as the only adequate means of restoring 
confidence, was their dismissal from the public service, 
and the arrest of others suspected of sympathy with 
them. 

Congress assembled again in May, and to it the 
President explained his reasons for the arrests and 
deportations he had made, asserting that he had only 
taken such steps as were necessary to preserve order. 
Dissatisfaction was on the increase in both Chambers, 
but Peixoto could have secured a majority to confirm 
his determination to hold no fresh presidential election. 
He did not attempt, however, to obtain the legal 
sanction of Congress to his conduct. On the other 
hand, the Chambers took no steps to express disapproval 
of his attitude, or to prevent the intervention of the 
Federal Government in the States. For the remainder 
of 1892 matters drifted in an unsatisfactory manner, and 
the Administration gradually developed into despotism. 



1893] RISING IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL 259 

Dr Jullio de Castilhos regained control in Rio Grande 
do Sul, a position he had been forced to resign in 
November 1891, and the inhabitants, incensed at his 
return to {Dower, revolted under the leadership of 
Gumercindo Saraiva. In other directions revolutionary 
outbreaks were threatened. 

The year 1893 opened with ominous murmurings of 
discontent and frequent rumours of revolutionary con- 
spiracies. The President was aware of the popular 
sentiment, but only became the more severe in his 
treatment of persons suspected of political intrigue and 
consolidated his military resources for a determined 
resistance if armed revolt broke out. In April, Admiral 
Custodio de Mello resigned his portfolio as Minister 
of Marine, and in a letter severely criticising the Presi- 
dent complained that the Ministry was ignored by the 
Executive. The Finance Minister, Dr Serzedello Correa, 
went out with him. 

In Rio Grande do Sul the spirit of revolt spread 
rapidly, the insurgent leader Gumercindo Saraiva being 
a man with a genius for organisation and guerilla 
warfare. A small store of munitions of war was 
obtained through agents in Uruguay, a larger amount 
was captured from the Government troops, and the 
President was compelled to despatch strong reinforce- 
ments for the southern garrisons, these and other 
military operations involving a heavy drain upon the 
national exchequer. A rising in Rio de Janeiro was 
talked of in June, but no movement was attempted. In 
the following month, however, Admiral Wandenkolk, 
with a handful of men, seized the Brazilian coasting 
steamer -Jupiter, and entered Rio Grande to aid the 
insurrection there ; but the move proved abortive, for 
the city did not respond, and Government reinforcements 
were promptly brought from the interior. Admiral 
Wandenkolk, finding himself powerless against superior 
forces, then left Rio Grande for the north ; but when off 
Santa Catharina, his vessel was captured, and all the 
conspirators brought to Rio de Janeiro as prisoners. 



260 BRAZIL 

At length, on September 6, the standard of revolt 
was raised in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro by Admiral 
Custodio de Mello on board the armoured cruiser 
Aquidaban. The plans of the conspiracy had been care- 
fully matured, but an inkling of them had reached the 
Government, which strove to discover the nature of the 
plot and the persons implicated. These efforts were 
unavailing, and it was a surprise to both the authorities 
and the public when the entire squadron in the harbour 
broke into open insurrection. In explanation of his 
conduct, and in justification to the officers and men 
supporting the movement, de Mello issued the following 
manifesto : — 



Fellow Citizens : 

The revolutionary movement of November 23 had no object but 
the restoration of a constitutional regime which, to the amazement 
of the whole nation, and especially of all who were responsible for the 
establishment of Republican Government, had been annihilated by 
the coup d'etat of November 3. 

The sole purpose of the dictatorship of November 3 was to create 
administrative irresponsibility and spread the belief that the people, 
unable to establish and maintain free institutions, had submissively 
bowed to the yoke of an autocracy. 

You know the part which, through force of circumstances, it was 
my lot to take in that memorable period of revolutionary action. I 
served the interests of the people on November 23, which, in virtue 
of my honour as a sailor and my duties of a citizen, my country had a 
right to demand I should defend. 

And if after that day to my humble home there came a share of 
public authority, it was not due to suggestions of vanity, but to political 
responsibility resulting from the revolution, which had created a new 
state of affairs. 

In the Government I sought to maintain my patriotic aspirations, 
contending for the supremacy of the Constitution and submission to 
the law. 

While I was a Minister not a single day passed over my head that 
did not find me engaged in the defence of popular rights and liberties 
against the encroaching and absorbing action of an Administration 
which, concentrating in its grasp all the political functions of the 
nation, tended, by usurpation after usurpation, outrage after outrage, 
to scale the ramparts of political power and annul all constitutional 
privileges. 

Against the Constitution and against the integrity of the nation, 
the head of the Executive has mobilised the national army, placed it 



1893] THE NAVY REVOLTS 261 

on a war footing, and utilised it to terrorise Santa Catharina and Rio 
Grande do Sul. 

And against whom ? Against foreigners and alien enemies ? No ! 
The President of the Republic has armed Brazilians against Brazilians ; 
he has raised legions of so-called patriots, spreading mourning, want, 
and desolation in every nook and corner of the Republic, for the sole 
object of gratifying his personal caprices and strengthening and per- 
petuating the supremacy of his tyrannical dictatorship. 

Promising to be the sentinel of the Treasury, the President has 
perjured himself and deceived the nation, opening with sacrilegious 
hand the public exchequer to a policy of bribery and corruption, thus 
abusing the authority which, in an evil hour, the revolution of 
November 23, 1891, placed in his hands. 

Bankruptcy is knocking at our doors, followed by a long train of 
misfortunes and disasters. 

Fellow citizens ! The Republican Administration has descended to 
all kinds of abuses. 

Mutilated and violated, the Constitution is no longer recognised as 
the supreme law of public liberty. 

In this wretched situation I can no longer remain inactive. The 
nation longs to be free from a Government that humiliates it. The 
time has arrived for regaining rights and liberties repressed and 
trodden under foot. 

In the life of a nation, as in that of an individual, there are 
moments of decisive action. 

To preserve our country from humiliation ; to uphold the 
principles of liberty which human honour consecrates ; to transmit 
unstained to our children a free government in Brazil — this is our 
present situation. 

Events have so ordained. 

An officer in the navy, a Brazilian, and a citizen of a free country, 
I once more take the field of revolutionary action, to give battle to 
the destroyers of the Constitution, and to restore the sway of law, of 
order, and of peace. 

No longing for power, no selfish aspirations for control by violence, 
leads me into this revolution. 

That the nation may prove its ability for sovereignty under 
Republican Government, is my desire, the supreme ambition of my 
mind, and my purpose at the present time. 

Long live the Brazilian nation. 

Long live the Republic. 

Long live the Constitution. 

Custodio Jose de Mello. 

Federal Capital, September 6, 1893. 

This pronunciamiento of Admiral Mello embodied 
the feeling of most naval officers, for the navy was on 



262 BRAZIL 

unfriendly terms with the army, and had been persist- 
ently ignored and slighted since the establishment of the 
Republic in 1889. When Admiral de Mello, therefore, 
determined to head the revolt, he relied upon this hos- 
tility to draw to his aid nearly all the officers of his own 
branch of the service, and the fact that he had been one 
of the prominent leaders in the successful revolt against 
General da Fonseca was also important, and undoubtedly 
attracted many Brazilians to his side. 

The civilians actively participating in the revolt were 
a group of members of Congress and others, who joined 
Admiral de Mello on board the Aquidaban on the morn- 
ing of September 6. That any prolonged conflict should 
occur, was not expected. The revolutionary movements 
in 1889 and 1891 had been of short duration, and similar 
brevity was anticipated now. It was thought President 
Peixoto would tender his resignation, or that a modus 
vivendi would be reached in a few days at furthest. 
But the sympathisers with the revolt and the peaceable 
section of the inhabitants were mistaken. Whatever 
faults Peixoto may have had, they did not include a lack 
of energy and determination, and a wish to resist the 
uprising was the dominant feeling amongst his sup- 
porters. But his decision to defend his position at all 
costs resulted in a prolonged and bloody struggle 
between the two factions. 

The defences of Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy were 
strengthened. Sangbag breastworks were thrown up 
along the water-front in all positions where a landing 
was likely, and cavalry patrolled the streets. Batteries 
of artillery were mounted on the hills commanding the 
bay ; martial law was proclaimed in the Federal District, 
and in the States of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Parana, 
Santa Catherina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The 
President personally inspected the defensive measures. 
Orders for war material were sent to Europe and the 
United States, and negotiations were opened for the 
purchase of war-vessels to take the offensive against 
the ships under command of Admiral de Mello. The 





President Peixoto. 



Admiral Saldanha da Gama. 





Admiral Custodio de Mello. 



GUMERCINDO SARA1VA. 



[Face page 262. 



1893] STRENGTH OF THE REBELS 263 

military element rallied round the Government with few 
exceptions. 

In possession of the insurgents were the warships 
Aquidaban, Republica, Trajano, Orion, Javary, Marajo, 
Marcilio JDias, Guanabara, Amazonas, Madeira, Sete de 
Septembre, Iguatemy, Aragaary, the cruiser Almirante 
Tamandare, and five torpedo-boats ; also the Brazilian 
merchant steamers Uranus, Venus, Marte, and Jupiter. 
Government steam-launches were captured, and utilised 
for warlike purposes. The rebels occupied the naval 
depot at the Armacao, near Nictheroy, but, after remov- 
ing all stores and ammunition needed for immediate use, 
abandoned the position. In the first few days, the fleet 
was busy laying in coal and supplies ; the former was 
taken from deposits in the bay, the latter from ware- 
houses near the water-front, and consisting for the most 
part of dried beef and recently imported stores. Occa- 
sional skirmishes took place, but no serious fighting. At 
the Armacao, however, matters bore a different aspect, 
for Peixoto had reinforced the garrison of Nictheroy, 
and every attempt of the rebels to land in the vicinity of 
that city was disputed. Eort Villegaignon remained 
neutral at the opening of the struggle, and was watched 
anxiously by both factions. It was the headquarters of 
the marine infantry and. heavily armed with guns of 
large calibre, and its proximity to Rio de Janeiro gave 
it great strategical importance. Cobras Island was held 
by a garrison that also stood aloof from any active 
participation in the revolt. The naval school at 
Enxadas Island, in charge of Admiral Saldanha da 
Gama, followed the example of Villegaignon, while the 
forts of Santa Cruz, Sao Joao Baptista, and Lage 
remained faithful to Peixoto. 

Civilians were apathetic, few thinking that there 
would be serious fighting, even after the suspension of 
all traffic in the harbour had brought home to people's 
minds the fact that something of the nature of civil war 
had broken out. But, on September 12, this apathy 
was abruptly disturbed when Admiral de Mello ordered 



264 BRAZIL 

all merchant vessels and foreign warships to leave the 
usual anchorage and move further up the bay, and next 
morning took up a position commanding the city. 
When, about 9 a.m., the guns of the forts at Santa 
Cruz and Sao Joao opened an ineffective fire upon the 
rebel ships, and an hour later the fleet began to bombard 
the Government forts and certain points in the city, 
ail was immediately confusion. The population, panic- 
stricken by the shot and shell thrown at the town, fled 
en masse to the suburbs, never pausing to note that the 
naval guns were directed chiefly against the war arsenal, 
the city being spared as much as possible. All day the 
fight went on, and the squadron then withdrew out of 
range of the guns of the forts. The Aquidaban had 
been struck several times by shells from Santa Cruz, 
but no serious damage occasioned to hull or machinery. 

On the night of September 18 heavy firing was 
heard from Santa Cruz, Lage, and Sao Joao. This was 
occasioned by the warships Republica, Marcilio Diaz, 
and the armed merchantmen Uranus and Pallas passing 
the forts at the mouth of the harbour. Three of these 
vessels ran out unharmed, but the Pallas was struck 
and her machinery badly injured when abreast of the 
military school, where for eight hours she lay crippled 
and exposed to the fire of the forts, with a number of 
civilian sympathisers aboard, all of whom considered 
themselves lost. A few threw themselves into the sea 
and swam to shore, there to be captured and shot down 
by troops. The engineers of the Pallas, however, did 
not lose heart. Unable to repair the damage to the 
principal machinery, they got the ship under weigh with 
an auxiliary engine. Before this was accomplished, 
some twenty men were killed or wounded, but at length 
the Pallas steamed away at a speed of three miles an 
hour to the southward. 

The object of sending the Republica and her con- 
sorts to southern waters was to establish a Provisional 
Government, thus giving a rallying point to Brazilians 
who wished to join the revolt. Direct communication 



1893] PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 265 

was established also with the rebels in Rio Grande do 
Sul. The plan was for the fleet in Rio de Janeiro, 
and the people of Rio Grande do Sul to make common 
cause against Peixoto, and the island of Desterro, in 
Santa Catharina, was selected as a convenient place to 
establish the Government. The city of Desterro, the 
State capital, being weakly garrisoned, surrendered in 
October, and a Provisional Government was immediately 
formed, Captain Lorena being proclaimed President and 
furnished with a ministry to carry on the adminis- 
tration. 

Little change occurred in the harbour of Rio de 
Janeiro during the remainder of September. At the 
instigation of the foreign diplomatic corps a com- 
promise was arranged, by which the squadron refrained 
from firing upon the city, provided no artillery was 
mounted within the town limits. Foreign vessels were 
allowed to load and discharge in the harbour so long as 
no war material was landed. Constant skirmishing 
took place near Nictheroy, and in the vicinity of the 
Armacao ; and on October 9 the white flag, which the 
insurgents had taken as their distinguishing emblem, was 
seen flying from the flagstaff of Fort Villegaignon, proof 
sufficient that the garrison had thrown in their lot with 
the revolt. It was impelled to do so by the action 
of the Government in cutting off the water supply and 
refusing further issue of rations. 

During November the progress of the revolution 
was marked by a daily exchange of artillery fire 
between the Government forts of Santa Cruz and Sao 
Joao, and the insurgent stronghold Villegaignon and the 
warships. Admiral de Mello now determined to go 
south to Desterro to confer with the Provisional Govern- 
ment, and Admiral Saldanha da Gama agreed to take 
over command of the rebel forces in the harbour. An 
incident occurred at this time, resulting in the death of 
two officers, a boatswain, and an ordinary seaman of 
the British squadron. A party from H.M.S. Sirius 
and H.M.S. Racer landed close to the powder magazine 



266 BRAZIL 

on Ilha do Gouvernador, then in possession of the 
insurgents. About 3.40 p.m. on November 3, the 
Mattoso powder deposit, containing seventy tons of 
powder, blew up with a terrific explosion, killing a 
number of Brazilians in the vicinity, and, it was supposed, 
injuring some British sailors. Search parties from the 
British squadron found that Lieutenant Beauchamp 
Mowbray, of the Sirius, Lieutenant C. G. Tupper, of 
the Racer, and Boatswain Harris, of the Sirius, were 
dead, and seaman Lynch so severely injured that he 
succumbed shortly afterwards. The only trace of the 
two officers was some uniform buttons. The explosion 
was expected ashore, and was probably the work of a 
Government agent, but the facts were never disclosed. 

On November 30 Admiral de Mello determined to 
carry out his intention of visiting Desterro. At mid- 
night, the Aquidahan, accompanied by the steamer 
EsperanpOr, got under weigh. The Esperanga escaped 
unscathed. The Aquidaban was struck in several 
places, but not seriously damaged. 

When de Mello left at the end of the month for 
Desterro, Admiral Saldanha da Gama, a man of great 
influence, published a manifesto to explain his posi- 
tion, in which he declared his wish to see affairs in 
Brazil on the same footing as existed previous to the 
revolution of November 15, 1889, and the people free to 
choose the form of government that they desired. This 
was twisted by the friends of President Peixoto to 
mean that Admiral da Gama was fighting to re-establish 
the imperial regime. That the Admiral preferred 
Monarchy to Republicanism there was no doubt ; but 
he most emphatically and repeatedly reiterated that he 
had no intention of forcing any particular form of 
Government upon Brazilians. What he always said 
was, " Let them choose for themselves." Notwithstand- 
ing these denials, the effect of his manifesto was to 
weaken sympathy from a section of the population, 
who, whilst holding President Peixoto in detestation, 
were strong believers in the ethics of Republicanism. 



CHAPTER XV 

brazil — continued 

Position in December 1893. Many Persons Emigrate. Precautions 
to stop Rebel Supplies. Peixoto orders Daily Firing against 
Rebel Ships. Troops in Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy. The 
Government Flotilla. Admiral da Gama. Strain of Continuous 
Fighting. Ilha Gouvernador. General Telles killed. Capture 
of Ilha Mocangue. Personality of da Gama. Question of 
Belligerent Rights. Journey of Mello to the South. Saraiva 
marches Northwards. Personality of Saraiva. Rebel Plan of 
Campaign. Saraiva reaches Parana. Mello captures Para- 
nagua. Successes raise Revolutionary Prestige. Lapa Sur- 
renders. War Material captured at Curityba. Scarcity of 
Ammunition. Rebel Casualties. Artillery Fire more effective. 
Government Flotilla sails from Europe. Foreign Trade Suffers. 
Insurgent Hospital Bombarded. Admiral Da Gama urges 
Mello to send Reinforcements. The Aquidaban reaches Harbour. 
Rebels attack the Armacao. Incident of U.S. Admiral Staunton. 
Arrival of U.S. Admiral Benham. Threat if United States 
Merchantmen Molested. Situation of Rebels. Council of War. 
Cruiser Republica Appears. Aquidaban and Republica sail North- 
wards. Government Flotilla Arrives. Population advised to 
leave City. Rebel Situation Desperate. Captain Castilhos 
grants asylum on Portuguese Men-of-War. Rebel Positions 
Abandoned. Peixoto demands Surrender of Refugees from 
Castilhos. Portuguese Vessels convey Rebels to Montevideo. 
Diplomatic Relations interrupted with Portugal. Incident of 
H.M.S. Sirins. Brutal Treatment of Insurgent Wounded. 

In December, 1893, civil war appeared inevitable. The 
people wanted peace, but they were too supine to take 
up arms to end the conflict. While the insurgents had 
many sympathisers, Peixoto was upheld by the military 
and a numerous political following, and he now allowed 

267 



268 BRAZIL 

his vindictive passions to overcome all caution. Legal 
guarantees were suspended under martial law, and no 
act of the authorities towards citizens could be criticised 
by the courts. Suspicion surrounded every person who 
was not an ardent supporter of the Peixoto Adminis- 
tration, and arrests were the order of the day amongst 
all classes of society. The prisons were filled with 
insurgent sympathisers, opportunity being taken to 
gratify personal spite by denouncing private enemies 
as being implicated in seditious plots against the Govern- 
ment, and thousands of peaceful people fled the country. 
Prominent persons, unable to escape on account of the 
strict supervision over transport from Rio de Janeiro, to 
avoid arrest lay hidden whilst this reign of terror lasted. 
The President understood that if he could stop 
supplies reaching the rebel squadron, the insurgents must 
abandon the harbour or surrender. For the rebels to 
take the warships away, meant the continuance of the 
fight elsewhere in Brazil, and this was not to the liking 
of Peixoto. His object was to prevent the squadron 
running the gauntlet of the forts and batteries. At the 
same time, he redoubled the precautions to hinder the 
insurgents receiving provisions. Whilst knowing that 
the squadron had a fair stock of ammunition, the Presi- 
dent argued that with sufficient provocation for fre- 
quent artillery and rifle fire, the supply would soon 
be exhausted. To draw the rebel fire, artillery was 
mounted on both sides of the harbour, and a daily duel 
between the Government batteries and Villegaignon, 
assisted by the naval vessels, took place. The National 
Guard was called out, and volunteer regiments raised, 
until, at the end of 1893, the troops in Rio de Janeiro 
and Nictheroy exceeded 20,000, well armed with 
repeating Mannlicher rifles, and amply provided with 
ammunition. The vessels Peixoto had ordered in 
Europe and the United States were now reported ready, 
and consisted of the converted steamer Old, re-named 
the Nictheroy, and armed with a Zalinski dynamite gun, 
several 6-inch quick firers, and a number of machine 



1894] POSITION OF THE INSURGENTS 269 

guns ; the torpedo-catcher Aurora, re-named the Gustavo 
Sampaio ; and six sea-going torpedo boats. Peixoto's 
design was to attack the rebel squadron under the 
protection of the fire from the forts and batteries. 

The position of Admiral Saldanha da Gama in the 
harbour was a difficult one. His object was to keep 
the attention of the army concentrated upon Rio de 
Janeiro, to allow more freedom for the revolutionary 
movement in the South ; but the rebel squadron was in 
an ineffective condition, and was not capable of taking 
the offensive. The monitor Javary had been sunk by 
a 9-inch shell, and the Aquidaban and the Repuhlica, 
the two most serviceable vessels in the navy, were at 
Desterro. Villegaignon fortress, moreover, had suffered 
severely from the converging fire of Sao Joao, Santa 
Cruz, and Cragosta. Its casualties in men had been 
heavy, and rations were getting difficult to obtain. For 
the moment there was ammunition, but the Admiral 
knew the stock would be exhausted if a general action 
occurred, and the strain was beginning to tell on officers 
and men. The Government troops now became more 
aggressive, and forced da Gama to active measures to 
denude his ships of their crews to obtain men for 
landing-parties. In December, for instance, Peixoto 
ordered General Telles with a strong body of men to 
occupy the Ilha do Gouvernador, hitherto in undisputed 
possession of the insurgents. This entailed a force 
being landed from the squadron, and in the sharp fight 
that followed (the rebels commanded by Admiral da 
Gama in person), the Government troops were routed 
and General Telles and a number of officers and men 
killed. The area of the island was of too great extent, 
however, to permit of permanent occupation by the 
rebels, so the position was evacuated and immediately 
occupied by Government troops. 

Sharp fighting also occurred on the island of 
Mocangue, which afforded excellent positions for 
artillery to annoy the rebel squadron. Peixoto ordered 
a battery of Krupp guns to be mounted there, and so 



270 BEAZIL 

effective was its fire that Admiral da Gama resolved to 
silence it. His attack was made with excellent judg- 
ment. Early one morning several ships were moved 
into position to bring a cross-fire to bear upon the 
trenches, and half an hour before daybreak 300 officers 
and men were landed, taking the Government troops by 
surprise. In less than an hour, the Krupp battery, a 
machine gun, and some eighty prisoners were captured, 
with a loss on the Government side of 35 killed and 
wounded, against 3 killed and 9 wounded among the 
insurgents. 

The personality of the Admiral alone kept the revolt 

alive. Luiz Felipe Saldanha da Gama was a man of 

exceptional ability, who had become Rear- Admiral in 

the Brazilian navy after long service. A descendant of 

Vasco da Gama, he had the pride of family tradition 

deep-rooted in his heart. The subservience of political 

principles to personal motives had no place in his life. 

He had travelled extensively, and his knowledge of 

English, French, Italian, Spanish and German enabled 

him to profit from his journeys. Whilst holding aloof 

from political affairs in Brazil, he frequently expressed 

to his more intimate friends his contempt for the 

politicians who had dragged his country down since the 

abolition of the imperial regime. He condemned the 

dictatorial methods of Peixoto, and at heart was a 

devoted servant of the exiled royal family. His 

personal inclination was for its restoration, but he never 

proposed to re-establish monarchy by force. At the 

beginning of the revolt he was in charge of the Naval 

School, and it was in part due to this fact that he got 

drawn into the revolutionary movement. The cadets, 

in age ranging from 16 to 21, were determined to join 

their comrades on the squadron, and Admiral da Gama 

could not reconcile his mind to take the offensive against 

the officers, and more especially the cadets, with whom 

he had been so long associated. Towards President 

Peixoto and his Administration he was bound by no 

ties, and naturally he decided to support his friends. 



1894] SALDANHA DA GAMA 271 

His energy was stupendous. Day and night he worked 
at details in connection with the insurgent vessels, 
inspecting every post, looking after the supply and 
purchase of rations, visiting hospitals, and personally 
superintending every warlike operation in the bay. His 
personal bravery gave those under him confidence in the 
presence of the gravest danger. No wonder, then, that 
with da Gama at the head of the revolt in the harbour, 
Peixoto should feel anxious. 

In the beginning of 1894, the question of the recog- 
nition of the insurgents as belligerents arose. The Pro- 
visional Government in Desterro instructed its agents 
abroad to press for recognition, on the grounds that the 
insurgents practically controlled the southern section of 
Brazil ; that they had established a government ; that 
this government was equipped with machinery of office, 
and that it maintained both military and naval forces to 
support its authority. To the squadron this recognition 
was of the highest importance, because it would have 
given the right to establish a blockade and cut off food 
supplies, and it was failure to obtain the belligerent 
rights that ultimately led to the collapse of the revolt. 
Without them the power of the rebel squadron was 
greatly restricted, inasmuch as it could not deter 
foreign merchantmen from entering the harbour. 

Admiral Mello, after leaving Rio de Janeiro in the 
Aquidaban, proceeded to Ilha Grande, the national 
quarantine station, and occupied the Government 
buildings without resistance on the part of the detach- 
ment of troops forming the island garrison. Two days 
later the Admiral sailed for Desterro to confer with the 
rebel government. It was determined to send for 
Gumercindo Saraiva, who, with 4000 men, was on the 
northern frontier of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, 
where he had fought a series of victorious engagements 
with the Government forces, capturing much additional 
war material. In place of lances and other obsolete 
weapons, with which his men were armed at the outbreak 
of the revolt, they had now modern rifles. Ammunition 



272 BRAZIL 

was difficult to obtain ; but supplies for Government 
troops were seized, and a small quantity purchased in 
Uruguay. The Rio Grande insurgents were without 
much military discipline, but obedient to their chiefs, 
and, being well mounted and accustomed to country life, 
were a mobile force. On receiving this message from 
the Provisional Government at Desterro, the rebel leader 
decided to move northwards with the majority of his 
army, leaving the command of the insurgent operations in 
Rio Grande in the hands of General Tavares, a man of 
wide experience in guerilla warfare. His instructions 
were to harass the Government troops, but avoid serious 
engagements. Early in January Saraiva arrived at 
Desterro, the mainland not far from the German settle- 
ment, bringing with him Colonel Salgado, a former officer 
in the Brazilian artillery. 

Saraiva was an interesting personality. One of a 
family of nine brothers, he was born near the Uruguayan 
frontier, where his parents were landed proprietors and 
cattle owners. He thus belonged to the class most 
injured by misrule in Rio Grande do Sul, and his dislike 
to governmental officials had caused trouble on various 
occasions ; so that, when the revolutionary movements 
broke out, he was a ready recruit. Knowing the country 
intimately from experience gained in driving cattle 
through Rio Grande and Uruguay, he was invaluable for 
guerilla tactics, and his natural talent for organisation 
soon brought him into prominence. His command over 
men was remarkable. He assumed the position of a 
semi-feudal chieftain, and demanded absolute obedience. 
He was now 46 years of age, could boast little education, 
but possessed a quiet dignity of manner and a fund of 
sound common sense in everyday affairs. His habits of 
living were simple ; the open air, with the earth for a bed 
and his saddle for a pillow, pleased him as well as a 
comfortably furnished house, and he was devoid of 
fear. 

The plan of campaign proposed by the Provisional 
Government was for the Rio Grande forces to march 



1894] REBELS ADVANCE FROM SOUTH 273 

through the central districts of Santa Catharina, cross 
into Parana, and advance on the city of Curityba by way 
of Lapa. Simultaneously, Admiral de Mello was to 
proceed with the cruiser Rejniblica and the armed trans- 
ports Uranus and Pallas to Paranagua. A railway 
connects Curityba with the seaport, and the possession 
of the two points meant control of the State of Parana. 
The armed transports were to be utilised to convey 
troops locally recruited in Santa Catharina to occupy 
Paranagua and the adjacent country. This plan was 
accepted by Saraiva, and by the middle of January, 
1894, word was received from him that his march 
northwards had met little opposition. Where fighting 
had occurred, he had been successful. He added that 
the garrison of Lapa was surrounded and its capitulation 
daily expected, and that he would be at Curityba by the 
end of the month. Admiral da Mello now started with 
his expedition, and the Republica with two armed 
transports entered Paranagua. Landing parties seized 
the port. The city made a show of resistance, but after 
20 of the garrison had been killed or wounded the force 
of 350 officers and men surrendered, and a considerable 
amount of war material was captured. Many of the 
prisoners enlisted in the rebel ranks. This success was 
important for the insurrection, because it gave the 
Provisional Government a port from which revenue 
could be collected to defray expenses. Order was 
quickly established in Paranagua and the vicinity. 

Mello's victory added prestige to the revolutionary 
cause, and enabled the insurgents to occupy Curityba 
and other important points without further resistance. 
The town of Lapa surrendered, the garrison being 
allowed transport out of the rebel zone. Situated on a 
hill rising from rolling plains, Lapa was considered to be 
impregnable. The surrounding slopes were strongly 
defended by trenches, and Saraiva feared the losses he 
might sustain in any attempt to carry the place by 
assault; but a small naval brigade of 150 officers and 
men obtained permission to rush the position, and 

s 



274 BRAZIL 

earned the two outer lines of entrenchments. The 
place then capitulated. 

On the occupation of Curityba, the warlike stores 
captured included two Krupp batteries of 6 guns each, 
3 Nordenfelt machine guns, a supply of artillery ammuni- 
tion, and 150,000 rounds of Mannlicher rifle ball cartridge. 
Two Italian regiments were now recruited from colonists 
settled in Parana, and the total available insurgent 
forces in February raised to more than 6000 men, fairly 
well equipped. It was proposed to advance to Sao 
Paulo, but Saraiva decided that his men and horses 
needed rest after their long marches from the south, 
influenced in this decision by the knowledge that to the 
northward lay the yellow fever region. 

Saldanha da Gama heard of these victories in the 
south, and he redoubled his attempts to prevent troops 
being despatched from the Brazilian capital to check 
the advance to Sao Paulo. Feints of landings were 
made daily, and the waste of ball cartridge was heavy. 
Casualties also augmented steadily, and at the end of 
January, the Admiral send word to Mello that he 
required reinforcements of men, ammunition, and food 
to maintain his position. 

Peixoto, likewise, was untiring in his efforts, and the 
artillery fire from Santa Cruz, Sao Joao, Gragoata, and 
the batteries mounted at the Armacao improved. In 
spite of reverses in the south, the President never 
wavered in his determination to subdue the revolt. In 
January, the vessels purchased in Europe and the United 
States were ordered to rendezvous at Pernambuco. The 
plan was to station them off the entrance of Rio de 
Janeiro to prevent the ingress or egress of insurgent 
vessels, and to cut off rebel supplies. If this was in- 
sufficient to induce the surrender of the insurgents, 
Peixoto proposed to open fire from every gun near 
the bay, and simultaneously to attack the insurgent 
squadron with his ships. 

During the revolt commerce and shipping suffered 
severely. Passenger and cargo traffic was not altogether 



1894] SITUATION AT RIO DE JANEIRO 275 

suspended on account of the protection extended by the 
foreign men-of-war, but restriction as to working hours 
and the danger to the crews from stray bullets was so 
great, that the port was practically closed for ordinary 
business. Admiral da Gama realised that the more 
impediments he could throw in the way of foreign ship- 
ping entering the harbour the more difficult would the 
situation be for the Government, for less trade entailed 
less revenue. With the exception of the Custom-house 
duties the Government practically had no income, and 
thus was forced to resort to emissions of inconvertible 
paper money. Feeling on both sides became more em- 
bittered as the conflict was prolonged, and absolute 
military despotism prevailed in Rio de Janeiro. So 
intense had vindictive feeling become that the insurgent 
hospital on Enxadas Island was bombarded, although a 
Red Cross flag floated over the buildings, and on one occa- 
sion six shells were thrown into the hospital, killing two 
patients. Another day two projectiles struck the prin- 
cipal ward in the main building. A remonstrance to 
Peixoto elicited the reply that the firing was not intended 
for the hospital, but directed at an armed launch crossing 
the bay. A second protest was submitted, pointing out 
that a number of wounded prisoners were under treat- 
ment at Enxadas, and after this the hospital was not 
molested. Admiral da Gama treated his prisoners most 
humanely. They were placed on a transport, regular 
rations issued, and the wounded cared for in the insurgent 
hospitals. 

By February da Gama found his position so critical 
that he sent another urgent request to Mello for rein- 
forcements and supplies. The Aquidaban arrived, but 
brought neither men nor provisions, and the accounts 
given by her commander in regard to hesitation on the 
part of the insurgent leaders to move on Rio de Janeiro 
were not satisfactory. The artillery fire from the 
Armacao now became so aggressive that da Gama 
decided to assault the position and endeavour to occupy 
it permanently. On the evening of February 7 a force 



276 BRAZIL 

of 35 officers and 600 men were landed on the island 
of Concecao, with the intention of attacking next morn- 
ing ; but transport arrangements went amiss, and the 
men remained under cover all day. At 1 a.m. next 
morning the force was embarked in barges, and con- 
veyed by steam launches to the spots selected for landing. 
Shortly after 3 a.m. the first shot was fired, and after 
some hard fighting the insurgents obtained possession of 
the naval arsenal and advanced towards Nictheroy, 
hoisting the rebel flag at daybreak over the Armacao. 
Heavy firing continued in the vicinity of Nictheroy, and 
here a serious check occurred. The Government troops 
were retiring when strong reinforcements opportunely 
arrived, obliging Admiral da Gama to retreat to the 
barges, himself wounded in the neck, and many of his 
force dead or disabled. The troops endeavoured to 
prevent the re-embarkation of the rebels, and a desperate 
conflict ensued ; but, aided by the machine guns of the 
cruiser Liberdade and several armed launches, the naval 
force finally succeeded in reaching their boats. This 
was not accomplished until the Admiral had been again 
wounded in four places. The insurgent loss altogether 
was 22 officers and 156 men killed and wounded. 
This attempt to capture the Armacao further crippled 
the rebel resources. The casualties amongst the 
Government troops reached 700 officers and men, but 
could be better borne. 

In October, 1893, Rear- Admiral Staunton of the 
United States navy was in command of the U. S. squadron 
in Brazilian waters. Admiral de Mello, then at the 
head of the naval revolt, paid a formal visit to the United 
States Admiral, and was received on board the flagship 
with the usual courtesies. Admiral Staunton returned 
the visit, and was given the customary salute. President 
Peixoto notified Washington of this interchange of visits, 
and asserted that such action was tantamount to recog- 
nising the rebels as belligerents. Washington cabled 
the recall of Admiral Staunton, and in January Admiral 
Benham arrived. He reached Rio de Janeiro with no 



1894] ATTITUDE OF U.S. ADMIRAL 277 

very friendly feelings towards the insurgents, and had 
no intention of allowing the rebels to interfere with 
United States merchant shipping, or of recognising rules 
tacitly admitted hitherto by foreign vessels. In the third 
week in February two United States merchantmen 
entered the harbour and proposed to draw up to the 
quays to discharge. Admiral da Gama notified the 
masters of these vessels that they could not moor to 
the wharves, as the district was within the field of fire 
between the ships and the shore, and no vessels were 
allowed in that zone. The shipmasters appealed to the 
United States Admiral. Benham ordered the merchant- 
men to go up to the wharves, and notified da Gama that 
he would open fire upon the insurgent squadron if any 
interference was attempted. The United States warships 
in harbour were the New York, Charleston, San Francisco, 
Detroit, and Newark. Admiral da Gama could make 
no effective resistance in the face of this superior force. 
The merchantmen were ordered to heave-to when abreast 
of the cruiser Trajano, and the Detroit immediately 
fired two shots at the rebel vessel. The merchantmen 
then were allowed to pass unmolested. This blow to 
the prestige of the rebel cause was great, because it 
showed clearly that the insurgents would no longer be 
permitted to interfere with shipping and commerce. 

The combined effects of the repulse at the Armagao 
and the action of the United States Admiral led da 
Gama to the conclusion that his situation was desperate. 
He had recovered from the wounds he received on 
February 9 with the exception of the injury to his left 
arm, the upper tendons of which had been severed by 
a fragment of shell, and on February 19 summoned a 
council of officers, to which he explained the position and 
asked the members to decide whether they wished to con- 
tinue the fight, or would authorise him as their leader to 
make terms with Peixoto. He pointed out that no 
supplies or reinforcements had come from the south, in 
spite of repeated and urgent requests ; but the officers 
unanimously decided to prolong the struggle. The 



278 BRAZIL 

Admiral then said he would again appeal to Mello for 
reinforcements before discussing a change of policy, and 
once more a message was sent to Desterro. To this the 
reply was that Mello had left for the north in the cruiser 
Republica, which appeared on the 23rd off Rio. The 
rebels imagined that the reinforcements so sorely needed 
had come, and it was decided that the Aquidaban should 
communicate with de Mello. After consultation with 
the senior officers of the squadron, da Gama determined 
that it would be useless for Mello to enter the harbour 
unless his force was sufficient for a landing at Nictheroy. 
If the reinforcements were not strong enough for this, 
the suggestion was that the two vessels should proceed 
to Bahia and demand the surrender of that city. At 
4 a.m. on the morning of February 24, the Aquidaban 
was under weigh. Search-lights on various heights 
showed her movements, and as she steamed down the 
bay, firing from the forts and batteries was fast and 
furious. Taking his ships within fifty yards of the 
walls of Santa Cruz, the commander, Alexandrino de 
Alencar, fired a broadside when abreast, and then 
steamed out to sea without discharging another shot. 
The gunnery at the forts was better than on former occa- 
sions, and one shell passed through the funnel and 
another completely wrecked the lower bridge ; no 
other serious damage occurred. 

Clear of the fire of the forts, Captain Alencar made 
for the Republica to confer with Mello. The views of 
Saldanha cla Gama were explained, and Mello said that 
an accident to the machinery of the transport accom- 
panying him from Desterro necessitated the return of 
the vessel to port. In these circumstances the Admiral 
considered it useless to enter Rio, and decided to steam 
northwards to Bahia in company with the Aquidaban. 

In the harbour of Rio de Janeiro comparative quiet 
ensued. Admiral da Gama waited for news from the 
north, expecting daily to hear of the success or failure 
of the expedition. On shore President Peixoto made a 
final disposition of the troops pending the arrival of 



1894] PREPARATIONS TO ABANDON RIO 279 

the Government warships. The artillery duel between 
the forts on the mainland and Villegaignon and the 
rebel ships continued, but no other aggressive measures 
were attempted ; but the constant shelling of Villegaignon 
for four months by Santa Cruz and Sao Joao has 
reduced the fortifications to a shapeless mass of ruins, 
and although the guns were intact it was evident the 
position must soon be untenable. The bomb-proof 
casemates no longer afforded protection to the garrison. 
In February a 9-inch shell from Sao Joao penetrated 
during the dinner hour, killing 7 and wounding 35 men. 

Admiral da Gama determined to evacuate the harbour 
of Rio de Janeiro as soon as he received information of 
the fate of Mello. If the expedition proved a success, 
the insurgents were to be transported to Bahia ; if a 
failure, to the south. Orders were given to provision 
and coal the insurgent vessels. The remaining warlike 
stores were distributed amongst the vessels, and arrange- 
ments made to disable such launches and ships as were 
not considered in a fit state to run the gauntlet of the 
batteries and forts. Whilst the vessels were preparing 
for sea, the armed transport Venus was struck by a 
shell and foundered, and a valuable stock of provisions 
and ammunition was lost in her. 

Whilst da Gama was waiting for news from Mello, 
the vessels Peixoto had purchased in Europe and the 
United States arrived off the entrance to the harbour 
on March 7. Peixoto then issued notice to the inhabi- 
tants that on the 13th all forts and batteries would open 
fire upon the insurgents, and that the new vessels would 
also attack. It was added that batteries posted in the 
city would join in the action, and that a bombardment 
by the rebel squadron might be anticipated. The 
population was therefore advised to leave the town, and 
certain localities were specified as free from danger. 
Panic followed ; men, women, and children fled to 
escape the threatened danger, and business was at a 
standstill. 

Next day da Gama learned that the Aquidaban was 



280 BRAZIL 

at Desterro and the Republica at Parangmi, and that 
no attempt had been made either to capture Bahia or 
to send reinforcements to Rio de Janeiro. He naturally 
regarded this news as proof that Mello had played him 
false, and a council of war was called at which da Gama 
explained the desperate situation, pointing out, however, 
that it might be possible to run the ships out of the 
harbour and proceed to the south, although the operation 
would be attended by extreme danger. The Admiral 
offered to treat with Peixoto, surrendering his own 
person if the safety of the officers and men under his 
command was assured. This proposal the council 
rejected, and finally it was decided to leave da Gama 
to act as he deemed fit. 

The Admiral determined not to risk sacrifice of life 
by attempting to run past the batteries and ships, and 
to appeal to the senior naval officer of the Portuguese 
squadron then in the port for asylum. Captain Castilhos 
acceded at once to the request, promising to receive 
the insurgents on board the Portuguese men-of-war Min- 
dello and Alfonso Alberquerque and land them in neutral 
territory. Arrangements were commenced immediately 
for abandoning the ships and Fort Villegaignon, and on 
the night of March 12 the rebels left their stations and 
embarked on the Portuguese vessels. 

On the following day the programme announced by 
Peixoto was executed. As there was no response from 
the rebels, the order was given to cease firing, and the 
news rapidly spread that the insurgents had given up 
the fight. Detachments of troops were sent to occupy 
Villegaignon and the islands of Cobras and Enxadas, 
and arrangements made to take charge of the deserted 
ships. Peixoto was furious that da Gama and his 
officers had escaped him, and sent a peremptory demand 
to Captain Castilhos for the surrender of the insurgents. 
This was curtly refused, in spite of a threat that the 
Portuguese ships would not be permitted to leave the 
harbour with the rebels on board. Captain Castilhos 
informed his Government of his action, pointing out 



1894] INCIDENT OF H.M.S. SIRIUS 281 

that the surrender of the insurgents to the authorities 
meant the summary execution of the greater number of 
officers and men. In reply the Portuguese Government 
ordered Captain Castilhos to proceed to Montevideo with 
the rebels, but not to allow them to land until further 
instructions. He sailed unmolested for the south three 
days later, and diplomatic relations between Portugal 
and Brazil were forthwith broken off. 

A few days after the close of the revolt in Rio an 
incident nearly brought about complications with the 
British Government. Lieutenant Hotham, navigating 
officer of H.M.S. Sirius, landed from a launch on Enxadas 
Island to take sights and correct chronometers. The 
military officers in charge of the island ordered his 
arrest, refusing to listen to explanations, and seizing the 
launch. After some hours had elapsed, another launch 
was sent to enquire the reason for Lieutenant Hotham's 
delay. On learning the facts, Captain Pipon demanded 
the instant release of his officer, and pending a reply 
moved the Sirius into a position to open fire on the 
Nictheroy and others of the new vessels belonging to the 
Government. Dismayed at this determined attitude, the 
authorities at once released Lieutenant Hotham. The 
commander of the Sirius further demanded the British 
flag to be hoisted on board the senior Brazilian naval 
officer's ship then in port, and duly saluted. Peixoto 
acceded. 

The wildest excesses took place after the collapse of 
the rebels. The insurgent wounded left in hospital at 
Enxadas were neglected and abused, and such civilian 
attendants as had remained on the island for hospital 
duties were imprisoned and flogged. 



CHAPTER XVI 

brazil — continued 

The Voyage of the Aquidaban and the Republica. Saraiva deceived as 
to the Position. Mello and Saraiva. Discontent with Provisional 
Government. Presidential Election. Dr Prudente Moraes. 
News reaches Saraiva. Parana evacuated. Mello organises 
Expedition to Rio Gx - ande. Curityha occupied without Resistance. 
Rebel Cause collapses. Naval Expedition against Desterro. 
Rebel Expedition enters Rio Grande. Threatened Bombardment 
of Rio Grande. Attack on Rio Grande. Insurgent Troops 
landed in Uruguay. Mello delivers Rebel Ships to Argentine 
Authorities. Argentine Government returns Vessels to Brazil. 
Naval Expedition at Desterro. Aquidaban sunk. Desterro 
Occupied. Insurgents shot by Military Authorities. Frenchmen 
executed. Indemnity demanded by French Government. Fate 
of Sai-aiva. Revolution crushed. President Moraes accedes to 
Office. Policy of new President. Militarism decreases. Opposi- 
tion to Moraes. Amnesty for Rebels. Law of Constitution strictly 
observed. Misiones Boundary settled. Outbreak at Military 
School. Firm Attitude of President. Diplomatic Relations 
with Portugal resumed. Disturbances in Rio Grande do Sul. 
Admiral da Gama joins Insurgents. Atrocities by Troops and 
Rebels in Rio Grande. Battle at Campo Osorio. Death of da 
Gama. Suspension of Hostilities. The Trinidade Question. 
Peace arranged with Insurgents. Amnesty for Officers. Sup- 
pression of Praetorian Methods. Italian Claims. Financial 
Legislation. President Moraes temporarily vacates Office. 

Admiral de Mello's two ships parted company two 
days after leaving Rio owing to a defect in the machinery 
of the Republica, so the ships instead of going to Bahia 
turned south, and while the Aquidaban went to Desterro 
to await further instructions the Rejniblica steamed to 
Paranagua, and on March 3 reached port. Three days 



1894] INSURGENTS OCCUPY CURITYBA 283 

later Admiral de Mello arrived at Curityba. The 
majority of the insurgent forces were in the vicinity 
of Punto Grosso, some seventy miles distant from 
Curityba, but connected with that city by railway, and 
it was from this point General Saraiva journeyed to 
meet the Admiral. 

At the council of war held on Saraiva's arrival the 
Admiral did not represent the position of da Gama as 
critical. A forward movement would be politic, he said, 
but was not a necessity to save the situation, and possibly 
Mello did not himself believe in the desperate nature of 
the insurgent position in Rio. Nothing definite 
resulted ; but some dissatisfaction was expressed at the 
attitude of the Provisional Government, and Saraiva 
resented the attempt of the Desterro authorities to 
control his movements. He was willing, he said, to 
co-operate with them under certain conditions, but 
would not recognise their right to issue orders in 
connection with his forces. A Governor was then 
elected for the State of Parana, civil authorities 
nominated for the districts held by the insurgents, and 
thanksgiving masses celebrated in the principal churches 
for the deliverance of this section of the country from 
the domination of Peixoto. 

March 1 was the date of the presidential election, 
and Dr Prudente cle Moraes Barros was declared 
elected ; but the insurgents insisted that the proceedings 
were invalid, on the ground that no voting had taken 
place in the States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa 
Catharina, and Parana. That these three States did 
not participate in the election was due to the disturbed 
conditions in southern Brazil. To Dr Prudente de 
Moraes Barros personally the rebels had no cause for 
objection. 

It was not until March 15 that news of the 
collapse of the revolt in Rio de Janeiro reached 
Curityba. Mello and Saraiva were in the city when the 
telegram announcing the surrender of Saldanha da 
Gama was received. To Mello the disaster could not 



284 BRAZIL 

have been unexpected, to Saraiva it was an absolute 
surprise, and in Curityba, Paranagua, and Desterro the 
effect was consternation and panic. Civilians who had 
lent active assistance to the insurgents made arrange- 
ments to leave the country, and on all sides the situation 
was regarded with most gloomy forebodings. General 
Saraiva called a meeting of his senior officers to discuss 
the situation, and all expressed the wish to return to 
Rio Grande do Sul. They resolved to evacuate Curityba 
at an early date, and Saraiva communicated this decision 
to Mello. A new plan of campaign was then drawn up. 
Saraiva with his forces was to march towards the north- 
western districts of Rio Grande, and Mello was to 
proceed to Desterro, there to organise a squadron and 
embark a body of troops from Santa Catharina and 
attempt the capture of the city of Rio Grande. Early 
in April Saraiva evacuated Curityba, leaving only the 
local levies recruited after the capture of the district in 
January, but these rapidly melted away, and by the 
middle of April there was no insurgent organisation to 
check the advance of troops from Sao Paulo. 

The Federal capital being now in no further danger, 
President Peixoto prepared, an army to restore the 
representatives of his Administration to office in the 
southern States. A division of 5000 troops was concen- 
trated at Sao Paulo, but the march to Curityba was 
long and tedious, and it was not until the end of April 
that the army approached the city, where no resistance 
was offered. The officials nominated by the insurgents 
fled or secreted themselves as best they could, and in 
the course of a few days the Government was in full 
possession of the whole State. Thus the collapse of the 
rebel cause was complete, and it only remained to assert 
the Federal authority in Santa Catharina, for which 
purpose a naval force was organised. 

The expedition under Admiral de Mello, consisting 
of the cruiser Repiiblica and three armed transports, the 
latter conveying 1400 men commanded by Colonel 
Salgado, left Desterro early in April, and reached the 



1894] ATTACK ON RIO GRANDE DO SUL 285 

harbour of Rio Grande safely on April 10, when a 
demand was sent to the authorities for the surrender of 
the garrison. The city was threatened with immediate 
bombardment unless it capitulated. Only a weak 
garrison was available for its defence, the majority of 
the troops having been sent into the interior of the 
country to attack scattered groups of insurgents. The 
commander, General Argollo, asked for time to consider 
the proposal of Admiral de Mello, and sent for rein- 
forcements. Meanwhile the foreign consuls met and 
decided to represent the necessity of allowing time for 
the foreign residents to remove to a place of safety 
before a bombardment took place. Mello granted 24 
hours to allow non-combatants to evacuate the town, 
and that delay proved fatal, permitting reinforcements 
to reach the city. At the expiration of 24 hours the 
HepMica opened fire on the town, and the rebel troops 
were landed between the city and the coast - line. 
Trenches had been constructed in this zone, and were so 
strongly held, that in the severe fighting which ensued 
the casualties amongst the invaders numbered 150 killed 
and wounded. Repeated attempts were made to carry 
the trenches, but without success, and after the struggle 
had continued for eight hours Colonel Salgado decided 
to retire. This brought the attack on Rio Grande to an 
end, although the Republica still continued to throw 
occasional shells into the town with little effect. A few 
buildings were damaged, but the loss of life was trifling. 
Mello was now convinced of the abortive nature of the 
expedition, and decided to make no further attempt of 
an offensive character against Rio Grande. After 
lingering in the vicinity for a day longer, the insurgent 
vessels put to sea, and two days later were sighted off 
Uruguay. There Colonel Salgado and his men dis- 
embarked, and were immediately disarmed by the 
Uruguayan authorities. Mello took the ships to the 
River Plate, and anchored off the port of Ensenada, 
whence he sent a despatch stating that he wished to 
surrender to the Argentine Government. The crews 



286 BRAZIL 

were then landed, and Argentine officials took charge of 
the cruiser and transports, which were at once put at the 
disposal of the Brazilian Government and in due course 
handed over. 

This fiasco removed another difficulty from the path 
of President Peixoto, but there was still the problem of 
Desterro to be solved. The Aquidaban and several 
small vessels were at that port, and would have to be 
reckoned with, so in April the flotilla of torpedo boats 
was despatched to the coast of Santa Catharina with 
instructions to find the Aquidaban and sink her. On 
the morning of April 16, in a dense fog, the Gustavo 
Sampaio was cruising in the neighbourhood of Desterro 
when she was discovered by the look-out on the 
Aquidaban, which at once opened fire with her machine 
guns. The Gustavo Sampaio discharged two torpedoes 
and steamed away. Later on in the day the German 
cruiser Ancon sighted the Aquidaban, and noticed she 
was partially submerged. On closer examination it was 
discovered that the vessel was aground and abandoned, 
with a gaping hole in her side. Notification was sent 
to Rio de Janeiro, and Peixoto ordered the flotilla to 
advance and take possession of the insurgent head- 
quarters at Desterro. 

No resistance was offered. Colonel Moreira Csesar 
was appointed military commandant, and by orders of 
the President the members of the Provisional Govern- 
ment were arrested on a charge of sedition. A similar 
fate overtook all naval and military officers and civilians 
who had participated directly or indirectly in the 
insurrection, and no time was lost in bringing the 
prisoners before a specially appointed military tribunal. 
In nearly every instance death sentences were passed, 
approved by Peixoto, and executed forthwith. Captain 
Lorena, the President of the Provisional Government, 
and his fellow-prisoners were shot. It was a scene of 
wholesale slaughter carried out under direction of the 
military. Rebellion is a serious offence, and merits 
severe punishment ; but adequate castigation and the 



1894] COLLAPSE OF INSURRECTION 287 

execution of the rank and file of a body of men who had 
surrendered after a long struggle entered into from 
political motives, are two different things. Nor was this 
scene of revenge confined to Desterro. Throughout the 
States of Santa Catharina and Parana persons impli- 
cated in the insurrection were seized and shot down. 
These events were ample justification for the action of 
the Portuguese senior naval officer in the harbour of Rio 
for the protection he accorded Admiral da Gama and 
his companions. 

Amongst the victims were three French citizens, 
Buette, Etienne, and Muller, engineers practising their 
calling in Desterro. After the city came under the 
domination of the insurgents they were employed on 
work connected with repairs to rebel ships, but took no 
part in the warlike operations. Yet they were charged 
with aiding and abetting the revolt. The French 
Government took up the matter energetically when the 
facts were made plain, and after a searching investiga- 
tion demanded a heavy indemnity. The affair was 
settled by the payment of 900,000 francs. 

Little was heard of Gumercindo Saraiva and his army 
of 4000 men, and no wonder, for after leaving Curityba 
early in April continuous bad weather was encountered, 
transport animals failed, and war material was aban- 
doned. Food too became scarce, so that before the 
frontier of Rio Grande was reached half the force was 
on foot. Malarial fever then decimated the ranks, and 
worst of all the frontier of Rio Grande was occupied by 
Government forces. Constant skirmishes took j)lace, 
and in May, Saraiva was shot through the heart by a 
spent bullet while returning with his staff from a recon- 
naissance of the enemy's position. His loss was a death- 
blow to the cause of his followers, and the remnant of 
these formerly victorious insurgents determined to march 
into Argentine territory and lay down their arms. One 
column crossed the river Uruguay into Misiones, another 
made for a point further south and reached the Argen- 
tine province of Corrientes. In Rio Grande do Sul a 



288 BRAZIL 

guerilla warfare was maintained by scattered groups, 
but the backbone of the movement was broken. 

The revolution was crushed after eight months of a 
civil war in which thousands of lives had been sacrificed, 
the public exchequer loaded with additional indebted- 
ness, and social and economic unity thoroughly dis- 
ordered. No wonder that the majority of educated 
Brazilians did not believe that the election of Dr 
Prudente de Moraes Barros would be verified by his 
accession to office, and looked forward to a period of 
military despotism, with General Peixoto as Dictator. 

Happily these gloomy forebodings were not fulfilled. 
On November 15, 1894, Peixoto surrendered the presi- 
dential office, and although in military circles mutterings 
of discontent were heard, no outbreak occurred. With 
the accession to power of Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros, 
the personal influence of Peixoto as a factor in Brazilian 
political life disappeared. He died on June 29, 1895. 

The new President was of different calibre to his 
predecessor. Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros belonged 
to the political group in Sao Paulo which had led the 
republican propaganda for some years before the deposi- 
tion of Dom Pedro II., was a republican from conviction, 
and had been the presidential candidate of the civilian 
element in the Constituent Congress which elected 
General Deodoro da Fonseca in February, 1891. 

It was supposed that the choice of the representative 
of Sao Paulo was the consideration offered by Peixoto 
for that State not joining the revolutionary movement. 
The Paulistas were opposed to the Peixoto Administra- 
tion, and they needed small encouragement to have 
thrown in their lot with the insurgent cause when 
Saraiva was at Curityba. When animosity against 
President Peixoto was highest, Dr Moraes was an- 
nounced as the official candidate for the Presidency, 
and the selection implied his success. Peixoto could 
unquestionably have declared himself Dictator in 1894, 
and that he did not is to his credit. Guilty of inhuman 
cruelties to his fellow-countrymen, holding in his hands 



1895] PRESIDENT MORAES ACCEDES 289 

the power to proclaim himself Supreme Chief, he yet 
refrained. 

Dr Moraes was a lawyer by profession, and opposed 
to the use of armed force in connection with public 
administration. His career had shown him to be 
possessed of an impartial judgment in political affairs, 
and that he had no vindictive feelings towards his 
opponents. Leading a life simple and free from any 
suspicion of ostentatious display, his quiet determination 
in public affairs had gained him the respect of the more 
intelligent Brazilians, and his integrity and straight- 
forwardness were beyond question. A marked alteration 
was accordingly apparent at once in the methods of 
public administration. Praetorian government dis- 
appeared, and military habits no longer dominated 
national politics. Legal rights were respected, and 
protection for life and property assured under the new 
ruler. Naturally there was strong opposition in some 
quarters, and the supporters of the policy of the late 
administration promoted intrigues and fomented diffi- 
culties. But this discontented faction was powerless in 
the face of the unanimous approval accorded to the 
altered manner of conducting the national affairs. The 
people had tasted freedom, and were not willing to 
submit again to dictatorial tyranny. 

On January 3, 1895, the President further consoli- 
dated his position by granting an amnesty to all enlisted 
men of the army, navy, and police who had taken part 
in the revolution. The commissioned officers were not 
included, but it was made to cover the cadets of the 
naval school. This action and other measures showed 
that the public administration was to be carried on in 
strict compliance with the terms of the Law of Consti- 
tution, and satisfied all reasonable expectations. 

About the same time (January 6) the dispute between 
Brazil and Argentina in connection with the Misiones 
territory was settled in favour of the Brazilian claims. 

The discontent in the army at the firm determination 
of President Moraes to eliminate military influence from 



290 BRAZIL 

national politics took active form in March. General 
Jacques had been appointed Commandant of the Military 
School, and was most unpopular with the students. 
Instigated by outside intrigues, the 390 officers and 
400 cadets undergoing instruction decided to make a 
demonstration hostile to the Moraes Administration. 
So, on reaching the establishment at 10 a.m. on the 
morning of March 15, General Jacques was saluted 
with insulting remarks concerning President Moraes, 
and cheers for Peixoto. The General at once reported 
the affair, and instructions were issued to close the 
school. The officers on the rolls were ordered to report 
for duty, and the 400 cadets were dismissed. A brigade 
of troops was marched to the school at 3 p.m., and the 
order concerning the students was read to them on 
parade, the cadets being informed they must resume 
civilian clothing and leave the premises. Officers and 
students together then attempted to create a riot in the 
streets. Many were arrested, and 32 officers were sent 
as prisoners to the forts of Santa Cruz and Lage. 
Forty more were confined at army headquarters. The 
attitude of President Moraes in regard to this outburst 
was proof that he was free from any leaning towards 
militarism. 

Diplomatic relations were now resumed with Portugal 
through the good offices of the British Government. 
The Portuguese Government stated that the protection 
granted to the insurgents had not been intended as an 
affront to Brazil, an explanation that the President 
accepted. 

Rio Grande do Sul was now again in a disturbed 
condition. Aparicio Saraiva, a brother of Gumercindo 
Saraiva, had collected the remnant of the insurgent 
forces which had invaded Parana and Santa Catharina 
the previous year, and with these defied the authorities. 
The movement was not against the National Govern- 
ment, but undertaken to oust Governor Castilhos from 
office. Admiral da Gama and some 400 officers and 
men from the naval revolt were in Buenos Aires, and 



1895] FRESH OUTBREAK IN RIO GRANDE 291 

they decided to throw in their lot with the Rio Grande 
rebels. Some successes were obtained at first over the 
Government troops, but the country was tired of the 
constant turmoil in the south ; yet, though the removal 
of Governor Castilhos would doubtless have induced the 
insurgents to lay down their arms, his supporters were 
numerous and influential, and could easily have changed 
front and made trouble in their turn. President Moraes 
did not feel justified in deposing Castilhos — an act, in 
his opinion, savouring of the methods of the former 
re'gime— so negotiations with the rebel leaders were 
attempted without satisfactory results. At this juncture 
Admiral da Gama took the field. Up to the time of his 
arrival on the scene the conflict had been carried on 
with the greatest barbarity, quarter on neither side 
being expected. An eye-witness described what occurred 
when 400 Government troops fell into the hands of a 
strong party of insurgents, in these terms : — 

The prisoners were penned into a cattle corral, a guard surround- 
ing the spot to prevent any attempt at escape. A man would ride 
into the yard and lasso a prisoner as though he were a bullock. 
Dragging his victim a few yards away, he would dismount, draw his 
long knife, and deliberately cut the prisoner's throat. This operation 
was repeated until half of the men in the corral were killed. The 
remainder were reserved for similar treatment the following day. 

This is horrible enough, but on June 24, the outbreak 
met with a reverse that destroyed any hopes of success 
its partisans may have entertained. At Campo Osorio, 
Admiral da Gama and 374 officers and men were 
surrounded by Government troops, commanded by 
Colonel Joao Francisco. A desperate struggle ensued. 
Five times the troops assaulted the rebel trenches, and 
were repulsed with heavy loss. Then, the ammunition 
of the insurgents becoming exhausted, they endeavoured 
to break through the enemy's lines, and some succeeded. 
Many others were killed or captured, and Admiral da 
Gama was wounded and his retreat cut off. To avoid 
being taken prisoner, he committed suicide, and his body 



292 BRAZIL 

was found some clays later horribly mutilated. The 
circumstances of his death decided public opinion 
that this warfare in Rio Grande must be ended, and 
negotiations were again opened with the insurgent 
leaders, a suspension of hostilities being declared 
meanwhile. 

It is difficult to understand the motive of Saldanha 
da Gama in joining the revolutionary movement in Rio 
Grande do Sul. He explained his action to his friends 
by stating that he believed Moraes would be simply a 
nominee of Peixoto, and that when he understood the 
policy of the President he was too far committed to 
withdraw from the movement in Rio Grande. Pie 
preferred to sacrifice himself rather than appear to act 
treacherously towards the rebel leaders. 

An unexpected excitement arose in July, when 
H.M.S. Barracouta, acting under instructions from Her 
Majesty's Government, proceeded to Trinidade, a 
deserted island lying about 651 miles to the eastward 
of the Brazilian coast, and there hoisted the British 
flag. The object was to facilitate the laying of a direct 
cable from England to Argentina, and the British 
claimed that the island had been occupied in 1700, and 
a British colony established in 1781, adding that the 
island was barren and possessed little fresh water. 
The Brazilian Government asserted that Portugal had 
possession in 1795, and, with the independence of 
Brazil, Trinidade became Brazilian. Public feeling ran 
high, and anti-British demonstrations were held in Rio 
and elsewhere. The matter was carefully investigated 
by the British Government, and the claim to the island 
withdrawn. 

Negotiations for the pacification of Rio Grande do 
Sul now approached a climax. General Innocencio 
Galvao de Queiros, commanding the troops in Rio 
Grande, represented the Federal authority ; General 
Jose da Silva Tavares acted on behalf of the insurgents. 
The conditions submitted to President Moraes were : — 

1. Unrestricted enjoyment of the rights and privi- 



1895] PEACE IN RIO GRANDE 293 

leges appertaining to Brazilian citizens under the 
Federal Constitution. 

2. The political reorganisation of the State of Rio 
Grande do Sul. 

3. The right to claim compensation for losses 
sustained. 

The President acceded to the first and third of these 
conditions, but refused the second on the ground that he 
had no power to act under the Law of Constitution. 
General Tavares, in reply, stated that the revision of 
the State Constitution demanded by the insurgents was 
not expected from the Executive, but that Congress 
should take such action as would ensure lasting peace. 
On August 23 a formal agreement of peace was signed, 
the second condition being left to Congress, whereupon 
the President immediately ordered a reduction of the 
army in the south. Arrangements were made for the 
insurgents to deliver up their arms, and on October 21, 
1895, an amnesty was sanctioned for all offences in 
connection with revolutionary practices previous to 
August 23, 1895, but providing that officers in the 
army and navy should not be permitted to return to 
duty for a period of two years. 

The remainder of 1895 passed without sensational 
events. President Moraes steadily adhered to the policy 
he had initiated on accession to office, and the change the 
new regime had affected in a single year was remark- 
able. Civil rights had been upheld. Dictatorial inter- 
ference by the Central Government in local affairs had 
been suppressed. The pacification of Rio Grande do 
Sul had been achieved. An amnesty had been granted 
to the participators in the outbreaks of 1893 and 1894. 

In 1896 some excitement was caused by the insist- 
ence of Italy that claims of Italian residents for damages 
to property and persons during the revolutionary period 
of 1893-4 should be promptly settled, but the dispute 
was arranged by the payment of cash indemnities in 
certain cases, referring others to arbitration. The 
Legislature took up the question of fiscal taxation, 



294 BRAZIL 

the Chamber of Deputies being decidedly in favour of 
a heavy protectionist tariff' Many new internal taxes 
were imposed, and the scale of duties on imported 
merchandise augmented. The condition of the national 
finances caused serious apprehension, for the effects of 
the disastrous occurrences from 1889 to 1894 were 
now felt, and the Government was unable to devise 
a remedy. In November, 1896, President Moraes, on 
the advice of his physicians, obtained leave from Con- 
gress to vacate, temporarily, his office, and confided his 
presidential duties to Dr Victorino Pereira, the Vice- 
President, retiring to the country to rest. 



CHAPTER XVII 

brazil — continued 

Sudden return of President Moraes to Rio de Janeiro. Plot against 
the President. Story of Antonio Maciel. The Canudos Settle- 
ment. The Jagungos and the Bahia Police. Bahia Government 
ask help against Conselheiro. Troops sent to Canudos and 
defeated by Jagungos. Another Expedition to Canudos under 
Colonel Moreira Caesar. Riots in Rio de Janeiro. Murder of 
Colonel Gen til de Castro. Strong force organised against 
Canudos. General Oscar in charge of Military Operations. 
Situation of Expedition unsatisfactory. Heavy Casualties 
amongst Troops. Followers of Conselheiro attack Troops under 
General Oscar. Situation saved by General Savaget. Minister 
of War at the front. Power of Religious Fanaticism. Failure to 
storm Canudos. Siege of the Stronghold. Canudos captured, 
October 3. Atrocities at Canudos. Withdrawal of Troops. 
Final Report of Operations. Accusations of Military Clique in 
Rio against Moraes. Plot to Assassinate President Moraes. 
Murder of Minister of War. Arrests made. Public Opinion and 
Attempt upon Life of President. Presidential Candidates. 
Campos Salles supported by President. Dr Campos Salles elected. 
Personality of President - elect. Critical financial situation. 
Mission of Campos Salles to London. Funding Loan Agree- 
ment.- Campos Salles accedes. Contrast between 1894 and 
1898. The Amapa Question. Nabuco represents Brazil. Policy 
of President Campos Salles. Brazilians satisfied. President of 
Argentina visits Brazil. Fiscal Legislation. Lack of strong 
Political Parties. Bubonic Plague in Santos and Rio. Economic 
Development and Political Disturbances. State Governments. 
Illegitimate Taxation. Federal Courts. States and Railways. 
Distribution of Population. Italians. State-aided Immigration. 
Sao Paulo and the Italian Colony. German Settlements in 
Brazil. German Colonists during Revolution. Portuguese 
Immigrants. Brazilian national character. Positivist Tend- 
encies. Public Instruction. Number of " Illiterates." Apathy 

295 



296 BRAZIL 

concerning Education. Administration of Justice. Condition of 
Prisons. Capital of Minas Geraes. Depreciation of Currency. 
Means of Communication. Inadequate Railway System. State 
Control of Railways. Central Railway a Political Machine. Tele- 
graphs and Cables. Inefficiency of the State Lines. Brazilian 
Waterways. 

President Moraes unexpectedly returned in March, 
1897. His reason for doing so was a plot against 
his administration, the discontented military element 
having taken advantage of the President's absence to 
stir up seditious feeling, aided by certain deputies, 
formerly ardent supporters of Peixoto. Suspicion fell 
on the Vice-President, and his arrest was ordered. A 
coup d'etat was intended, and of this the President had 
been warned, but his prompt action disconcerted his 
enemies and prevented the conspiracy from coming to a 
head. 

Another cloud now appeared on the horizon, with 
momentous results, for it entailed a war in the interior 
of Brazil against a force that had never been known 
to exist. The antecedents are curious. 

In 1861 a man named Antonio Maciel lived in 
Pernambuco with his mother. He possessed fair 
education and moderate fortune, but had married 
against his mother's wishes. Jealousy sprang up 
between parent and wife. Maciel's mind was poisoned 
by his mother's constant insinuations that she had proof 
of the wife's infidelity. She told her son to secrete 
himself in the bushes at the foot of the garden, and that 
shortly after nightfall he would see his wife meet her 
lover. To the wife a similar story was told, and in the 
evening the mother donned male costume and approached 
the trysting-place she had indicated to husband and 
wife. In the darkness Maciel saw, as he thought, his 
wife and her lover, and fired first at the one and then at 
the other, killing both. Overcome by remorse, he 
apprised the authorities of his crime, and was con- 
demned to a long term of imprisonment, but at the 
end of a year was pardoned. He then determined to 



1897] ANTONIO CONSELHEIRO 297 

devote the remainder of his life to missionary work in 
the interior of Brazil, selecting what is known as the 
sertao for his field, a district inhabited by people 
descended from Indians mingled with Portuguese blood, 
who have little in common with the Brazilian of to-day. 
Known as Jagungos, they live on the products of the 
chase. Although provided only with antiquated 
weapons, every man is armed, and their wants are 
few; only a little Indian corn to add to their diet of 
fish and game, a small supply of cloth for the rough 
garments they wear, and a stock of powder and lead 
for their firearms. It was to these savages Maciel set 
out, and in the course of thirty-five years he came to be 
regarded by them as a prophet. 

Antonio Conselheiro, as this man was called by his 
followers, preached no recognised form of religion. He 
merely taught the Jagungos that there was a life here- 
after they could attain under certain conditions of 
living on earth, inculcating, however, many fundamental 
principles of Christianity, civilisation, and a belief in a 
Supreme God. From time to time chapels were built 
in different districts, and round these settlements sprang 
up. One such place was Canudos, some 300 miles from 
Bahia, and there the authorities of Bahia thought it 
necessary to nominate a magistrate. This official 
became involved in an intrigue with a Jagungo woman, 
and becoming afraid of remaining at Canudos he obtained 
an appointment in a neighbouring district, taking the 
girl with him. Antonio Conselheiro, in 1896, sent out 
men to cut wood for building purposes, and these people 
came to the vicinity where the former Canudos 
magistrate was. Thinking they were searching for 
him, he sent police to drive them from the district. A 
fight ensued, and the police were worsted. Bahia was 
asked for assistance, and 200 men arrived, but proved 
unable to cope with the Jagunpos, who, believing the 
Government wished to turn them out of their settle- 
ments, determined to resist. 

The Governor of Bahia then appealed to the Federal 



298 BRAZIL 

Government for aid, and an expedition under command 
of Major Febronio was organised, to which was added a 
number of police from Bahia. In January the march to 
Canudos began, and the camp of Antonio Conselheiro 
was reached at the end of the month. Ordered to 
surrender, the Jagungos refused, and Febronio determined 
to take the place by assault. But the troops were 
repulsed, 50 officers and men killed or wounded, and 
the expedition forced to retire towards Queimadas, 
suffering severely during the retreat. Quantities of 
arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy. 

The Federal Government now decided to send a 
strong force against Canudos, and a column of 1500 
men was organised, including a battery of field artillery, 
and strengthened by 400 armed police. The command 
was given to Colonel Moreira Caesar, and in February 
1897 the advance began. Queimadas, 180 miles to the 
north- east of Bahia, was the base of operations, and for 
the greater part of the distance railroad communication 
was available. Thence the country was rugged and 
broken, and heavy undergrowth afforded excellent cover 
for the enemy. Colonel Moreira Caesar, however, was 
confident of success. Underestimating the strength of 
the enemy, the expedition was pushed forward rapidly, 
and small precautions taken to avoid surprise. The 
inevitable followed ; on March 2, the column was ambus- 
caded, the troops thrown into confusion, and Colonel 
Moreira with many officers and men killed. Panic 
ensued ; the guns were abandoned, rifles and ammuni- 
tion thrown away, and stores of all kinds left lying by 
the roadside. News of this disaster reached the 
Government three days later, the telegram from Bahia 
stating that fugitives arriving at Queimadas reported 
the annihilation of the expeditionary force, but after 
three or four days further particulars showed that the 
loss of life was not so great as at first supposed. 
Stragglers drifted back, and when the final muster of 
the survivors was made, some 1100 men were present. 

Colonel Moreira Caesar had been one of the prominent 



1897] EXPEDITIONS TO CANUDOS 299 

members of the military regime under Peixoto. So it 
was now asserted by his former followers that the 
Canudos movement was the outcome of monarchist 
intrigues, and that the fault of the disaster lay with the 
Administration for not dealing more harshly with all 
persons of monarchist tendencies. Serious rioting 
ensued in Bio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The offices 
of the newspapers Apostolo, Liberdade, and Gazeta da 
Tarde in the former city, and that of Commercio in 
the latter, were sacked, and other buildings were damaged, 
on March 7. Next day the mob again assembled, and 
Colonel Gentil de Castro, the editor of the Jornal do 
Brazil, a newspaper professing monarchist leanings, was 
assassinated at the Sao Francisco Xavier station. 
Attempts were also made to murder the Visconde de 
Ouro Preto and Senhor Affonso Celso, but a powerful 
police force brought into the city restrained the mob 
from further violence. 

A strong army corps was forthwith organised, for it 
had become evident that another repulse would bring 
serious complications. For one thing, a victory for 
Antonio Conselheiro would draw to his standard 
thousands of Jagimgos and give additional incentive to 
repeat the disgraceful scenes of March 7 and 8 in Rio. 
Orders were issued for the regulars at all stations to 
concentrate at Bahia, and several States aided by sending 
local regiments, so that by May the force consisted of 
10,500 troops. General Cantuaria was given charge of 
the Bahia military district, General Arturo Oscar 
directed the field operations, with General Savaget as 
second in command. Oscar pushed on towards Canudos 
in June, but was greatly hampered by want of transport, 
and had much difficulty in provisioning the troops. 
The Jagwigos gave the expedition no rest, laying 
ambuscades in all directions. 

As Oscar approached Canudos the tactics of Antonio 
Conselheiro became bolder, and his persistent attacks 
had already cost the troops 1000 casualties. The men 
were wearied by long marches over barren stretches of 



OOUntry, and worn poorly supplied with provisions and 
ammunition. If therefore became necessary to suspend 
the advanoe, and ( lolonel Madoiros with a strong brigade 
was detaohed, to OOnvoy the wounded to Monte Santo 

and bring back supplies. This was understood by 
Conselheiro to mean that the troops were afraid to 
approach Dearer to Oanudos, so the Jagunpos assembled 

in force and surrounded Oscar's camp, which was located 
in a position commanded by abrupt hills, from which 
a continuous lire was maintained. Soon the situation 
became critical, but relief was afforded by Savaget in 
command of a column 2000 men, which had marched 

through Sergipo to effect a, junction with General Oscar 
near Oanudos. At the beginning of July he arrived at 
Ooeorobo, six miles to the north of ( -anudos, and fought 

a severe action, in which the general and (> officers were 
wounded, the casualties amongst the rank and file 
exoeeding 200 men. In spite of this loss General 
Savaget continued his advance, and reached Oscar just 
when matters Looked most gloomy. There the com- 
bined forces remained on the defensive awaiting the 
return of Oolonel Madeiros with supplies. 

When the Government understood the difficulties 
confronting General Oscar, further reinforcements of 
8500 men were ordered io Bahia. Additional artillery 
was also sent to the front, and heavy siege guns 
were despatched bo reduce the fortified positions in 
the neighbourhood. This brought the total number of 
troops employed in the operations up to 14,000, and no 
more could be furnished without Calling out the National 
Guard. The Minister oi' War, General Bittencourt, 
proceeded to Bahia io superintend the arrangements for 
the campaign. Public interest was centred upon the 
movements oi' the troops. No attention was paid to 
repeat i^l assertions in certain quarters that the main 
source oi' strength for the JagwnpOS was the support. 
they obtained from monarchist centres, for they were 
false. The Jagunpos were religious fanatics with a blind 
faith in the personality of Conselheiro, and their ability 



1897] CANUDOS BESIKGF/I) 301 

to resist troops lay in the fact, that every inch of the 
country was familiar to them, enabling them to move 
quickly from one position to another whenever the 
expedition advanced. Being also skilled marksmen, 
they made the best use of the ammunition at their 
disposal, and the arms and other war materials captured 
from Colonel Moreira C;csar and other expeditions gave 
them means of defence. Their successes at the com- 
mencement of the struggle tended to convince them that 
they wci'c in the right in a conflict regarded l>y them as 
an attack upon their religious practices, 

While waiting for the reinforcements and supplies, 
General Oscar moved to a hill two miles from Canudos, 
known as Favella. The position was undesirable owing 
to scarcity of water, l>ut it was possible to use artillery 
fire from this point against the headquarters of the 
fanatics. On July 18 Oscar attempted to storm 
Canudos, and the troops succeeded in capturing a portion 
of the town, but wca'c, ultimately driven back with the 
loss of 800 killed and wounded. Oscar then determined 
to remain entrenched on the Favella hill until the arrival 
of the reinforcements from Bahia. 

A. long siege now ensued, varied by attempts to 
assault the outlying portions of tin; settlement and by 
sallies of the fanatics to dislodge their enemies from 
the positions from time to time captured. During 
August and September the bombardment continued, 
but a stone church building in the centre of the town 
was still intact at the commencement of October, and 
this formed the rallying [joint for the JagimgOS when 
their trenches became untenable from shell fire. General 
Oscar had intended forcing the surrender of Canudos 
by shutting off supplies, and becoming impatient at the 
determined resistance offered, decided to order a general 
assault. When October came and the besieged town 
showed no signs of capitulating, the troops available for 
the attack numbered 5500, and with these the advance 
was made on October V,. A desperate encounter followed, 
but the defence was unable to resist superior force, and 



302 BRAZIL 

finally succumbed. The church was only carried after 
a fierce fight, in which the remnant of the fanatics shel- 
tered by its stone walls were killed. Terrible scenes 
ensued. All discipline was lost ; many of the houses 
and huts in which women and children had taken refuge 
were set on fire, the occupants perishing in the flames 
or deliberately shot down when endeavouring to escape, 
no mercy being shown. How many were killed is not 
known, but the bodies of 450 lighting men were counted. 
A few prisoners, however, were saved from the general 
massacre, and brought, some to Bahia, some to Rio, but 
they refused to speak of their life at Canudos. A body, 
reported to be that of Antonio Conselheiro, was found 
buried under the church. It was asserted he had been 
killed several days before the final battle. 

With the fall of Canudos the war ended, although 
bands of Jagun^'os were still reported in different districts, 
and information reached General Oscar that they were 
concentrating in force at Caypam. At the approach of 
troops, however, they dispersed, and nothing more serious 
than the interchange of a few shots occurred, so at the 
end of October the evacuation of the district was ordered. 
The total losses in this campaign were placed at from 
5000 to 6000 officers and men killed and wounded. 

Just when the situation of the troops in the Canudos 
campaign was causing President Moraes keenest anxiety, 
his political enemies in Rio de Janeiro were endeavour- 
ing to throw discredit upon the Administration. The 
military, or jacobino, element persistently asserted that 
the cause of the non-success of General Oscar at the 
beginning of the campaign was due entirely to the 
President refusing adequate supplies. Rioting incited 
by these malcontents occurred in the streets of Rio on 
the publication of any unfavourable news, and in Con- 
gress attempts were made by Deputy Francisco Glycerio 
and others of the former Peixoto clique to embarrass the 
action of the President. In spite of these intrigues, 
President Moraes fulfilled his duties with a dignity 
and quiet determination worthy of all praise. 



1897] MINISTER OF WAR ASSASSINATED 303 

The Minister of War remained in Bahia to super- 
intend the withdrawal of the troops. Necessary details 
being settled, General Bittencourt returned to Rio to 
make his final report to the President. A week later 
a tragedy occurred. The jacobinos, unable to create 
serious embarrassments for the Administration during 
the Canudos campaign, determined on other means to 
attain their ends. Intimidation of prominent officials 
was attempted by anonymous letters, in which the 
assassination of public men was hinted at. No notice 
being taken of these communications, the desperadoes 
plunged into crime. 

On November 4, 1897, President Moraes, accom- 
panied by the Minister of War and his staff, boarded the 
steamer Espirito- Santo to welcome General Ruy Barbosa, 
and at 1 p.m. landed at the arsenal. A cry was heard 
of " Long live the memory of Floriano Peixoto," followed 
by shouts of "Long live the President of the Republic," 
and amid the noise a soldier forced his way through the 
crowd and levelled a pistol at the President, but it missed 
fire. A blow from Colonel Mendes de Moraes felled 
the would-be assassin, and cries of "Kill him, kill him," 
rose from various quarters. The President and Minister 
of War protested against the slaughter of the criminal. 
A struggle ensued in the attempt to disarm the soldier, 
who in the course of it drew a long knife and wounded 
Colonel Mendes de Moraes, and slightly injured other 
bystanders. The Minister of War rushed forward to 
assist, and was stabbed thrice, dying in a few moments. 
Examination of the pistol with which the murder of the 
President was attempted, showed the weapon to be 
loaded in both barrels with Comblain bullets. The 
assassin was Marcellino Bispo de Mello, a native of 
Alagoas, and a private in the 33rd Regiment. 

Investigation revealed a political conspiracy to 
assassinate Dr Moraes, in which certain of the jacobinos 
were directly concerned. Martial law was proclaimed in 
the Federal District to allow the police authorities a 
free hand in making arrests of suspected persons. 



304 BRAZIL 

Various people whose complicity in the conspiracy was 
undoubted were arrested, amongst whom was Major 
Diocletiano Martyr, accused of being the intermediary 
who arranged the crime. The details as they were 
unfolded showed the conspiracy to be widespread. 

For the first time since the institution of republican 
government in Brazil, public opinion made itself heard, 
and most emphatically condemned the attempt upon 
the life of Dr Moraes, and it made him secure of approval 
for his methods of administration. He felt he would 
be supported in measures he took to prevent any relapse 
to a praetorian system. Therefore no clemency was 
extended to the jacobinos, who were made to comprehend 
that any further attempt to disturb public order would 
be punished with a heavy hand. Thus cowed, they made 
no effort at further opposition. 

The presidential election for the period beginning 
November 15, 1898, now began to occupy public atten- 
tion, and the candidates supported by President Moraes 
and his administration were Dr Manuel Campos Salles 
for President, and Dr Rosa E. Silva for Vice-President ; 
the former had been Governor of the State of Sao Paulo, 
the latter was a prominent citizen from Pernambuco. The 
opposition candidates were Senhor Lauro Sodre, formerly 
Governor of Para, and now a member of the Senate, 
and Dr Fernando Lobo from Minas Geraes, and also 
a Senator. Senhor Sodre was a young army officer of 
considerable ability. Dr Lobo could lay claim to small 
qualification for office, for he had been one of the most 
subservient members of the Peixoto Administration. 

Official influence is the main factor in all South 
American electoral contests, and the fact that Dr Campos 
Salles could count upon President Moraes and his friends 
was ample assurance that he would be elected. The 
President had chosen wisely, for Dr Campos Salles was 
experienced in public affairs and commanded the respect 
of the Conservatives. Under his rule Sao Paulo had 
prospered. Moreover, that State was the centre of 
sounder republican ideas than any other section of 



1898] ELECTION OF CAMPOS SALLES 305 

Brazil. Campos Salles had sufficient private fortune 
to place him above the suspicion of seeking office for 
personal gain. 

The opposition candidate represented the methods 
of Fonseca and Peixoto, favouring intervention in the 
local affairs of states and the use of armed force to 
carry out any policy the Administration desired. His 
supporters comprised professional politicians, needy 
adventurers, ambitious military officers — all the elements 
which had caused disaster and suffering during the 
previous decade. President Moraes realised the danger 
to Brazil if the opposition should win, and determined 
that official influence should be used unsparingly in 
favour of Campos Salles. 

The election was held on March 1, and Dr Campos 
Salles was declared successful. Some clamour was 
raised by the opposition on the ground of unfair treat- 
ment by the Government, but the majority of intelligent 
people listened with scant courtesy to this tirade of 
abuse directed against the President and the supporters 
of his policy. They did well, for in the President-elect 
the Brazilians had a man whose political ideas were in 
accordance with the changes wrought by President 
Moraes in the administration of public affairs. Dr 
Campos Salles was a republican from conviction, who 
for several years before the deposition of Dom Pedro II. 
had assisted in spreading the republican propaganda. 
An able lawyer, whose ambition was to govern Brazil 
by the terms of the Law of Constitution, he accepted 
the responsibilities laid upon him with the full deter- 
mination to do his duty at all costs. 

In the early part of 1898, the full effects of the 
financial mismanagement, coincident with the disturbed 
internal conditions of the country since 1889, became 
apparent, and rendered some arrangement necessary 
with the national creditors to save Brazil from default. 
The President determined to open negotiations with the 
holders of the foreign debt, and to Dr Campos Salles 
was confided the mission of visiting Europe and devising 

u 



306 BRAZIL 

a plan to give time for the Brazilian Treasury to recover. 
The President-elect was courteously received in London 
and elsewhere, and after hearing his explanations, an 
agreement was made with the Rothschilds. Cash 
interest payments were suspended for three years dating 
from July 1, 1898, and bonds issued instead for the 
amount due. Sinking funds were suspended for twenty 
years, but Campos Salles promised he would use every 
effort to ensure a resumption of interest payments in 
cash in 1901. The success of this mission added greatly 
to the prestige of the President-elect. 

President Moraes completed his tenure of office on 
November 15, 1898, and the contrast between the 
conditions at this date and when he acceded to power 
calls for more than passing mention. At the earlier 
date the dictatorial regime of Peixoto held Brazil in an 
iron grip, and personal liberty was at the mercy of a 
tyrannical Administration. In Rio Grande do Sul the 
revolutionary movement threatened again to plunge the 
Republic into civil war; intervention in the local affairs of 
the different States had bred discontent ; corruption was 
rampant in the administrative departments ; the Press 
was muzzled, and the right of public meeting denied. 
Everywhere public welfare was absolutely uncared for 
by the Government. In the teeth of determined 
opposition President Moraes established order in public 
affairs. Undeterred by threats of assassination, he broke 
the vicious influence of the jacobinos, and pacified Rio 
Grande do Sul. His administration was conducted 
according to the Law of Constitution, civilians' rights 
respected, and the Press allowed full license. The 
heavy expenditure in connection with the warlike 
operations against Canudos had prevented the rehabili- 
tation of financial credit, but the arrangements made by 
Dr Campos Salles were such as to give ample oppor- 
tunity for recovering stability. 

A misunderstanding had arisen in 1897, on the 
frontier of French Guiana, threatening to bring compli- 
cations between the two Governments. To avoid these, 



1899] FISCAL ^LEGISLATION 307 

President Campos Salles determined to submit the 
question to the arbitration of the President of the 
Swiss Republic, and in April, 1899, Dr Nabuco went 
to Switzerland as the Brazilian representative. His 
nomination was of some significance, for he belonged to 
the Monarchist Party, and had refused hitherto to serve 
the Republican Administration in any capacity, and his 
acceptance of this mission meant that the hostile feeling 
which monarchists professed towards the republic had 
disappeared. The policy of the new Administration was 
a continuation of the methods established by President 
Moraes, and that fact alone caused most Brazilians to 
rally round the Government. 

The President of Argentina visited Brazil in August, 
1899, the first instance of the President of one South 
American Republic officially visiting another. President 
Roca was escorted by a squadron of the Argentine navy, 
and accompanied by a large staff of naval and military 
officers, and his visit was not without some result, for 
a commercial treaty between Argentina and Brazil was 
signed, and shortly afterwards ratified. 

The first and second sessions of Congress in the 
presidential term of Campos Salles were occupied with 
fiscal legislation. The chief source of revenue to the 
Central Government came from duties levied on imported 
merchandise, and this was found to be inadequate to 
cover the national expenditure. To provide additional 
income the amount of the duties was increased, and 
new taxes were levied by excise stamps for all articles 
in everyday use. Personal motives occasionally led to 
opposition to the fiscal Acts that Congress was asked 
to sanction, but the subject was not made a party ques- 
tion, and members of Congress were opportunists for 
the most part. Nominally the political parties were the 
repvMkanos, the federalutas repuhlfcamz, and an insig- 
nificant group professing to hold monarchist opinions. 
No strong party organisation existed, the members of the 
different political sections voting from personal motives 
without regard to party principles. An alleged mon- 



308 BRAZIL 

archist conspiracy was discovered ill February, 1900, 
and a number of arrests made ; but the majority of the 
prisoners were released after a detention of a few days, 
and the movement met with no general support from 
the people. The appearance of bubonic plague in 
Santos in 1899, and Rio in 1900, marked the end of the 
century. In Santos the epidemic has been stamped out 
by the energetic action of the authorities, but in Rio the 
disease threatens to become endemic. 

The last two years of the Campos Salles Administra- 
tion calls for no special mention except in connection 
with the dispute over the Acre territory with Bolivia. 
The negotiations were conducted on both sides in a 
moderate spirit, with the result that the way was 
paved for a treaty between the two Governments, which 
was signed in 1903, and subsequently ratified. On 
November 15, 1902, Dr Rodriguez Alves, a former 
Governor of Sao Paulo, was installed as Chief Magistrate, 
and his term does not expire until 1907. Since his 
accession to power there has been no disturbance of 
public order. 

Economic development in Brazil has been retarded 
by disturbed politics, and the unwieldy character of the 
existing constitution of the Republic. The semi-inde- 
pendence of the States in the Federal Union renders 
local administration cumbrous and costly, and opens the 
door to corruption. In rich and populous districts the 
necessary revenue may be forthcoming to sustain a host 
of local officials, but in the poorer sections the demands 
made on the inhabitants are so exhausting that develop- 
ment is strangled. Promising industries are crushed 
by taxation, often of an illegal character. Nominally 
there is the right of appeal to the Federal Courts against 
unjust impositions of State authorities, but this right 
avails little, on account of the heavy cost entailed. 
Another disadvantage arising from the sovereign rights 
of the States is the hindrance they cause to railway 
extension, as from each State through which a new 
railway passes a concession must be obtained. Onerous 



1903] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 309 

conditions are accordingly imposed by the local govern- 
ments at the time of construction, and also after the 
railway is open to the public service. The Law of 
Constitution of 1891 was on lines that presupposed 
the population of Brazil to equal that of the United 
States in capacity for self-government, and in the recog- 
nition of sparsely populated districts as semi-independent 
communities an even greater license is conceded than 
in North America. The broad result is that local 
administrations abuse their power, partly through ignor- 
ance, partly from corrupt motives. 

Brazil, with an area of 3,209,878 square miles, was 
credited by the census of 1890 with a total population 
of 14,333,015; classified as whites, 5,000,000; half-breeds 
of Indian, negro, and white blood, 6,500,000; negroes, 
3,500,000; and Indians, 400,000. The whites comprise 
descendants of Portuguese settlers, foreign immigrants 
from Portugal, Italy, and Germany, and a few South 
Americans from other parts of the Continent ; but the 
colour line between them and negroes is only slightly 
observed, in spite of the fact that slavery existed until 
1887. This enumeration gave a density of 4 J persons 
to the square mile. From Italy has come a steady flow 
of immigration for the past fifteen years. Previous to 
the abolition of slavery, the coffee planters and other 
employers of labour realised that immigration must be 
encouraged to maintain the great producing industries, 
and the result of representations to the Imperial 
authorities was a propaganda in Europe to show the 
advantages that Brazil offered for settlement. After the 
suppression of slavery in 1887, the demand for labourers 
rapidly increased, and both Italians and Portuguese 
came in large numbers. Good wages were earned, and 
the heavily taxed lower classes of Italy were eager to 
travel to the coffee plantations of Sao Paulo and Minas 
Geraes. The Portuguese prefer the cities, and gain a 
living as servants, in shops, as boatmen, and at small 
trades. State-aided immigration was undertaken by 
the Government, and Italians principally benefited by 



310 BEAZIL 

the free passages to Brazil, so that by 1892, the number 
in the country was reported by the Italian legation to 
exceed 1,000,000. Sao Paulo is the centre for these 
immigrants from Italy. Its climate appeals to them, and 
the work on the plantations and in the city of Sao Paulo is 
congenial. How far these incomers will become assimi- 
lated to the Brazilian it is not yet possible to say. At 
present the majority remit their wages to their homes 
in Italy, do not intermarry largely with Brazilians, and 
seldom form binding social ties. Occasionally, however, 
they buy plots of land, and when this occurs they become 
fixed residents of Brazil, but such instances are not 
common. Hitherto these people from Southern Europe 
have been inclined rather to adopt Brazilian habits and 
customs than to impart those of their own nationality. 

The German settlements in the South are destined 
in the future to play an important part in Brazilian 
national life. At Porto Alegre and elsewhere in Rio 
Grande do Sul the number of German residents exceeds 
50,000, and Santa Catharina and Parana contain other 
colonies all sufficiently strong to retain their own 
manners and traditions, and hitherto showing small 
inclination anywhere to lose them. In the revolutionary 
period, 1893-5, these settlers held aloof from the struggle 
and maintained the strictest neutrality, indifferent to 
local politics. So strong was this apathy that in the 
larger settlements armed guards were established by the 
residents for their protection against marauding attempts 
on their property, and neither Government nor revolu- 
tionary troops were permitted to enter their territory. 
The Germans are agriculturists and cattle owners, and 
although few among them have acquired wealth, they 
are in a fairly prosperous condition. Those German 
colonies, however, formed by Dom Pedro II. at Petro- 
polis, Novo Friburgo, and the neighbouring districts 
occupy land which is poor and broken by rugged 
mountain ranges. So they only make a bare living by 
growing vegetables, fruit, and minor agricultural products, 
and their progress is slow compared to that of their 



1903] THE FOREIGN RESIDENTS 311 

fellow-countrymen in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa 
Catharina. 

The Portuguese become so intimately associated 
with Brazilians that they practically lose their national 
identity. They intermarry with their Brazilian 
neighbours, and express no intention of returning to 
Europe except for an occasional visit. Brazil becomes 
their home, and their children grow up with Brazilian 
ideas of life. The number of Portuguese who take out 
naturalisation papers is not great, but this is due largely 
to apathy. Moreover, by retaining their nationality 
they are exempt from military service, and this is a 
privilege they do not care to forego, unless for direct 
compensation in the shape of official employment. As 
a rule, they are thrifty and industrious, and form a 
valuable addition to the labour supply. 

The dominant note of Brazilian character comes 
from the Latin stock which colonised this section of 
South America. Circumstances have modified ideas in 
many respects, but not to an extent to alter the funda- 
mental principles underlying and governing action and 
line of thought. Into the solemn mystery surrounding 
the traditions of the Catholic Church have crept super- 
stitious African legends, and intermingled with these 
are traces of Indian folk-lore. The product is an 
imagination ready to receive without reasoning passing 
impressions, and in this soil the doctrines of Auguste 
Comte took ready root on minds lacking in mental 
balance, producing many evil fruits. Mental perspective 
is contracted, and lacks energy to strike boldly in new 
directions. Examples of the want of sound judgment 
on the part of prominent Brazilians in recent years are 
found in Admiral de Mello during the revolt of 1893-4, 
in General Saraiva's hesitation to march northwards 
after his victories in Parana, and in Admiral Saldanha 
da Gama's resolve to join the hopeless cause of the Rio 
Grande insurgents. General da Fonseca when President, 
General Eloriano Peixoto, President Moraes, when he 
allowed the country to be dragged into a war entailing 



312 BKAZIL 

the sacrifice of the lives of 5000 soldiers without an 
effort to negotiate with Antonio Conselheiro, all behaved 
like men swayed by fixed ideas. Added to the tropical 
conditions in which life is passed, there is an absence of 
mental training in youth, and a social system extremely 
lax in regard to a moral standard of everyday conduct. 
Belief in spiritualism is widespread, and at times 
inspires these naturally timid people with a fanaticism 
that carries them blindly into peril. The average 
Brazilian is not lacking in intelligence, but his mind 
fails to stand the strain of mastering intricate detail. 
This want of thoroughness has caused Brazil many 
troubles in the past, and is a standing menace to the 
country in the future. 

To permit satisfactory evolution of Brazilian 
character, education must be placed on a different 
footing from the present. Under the existing system 
it is not compulsory. Public instruction, in so far as 
the primary and secondary stages are concerned, is under 
the control of State and Municipal authorities, over 
whom the Federal Administration exercises no jurisdic- 
tion. Higher education, however, is in the hands of 
the Central Government. The establishments comprise 
two medical schools, four law colleges, four military 
schools, one naval school, and a school of mines. The 
number of students is 3000. In addition, there is the 
Lyceum of Arts and Trades, with accommodation for 
2500 pupils, and five special schools with facilities for 
600 students ; while the Gymnasio National, a secondary 
school, is maintained by the Federal Government, the 
States having the right to found similar institutions. 
All other secondary schools are private concerns, and 
the result of this inadequate system was clearly demon- 
strated in 1889, when the official returns showed 7500 
public and private primary schools, attended by 300,000 
pupils. The following year no fewer than 8,365,997 
persons were returned as "illiterates," unable to read or 
write, and since then the number of illiterate persons 
has increased. The States render no educational returns 



1903] DEFECTIVE EDUCATION 313 

to the Federal Government, and only Sao Paulo makes 
a real effort to grapple with this grave problem. Even 
there the measures taken are efficient only in cities and 
towns. 

The importance of this vital national question does 
not appeal to the majority of Brazilians. They were 
indifferent to it under the Empire, and remain so at the 
beginning of the new century. Dom Pedro took 
personal interest in higher education, and was never 
slow to suggest improvements, but gave little heed to 
primary education, and the Republican authorities have 
allowed matters to run on in the old grooves, attempt- 
ing no reforms. Indeed, the standard of higher educa- 
tion has suffered from the withdrawal of the protection 
afforded it by Dom Pedro ; and where other nations 
have increased facilities for educating the lower classes, 
Brazil has retrograded. No wonder if in these circum- 
stances the majority of the inhabitants are wrapped in 
ignorant superstition and make no advance towards a 
higher civilisation. 

With a defective educational system, it is not sur- 
prising that the administration of justice is on an 
unsatisfactory footing. Brazilian law is codified, and 
in the hands of impartial and intelligent judges would 
meet the necessities of criminal and civil proceedings ; 
but corruption is common in all branches of the judiciary, 
and the cost of litigation is abnormally high. Delay of 
decisions in contested cases is one serious complaint ; 
and an investigation into the condition of the principal 
prison in 1899 in Rio de Janeiro (Casa da Detencao) 
brought to light grave abuses. Prisoners arrested for 
trivial offences were kept in confinement without trial 
for months, in some instances for years. Ten and 
twelve prisoners were crowded into cells intended to 
hold four only, with the excuse of "no room." No 
discrimination of class was made, hardened criminals 
and offenders for petty illegal acts being herded together. 
The prison was condemned as insanitary by medical 
experts, and.no discipline was observed. The scandal 



314 BRAZIL 

led to some reforms in this particular establishment, 
but nothing was done towards reform all round. 

An extraordinary experiment deserves mention in 
the State of Minas Geraes. Ouro Preto was formerly 
its capital, but in 1891 it was decided to remove head- 
quarters to a more suitable spot, and the authorities 
selected the valley of Bello Horizonte, fifty miles distant 
from Ouro Preto. There was no sign of town or 
hamlet in the vicinity, nor was it the centre of any agri- 
cultural or pastoral industry ; but it was picturesque, and 
struck the fancy of the officials, and straightway they 
ordered a city to be built — no light task, as the State 
Government soon found to its cost. A railway was 
laid to give access to the valley, but as the plans of 
construction were presented the heavy expenditure for 
the project became obvious. Government buildings, 
theatres, municipal offices, barracks, and other costly 
edifices were required, and all planned on royal scale. 
A water-supply too was provided, the streets paved, 
electric light and gas installed, and other expenses 
incurred, so that votes were always exceeded, and in 
1892 the works were perforce suspended for want of 
money. All revenue was then mortgaged to permit a 
resumption of construction, and at length the new city 
was sufficiently advanced for habitation. Bello 
Horizonte was declared the local capital in 1898, and 
the Government transferred to it. 

Economic progress in Brazil has also been retarded 
by the financial difficulties of the Federal Government, 
resulting from reckless expenditure of the national 
resources to combat revolutionary outbreaks and satisfy 
the demands of the corrupt circle surrounding the 
Presidency from 1890 to 1894. The depreciation of 
the currency was due to the mismanagement of the 
national finances, and occasioned the ruin of many 
families who possessed fixed sources of income. It 
also disturbed the wages of employe's and labourers, 
reducing their earnings. To the effects of the reduced 
purchasing power of the inconvertible notes was added 



1903] MEANS OF COMMUNICATION 315 

the burthen of heavy extra taxation, rendered necessary 
by obligations contracted in former Administrations. 
These two influences caused widespread poverty amongst 
all classes of Brazilians, and paralysed economic progress. 
Reaction has begun, but has not yet overcome the results 
of former errors. 

Lack of more adequate means of communication is 
still felt severely in Brazil, for the length of railways 
open for public service is only 9000 miles, in a country 
only 300,000 square miles smaller than the United 
States. This limited facility for transport hinders 
development in every direction, and it is due to it that 
the interior of the country remains unknown and un- 
populated. Under the Empire many railway lines were 
projected, and a few constructed, partly by the Central 
Government, partly by private enterprise, under a 
guarantee of a fixed rate of interest on capital invested. 
Under the Republic the nation attempted to obtain 
control of all railways where the right of purchase was 
recognised by the concession, and it was then the system, 
now controlled by the Leopoldina Company, passed 
under State management. The Government found 
itself unable successfully to direct the system acquired, 
and to earn the money due for interest on the bonds 
issued to cover the cost of purchase. As national 
property, the railway became the refuge of political 
adventurers, all posts being given away as recompense 
for political service rendered or promised. No wonder 
that the line could not earn enough to cover the cost of 
maintenance ; so after long litigation the bondholders 
regained possession of their property, and enough was 
earned within two years to pay a dividend. The Central 
Railway of Brazil, which has remained under State 
control, is a parallel instance, doing duty as a pension 
list. Political patronage secures a favourable response 
to applications for employment. No attempt is made 
to manage the State railways on a commercial basis, and 
the result of the ignorance of the employes is that a 
valuable property is a constant drag upon the national 



316 BRAZIL 

resources instead of yielding a handsome profit. The 
desire for State control of the railway systems is found 
everywhere in South America, and for a reason not 
far to seek. A railway organisation becomes one of 
the most powerful of political machines when run under 
State auspices, the employes being dependent for their 
positions on the Government. Presidential or congres- 
sional elections are more easily manipulated when the 
railway employe is aware that the penalty for voting 
against the Government is instant dismissal. The result 
in Brazil has been that the projected lines to unite 
Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul with Rio de Janeiro 
have not been built, the loss through systematic State 
mismanagement having left each Administration with 
only limited funds for railway extension. Notwith- 
standing, the Government has remained unwilling to 
give private companies the right to provide means of 
transport. 

The same jealously of private enterprise has been 
shown in connection with the telegraph service. If the 
Government could maintain efficient telegraphic com- 
munication there could be no cause for complaint, but 
this is not the case. In Brazil it is no infrequent occur- 
rence to send a message to some interior town the day 
before starting for it, and to arrive twenty-four hours 
ahead of the despatch announcing the intended visit. 
So far, however, as submarine cables are concerned, the 
Government has no control beyond a heavy tax levied 
on the receipts of the companies, and the right to place 
irritating restrictions on the despatch of all messages, 
even ordinary business communications, in time of 
revolutionary trouble. Recently the cable service has 
been extended, additional communication to Europe 
being established via Senegal in 1891, thus giving an 
alternate route. Cable connection between Para and 
Manaos, a distance of nearly 1000 miles, has also 
been recently opened. 

In the matter of utilising her waterways to best 
advantage, Brazil is behind the times. The Amazon, 



1903] BRAZILIAN WATERWAYS 317 

with its many tributaries, presents possibilities for 
development that have been allowed to rest in the 
background. Steamer accommodation provided by ships 
flying the Brazilian flag is totally inadequate to fulfil 
the wants of the travelling public, or to carry freight 
at reasonable rates. 



PART II 



CHAPTER XVIII 



CHILE 

Law of Constitution. Congress. The Executive. State Council. 
Administration from 1833 to 18G1. President Bulnes. President 
Montt. President Perez. Liberal Administration. Disaster to 
the Compania Church. War with Spain. Blockade of Valparaiso. 
Capture of the Covadonga. Bombardment of Valparaiso. Truce 
with Spain. Foundation of Chilian Navy. Re-election of 
President Perez. Economic Progress. President Ernlzuriz. 
Construction of the Cochrane and Blanco Encalada. Railway 
Expansion. Presidential Candidates in 1876. President Pinto. 
Relations between Chile and Bolivia. Economic Crisis. Incon- 
vertible Currency. Relations with Argentina. Quarrel with 
Bolivia and Peru. President Pinto and the War. Presidential 
Contest in 1881. Election of Santa Maria. Congressional 
Elections. Treaty with Peru. Truce with Bolivia. Laws of 
Civil Registry and Marriage. The Cemeteries. Presidential 
Election in 1886. Origin of Parliamentary System. Early Days 
of Balmaceda. Special Mission to Lima. His connection with 
Politics. Election to Congress. Programme of Reformistas. 
Opposition to new Political Movement. Balmaceda appointed 
Minister in Buenos Aires. Balmaceda in 1882 and 1885. 
Election to Presidency. Political Intrigues. Ministry of Sefior 
Carlos Antuiiez. Zanartii Cabinet. Congressional Elections, 
1888. Resignation of Zaiiarti'i. Ministerial changes. Policy con- 
cerning Church and Education. Conflict between Congress and 
Executive. Political situation in 1890. Dictatorial attitude of 
Balmaceda. Sefior Vicuna proclaimed Presidential Candidate. 
Resolutions by Mass Meetings. The Comision Conservadora. 
Pretext for Revolt. 

The Law of Constitution, under which Chile is 
governed, was voted by the representatives of the nation 
in 1833. Although it has been modified from time to 

X 



322 CHILE 

time to meet the developments of unforeseen conditions, 
in its fundamental points it remains unaltered to the 
present day. Administration is vested in three branches 
—legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative 
power consists of the National Congress, comprising 
two assemblies, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. 
The Senate is composed of members returned by the 
direct vote of the provinces for a term of six years in 
the proportion of one Senator for every three Deputies, 
and the Chamber of Deputies comprises representatives 
chosen by the direct vote of the departments for a term 
of three years, in ratio of one Deputy for every 30,000 
inhabitants or any fraction of not less than 15,000. 
Voting is cumulative, and the franchise is extended to 
all male citizens of twenty-one years of age who can 
read and write. The Executive is exercised by the 
President of the Republic, elected by indirect vote for a 
term of five years, in the month of June preceding the 
expiration of the existing presidency, the new chief 
magistrate taking his seat on the 18th of the September 
following. By an amendment to the Law of Constitu- 
tion enacted in 1871, the President is not eligible for 
re-election at the close of his term. In questions of 
legislation the President has a modified right of veto, 
but a Bill returned to the Chambers may become law if 
a majority of the members are present and a two-thirds 
vote is obtained. The President is assisted by a 
Cabinet of seven ministers, namely : — Interior ; Foreign 
Affairs ; Worship and Colonisation ; Justice and Public 
Instruction ; Finance ; War and Marine ; and Industry 
and Public Works ; and the Constitution further provides 
for a Council of State, consisting of the ministers holding 
portfolios ; five members nominated by the President, 
these to include a member of the Courts of Justice, an 
ecclesiastical dignitary, a general or admiral, an official 
of the Finance Department, one ex-minister or diplo- 
matic agent ; and six members chosen by Congress. It 
is the Council's duty to advise the President, and to act 
as a check upon him in his conduct of public affairs. 




Chilian Celebrities. 



[Faci: page 322. 



1841] AUTOCRATIC PRESIDENTS 323 

From the date of the Law of Constitution in 1833 
until 1861, the Government was conducted more on the 
lines of a Dictatorship than a Republic. It was not 
designed in the Constitution that this dictatorial 
tendency should exist ; but in view of subversive out- 
breaks and the turbulent character of the Chilians, 
extraordinary powers were granted from time to time, 
principally for the suppression of revolutionary risings, 
and these included power to suspend constitutional 
guarantees, muzzle the expression of public opinion, 
imprison and exile political suspects without trial, and, 
in fact, to adopt any arbitrary measures that the Presi- 
dent might consider necessary to secure his absolute 
authority. Moreover, the Law of Constitution permitted 
the re-election of a President at the expiration of his 
term of office ; and this led to the custom of extend- 
ing the presidential period to ten years, a prolongation 
conducive to autocracy. It was in such circumstances 
that President Prieto developed dictatorial tendencies 
previous to 1841, and the system showed no signs of 
modification under President Bulnes between 1841 and 
1851. Bulnes was a soldier, and had small idea of any 
method of administration other than by force, and all 
attempts to dispute his authority were crushed with an 
iron hand. 

In 1851 Manuel Montt acceded to the Presidency, 
and public opinion confidently looked for a decisive 
change in the Government. Montt was a civilian and a 
judge of the Supreme Court, and he was regarded as a 
man who would insist upon personal liberties being 
respected ; but unfortunately a revolution occurred a few 
days after his installation, and stern measures were 
adopted to quell the outbreak. It may have been that 
this subversive movement exerted a direct influence on 
his attitude, or possibly the fact that ex-Presiclent 
Bulnes was a power in the presidential councils was 
responsible for his policy ; but in any case the first five 
years of Montt's Administration showed no improvement 
in the position of the Chilians in regard to civil and politi- 



324 CHILE 

cal liberty. It was not that Montt was an unjust man 
in the literal sense of the word, indeed his reputation is 
rather the reverse ; but he was impatient of the slightest 
wish to dispute his authority ; and although during the 
latter live years of his Administration, from 1856 to 
1861, a greater degree of political and civil liberty was 
apparent, this satisfactory development was crushed by 
the occurrence of another insurrection in the provinces 
Atacama, Aconcagua, Talca, and Concepcion, an out- 
break which led to a renewal of the drastic measures of 
former years, persons suspected of sedition being treated 
with the utmost severity. Practically from 1833 to 
1861 the administration of the country was so conducted 
that the people were excluded from all participation in 
the affairs of the Government, and it was due to this 
fact that the country was so constantly a prey to those 
internal dissensions which served to hinder all economic 
progress and substantial prosperity. 

The year 1861 marked a new departure. Seiior 
Jose Joaquin Perez succeeded President Montt on 
September 18, and it was evident from the commence- 
ment of his Administration that Chile was about to 
enjoy a freedom unknown in the past. One of Perez's 
first acts was to annul the decrees of expatriation 
against persons who had taken part in former subversive 
plots, and throughout the country this action was 
warmly applauded by all classes. Nor were the Chilians 
disappointed in their expectations, for the expression of 
public opinion was encouraged and criticism of the 
Government invited instead of being treated as a crime, 
as had previously been the case. The extraordinary 
powers conceded heretofore to dictatorial presidents 
were neither asked for nor required by Perez, and the 
people recognised that the oppression which had weighed 
so heavily upon them since their independence from 
Spanish dominion was eliminated. They felt that it 
was no longer an autocratic President, but the Legisla- 
ture which ruled Chile. 

Two years after Perez assumed office a disaster, of a 



1863] BURNING OF COMPANIA CHURCH 325 

magnitude unparalleled in Chile, occurred in Santiago. 
On the afternoon of December 8, 1863, a special service 
was celebrated in the old Jesuit church of the Compania. 
The interior of the building was decorated profusely 
with tapestries and hangings in honour of the occasion, 
and a profusion of candles and lamps gave added effect 
to the scene. Towards the end of the afternoon the 
church was densely crowded with women and children 
of all ranks of society, when suddenly a current of air 
caught one of the high hanging draperies, bringing it in 
contact with a lighted candle, and in a moment this dry 
curtain was on fire. The wind caused the flames to 
spread with utmost rapidity, and before any effort could 
be made to check the fire the interior of the church 
was a mass of burning hangings and woodwork. A 
panic ensued, and all present made a rush for the doors, 
with the result that every exit became jammed. Women 
and children were trodden under foot and crushed to 
death in their frantic attempts to escape. Soon the 
doorways were heaped with the bodies of the dead and 
dying, impeding all outlets. In the interior of the church 
the conflagration raged, and the shrieks rose high above 
the din of falling timbers as beam after beam crashed 
down on the heads of the unfortunate victims. The 
news of the catastrophe spread quickly through the 
city, and fathers, husbands, and brothers rushed to the 
scene, only to find themselves helpless to give aid to 
their dear ones imprisoned within the walls. For two 
hours the flames continued, in spite of all efforts to 
subdue them ; but at 9 a.m. the roof of the burning 
building fell in, and the holocaust was complete. Two 
thousand persons had perished in the course of less 
than a couple of hours, and there were few families in 
Santiago but mourned some relative amongst the dead. 
A few bodies were recognised and claimed by relations 
for burial, but the vast majority were past all identifica- 
tion, and the corpses were carted to the cemetery and 
there interred in a common tomb, over which a 
monument was subsequently raised. 



326 CHILE 

While the Perez Administration proved so satis- 
factory for the Chilians at home, it was during this term 
that the country became involved in war with Spain. 
The outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Peru 
in connection with the quarrel concerning the Chincha 
Islands, caused the President and his advisers to imagine 
that if Spain was victorious the Spaniards would 
endeavour to regain control over South America. 
Regarding the Spanish attitude as distinctly menacing, 
the Chilian Government proposed that, in company 
with Bolivia and Ecuador, common cause should be 
made with Peru, and in 1865 these four South American 
republics were united against such power as Spain 
could send across the seas to attack them. The policy 
of Perez was supported enthusiastically in Chile ; but 
the country was unprepared for war, and towards the 
latter part of 1865 a Spanish squadron blockaded 
Valparaiso, and considerable damage was inflicted upon 
the trade of that city. Chile possessed only one warship, 
the Esmeralda, commanded by Captain Juan Williams 
Rebolledo, and in January 1865, when this vessel was 
cruising to the north of Valparaiso, she captured the 
Spanish gunboat Covadonga and took her prize into 
Coquimbo. The incident so affected Admiral Pareja, 
the Spanish officer in charge of the blockading squadron, 
that he committed suicide on his flagship, the Villa de 
Madrid. Irritated by the loss of the Covadonga and 
the death of Admiral Pareja, the Spanish Government 
sent out the Numancia, commanded by Captain Mendez 
Nunez, and other vessels, with orders to exact reparation 
from the Chilians. Captain Nunez assumed charge of 
the Spanish fleet on his arrival in Chilian waters, and 
decided that the shortest way to accomplish his mission 
was to bombard Valparaiso, although that seaport was 
undefended. On March 31, 1866, at 9.30 a.m., four 
Spanish ships fired on the town for three hours, aiming 
chiefly at the custom-house sheds, because they were 
filled with valuable merchandise. When it was seen 
that these biuldings were in flames and other sections of 



1866] VALPARAISO BOMBARDED 32? 

the city were burning, the order to cease firing was 
given, but not until damage to the estimated value of 
$14,000,000 was done. 

After the bombardment, the Spanish squadron left 
Valparaiso and did not attempt to interfere again with 
the Chilians. In 1867 a truce was made between Spain 
and Chile, and twelve years later, in 1879, a treaty of 
peace and friendship was signed ; but even after a lapse 
of thirty-five years bitter feelings exist against the 
Spaniards on account of that bombardment. One re- 
sult of the war was that the Chilians realised that they 
required ships and forts to defend themselves in future 
against foreign aggression, and the foundation of the 
navy, which rendered such signal service a few years 
later, was laid by President Perez, when he gave instruc- 
tions for building the OHiggins and Chacabuco. Forts 
were also constructed for the defence of Valparaiso, and 
attention generally was given to the question of military 
and naval armaments. 

As had been the custom, Perez was re-elected for 
another presidential term. In some quarters exception 
was taken to this proceeding, on the grounds that the 
time had arrived to amend the Law of Constitution 
where it concerned the re-election of the President. 
Perez informed the deputations waiting upon him in 
connection with this matter that they had full liberty of 
public meeting to discuss such questions, and a free 
Press to circulate their ideas. This attitude conciliated 
the Opposition in regard to his election, but on the other 
hand a legitimate agitation was set afoot to amend the 
law in respect to the eligibility of Presidents for a 
second consecutive term, and in 1871 a reform was 
sanctioned which precluded re-election at the expiry of 
the regular presidential period. As this was the first 
time any such action had been attempted by consti- 
tutional means, it marks an important step in Chilian 
political evolution. 

In addition to the satisfactory political conditions 
established by Perez, his Administration was noteworthy 



328 CHILE 

for economic progress. Railways projected by President 
Montt were finished and opened for traffic, and tele- 
graphic communication was established throughout the 
central districts. Public instruction was encouraged, 
and schools and colleges founded by aid of the Govern- 
ment at the initiative of Seiior Barros Araiia, who 
represented to Congress the necessity of a more ex- 
tended system of education. Measures were taken to 
provide more adequate means of protection for life and 
property than had formerly existed, and the efforts 
in this direction encouraged the establishment of new 
industries in country districts where settlers had pre- 
viously been afraid to reside because of the prevailing 
lawlessness. 

Senor Federico Emizuriz was elected to succeed 
Perez, and he assumed office on September 18, 1871. 
The new Chief Magistrate entered upon his presidential 
duties under different auspices to his predecessors. In 
the Senate he had supported the amendment of the 
Constitution regarding the ineligibility of Presidents for 
re-election, and through his influence Congress had 
approved the measure. During his Administration the 
country enjoyed exceptional peace at home and abroad, 
and the political and civil liberties permitted under 
Perez were strictly respected and in some directions 
amplified. In one matter Emizuriz rendered his country 
a service which proved of the utmost importance at a 
slightly later stage. In 1871 Peru possessed a navy 
consisting of several modern ships, and this gave her a 
preponderating power in her dealings with her neigh- 
bours. Emizuriz recognised that Chile was at a serious 
disadvantage, in consequence of her naval inferiority, 
whenever complications arose with the Peruvian 
Government, and to remedy this drawback the 
President in 1873 ordered the construction in British 
shipyards of the ironclads Almirante Cochrane, Almirante 
Blanco Encalada, and the gunboat Magallanes. It was 
not until after his death that occasion occurred to use 
these men-of-war for fighting purposes, but when the 



1873] THE CHILIAN NAVY 329 

time did come his forethought proved the salvation of 
the Chilians. 

The policy of Errazuriz in regard to public works 
was especially beneficial. Loans were raised in London, 
and the money expended on extending the railway 
system ; the Valparaiso custom-house sheds destroyed 
during the Spanish bombardment were remodelled and 
rebuilt ; the Congress Hall in Santiago was erected, and 
other improvements initiated. Perhaps one of the most 
remarkable features of his Administration was that 
throughout his term the same Minister of the Interior 
held office without interruption, and this permitted a 
continuity of policy that would have been impossible if 
he had been hampered by ministerial changes. 

The question of the presidential election created 
general interest in 1876. In former years the retiring 
President had nominated his successor ; but in 1876 
more liberal ideas prevailed, and the Chilians were 
called upon to decide for themselves to whom the 
Government should be entrusted. The candidates were 
Senor Benjamen Vicuna Mackenna, Senor Miguel Luis 
Amunategui, and Senor Anibal Pinto. Mackenna was 
a distinguished historian, and had served his country in 
different public capacities ; Amunategui had been a 
professor of the National Institute, was a well-known 
writer, and had been Minister of the Interior under 
Perez ; while Pinto was a man of good standing, who 
had held the portfolio of War under Errazuriz. Senor 
Pinto won, and on September 18, 1876, assumed his 
presidential responsibilities. 

Pinto was destined to rule Chile during a most 
critical period. The war with Bolivia and Peru altered 
the course of Chilian history and character, and 
President Pinto was far from the generally accepted 
ideal type of citizen to face the great national crisis 
which confronted the country in 1879. He was quiet, 
inclined to studious habits, and a strong advocate for 
peaceful measures, and yet he showed no sign of 
faltering when his Administration became involved in a 



330 CHILE 

bloody and costly war in which the lives of 20,000 of 
his countrymen were sacrificed. 

Before the outbreak of war, and while relations with 
Bolivia caused constant anxiety, President Pinto had to 
deal with a difficult and unforeseen situation. The 
country was plunged into a severe economic crisis due 
to depression in the mining industry, and the revenue 
shrank to such an extent that the available funds were 
barely sufficient to meet the ordinary expenses. Gold 
and silver coin was shipped abroad by the commercial 
community in payment of liabilities, and this brought 
a monetary crisis. The Administration suggested a law 
to relieve the banks from specie payments, which was 
sanctioned, and an inconvertible note issue established. 
The currency complications date from this period, and 
they have proved ever since a constant obstacle to com- 
mercial prosperity and economic development. To add 
to the trouble, the dispute with Argentina concerning 
the boundary line gave cause for serious alarm, and it 
became so acute in 1878 that hostilities between the two 
countries appeared likely to occur ; but, happily, the 
tact shown by the President conciliated the angry 
passions on both sides of the Andes, and a treaty was 
signed which removed for the time any danger of a 
rupture. 

The question of relations with Bolivia has been 
dealt with under the description of the war of 1879 ; it 
is unnecessary here to enter into the details of that 
controversy beyond noting the fact that the President 
never wavered in his determination to protect Chilian 
rights in Bolivia, even when his policy in this respect 
entailed an appeal to arms to support his convictions. 
Pinto considered the rupture with Peru inevitable, and 
he accepted the situation as the only possible one for 
the general welfare of Chile. From the moment of the 
outbreak of hostilities he was untiring in his efforts to 
furnish the army in the field with supplies of men and 
equipment, and he personally supervised the details of 
the various expeditions, besides devising expedients to 



1881] PRESIDENT PINTO 331 

obtain the funds necessary for the conduct of the 
campaign. Throughout the period when the success or 
failure of the Chilian cause hung in the balance, Pinto 
kept a cool head and clear judgment in regard to the 
operations by land and sea, and his confident atti- 
tude materially assisted in bringing about the final 
victory. 

In 1881 came the question of the election of a 
successor to Pinto. A number of prominent politicians 
requested the President to advise in the selection of a 
candidate ; but to this appeal he replied that he had 
nothing to do with the election of his successor, and no 
arguments could induce him to depart from his deter- 
mination to refrain from exerting his official influence. 
The candidate upon whom the choice fell was Seiior 
Domingo Santa Maria, who assumed office at the usual 
date in 1881. Seiior Pinto survived his term of office 
for three years, dying in Valparaiso in 1884. 

President Santa Maria had passed through many 
vicissitudes in his political career. In 1848 he had 
been in the public service as Intendente of Colchagua, 
and afterwards held other posts ; but during the Presi- 
dency of Senor Manuel Montt he was implicated in 
revolutionary outbreaks and condemned to banishment. 
On his return to Chile in 1864 he was named Minister 
of Finance by President Perez ; later he was the repre- 
sentative of Chile to the Government of Peru; subse- 
quently he was appointed a judge of the Court of 
Appeal ; and under President Pinto he had held the 
portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Interior. The new 
President, as a Liberal, opposed the introduction of 
clerical influence into political affairs, and this led to 
bitter opposition to his Administration on the part of 
the Conservatives, who represented the Church Party. 
It was in consequence of this opposition, which was 
subsequently strengthened by different groups of 
Liberals, that he brought official influence to bear in 
the Congressional elections of 1882, his object being to 
create an absolute majority in his favour in the 



332 CHILE 

Chambers ; but his action was severely criticised, and 
led to violent obstruction to all legislative measures 
brought forward by his Administration, and when in 
1885 he adopted a similar policy in the elections, he 
again brought upon himself an avalanche of abuse. 

In spite of this opposition to his Administration, the 
President succeeded in carrying through some important 
measures. The treaty of peace with Peru was signed and 
ratified, and a truce was celebrated with Bolivia ; and two 
measures were passed, most directly affecting internal 
affairs in connection with the laws relating to civil 
registry and marriage. Until these laws were enacted 
the priests alone controlled the registers for the inscrip- 
tion of births, deaths, and marriages, but the new laws 
provided special officials for the purpose, and the 
registration of all marriages, births, and deaths was 
made compulsory. Another reform was the freeing of 
the cemeteries for the burial of all persons, whereas 
formerly only those belonging to the Roman Catholic 
religion were permitted interment in consecrated 
ground. These reforms were carried in the teeth of 
the most violent resistance from the Church Party. 

When the term of Santa Maria approached comple- 
tion he selected Senor Jose Manuel Balmaceda as his 
successor, and threw all the weight of his official 
influence in favour of his choice. The Conservatives 
and those Liberals who were in opposition made a 
determined fight against Balmaceda, but the official 
support accorded to him finally secured his return. 

The action of Santa Maria in using official influence 
in the Congressional election of 1882, and again in 1885, 
was due to the curious phase into which political pro- 
cedure in the Chambers had drifted. Ideas of Liberal 
Government had gradually evolved the unwritten law 
that the resignation of the ministry should follow an 
adverse vote on any administrative measure ; in other 
words, the ministry was only justified in holding office 
when it represented a majority in Congress. This 
development was the result of the agitation by the 



1885] PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 333 

Liberals to secure a parliamentary system of govern- 
ment ; but there was one important defect in the 
adoption of this procedure which then, and since, caused 
unexpected complications. No power is given to the 
President to dissolve the Chambers when an adverse 
majority exists, and it was the effort to secure a 
substantial majority in the Legislature that induced 
Santa Maria to act as he did in 1882 and 1885. The 
so-called parliamentary procedure has been productive 
of similar practices in succeeding Administrations, and 
must continue to do this until the power of ordering a 
dissolution of the Chambers is vested in the President. 
The alternative can only be the introduction of a system 
making the Ministry practically independent of Con- 
gress, as is the case in the United States. 

Senor Balmaceda acceded to the Presidency on 
September 18, 1886, and his term was destined to be 
marked by stirring events, covering a notable period in 
Chilian history. A brief description of himself and his 
policy will therefore help towards a better understanding 
of the situation from 1886 to 1891. 

Jose Manuel Balmaceda was born in 1838, and in 
his childhood autocratic government was the keystone 
of Chilian politics. His father had been an intimate 
councillor and supporter of President Manuel Montt, 
and throughout the revolutionary risings of 1851 and 
1859 he enthusiastically espoused the cause of his friend. 
Young Balmaceda was educated under clerical influence, 
and an inclination to asceticism was ingrained in his 
nature. After completing his studies he wished to take 
priestly orders, but his father strongly opposed the 
Church as a career, and in 1864 he obtained an appoint- 
ment for his son as a member of a special mission to 
Lima, to attend a South American Congress called to 
discuss the attitude of Spain towards Peru in connection 
with the question of the Chincha Islands. When, a 
year later, Jose Balmaceda returned, he no longer thought 
of devoting his life to the priesthood, but rather to 
politics or diplomacy. Finding for the moment no 



334 CHILE 

opening in these directions, he occupied himself with 
the management of his father's country estates, and 
shortly afterwards married the Senorita Emilia Toro 
Herrera, a member of one of the most prominent 
families of Santiago. 

During his life in the country, Balmaceda did not 
allow himself to lose touch with political developments. 
The closing years of the Perez Administration saw the 
change from dictatorial rule to Constitutional Govern- 
ment, and the more advanced thinkers of the younger 
generation then established the Reform Party, taking for 
their motto the word "Libertad," and giving expression 
to their views at meetings and through the newspaper 
La Libertad, a journal founded in 1866 by the 
brothers Arteaga Alemparte to disseminate through the 
country a creed for the advancement of political liberty. 
Among these reformers Balmaceda took his place, and 
soon became one of the most prominent advocates of 
the new doctrines. At the elections for the Chamber 
of Deputies in 1870, Balmaceda was a candidate for the 
Department of Carelmapu, and after a hard contest was 
victorious. From that date until his death, he was 
constantly before the people of Chile as a participator 
in political developments. 

On September 26, 1875, the reformistas convened a 
meeting, and adopted the following programme as the 
political basis of their party :■ — 

1. Equality and independence of the different public administrative 
departments. To guarantee this, the establishment of the following 
principles : — 

(a) Independence and responsibility of the judicial power. 
(jA Organisation of the franchise on the popular lines of liberty 
of suffrage and non-intervention of official influence in 
electoral matters. 

(c) Reform of the municipal power, and independence in local 

affairs. The limit to such power being that municipal acts 
must harmonise with the general welfare. 

(d) Separation of Church and State upon the following principles : 

(1) Subjection of all religious communities to common law ; 

(2) Suppression of special laws and privileges ; (3) Freedom 




President Balmaceda. 



[Face page 334. 



1875] POLITICAL REFOPM 335 

of the cemeteries to all religious sects ; (4) Establishment of 

civil registry and civil marriage. 
(e) Encouragement of public education by State and Municipality. 

Liberty of instruction and profession, the latter qualified by 

the necessity to prove competence. 
(J") Equal distribution of the charges levied by State or Munici- 
pality. 
(g) Reform of the Law of Constitution to make practicable these 

ideas, and where necessary a modification of civil and 

administrative laws. 

These political ideals emanated from Balmaceda, and 
explain his later career. That some of them were 
impracticable, was shown subsequently, but this does 
not minimise the historical importance of the action of 
the reformistas. It marked an upheaval in Chilian 
political life, and the new doctrine was vigorously 
preached by Balmaceda and his colleagues in and out 
of Congress. The effect was to create a more general 
interest in political affairs, for the new principles gained 
ground steadily in spite of bitter opposition by the Con- 
servatives and the supporters of the Clerical Party. 

When war with Bolivia and Peru broke out in 1879, 
the attitude of Argentina was most important to Chile. 
The boundary question required careful diplomatic 
treatment to ensure Argentine neutrality, and an able 
representative in Buenos Aires was indispensable. 
Balmaceda was selected for this post by President 
Pinto, and his mission was successfully fulfilled. For 
a year Balmaceda remained in Argentina, and then he re- 
turned with the assurance that Argentina would neither 
press her claims in respect to the disputed territory or 
lend active assistance to the enemies of Chile. Soon 
after this the question of the presidential election came 
up, and efforts were made to bring him forward, but 
Balmaceda decided not to enter the electoral campaign 
on his own behalf, preferring to act as a leader of the 
party in favour of Senor Santa Maria, who, in due 
course, was elected, and it was only natural a portfolio 
in the Cabinet should be offered to Balmaceda. He 
accordingly became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Santa 



336 CHILE 

Maria's first Cabinet. In view of the existing inter- 
national complications this was a most important post, 
and it afforded him a wide scope for his abilities. 

The policy of Santa Maria in connection with the 
Congressional elections led to a Cabinet crisis in 1882, 
entailing the resignation of the Prime Minister, Sefior 
Jose Francisco Vergara, and this portfolio was accepted 
by Balmaceda. It is not easy to reconcile his retention 
of office with the political principles he enunciated 
between 1870 and 1879, for then one of the factors 
upon which greatest stress was laid was the non-inter- 
vention of the Government in elections. On the other 
hand, three of the principal objects for which the 
re/ormistas had contended — the freeing of the cemeteries, 
the establishment of civil registry, and the civil marriage 
l aw — were now brought forward. Apparently Balmaceda 
considered himself justified in remaining in office to 
assist the passage of these reforms, which were presented 
to Congress in 1882 and 1883, and duly approved. 
When the question of the separation of Church and 
State came before the Chambers a year later, Balmaceda 
again fell away from the programme of 1875, supporting 
the union of Church and State, with the modification of 
liberty of worship rather than absolute separation. In 
defending his conduct in the Senate, he stated that he 
considered too rapid a change from existing conditions 
was injurious to the true welfare of the country. 

When the Congressional elections took place in 
1885, official influence was again utilised to obtain 
majorities. Nor did Balmaceda, then Minister of 
Interior, raise any protest against a practice he had 
condemned so frequently in public and private, and for 
his attitude he was attacked in the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate. His conduct was placed in a worse 
light by the publicity given to a telegram despatched by 
him, and referring to preparations then being made for 
the proclamation of a presidential candidate to succeed 
Santa Maria. It was urged that this telegram demon- 
strated the intention of the Administration to interfere, 



1885] BALMACEDA AND THE ELECTION 337 

and the incident attracted unusual attention, as it was 
known that the presidential candidate of the Liberals 
was no other than Balmaceda. In consequence of 
these attacks and of the fact that he was the presi- 
dential candidate, Balmaceda resigned in January of 
1886. 

Opposed to Balmaceda for the Presidency was Senor 
Jose Francisco Vergara ; but it was soon clear that he 
had no chance of success, and he withdrew from the 
contest. The Conservatives refused to take part in the 
election, alleging that the influence of the Government 
was exercised on behalf of Balmaceda, and that, con- 
sequently, they had no chance of fair treatment at the 
polls. In these circumstances Balmaceda was unopposed, 
and on June 25, 1886, was declared elected, his election 
being ratified by Congress on August 30. Preparations 
were made by his friends to celebrate his success by a 
banquet in his honour ; but he declined any such mani- 
festation, and this refusal, although applauded by the 
Press, offended a section of the Liberals, and developed 
serious consequences at a later period. 

The majority in Congress were Liberals when 
Balmaceda assumed the Presidency in the middle of 
September, but the party had split into factions, called 
respectively Liberals, Nationals, Dissentient-Liberals, 
and Radicals, although so far as political doctrine was 
concerned small difference existed. During the violent 
debates in 1884 in connection with the separation of 
Church and State, all Liberals approved the theory of 
the measure ; but they were at variance on the method 
and the time. It was anticipated that Balmaceda would 
receive general support in the Chambers ; and that he 
did not was due to the fact that the various groups 
posing as Liberals were more swayed by personal motives 
than by strict adherence to political principles, and this 
led them often to oppose the Administration without 
just cause. It was the ambition of Balmaceda to reunite 
the Liberals into one strong party, and to this end his 
first ministry was composed rather of representatives 

Y 



338 CHILE 

from the groups likely to oppose his policy than of men 
who could be relied upon for support in an emergency. 
His first Cabinet consisted of Sen or Eusebio Lillo, 
Interior ; Sen or Joaquin Godoy, Foreign Affairs ; Sen or 
Pedro Montt, Justice, Worship, and Public Instruction ; 
Senor Augustin Edwards, Finance ; and Senor Evaristo 
Sanchez, War and Marine. Apparently these appoint- 
ments gave satisfaction at first to the majority in 
Congress, but in a very few weeks political intrigues 
brought a,bout complications. 

The result of these intrigues was in evidence when 
the Chambers met in October, six weeks after the 
presidential inauguration. At the preliminary session 
to elect officers the Deputies chosen were in political 
unison with the Cabinet, but at the next meeting the 
Conservatives allied themselves with the various groups 
opposed to the Administration, refused to ratify the 
elections, chose officers of their own political colour, and 
formed a strong majority against the Ministry. As the 
estimates for the ensuing year had not yet been sanc- 
tioned, a deadlock was certain unless another Cabinet 
was appointed, and the Ministry resigned on November 
25. A new Cabinet was formed on the last day of the 
month, and in its composition Balmaceda again showed 
his wish to unite the different Liberals into one party. 
The Ministers were Carlos Antuilez (Liberal), Interior ; 
Francisco Freire (Liberal), Foreign Affairs ; Adolfo 
Valderrama (National), Instruction ; Augustin Edwards 
(National), Finance ; and Nicolas Peha Vicuna (Liberal), 
War and Marine. This gave a preponderance of port- 
folios to the Liberals, whereas that advantage had been 
with the Nationals in the former Ministry. The spirit 
of opposition to the President when he had been only 
a few weeks in office was a foretaste of after events ; 
but he failed to grasp the fact that in his efforts for 
uniting the Liberals he was laying the foundation of 
troubles that would render his own position untenable 
in the end. 

The situation at the beginning of 1887 was unpleasant 



1887] CONGRESS AND BALMACEDA 339 

to contemplate. There was no doubt that the tactics 
of the Opposition which had brought about the resigna- 
tion of the Ministry under Senor Lillo would be repeated 
after the Chambers reassembled for ordinary sessions, 
and the President was powerless to remedy this state 
of affairs. The apparent solution lay in a real unification 
of the Liberals, and Balmaceda determined on another 
attempt in this direction. In June, 1887, the Ministry 
under Senor Antimez resigned office. A new portfolio 
—that of Industry and Public Works — had meantime 
been created, and this gave six, instead of five, appoint- 
ments to the Cabinet. Balmaceda now nominated two 
Liberals, two Nationals, and two Dissident-Liberals : — 
Anibal Zanartii (Liberal), Interior ; Miguel Luis Amuna- 
tegui (Dissident), Foreign Affairs ; Pedro Lucio Cuadra 
(Liberal), Justice ; Augustin Edwards (National), 
Finance ; Manuel Garcia de la Huerta (Dissident), War 
and Marine ; and Pedro Montt (National), Industry and 
Public Works. This Ministry was the longest lived 
of any under his Administration, remaining in office 
until April, 1888, the only modification during that 
period being the appointment of Senor Augusto Matte 
to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, rendered vacant by 
the sudden death of Senor Amunategui. 

Congressional elections were held in March, 1888, 
and, although everything passed off quietly, the occasion 
gave rise to many new developments. The Opposition 
accused Balmaceda of using official influence to secure 
the return of candidates favourable to himself, and the 
President denied that the elections had been other than 
perfectly free. In one sense, possibly, this assertion was 
made in good faith, for no open corruption was apparent 
and no disturbance of public order occurred ; but there 
was no doubt that indirectly the President did bring 
pressure to bear, following in this respect the example 
of Santa Maria in 1882 and 1885. Subsequent events 
demonstrated the truth of this statement. Many 
members of Congress who owed their seats to the 
protection extended by the President were no sooner 



340 CHILE 

in office than they opposed the Administration, and the 
immediate outcome of these elections was the resignation 
of the Ministry in consequence of serious disagreement 
between Senor Zanartii and Balmaceda. This resigna- 
tion marks an important epoch, because from that date 
the tone of Congress was invariably hostile to Balmaceda, 
and, as a consequence, between April, 1888, and October, 
1890, no fewer than ten Cabinets were appointed. The 
leaders of these various Ministries were : — Senor Cuadra, 
April 12, 1888; Barros Luco, November 2, 1888; 
Lastarria, June 11, 1889; Ramon Donoso Vergara, 
October 23, 1889 ; Manuel Sanchez Fontecilla, November 
7, 1889 ; Adolf o Ibanez, January 1, 1890 ; Sanfuentes, 
May 30, 1890; Belisario Prats, August 11, 1890; and 
Claudio Vicuna, October 15, 1890. 

Political turmoil such as these changes implied was 
galling to a man of the ambitious character of Balmaceda. 
To reform the intellectual and economic state of the 
Chilian people was his aim, and in many ways he found 
his projects impracticable, but he grasped the fact that 
if he controlled Congress he could settle many vexed 
questions retarding the material development of the 
country. The status of the Church in Chile was regarded 
by him as requiring clear definition, the footing on which 
clerical influence stood being incompatible with existing 
circumstances. Public education was a subject to which 
he devoted careful study, but here his efforts at advance- 
ment were blocked by the hostility of the Chambers. 
Public works were needed and persistently advocated 
by him ; but the antagonistic attitude of Congress 
interfered with his plans in this direction also, and the 
continuous friction between the Executive and the Legis- 
lature altered the character of Balmaceda until he felt 
he stood alone. Gradually in the struggle he developed 
dictatorial tendencies, which became more pronounced 
when he realised that his efforts to unite the Liberals 
were doomed to failure. In some respects he owed 
his disappointment to the fact that he was in advance 
of his time, and before his death he realised he had 



1889] DISTURBED POLITICAL CONDITIONS 341 

gone too fast for the people lie wished to aid and 
regenerate. 

The conflict between the President and Congress 
reached an acute stage in 1889. An accusation was 
made to the effect that the President was preparing the 
way for a nominee of his own to succeed him, and he 
was requested to declare categorically that he would 
make no use of his influence in the presidential election 
of 1891. This met with a curt refusal, and everywhere 
the Chilians realised that the strained relations existing 
between the Chambers and the Executive might lead to 
serious consequences. As the hostility in Congress 
became more marked the autocratic tendencies of 
Balmaceda were accentuated, and finding that the 
parliamentary system hampered his Administration, he 
insisted on his right to name his ministers and kee]3 
them in office in spite of an adverse majority in the 
Chambers. This called forth a clamour of indignation, 
and Congress determined to refuse supplies until the 
President modified his attitude. In the end Balmaceda 
was obliged to give way : he nominated a Cabinet in 
accordance with the wishes of the Chambers. Not 
until this was done was the budget for 1890 sanctioned. 

In 1890 it became evident that a definite rupture 
between the Executive and Congress was inevitable, 
and the two questions which had created difficulties 
in 1889 recurred with increased vigour. The first 
was that of a representative as opposed to a parlia- 
mentary system of government. Balmaceda had again 
changed his Cabinet, and the Chambers refused support 
to the new ministers ; but the President stubbornly 
held his ground until matters reached a deadlock. He 
then temporised with Congress, but the breach had 
become so wide that no permanent solution of the 
quarrel was possible, and all attempts to conciliate the 
conflicting interests were unavailing. On October 15, 
when Congress was not in session, Balmaceda appointed 
a Ministry under the leadership of Senor Claudio Vicuna, 
which was at variance with the ideas of the majority of 



342 CHILE 

Senators and Deputies, and the effect was to further 
embitter the Opposition. 

It was thought that the impossible situation into 
which the Administration had drifted would lead to the 
resignation of Balmaceda ; but he showed no inclination 
to take this way out of the difficulty, and he let it be 
understood that he was determined to govern the 
country irrespective of the opinion in the Chambers. 
From October, 1890, he assumed almost dictatorial 
powers, surrounding himself with men whom he could 
depend upon to do his bidding, and assuming an attitude 
directly opposed to the doctrines he had preached at 
the commencement of his political career. By his 
action he alienated the sympathy of many people who 
had watched with interest the widening of the breach 
between himself and Congress ; moreover, there was no 
longer any doubt that he would use his influence un- 
sparingly to ensure the election of his successor, and on 
March 8, 1891, his nominee, Senor Claudio Vicuna, then 
Minister of Interior, was proclaimed the presidential 
candidate by a convention assembled in Santiago. 

How great the tension between the President and 
the Opposition had become in October, 1890, is seen by 
a resolution passed at a mass meeting held in Santiago 
on the 15th of that month. This was : — 

1 . That the President has broken his word of honour as both man 
and governor, in organising a ministry not supported by Congress. 
That he is unworthy of confidence, and has shown from the first his 
intention to intervene in electoral questions. 

2. That the Common Conservadora merits a vote of thanks for 
having assumed its constitutional role in defence of the prerogatives 
of Congress. 

3. That all citizens, without distinction of political colour, should 
unite to offer resistance by legal means so long as the Government 
acts according to the Constitution, and by all possible means when 
the Government oversteps that Constitution. 

The Comidon Conservadora referred to at this 
meeting is a body of six Senators and eight Deputies 
appointed by the Chambers to safeguard the interests of 



1890] THE COMISION CONSERVADORA 343 

Congress when that body is not in session. On October 
16, 1890, this committee sent a note to the President 
requesting that Congress be convoked, and in reply 
received only an acknowledgment of the communica- 
tion. On November 21 following, the committee again 
demanded that the Chambers be summoned, and five 
days later it was advised by Balmaceda that "the causes 
which determined the closing of the extraordinary 
sessions of the National Congress on October 15 last 
are still existing, and the time has not yet arrived for 
the Chambers to be convoked." The Comision Conserm- 
dora continued to protest against various acts of the 
Administration, and on December 10 advised the 
Executive that after December 31 there would be no 
authorisation for maintaining the army and navy unless 
such expenditure was sanctioned by the Legislature. 

All these indications showed that the breaking point 
was near. The Executive was acting within the letter 
of the Law of Constitution, but it was abundantly clear 
that the attitude of Balmaceda would lead to some 
illegality which would give the Opposition an opportunity 
of revolting against his authority, and early in January, 
1891, a decree issued by Balmaceda afforded this 
pretext. This decree was : — 

No. 40 — . Santiago, 5 of January, 1891. 

His Excellency decrees : — ■ 

That Congress has not despatched the Law of Estimates for the 
present year. 

That it is impossible, pending the promulgation of the said law, 
to suspend the public services without endangering internal order 
and external security. It is therefore decreed : 

Pending the sanction of the Law of Estimates for 1891, those 
approved by the law of December 31, 1889, shall remain in force. 

Let this be registered, communicated, published, and inserted in 
the Gazette of Laws. 

Balmaceda. 
Claudio Vicuna. 
Domingo Godov. 
Ismael Perez Montt. 
J. M. Valdes Cuevas, 
J. F. Gana. 
G, Mackenna. 



344 CHILE 

This act was illegal, and was issued in the face of the 
communication of December 20, 1890, from the Comision 
Consermdora to the Executive, and it proved to be the 
signal for the outbreak of a civil war which devastated 
the country for a period of eight months. 



CHAPTER XIX 

chile — -continued 

Preparations for Rebellion. The Navy Revolts. Capture of War 
Material. Skirmish in Valparaiso. Occupation of Coquimbo. 
Engagement at Pisagua. Attitude of Balmaceda. Measures 
against Revolution. Position in January, 1891. Public Opinion. 
Capture of Pisagua. Revolutionary Troops. Fight near Dolores. 
Congressionalists Defeated at Huara. Occupation of Iquique. 
Attempt to Recapture Iquique. Intervention of Admiral Hotham. 
Congressionalists at Iquique. Defeat of Robles at Pozo Almonte. 
Capture of Ai'ica. Reinforcements for Tarapaca. Antofagasta 
Blockaded. Evacuation of Antofagasta. Colonel Camus Retires 
into Bolivia. Occupation of Caldera. The Blanco Encalada. 
Lull in Hostilities. Treatment of Suspected Persons. Financial 
Difficulties. The Junta de Gobierno. Revolutionary Agents. 
The Itata Incident. Peace Negotiations. Meeting of Commis- 
sioners in Santiago. Attempt to Assassinate Balmaceda. 
Optimistic Feeling. The Condell and Lynch. Dictatorial 
Tendencies of Balmaceda. Election of Sefior Claudio Vicuna. 
Richard Cumming. Revolutionary Propaganda in Europe. 
Sympathy with Revolutionary Cause. Armaments reach 
Iquique. Congressionalist Armjr. Revolutionary Committee in 
Santiago and Valparaiso. Embarkation of Revolutionary Army. 
Balmaceda and the Invasion. Insurgents near Santiago. 
Execution of Prisoners. Massacre of Lo CaTias. Tyrannical 
Conduct of Balmaceda. The Esmeralda off Valparaiso. Landing 
of Congressionalists. The Central and Southern Districts. 

Previous to the decree of January 5, 1891, which 
set moving active revolutionary measures, extensive pre- 
parations had been made for armed revolt : many of the 
principal naval officers had been sounded, and found 
willing to lend assistance in the movement against 
Balmaceda. Interviews took place on January 3, 1891, 



346 CHILE 

and on the two subsequent clays between Captain Jorje 
Montt, the senior naval officer at Valparaiso, and Senor 
Waldo Silva and Senor Ramon Barros Luco, and 
arrangements were made for the squadron to be ready 
on the night of January 6 ; the former as Vice-President 
of the Senate, and the latter as President of the Chamber 
of Deputies, were to board the ships as the representa- 
tives of Congress in the movement. On the evening of 
January 6, Senor Silva and Senor Barros Luco, with 
several deputies and friends, embarked on the Blanco 
Encalada, and at midnight that vessel, accompanied by 
the Esmeralda and the OHiggins, left Valparaiso 
harbour for Quinteros, where the Cochrane and Magal- 
lanes were lying. Next morning the commanders 
assembled on the Blanco Encalada, when the communi- 
cations exchanged between the Vice-President of the 
Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and 
Captain Montt, were read, and the object of the 
rebellion against Balmaceda was explained, the com- 
manders expressing approval, and announcing their 
adhesion to the revolution. The position was then 
explained to the junior officers and crews, after which 
the ships returned to Valparaiso. 

The remainder of January 7 was occupied by the 
squadron in taking possession f the Huascar, some 
steam launches, and the vessels of the Chilian South 
American Steamship Company, these latter being 
required as transports, and on January 8 the Cochrane 
and Magallanes sailed north to establish the blockade of 
Iquique. On the same day the Congressionalists seized 
a valuable cargo of war material recently arrived for the 
Chilian Government in the German steamer Cleopatra, 
consisting of 4500 Mannlicher rifles, and the Esmeralda 
went south to Talcahuana and captured all stores at 
that naval station. On January 10 a skirmish occurred 
in the harbour of Valparaiso between boats belonging 
to the squadron and the shore batteries, in which 
several men were killed and wounded. Next day a 
party disembarked from the Esmeralda at Lebu, and an 



1891] OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR 347 

expedition from the transport Angamos captured a 
detachment of rural police at Quillota. The OHiggins 
and the transport Amazonas arrived off Coquimbo on 
the 12th, and after some skirmishing that place was 
occupied. The town of Serena was entered without 
resistance, and Ovalle was visited on the same day, the 
result of the expedition being the capture of 400 rifles, 
a considerable quantity of ammunition, and a large 
amount of coal and other necessaries. 

Four clays later, the Magallanes appeared off Pisagua, 
in the Province of Tarapaca, and landed a party to take 
possession of the town, the garrison joining the rebel 
cause. In the next few days the squadron visited 
various ports, and occasional skirmishes occurred when 
resistance was offered ; but no serious fighting took 
place until January 21, when an attack was made by 
the Government troops upon Pisagua, to endeavour to 
regain possession of that town. A sharp engagement 
ensued, in which the Congressionalists lost 5 killed and 
1 officer, and 13 men wounded ; and on January 23 
another engagement occurred in this vicinity without 
decisive result. A third action took place on January 
26 ; the attacking force consisted of 400 men commanded 
by Major Marco Aurelio Valenzuela, and in this fight 
the Congressionalists were worsted and obliged to 
re-embark their men, leaving 8 officers prisoners in 
the hands of the enemy. 

On the morning of January 7 the Intendente of 
Valparaiso had advised Balmaceda of the revolt of 
the squadron, and a meeting of the Cabinet was called 
to discuss the situation. An outbreak had been 
expected ; but the fact that the whole of the navy had 
joined the movement came as a surprise to the President 
and his Ministers, and the question of a compromise 
with the Congressionalists was considered, but dismissed 
as impracticable. The President explained the measures 
to be taken, and a decree was issued under which he 
assumed absolute powers. Under this authority he 
became Dictator, and all constitutional guarantees were 



348 CHILE 

suspended. Orders were issued for the suppression of 
newspapers in sympathy with the rebellion, directions 
were given for the augmentation of the army to 40,000 
men, and the military forces were declared to be on a 
war basis, the pay of officers and men being raised fifty 
per cent. Preparations were made for the concentra- 
tion of the army at various points, and an order was 
published prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition. 
The officers and men of the navy were proclaimed 
rebels, but a reward of two years' pay was offered to the 
crews of any men-of-war if the vessel in which they 
were serving deserted the revolutionary cause to support 
the Government. 

On January 29 the towns of Serena and Coquimbo 
were reoccupied by Government troops, the Congres- 
sionalist garrison having been withdrawn two days 
previously and sent north to Tarapaca, and on the last 
day of the month Balmaceda ordered reinforcements of 
300 men under command of Colonel Eulojio Robles to 
proceed to Patillos in Tarapaca, and march thence to 
support Iquique. The command of the army was 
entrusted to General Jose Francisco Gana, General 
Jose Velasquez was appointed Chief of Staff, and 
Colonel Julio Banados Espinosa named Military 
Secretary. It was evident that Balmaceda was deter- 
mined to make every effort to maintain his position, and 
his resolution was not shaken by the discovery of a 
military conspiracy in Santiago. This attempt against 
the Government was frustrated by the vigilance of 
General Barbosa, the result being the arrest and 
imprisonment of Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Alamos, 
Major Gatica, and other officers. 

The position at the close of January, 1891, showed 
every prospect of a long struggle. The revolution con- 
trolled the sea, but had established no permanent footing 
on shore ; and Balmaceda had a formidable army with 
which to dispute all attempts of the Congressionalists to 
gain possession of any large section of territory, although 
lack of transport prevented him throwing a strong force 



1891] PUBLIC OPINION 349 

into Tarapaca, the locality where the rebels intended to 
concentrate before attempting an advance on Santiago 
or Valparaiso. During the first three weeks of the 
revolt the people of Chile had time to consider the 
situation, and broadly speaking the balance of opinion 
was in favour of the Congressional Party. There was 
no spontaneous uprising in aid of the rebellion, but 
sympathy was demonstrated in indirect ways by all 
classes. The majority of the Chilian aristocracy had 
openly joined the revolt, and expressed their willingness 
to contribute their money and personal services in the 
fight against Balmaceda, and this action of the more 
wealthy section of the community naturally influenced 
the views of a large portion of the population. 

An interesting decision as to the legality of the Acts 
of Balmaceda was given in the Supreme Court on 
January 10, 1891, and was representative of the drift 
of public sentiment. Six judges were called upon to 
decide whether two men of the army should be tried by 
military or civil process, and by a majority of two votes 
the Court ordered the men to be delivered to the civil 
tribunal, on the ground that Congress had made no 
provision for military forces and that the army had no 
legal standing. This verdict served to support the Act of 
Deposition, signed by eighty-nine members of Congress, 
in which the signatories declared that Balmaceda was 
no longer recognised as President. The document was 
published in the Heraldo newspaper on January 7, and 
by that means circulated through the country. On the 
other hand, Balmaceda had a large circle of friends who 
stood firmly by him, and this, in conjunction with the 
fact that the resources of the Government at the out- 
break of the revolution were infinitely greater than those 
of the Congressionalists, drew many supporters to his 
side. 

In the beginning of February the warlike operations 
assumed a more serious character, and on the morning 
of the 6th, the Cochrane, OHiggins, Amazonas, and 
Cachapoal appeared off Pisagua, where the Magallanes 



350 CHILE 

was lying. The garrison of that town consisted of 300 
men under Major Valenzuela, the officer who had 
effected its recapture on January 26. A detachment of 
300 men was landed from the ships to the north of the 
town, and a similar force on the south, these troops 
being instructed to converge towards the heights of "El 
Hospicio " and assault the position and guns at that 
point, and as soon as they were well advanced the ships 
opened a heavy fire on the fortifications of the town. 
The position at " El Hospicio " was captured with little 
difficulty, and the Congressional forces then descended 
to attack Pisagua, the garrison surrendering after resist- 
ing for a couple of hours. The casualties on the side of 
the defence were 2 officers and 10 men killed, 1 officer 
and 28 men wounded, and Major Valenzuela and 250 
officers and men were taken prisoners ; and the loss on 
the side of the revolution was 8 killed, and 1 officer and 
10 men wounded. Four guns, 160 rifles, 101 
Winchester carbines, and a quantity of ammunition 
and stores fell into the hands of the victors ; and from 
this date Pisagua remained in the possession of the 
Congressionalists. After this success the revolutionary 
leaders set to work to organise an effective land force, 
and men were brought from various points on the coast 
and drilled and disciplined. Recruits were also 
obtained from the mining districts in the vicinity of 
Pisagua, and in less than a fortnight 2000 men were 
under arms. 

General Kobles, who had arrived at Patillos on 
February 2, and reached Iquique next day, now marched 
with a force of 339 officers and men in the direction of 
Pisagua. He intended to attack that place after making 
a junction with a detachment sent to meet him from 
Tacna ; but when nearing the station of Dolores on 
February 15, he found that a strong revolutionary force 
had come from Pisagua to intercept his advance. So he 
took up a position on the hill of San Francisco, the site 
of a memorable battle in 1879, and there awaited 
developments. At 3 p.m. the Congressionalists opened 





ADiMIRAL Jorje iMontt. 



Ramon Barros Luco. 





General Canto. 



General Korner. 



[Face page 350. 



1891] REBELS VICTORIOUS IN TARAPACA 351 

fire with their artillery, and under protection of the guns 
the infantry was pushed forward ; in a couple of hours 
it was evident that Robles could not hold his ground, 
and he retired towards the railway to await reinforce- 
ments from Iquique. In the fighting on the hill and 
during the retirement the casualties were heavy, only 
108 men escaping, amongst the officers killed being 
Colonel Villagras and Lieutenant- Colonel Riquelme, 
while 6 others were taken prisoners ; the revolutionary 
loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, and 54 officers and 
men wounded. This defeat of Robles led to unexpected 
events. 

The news of the disaster at Dolores and the request 
for assistance by Robles caused consternation in Iquique. 
Colonel Soto, in command of the garrison, determined to 
take the majority of his troops to where the survivors of 
the recent fight were encamped, and he joined Robles on 
February 16, the combined force numbering 800 men. 
On the following day Robles decided to march to Huara, 
and intercept the advance of the enemy towards Iquique, 
and he arrived at that place at noon. At 3 p.m. notice 
was brought in that the enemy was in sight, the Con- 
gressionalists' strength being estimated at 1200 men, 
and a few minutes later the struggle began. The positions 
selected by Robles were exceptionally well adapted for 
defence ; in spite of repeated assaults by the rebels, the 
Government troops held their ground, and at 5 p.m. a 
cavalry charge threw the attacking forces into disorder. 
General Urrutia, fearing a disaster, decided to retreat, 
and it was only the lack of mounted men on the part of 
the Government forces that prevented this retreat 
becoming a rout. The Congressionalists were obliged 
to leave their dead and wounded on the field, and 1 
field gun, 4 machine guns, and 200 rifles were aban- 
doned, besides the loss of 10 officers and 240 men 
killed and wounded, and 1 officer and 78 men taken 
prisoners. The Government casualties were 1 officer and 
35 men killed, and 12 officers and 120 men wounded. 

The departure of Colonel Soto from Iquique was 



352 CHILE 

unavoidable in view of the situation of E-obles ; but it 
left the town without an adequate garrison for defensive 
purposes, and the commander of the Blanco Encalada 
was quick to take advantage of the opportunity afforded 
to obtain possession of the city. On February 16, 1891, 
he demanded its surrender ; the Intendente replied that 
he had no forces to resist, but stipulated that private 
property should not be injured, or personal violence 
offered, and at 10.30 a.m. the town was occupied by a 
detachment from the squadron. 

Three days later, Colonel Soto with a small force 
arrived early outside the city, and penetrated into the 
streets without being discovered. The garrison from the 
squadron only consisted of 40 men, these being quartered 
in the Custom-house ; but before Colonel Soto could 
reach this building the alarm was given, and the defenders 
opened fire. Reinforcements were now sent ashore from 
the Blanco Encalada, and a brisk musketry action was 
maintained for an hour. At 8 a.m. the guns of the 
Blanco Encalada and the Esmeralda began firing, and 
soon afterwards a large portion of the town was in 
flames. The danger of the total destruction of Iquique 
was so apparent, that Admiral Hotham, who was in the 
roadstead on his flagship, sent Captain Lambton to 
arrange an armistice between the combatants, and 
invited Colonel Soto to meet the Congressional repre- 
sentatives on the Warspite, in order that some under- 
standing might be reached and further injury to property 
prevented. At this conference it was decided that 
Colonel Soto should retire his force to the suburb of 
Cavancha and there deliver all his arms, both officers 
and men being free afterwards to remain in Iquique, or 
proceed in a revolutionary transport to any Chilian port 
they selected. By this arrangement the Congression- 
alists were left in quiet possession of Iquique, and the 
stores and war material accumulated at that place, these 
including half a million rounds of rifle ammunition and 
a considerable sum of public money. 

The Congressionalists now made Iquique their head- 



1891] BATTLE OF POZO ALMONTE 353 

quarters, and immediately proceeded with the organisa- 
tion of military forces in order to establish control over 
the Province of Tarapaca. Meanwhile the possible loss 
of Tarapaca spurred Balmaceda to further exertions, and 
reinforcements were sent to Robles to enable him to 
regain his lost ground. Expeditions were despatched to 
Arica, and in all 1000 men were landed to join Robles 
in the Pampa of Tamarugal. But by now the leaders 
of the revolution had also organised a division ready to 
take the field, and on March 6, 1891, these troops, under 
command of General Holley, were in the neighbourhood 
of Pozo Almonte, where Robles was encamped, the 
Government forces numbering 1300 and the Congres- 
sionalists 1600. At 7 a.m. on the 7th the action com- 
menced with artillery fire at a range of 5000 yards, from 
rising ground which had been selected on the preceding 
day, and General Robles, holding a strong position, felt 
confident he could repel the rebel attack. 

On the advance of the Congressional infantry against 
his left wing, Kobles ordered the troops on the right to 
be thrown forward to attack the revolutionary flank. 
This movement was cleverly executed, and the advancing 
enemy was practically surrounded ; but the revolutionary 
leader saw the danger, and hurrying up all available 
reserves saved the situation, after a desperate struggle 
which at times developed into a hand-to-hand conflict. 
For the next two hours a stubborn resistance was offered 
by the Government troops, but they were gradually 
forced back, and to make matters worse their ammuni- 
tion ran short, so that before noon the battle was over 
and the Congressionalists absolute masters of the field. 
Few of the Government force escaped, and their artillery 
was abandoned in the railway station of Pozo Almonte. 
Robles had been shot in the left ankle about 9 a.m., and 
at 11.30 a.m. was mortally wounded ; it was stated that 
he was subsequently bayonetted as he lay in a dying 
state on a hospital stretcher, although proof of this 
atrocity is lacking. 

So far as accounts made public by officials of both 

z 



354 CHILE 

sides can be believed, the loss on the part of the Govern- 
ment troops was 11 officers, including General Robles, 
killed, and 12 wounded, besides 23 taken prisoners. Of 
the remainder of the force, 400 were reported as killed 
or wounded, although this was probably below the actual 
figure, and 380 captured. The casualties of the Con- 
gressionalists were 7 officers and 76 men killed, and 4 
officers and 156 men wounded, while 165 men were 
returned as "missing," these latter probably having died 
of wounds through being overlooked by the ambulance 
23arties sent out after the fighting ceased. This gave a 
total of killed and wounded in this engagement of 831 
officers and men out of a total force of 2900 engaged. 
In this encounter the war material captured by the 
Congressionalists included 11 guns, 4 machine guns, and 
800 rifles. 

The victory at Pozo Almonte gave the rebels control 
of Tarapaca, and the defeat and death of Robles left the 
Government no rallying -point for reinforcements. Any 
attempts to reconquer the province inferred an invasion 
by long and tedious marches from the south, for by sea 
the transport of troops had become impossible. The 
refugees from Pozo Almonte made the best of their way 
to Arica, but the two or three hundred survivors were 
no longer a fighting force. In the beginning of April, 
the Cochrane, OHiggins, Abtao, Aconcagua, and Maipu 
arrived off Arica and demanded the surrender of the 
garrison, but this was refused by Colonel Arrate, the 
officer in command. A force of 1500 men was dis- 
embarked from the ships to attack the town, and then 
Colonel Arrate ordered the evacuation of the city, retiring 
in the direction of the river Sama, and reaching Peruvian 
territory on April 7. The armament of the troops was 
delivered to the Peruvian authorities, and the force of 
84 officers and 569 men was sent to Arequipa, where 
it remained until peace was restored. Tacna and Arica, 
as well as Tarapaca, were now in undisputed possession 
of the revolution. 

To attempt the relief of General Robles, a column 



1891] REBELS OCCUPY ANTOFAGASTA 355 

2000 strong, commanded by Colonel Hermogenes Camus, 
had been landed at Antofagasta at the end of February. 
The plan was to march across the Atacama deserts and 
enter the Pampa of Tamarugal to reach the district 
where Robles was encamped, and this journey was a 
matter of weeks if all went well with the expedition. 
Colonel Camus had proceeded as far as Quilloga when 
news arrived of the annihilation of the Government 
troops at Pozo Almonte, and he decided it was useless 
to continue the march in the face of this disaster. The 
order was given to return to Calama, a station of the 
Antofagasta railway close to the Bolivian frontier, and 
this place was reached at the end of the third week in 
March. One reason that decided Colonel Camus to adopt 
this course was the insubordinate conduct of the men 
under his command, and this became so serious that he 
was obliged to disarm a portion of his force. Arriving 
at Calama, the information received was unsatisfactory, 
and Camus determined to delay any further movement 
until he was joined by Senor Villegas y Silva, the Inten- 
dente of Antofagasta. 

Since March 16 Antofagasta had been blockaded, 
and on the 17th the officer in command of the Blanco 
Encalada had notified the Intendente that measures 
would be taken to suspend the railway service and cut 
off the water supply of the town, both railway and water 
distillery being commanded by the guns of the war- 
ships. On March 18 a detachment of 35 men of the 
garrison mutinied, joined the revolution, and were taken 
on board the Blanca Encalada. On the 19th a division 
of Congressional troops under General Holley landed at 
Celoso, close to Antofagasta, and Senor Villegas, the 
Intendente, decided to retire with the garrison to the 
interior and join Camus at Calama. This he did, the 
garrison of 514 officers and men proceeding by train to 
Calama, and reaching that place early the following day. 
The town of Antofagasta was thus left free for the 
occupation of the revolutionary forces, and it was taken 
possession of by General Holley without resistance. 



356 CHILE 

A reconnaissance was made from Antofagasta towards 
Calama to ascertain the position and strength of the 
division under Camus, and some skirmishing occurred, 
but no serious fighting. Holley considered it advisable 
to send north for reinforcements, and the advance to 
Calama was postponed until the 29th. Meanwhile, 
Camus, who had decided to enter Bolivian territory, 
travelled by rail with his division to Huanchaca, and 
there all armament was surrendered to the Bolivian 
authorities, an encampment being formed at Uyuni 
preparatory to the journey over the Andes into Argentina, 
thence by way of Mendoza and the Uspallata pass to 
Santiago. On April 5, 1891, this force set out, and after 
inarching 660 miles on foot throughout the wild, moun- 
tainous regions of the Cordillera, and travelling 1200 
miles by rail from Jujuy to Uspallata, finally reached 
Santiago on May 17, a performance which showed 
wonderful power of resistance to hardship and fatigue. 
Thus, on March 29, Calama was occupied by Congression- 
alists, and the whole province of Atacama fell under 
their control. 

The Congressionalist leaders now determined to take 
possession of the port and district of Caldera, and this 
was accomplished on April 22 without resistance from 
the small garrison. The detachment of troops at Caldera 
and the surrounding district consisted of 600 men of 
the Husares de Santiago, commanded by Colonel Stephan, 
and this officer finding all other means of retreat cut off, 
decided to follow the example of Colonel Camus and 
march over the mountains into Argentine territory and 
thence to Chile. This was another remarkable under- 
taking, as deep snow was met in the pass of Uspallata 
and elsewhere, but it was successfully accomplished, 
and Colonel Stephan and his men reached Santiago in 
the middle of July, 1891. 

The ease with which the towns on the coast had 
been occupied tended to make the rebel officers over- 
confident, and this led to a serious misfortune after the 
occupation of Caldera, when the Blanco Encalada was 



1891] SINKING OF BLANCO ENCALADA 357 

left to guard that port. In the possession of the Govern- 
ment were two torpedo-boats, the Lynch and Condell, 
and President Balmaceda ordered these vessels to cruise 
northwards towards Caldera, to see if an opportunity 
offered for the destruction of the revolutionary squadron. 
On the morning of April 23, at 4 a.m., these two boats 
crept into the harbour where the Blanco Encalada was 
anchored, and approached within a hundred yards with- 
out being discovered, and the Condell discharged three 
torpedoes in rapid succession, but without effect. The 
Lynch was more fortunate, and her second torpedo struck 
the Blanco Encalada amidships, causing her to founder 
in five minutes, drowning 12 officers and 207 men. 
Both the Condell and Lynch escaped without serious 
damage, although exposed to a hot fire from the Blanco 
Encalada and the shore. When outside Caldera Bay, 
they fell in with the revolutionary armed transport 
Angamos, and nearly succeeded in capturing her, but 
were prevented by the appearance of another vessel, 
supposed to be the Esmeralda. 

After the sinking of the Blanco Encalada, a lull 
occurred. The Congressionalists were awaiting arms 
and ammunition from Europe and the United States 
before attempting an attack on the main positions of 
Balmaceda at Santiago and Valparaiso, and meanwhile 
the organisation of additional troops was carried on at 
Iquique and other centres. In this preparatory work 
the Congressionalists were aided by Colonel Korner, a 
German officer who had been attached to the Chilian 
army before the revolt. 

The escape of Colonel Korner from Valparaiso when 
he started for the north to join the insurgents is an 
example of the difficulties in the way of Congressional 
sympathisers who wished to take active part in the 
revolt. Every steamer was watched, and no opportunity 
occurred for Korner to embark. At last, with the 
connivance of some friends, he was coopered up in a 
barrel and shipped as cargo, not being released from his 
voluntary confinement until the ship was well out at sea, 



358 CHILE 

Balmaceda was still confident he could hold his own 
in spite of the reverses he had suffered. An army of 
40,000 men was concentrated in the central and 
southern districts of Chile ; two men-of-war, the Presi- 
dente Pinto and Presidente Errazuriz, were expected 
shortly from Europe, and several torpedo-boats, in 
addition to the Lynch and Condell, were prepared for 
service. Unfortunately for himself, Balmaceda now 
adopted a more severe policy against all persons 
suspected of complicity in the revolution, and his 
conduct alienated much sympathy. On May 15, two 
sergeants of the 7th Regiment, Benigno Pena and Pedro 
Pablo Meza, were condemned to death on a charge of 
treason, and shot ; on May 23, similar treatment was 
accorded to Gregorio Vera, Juan Ovalle, Ramon Santi- 
banez, and Juan Grammer, in consequence of an attempt 
to seize the torpedo-boat Guale, and other executions 
followed. Balmaceda now found that he was short of 
funds to meet the heavy expenses entailed by the war, as 
a large proportion of the Chilian revenues were derived 
from export duties on nitrate of soda, and this source of 
income had passed into the hands of the Congres- 
sionalists when they obtained control of Tarapaca. In 
these circumstances he issued Treasury notes, and 
utilised the specie reserve which had been accumulated 
for the conversion of the paper money emitted during 
the Chilian- Peruvian war, both these measures entailing 
a serious disturbance of economic and financial condi- 
tions. 

In April the Congressionalists organised a Provi- 
sional Government at Iquique with Captain Jorje Montt 
at the head of the Administration. The arrangements 
for military and naval operations devolved upon this 
Junta de Gobierno, as the Administration was officially 
styled in public documents, and it was responsible for 
all appointments, and for the necessary supplies of war 
material for the campaign. 

General Estanislao Canto, who had been nominated 
Commander-in-chief of the Congressional army, was an 



1891] THE IT AT A INCIDENT 359 

energetic organiser, and he was fortunate in having 
Colonel Korner as his right-hand man ; but regiments 
of soldiers without arms and ammunition were of little 
avail, and it was to the provision of an adequate supply 
of war material that the attention of the Provisional 
Government was principally devoted. Agents were 
employed in England, on the Continent of Europe, and 
in the United States, to purchase the required equip- 
ment, and money for this purpose was plentiful from 
the duties on the export of nitrate of soda from 
Tarapaca and the assistance of wealthy supporters. 
The principal difficulty lay in the shipment of warlike 
material from foreign ports, for the agents of 
Balmaceda were active in denouncing the embarka- 
tion of arms and ammunition. For the purpose of 
evading these restrictions, the transport Itata was 
despatched to a point near San Diego in California to 
bring supplies ordered by the Junta, the cargo consist- 
ing of 5000 rifles and 2,500,000 cartridges. This was to 
be transferred from a sailing ship off the island of San 
Clemento, and the Itata left Iquique in April on this 
important mission. 

In due course the Itata received her cargo, and 
apparently everything was ready for the homeward 
journey, when an unexpected difficulty arose. The 
representative of Balmaceda in the United States 
notified the authorities of the Itata's presence in 
United States waters, and gave particulars of her 
mission. Orders were issued to prevent the steamer 
leaving the port, and a marshal was placed on board, 
the officer in command, Captain M. Tejeda, being 
advised that he could not sail pending a decision as to 
the action to be taken. Captain Tejeda, well aware of 
the anxiety with which his cargo was expected at 
Iquique, slipped out of San Diego carrying the United 
States marshal with him, and a man-of-war was sent in 
pursuit, but was unable to overtake him. Knowing 
some United States naval vessels were off Iquique, 
Tejeda took his ship into Tocopilla, reaching that port 



360 CHILE 

on June 3, 1891, and there he received telegraphic in- 
structions to proceed to Iquique without disembarking 
any portion of the cargo. The Itata entered the harbour 
of the latter port a little before midnight on June 3, and 
was directed by the revolutionary authorities to anchor 
near the United States warships. 

The Junta de Gobierno was unable to refuse the 
demand of Admiral MacCann that the Itata should be 
sent back to San Diego, and there submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the United States courts, although this 
entailed a long delay in the delivery of the arms and 
ammunition, and possibly even the confiscation of the 
cargo. No argument would induce the American 
Admiral to modify his attitude, and the Congression- 
alists were forced to order the vessel north. On 
June 13, a guard from the United States cruiser 
Charleston arrived on board the Itata, and at 8 p.m. 
she left for San Diego with the Charleston as a con- 
voy. It was a bitter disappointment to the rebels and 
a triumph for Balmaceda that this cargo was not dis- 
embarked, and as events turned out the vessel was 
detained in San Diego until the following October. 

On April 19 the Junta received a communication 
from E-ear- Admiral Hotham to the effect that he had 
been requested by the British Minister in Santiago, Mr 
John Gordon Kennedy, to inform the Congressionalists 
that in his opinion and that of the German Minister, 
Baron Gutschmid, Balmaceda would open peace negotia- 
tions, and he desired to know if the Junta would be 
willing to discuss the subject. Admiral Hotham further 
stated that he was prepared to give passage to Valparaiso 
in the Warspite to the commissioners appointed to 
represent the Congressionalists. The Junta agreed to 
follow the suggestion of the British and German 
Ministers, and nominated a commission to discuss terms 
for a cessation of hostilities, the commissioners being 
M. Concha y Toro, E. Altimirano, C. Walker Martinez, 
Gregorio Donoso, B. Prado, Pedro Montt, and Eduardo 
Matte. A safe conduct was issued by Balmaceda for 



1891] A PEACE CONFERENCE 361 

these representatives to proceed to Santiago and be free 
from molestation until May 15, and on May 3 they held 
a preliminary meeting. It was then found that it was 
not the good offices of the British and German Ministers 
that had been accepted by Balmaceda, but those tendered 
by the representatives of the United States, France, and 
Brazil ; but it was deemed advisable to continue the 
negotiations in spite of this change. A second meeting 
was held, at 8 p.m., in the house of the United States 
Minister, Mr Patrick Egan, and a third conference took 
place on the following day. On May 5 the com- 
missioners placed in the hands of the mediators the con- 
ditions upon which they were willing to make peace, and 
this document stated : — " In the name of our colleagues, 
we offer to lay down our arms if the Constitution and 
Laws of the Republic be re-established in full vigour, 
with the declaration and acknowledgment of nullity of 
all acts executed in open violation of the Constitution 
and Laws. The constitutional and legal situation must 
revert to where it was on December 31, 1890, for the 
purpose of eliminating from the Boletines decrees which 
have exceeded the faculties of the Executive. As an 
example of our meaning, we cite the decree ordering the 
elections of senators, deputies, and municipal authorities 
in March last. The citizens deriving offices from those 
illegal elections cannot be recognised as representatives 
of the people. We would point out that the Courts of 
Justice ought to sit with all the attributes of jurisdiction 
provided by our laws, and that the numerous decrees 
dismissing public employes must be revoked where such 
officials are protected by public guarantees. The 
legitimate Congress, whose power still subsists, should 
be immediately convened, for the purpose of arranging 
future elections and providing for the expense of main- 
taining the public Administration. In other words, we 
ask for the re-establishment of the Government on a 
constitutional basis. In the second place, we ask for 
substantial guarantees that any agreement will be loyally 
executed." This document was signed by the seven 



362 CHILE 

commissioners, although not without objection on the 
part of Senores Prado, Concha, Matte, and Altimirano, 
who desired to insert a clause providing for the resigna- 
tion of Balmaceda. It was pointed out, however, that 
this would be the certain consequence of the abrogation 
of all decrees since the end of 1890, and that the 
demands were less personal if Balmaceda were not 
directly mentioned. 

Next day the mediators, Mr Egan for the United 
States, M. A. Defrance, the French charge d'affaires, 
and Senhor E. de B. Cavalcanti de Lacerda for Brazil, 
communicated the general tenor of these terms to 
Balmaceda through his Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
On learning the proposed conditions Balmaceda expressed 
surprise that the revolutionary representatives should 
have asked so much, but consented to give further 
consideration to the proposals before sending a reply ; 
meanwhile, unfortunately, an incident occurred that 
caused negotiations to be broken off. About 4.30 p.m. 
on the same day that the terms of the Congressionalist 
commissioners were communicated, Balmaceda with the 
members of his Cabinet left the Congress Hall and had 
no sooner reached the street than they were approached 
by two men on horseback, who threw a bomb on either 
side of the President and galloped away. One of these 
bombs exploded, but caused no injury, and the other 
failed to burst. The general idea in Santiago was that 
the affair was a farce, and was not intended to do any 
harm ; but this was not the opinion of the Cabinet, 
and Minister Godoy insisted that it was the work of 
sympathisers with the revolution. It was then decided 
to cancel the safe conducts issued to the commissioners, 
and order their arrest and imprisonment, and it was 
only the firm attitude of the representatives of the 
United States, France, and Brazil that prevented this 
being done. Balmaceda refused to continue the negotia- 
tions, and the commissioners, whose safety was carefully 
provided for by the three foreign ministers, proceeded to 
Valparaiso and embarked for the north, 



1891] FAILURE OF PEACE PROPOSALS 363 

An attempt was made at the end of May, by the 
United States Minister, to renew these negotiations, and 
a communication to that effect was made by Admiral 
MacCann to the Junta de Gobierno. At the same time 
a suggestion was put forward for a cessation of 
hostilities until September 18, the date when the new 
presidential term would commence ; but to this latter 
proposal Balmaceda refused to listen, and in consequence 
nothing was accomplished. 

On May 27 the Government of Bolivia issued a 
decree recognising the belligerency of the Junta de 
Gobierno, and that a state of civil war existed in Chile ; 
but this was the only Government to adopt this attitude 
in spite of every endeavour to induce other South 
American Administrations to take a similar step. The 
desire for this recognition was to prevent Balmaceda 
obtaining supplies of war material, as he had done in 
the case of the transport Aquila purchased in Buenos 
Aires in July ; another important reason was that the 
two new cruisers Presidente Errazuriz and Presidents 
Pinto were now ready to leave France, and substantial 
delay in the departure of these vessels could only be 
effected by the revolutionary agents if the belligerent 
status of the Congressionalists was recognised. 

In June the supporters of Balmaceda were opti- 
mistic. The sinking of the Blanco Encalada and the 
incident of the Itata raised hopes of ultimate victory, 
and the fact that the two cruisers constructed in France 
were reported ready increased their confidence. It was 
proposed to organise a squadron comprising these two 
new cruisers, the torpedo-boats Condell and Lynch, 
some smaller vessels of the same class, and the armed 
transports Imperial and Aquila, arrangements for the 
purchase of the latter steamer from the Veloce Company 
being well advanced. 

Pending the arrival of the cruisers and the Aquila, 
the Condell and Lynch were sent on predatory excur- 
sions to the section of the seaboard controlled by the 
Congressionalists ; to a certain extent these tactics were 



364 CHILE 

successful, the superior speed of the two torpedo-boats 
rendering them immune from capture. They made 
their appearance at Pisagua, Iquique, Chailaral, Taltal, 
and Antofagasta while the Junta de Gobierno was 
waiting for war material to equip the army for the 
invasion of the central districts. Throughout June and 
July, Balmaceda showed the greatest energy in augment- 
ing the strength of his army, and at the beginning of 
August the number of men under arms from Coquimbo 
to Valdivia was 50,000, the bulk of these being con- 
centrated for the defence of the National Capital, 
Valparaiso, and Coquimbo. 

As Balmaceda became more confident of success 
he developed marked dictatorial tendencies. In June 
he made preparations for the election of his successor, 
although at the time he did not control one-half of 
Chile. The candidate supported by the Government, 
Senor Claudio Vicuna, was unopposed, and was declared 
elected. In many other ways Balmaceda developed 
despotic attributes ; every day suspected persons were 
arrested, the case of Mr Richard Gumming raising strong 
feelings against the Administration. This man was 
born in Chile of British parents, but the fact of his birth 
in Chilian territory subjected him to Chilian laws. The 
charge against him was complicity in a plot to seize the 
torpedo-boats Gondell and Lynch : and doubtless he had 
knowledge of this conspiracy, for in common with the 
majority of men of his class he was in sympathy with 
the Congressionalists. He was tortured into an admis- 
sion of being cognisant of the plot, and a court martial 
condemned him to death. His execution took place on 
July 12, and created a profound sensation. 

Abroad the Congressionalist agents worked hard 
for the revolutionary cause. The conditions leading up 
to the revolt were explained in the United States, 
Europe, and in South America. In North America 
the representatives of the Junta de Gobierno were Senor 
Pedro Montt and Senor Trumbull ; in Europe the task 
was confided to Senor Augusto Matte and Senor 



1891] CONGRESSIONAL MISSIONS ABROAD 365 

Augustin Ross ; in Bolivia to Senor Juan Gonzalo 
Matta ; in Argentina to Senor Adolfo Guerrero and 
Senor Alvaro Bianchi Tupper ; and in Peru to Senor 
Javier Vial Solar. The mission to the United States 
was unfortunate in regard to the Itata, but Matte and 
Ross in Europe materially helped the rebels ; not only 
was war material obtained and shipped to Chile, but in 
May and June the departure of the two cruisers so 
anxiously expected by President Balmaceda was kept 
back until the revolutionary leaders had time to organise 
the invasion of the central districts. In Argentina, 
Guerrero and Tupper raised obstacles to the sailing of 
the transport Aquila, and they also supplied the Junta 
with information of all movements of Balmaceda's 
forces. In Peru, the task of Senor Solar was to delay 
the steamer Mapocho, induce the authorites not to allow 
the return to Chile of the troops who had entered 
Peruvian territory after the conquest of Tarapaca and 
Tacna by the Congressionalists, and to secure supplies 
for the revolutionary forces, these three objects being 
successfully attained. 

In Santiago and Valparaiso revolutionary committees 
worked unceasingly against Balmaceda. It was a most 
dangerous position for sympathisers with the Congres- 
sionalists ; but they did not flinch, and the progress of 
the revolution and the disasters to the Government 
troops were made known, and the effect of these 
successes counteracted the influence of Balmaceda in 
many districts where his authority was still recognised, 
and, furthermore, means were found to smuggle many 
recruits to the north for the revolutionary army. 
General Baquedano, the Commander-in-chief of the 
Chilian army previous to the outbreak of the revolt, was 
favourably disposed towards the Congressionalists, as 
were many prominent people in high places, who, 
without open adhesion to the revolt, did much to alienate 
sympathy from Balmaceda. 

On July 3, 1891, the transport MaijJO arrived at 
Iquique with a cargo of arms and ammunition. This 



366 CHILE 

war material was purchased by Sehor Ross in Europe, 
and despatched on the steamer Waudle to San Sebastian 
Bay in Tierra del Fuego, and there the Maipo had 
taken over the cargo. The shipment comprised a 
battery of 6 Krupp mountain guns, with 1700 shells 
and 1000 shrapnels; 5000 Gras rifles, with 2,000,000 
cartridges ; 1,970,000 Mannlicher cartridges ; and a 
supply of ammunition for the squadron. 

Now that arms and ammunition were available, no 
time was lost. The regiments recruited at Iquique, 
undergoing military instruction, were equipped and 
drafted to points in the south and new regiments raised, 
principally from the miners working in the nitrate of 
soda districts. At the end of July a notification was 
sent to the revolutionary committees in Santiago and 
Valparaiso that the advance of the Congressional army 
might be expected in August, and that the date would 
be signalised by the appearance of the Esmeralda off 
Valparaiso. The total strength of the proposed expedi- 
tion was 9300 men, and the force was divided into 
three brigades, the first being concentrated at Huasco, 
the second and third at Calclera. Here transports were 
in readiness, and, on August 16, the order was given to 
start the expedition ; and the vessels, convoyed by the 
squadron, set out for the south. This was the crisis of 
the revolutionary movement, for less than 10,000 men 
were to attack an army of 40,000 strong. Failure 
meant the collapse of the revolutionary cause ; but the 
leaders were confident of success ; the troops were 
thoroughly well armed and equipped, they were the 
best fighting material in Chile, and they had enlisted in 
the revolutionary ranks of their own free will. More- 
over, the Junta had information from Santiago and 
Valparaiso that desertions from the army of Balmaceda 
would be numerous when the expedition landed, and 
this proved to be the case. 

Balmaceda received notice of the preparations of the 
Congressionalists, and made plans to repel the invasion. 
Strong positions were selected in the neighbourhood of 



1891] THE ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH 367 

Concon aud Placilla, to check an advance upon Valparaiso, 
for it was known that the landing would be near 
Quinteros, and it was for the object of bringing 
the invaders immediately face to face with a difficult 
situation that Concon was chosen as a first line of 
defence, while Placilla, a few miles to the south, served 
admirably as a second line. The Government was con- 
fronted by imexpected difficulties when it was known 
that the invasion was close at hand. Armed groups 
made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Santiago 
and caused serious embarrassment to the authorities by 
destroying railway bridges and generally interrupting 
communication between Santiago and Valparaiso, and 
on August 14 one of these groups attempting to destroy 
the bridge near Quilipue' was surprised by a patrol 
detached for the protection of the line, and a skirmish 
ensued, in which the corporal of the patrol was killed. 
On the same afternoon, four men were arrested on a 
charge of being implicated in the revolution, and were 
tried by summary court martial, condemned to death, 
and executed on August 20. 

Balmaceda now adopted measures of the utmost 
severity. Orders were given to show no mercy to any 
insurgents captured, and it was under these instructions 
that the massacre of "Lo Canas" took place. Fifty 
young men, all members of well-known families in 
Santiago, assembled at "Lo Canas," probably with the 
intention of forming a party in connection with the 
revolution, and on the morning of August 19 they were 
surrounded by Government troops. No attempt was 
made at defence, for few of the young men were armed, 
but the troops fired into the house and killed twenty-one 
of the occupants. Fifteen escaped, although several 
subsequently died of wounds, and fourteen were captured 
and imprisoned until the fall of Balmaceda, On August 
18 another group of seven young men were arrested in 
Santiago. 

It was these occurrences towards the close of his 
Administration that caused Balmaceda to be characterised 



368 CHILE 

as tyrannical and cruel. When the end of the contest 
approached, the strain affected his mind to such a degree 
that the value of human life sank into insignificance 
when compared to any question of his own supremacy. 
Political suspects were flogged and tortured in the 
prisons to make them reveal the names of sympathisers 
with the rebellion. That these practices were directly 
ordered by Balmaceda is improbable, but that he was 
ignorant of them is impossible. The latter part of the 
revolutionary period was a reign of terror, and it was 
this fact that contributed to the downfall of the man 
in whom centred the moving spirit of the resistance to 
the Congressionalists. With the sympathy of the 
majority of the inhabitants on his side, Balmaceda could 
have defied the power and wealth arrayed against him 
in the ranks of the revolution, and this sympathy he 
had to a large extent at the commencement of the 
movement ; but he lost it entirely through the attitude 
he subsequently adopted. 

On August 18 the Esmeralda appeared off Valparaiso 
and fired three guns. This was the signal agreed upon 
by the Junta to notify the friends of the Congressionalists 
that the disembarkation of the revolutionary army would 
take place within forty-eight hours, and it proved to be 
the death-knell of all hopes that Balmaceda may have 
had for the re-establishment of his authority. On the 
following day sixteen vessels assembled fifty miles to 
the south of Valparaiso with the army under the 
orders of General Estanislao Canto, the revolutionary 
Commander-in-chief, accompanied by General Holley, 
Minister of War in the Junta. In the evening a pro- 
clamation was read to the troops on the transports, 
giving a general explanation of the object of the expe- 
dition, and a distribution of two days' rations and a 
supply of ammunition was then made. 

At six o'clock next morning, the Condor and Huemul, 
accompanied by the transport Bio-Bio, entered the bay 
of Quinteros and made a careful search for submarine 
mines. On reporting the bay clear, the Pisagua 



1891] THE LANDING AT QUINTEROS 36S 

Regiment was landed from the Bio-Bio to occupy the 
village of Quinteros, and the remaining transports came 
up, the disembarkation of the troops being effected in 
sixteen barges towed by steam launches, each barge 
carrying 110 men, and by 10 p.m. the army was ashore. 
Notice of the disembarkation was despatched to 
Balmaceda by Major Athas, who was stationed at 
Quinteros to observe any approach of the enemy, and 
after advising the appearance of the fleet the telegraphic 
apparatus was destroyed and the wires cut. 

The news of the landing at Quinteros spread rapidly 
through Valparaiso and Santiago. It was evident from 
the temper of the people that any decided revolutionary 
success would make the position of Balmaceda untenable, 
and that if the Government forces were defeated in the 
central districts, no attempt could be made in the south 
to prolong the struggle. 



2 a 



CHAPTEE XX 

chile — continued 

Country round Quinteros. Congressionalist Army. Tactics of 
Defence. Battle of Concon. Congressionalist Victory. Heavy 
Casualties. Reorganisation of Government Troops. Reinforce- 
ments from Santiago. Defence of Vina del Mar. Faulty 
Information Concerning Valparaiso. Advance on Vina del Mar. 
Concentration at Quilpue. Preparations for Attacking Val- 
paraiso. March to Placilla. Defence of Placilla. Strength of 
the Armies. Battle of Placilla. Severe Losses. Occupation of 
Valparaiso. Riotous Scenes. Message to Balmaceda. The 
President Resigns his Powers. Decree of General Baquedano. 
Political Prisoners. Unprotected state of Santiago. Arrival of 
the Junta de Gobierno. Disarmament of Troops. 

Between Quinteros and Concon is the river Aconcagua, 
a deep stream with steep hills rising on either side, but 
which can be forded at the village of Colmo and also at 
Concon bajo. The advance of the Congressionalist army 
was confided to Colonel Korner, chief of staff to General 
Canto, who was acquainted with the country near the 
Aconcagua and with the Concon district to the south, 
and he realised the importance of occupying the valley 
of the river before the enemy could concentrate in force 
to obstruct the passage of the fords. 

No time was lost after the disembarkation. The 1st 
Brigade, commanded by Colonel Anibal Frias, was sent 
on as the different regiments reached the shore, and was 
ordered to concentrate on the right bank of the 
Aconcagua in the direction of Concon bajo, six miles 



1891| BATTLE OF CONCON 371 

distant from Quinteros, but it was not until 10 p.m. 
that they were assembled at this point. The 2nd 
Brigade was ordered to the village of Colmo, but did 
not reach its destination until 7.30 a.m. on the following 
day ; and the 3rd Brigade, the last to disembark, camped 
for the night four miles to the north of Conc6n bajo. 
The total strength of the revolutionary army was 9284 
officers and men. Scouting parties were thrown out, 
and reported that the enemy had taken up positions 
on the left bank of the river, extending from Colmo to 
Concon bajo. 

No small confusion arose amongst the Balmacedists 
when the news of the landing and advance of the Con- 
gressionalists was received. Only the Valparaiso and 
Santiago Divisions were ready to take the field, the 
former commanded by General Alcerrica, and the latter 
by General Barbosa. The effective strength of these 
two divisions was 8500 men, but owing to detachments 
detailed for various purposes the number of the troops 
at Concon on August 21 only reached 6322. The 
Coquimbo Division had not come in, and the Conception 
forces only marched for Santiago on the day of the 
disembarkation of the Congressional army, so that the 
superiority of numbers lay with the attacking force. 
With this knowledge before them, the senior officers 
of the defence were divided in opinions as to the tactics 
to be followed, General Alcerrica advising a retirement 
to Vina del Mar and the occupation of the heights near 
Miramar ; but to this General Barbosa objected on the 
ground that any retrograde movement would be disastrous 
in its effects upon the discipline of the troops, and this 
argument eventually decided the point. 

The battle was begun at 7.30 a.m. on August 21 by 
the Congressional artillery of the 1st Brigade opening 
fire upon the left flank of the enemy, with a view to 
discover the position of the guns of the defence. To 
this cannonade there was no response, and rifle fire was 
then directed against the huts on the left bank of the 
river, which were forthwith evacuated. The 2nd Brigade 



372 CHILE 

had now reached Colmo, and the Armstrong battery 
opened on the enemy, the guns of the Government 
forces replying. A brisk artillery duel was maintained 
for an hour, and meanwhile a reconnaissance of the two 
fords was made by the Junta's troops. The one opposite 
Colmo was found practicable so far as the depth of 
water was concerned, but the ground to the left of the 
river was broken and afforded admirable cover for 
defence. At Concern bajo the conditions were more 
favourable, the ford being only three feet deep, the 
ascent to the heights on the south side of the river 
comparatively easy, and the position only weakly held, 
so it was decided to take the 1st Brigade over the river 
at Conc6n bajo while the 2nd Brigade engaged the 
enemy at Colmo, where the main body of the Govern- 
ment troops were concentrated. The 1st Brigade of 
the Congressionalists crossed the river without serious 
losses, occupying the heights on the left bank near 
Concon bajo shortly before noon, and, once well across, 
the brigade swung round and attacked the left flank of 
the enemy, while the guns of the squadron seconded the 
movement by shelling the plateau on which the main 
body lay. 

The supporters of Balmaceda made a stubborn stand 
and disputed every inch of ground, but at 2.30 p.m. 
reinforcements were brought up to the assistance of the 
1st Brigade, and a portion of the 2nd Brigade was thrown 
over the river to push home the assault on the right, and 
half an hour later the Government forces began to run 
short of ammunition. Thereupon the Congressionalist 
troops perceptibly gained ground, and shortly before 
4 p.m. the Government forces were driven from their 
positions and the victory of the revolutionary army was 
complete. Pursued by the Congressionalist cavalry, the 
retreat quickly developed into a rout ; the men threw 
down their arms and scattered in all directions, a large 
number being taken prisoners, while others reached 
villages in the neighbourhood and discarded their 
uniforms. 



Map to illustrate 

THE CAPTURE OF 
VALPARAISO 




[Face page 372. 



1891] HEAVY CASUALTIES 373 

That night the Congressionalist army encamped on 
the heights occupied by the supporters of Balmaceda the 
previous day. The casualties on both sides had been 
heavy, and the victors reported 19 officers and 197 men 
killed and 49 officers and 482 men wounded, besides 122 
missing, probably drowned during the passage of the 
river. The loss on the part of the Government troops 
was 1700 officers and men killed and wounded and 
1500 officers and men taken prisoners, while the whole 
of their artillery, consisting of 18 pieces and 4 
machine guns, was captured. Amongst the wounded 
was Colonel Hermogenes Camus, the officer who had 
directed the march through Bolivia and across the 
Andes after the evacuation of Antofagasta by the 
Government authorities. 

The survivors of the army of Balmaceda straggled 
along the road to Quilpue and were collected and re- 
organised by General Barbosa, but when mustered this 
remnant only reached 2000. General Alcerrica pro- 
ceeded to Vina del Mar to make preparations for the 
defence of that locality and Valparaiso, the garrison, 
including the police, at the latter place comprising 1300 
men, it having been reinforced on the 22nd by the 
advanced guard of the Concepcion Division, which had 
reached Santiago on the afternoon of the 20th and been 
sent forward to endeavour to reach General Barbosa 
before the battle of Concon. The Congressionalists 
neglected to seize the railway between Santiago and 
Concon after their victory, and this negligence resulted 
in 8000 Government troops being transferred from 
Santiago to Valparaiso during the day and night of the 
22nd. In view of these reinforcements the capture of 
Valparaiso was not easy, and General Alcerrica, in 
spite of the recent reverse, waited confidently in Vina 
del Mar for the attack. 

On the morning of August 22 the revolutionary army 
was still resting from the fatigues of the previous forty- 
eight hours, when information reached General Canto 
that both Vina del Mar and Valparaiso were denuded 



374 CHILE 

of troops and would be an easy prey to the Congression- 
alists if an immediate advance was made. Probably 
this information was correct in substance when des- 
patched to the Commander-in-chief, for it was reasonable 
to suppose that railway communication with Santiago 
had been cut, as was intended by General Canto after 
the victory at Concon, but the troops detailed to destroy 
the line had failed to carry out their instructions, and 
this enabled the reinforcements to reach Valparaiso. 
Of the strength of the garrison in Valparaiso and Vina 
del Mar the information was quite inaccurate, but acting 
on the supposition that the place was weakly held, an 
advance on Vina del Mar was ordered. For this 
operation the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were directed to 
move forward on the night of the 22nd until close to 
Viila del Mar, then take up positions on the heights 
for a sudden attack on the town, the assault being fixed 
for daybreak on August 23. It was intended that the 
place should be carried by a bayonet charge, and the 
revolutionary artillery was so placed as to command 
the town and the fort of Callao in order to protect the 
infantry advance and silence the guns, while the 1st 
Brigade was to cover the retirement of the attacking 
force if the movement was unsuccessful. In accordance 
with these dispositions the advance began during the 
night. 

Unexpected difficulties were encountered, and the 
2nd and 3rd Brigades did not reach their positions until 
6 a.m. in daylight and all chance of surprising the 
garrison lost. Under the altered conditions the com- 
manders of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades requested further 
instructions from the Commander-in-chief, and pending 
his decision the Congressional artillery opened fire on 
the fortress of Callao, while the Cochrane and Esmeralda 
also bombarded this fort from seawards, but little 
damage was done by the artillery fire on either side. At 
10 a.m. orders were received to withdraw the 2nd and 
3rd Brigades, and later all the troops were retired 
beyond reach of the artillery at Vina del Mar to a 



1891] CONCENTRATION AT QUILPUE 375 

position on the heights of Las Cruces. The casualties 
during the day were insignificant, only 1 officer and 2 
men being wounded. 

The fact that Valparaiso and Vina del Mar were 
strongly held led the Congressionalists to reconsider 
their position. The mistake of not cutting the railway 
communication between Santiago and Valparaiso after 
Concon was clearly recognised and it was too late to 
repair the error, but it was obvious that immediate 
action must be taken to deprive Balmaceda of easy 
transportation from Santiago to the seaboard. For this 
purpose it was determined to concentrate the army at 
Quilpue and block the passage of trains at that point. 
In accordance with this plan the 2nd Brigade marched 
on the night of August 23, reaching Quilpue early on 
August 24 without encountering resistance, while the 
3rd Brigade destroyed the line at Salto before retiring to 
Quilpue. From information gleaned at this point it was 
ascertained that during the previous twenty-four hours 
thirteen trains conveying 8000 troops had passed through 
the station en route to Valparaiso, and also that Generals 
Barbosa and Alcerrica were in Valparaiso, and that 
Balmaceda had been in Quillota and Quilpue that 
morning. The 1st Brigade was ordered to make a feint 
of attacking, and then retire on the evening of August 24 
towards Quilpue, bringing the guns and stores disem- 
barked by the squadron at Concon bajo ; to further 
deceive the enemy, orders were issued for camp fires to 
be lighted on the evening of the 24th, and replenished 
before the position was evacuated. The distance from 
the encampment of the revolutionary army to Quilpue 
was only six miles, but the mountainous nature of the 
country and bad condition of the roads from the heavy 
rainfall prevented the rearguard of the 1st Brigade 
reaching that place until after daybreak on August 25. 
With the exception of a small force sent on reconnais- 
sance duty towards Pena Blanca, the troops were per- 
mitted to rest on August 25. 

The object of General Canto now was to attack 



376 CHILE 

Valparaiso from the south-east. In order to do this it 
was necessary to obtain possession of the heights near 
Placilla and Las Zorras, and it was decided to advance 
from Quilpue to Las Cadenas, a hamlet on the Placilla 
road, ten miles in a direct line from Quilpue. It was 
thought inadvisable to march out of Quilpue by daylight, 
as the movement could be seen by the enemy's outposts 
on the heights near Salto, and orders were given to start 
at 1.30 a.m. on August 26 ; but a delay occurred, and it 
was 6.30 a.m. before the 1st Brigade, forming the 
rearguard, left Quilpue, and, consequently, news of the 
movement reached the authorities in Valparaiso. The 
heavy state of the roads made the march to Las Cadenas 
a long affair, and the circuitous route followed increased 
the distance to 25 miles. The troops were wearied from 
want of sleep, lost their formation and straggled out, and 
it was not until daybreak on August 27 that the army 
reached its destination. Soon after leaving Quilpue a 
squadron of the Husares de Colipulli, commanded by 
Major Julio Padilla, joined the Congressionalists and was 
incorporated under the title of Husares Constitutionales. 
The intention of General Canto had been to occupy the 
heights of Placilla at daybreak on August 27 ; but the 
disorganised condition of the men made this impossible, 
and the attack was postponed until 8 a.m. on the 28th, 
to allow the troops rest and food before going into 
action. 

The retirement from Vina del Mar on August 24 
surprised Balmaceda's generals, and they imagined that 
the enemy had returned to Concon bajo to re-embark, or 
had marched inland to attack Santiago. A reconnais- 
sance on the 25th discovered the Congressionalists at 
Quilpue. General Barbosa insisted that the revolutionary 
forces intended to re-embark ; but General Alcerrica 
maintained that an attack would be made on Valparaiso 
from Placilla, and events proved this conclusion to be 
correct, for on the 26th a telegram from Colonel Juan 
de Dios Leon, who was reconnoitring between Salto and 
Quilpue, informed the authorities that the Congression- 



1891] BATTLE OF PLACILLA 377 

alists had followed the direction of the Casablanca 
cartroad towards Placilla. 

From this it was evident that the enemy intended to 
converge upon Placilla, and preparations were com- 
menced by Barbosa and Alcerrica to occupy the heights 
of Alto del Puerto with the main body of the Govern- 
ment troops. At half-past three in the afternoon the 
division near Vina del Mar was advanced to Las Zorras 
and Alto del Puerto, the vanguard reaching this position 
at ten o'clock next morning, the 27th. As had happened 
with the Congressionalists, the heavy state of the roads 
made marching difficult, and the men were worn out 
with fatigue when they arrived at their destination. A 
reconnaissance in the direction of Las Cadenas reported 
the enemy in full strength five miles distant. The 
Government troops concentrated on the heights at 
Placilla numbered 9200 officers and men, and the 
strength of the revolutionary forces was almost the 
same, the gaps in the ranks from the fighting at Concon 
having been filled by volunteers from the prisoners taken 
on that occasion and by deserters from the Government 
army. The defence had 40 guns and 4 machine guns, 
while the revolutionary army was equipped with 50 
guns and 10 machine guns ; but this preponderance of 
artillery was counterbalanced by the more advantageous 
position held by their opponents. 

The plan of the revolutionary leaders for the attack 
upon Placilla on August 28 was simple. The artillery 
was directed to take up positions on the high ground 
near Las Cadenas fronting the Alto del Puerto and to 
the east of the road to Placilla, with orders to concen- 
trate all fire on the enemy's guns, and was protected by 
the 3rd Brigade. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were to 
advance to positions on both sides of the Placilla road, 
and to press forward gradually for a frontal attack on 
the Alto del Puerto, but inclining to the left to outflank 
the right wing of the defence. Part of the cavalry was 
in rear of the 2nd Brigade to protect the left, and the 
remainder was in rear of the 3rd Brigade ready for any 



378 CHILE 

emergencies, and, if necessary, to support the right 
wing. The Commander-in-chief remained with the 3rd 
Brigade. 

The position of the Government troops was ex- 
ceptionally strong, and extended on both sides of the 
Pl-acilla road, with the right and left flanks resting 
on deep ravines. From Placilla to the Alto del Puerto 
the ground rose gradually, and afforded excellent cover 
and a clear field of fire. The cavalry was posted in 
rear of the line in a dip in the Valparaiso road, the 
bulk of the artillery being massed in the centre, but 
a few guns were detached towards the right. The 
reserves were kept close to the cavalry in rear of the 
centre. 

At 7 a.m. on August 28, the Congressionalist advance 
began. The 1st Brigade led the attack, and crept up 
within half a, mile of the enemy's lines before fire opened, 
but at 7.30 a.m. the artillery on both sides commenced 
a heavy cannonade which lasted for an hour. Shortly 
before 9 a.m. General Canto saw that the 2nd Brigade, 
which should have supported the 1st Brigade, had 
drifted to the left to obtain the protection of some 
broken ground and was not able to reinforce the leading 
troops, rendering the position of this section extremely 
critical. Reserves from the 3rd Brigade were immedi- 
ately thrown forward, and at 10 a.m. all available troops 
of the revolutionary force were engaged in the first line. 
The advance was disputed at every step, the defence 
maintaining a heavy rifle and artillery fire, and the 
Congressionalists being checked for some time by the 
ravines and wire fences ; but a bayonet charge by the 
Esmeralda Regiment against the left flank of the defence 
at half- past ten carried that section of the position, and 
immediately afterwards the Congressional cavalry charged 
the line and captured several guns. The infantry now 
broke through the defence at all points and a hand-to- 
hand fight ensued ; but it lasted only a few moments, 
and then the defenders threw down their arms, some 
surrendering, others taking to flight. By eleven o'clock 



1891] CONGRESSIONAL VICTORY 370 

the battle was over, and the last hopes of Balmaceda 
were shattered. 

When defeat was certain, General Alcerrica attempted 
to escape on horseback, but was pursued by some 
cavalry-men, against whom he fired several shots from 
his revolver. His horse fell dead, and the General 
attempted to proceed on foot, but realised this was 
impossible. Near by was a house, and rushing into this 
shelter he expired a few moments afterwards from his 
wounds. The death of General Barbosa was more 
tragic. The Commander-in-chief of the Government 
troops took refuge in the residence of Senor Soto on 
the Alto del Puerto, and was followed by half-a-dozen 
troopers, against whom he attempted to defend himself, 
shutting himself into a dark room and wounding three 
soldiers as they tried to enter the doorway. Then 
Ensign Fuenzalida appeared with his revolver in hand 
and forced his way into the room, a duel ensuing in 
which the General was twice wounded without injuring 
his adversary. When his ammunition was exhausted, 
Barbosa drew his sword to attack his opponent ; but he 
was overpowered by the troopers, dragged outside, and 
there killed in cold blood, his body being pierced with 
lance thrusts and hacked by sabre cuts. 

The casualties on both sides were heavy. The action 
had lasted scarcely four hours, but when the rolls were 
called the losses of the victors were found to be 22 
officers and 463 men killed and 83 officers and 1041 
men wounded, besides 199 missing — a total of 1800 ; 
and on the part of the defence, the returns were 941 
killed and 2422 wounded— a total of 3363. 

At 12.30 p.m., an hour after the firing ceased at 
Placilla, Valparaiso was occupied by a detachment of 
Congressional troops, the garrison offering no resistance ; 
but the torpedo-boat Lynch opened fire, although she 
was soon overpowered. At 3 p.m. General Canto 
arrived, and two hours later the squadron under Admiral 
Montt anchored in the bay. The friends of Balmaceda 
were given asylum on the German man-of-war Leipzig, 



380 CHILE 

and the United States cruisers San Francisco and 
Baltimore, but the majority of the population were 
satisfied at the turn affairs had taken, and readily 
accepted the change of authority. Unfortunately no 
efficient measures were taken during the first night for 
policing the city, and many of the victorious troops 
became drunk, with the result that scenes of rioting and 
disastrous incendiary fires occurred. Patrols were forced 
to shoot down 300 persons before order was established, 
and the actual monetary loss from damage done to 
property was estimated at $3,000,000. 

It was from the officer in command of the Govern- 
ment troops at Limache that Balmaceda first received 
information of the defeat at Placilla. On August 28 
constant telegraphic messages were exchanged between 
Limache and Santiago, but it was not until 7.30 p.m. 
that a telegram from Quillota, sent by Colonel Vargas, 
definitely conveyed news of the disaster. The message 
read : — " Arrived here, several officers of defeated army. 
They say defeat is complete. Our men fought without 
bravery or enthusiasm, and in crisis of struggle laid 
down arms and passed over to enemy. Generals Barbosa 
and Alcerrica dead. Senor Claudio Vicuna and Senor 
Banados shut up in Municipal Building, Valparaiso, and 
that city in power of Opposition. Nothing more for 
me to do here. I march with my men to Santiago — 
Vargas." Balmaceda was in consultation with his 
ministers when this despatch reached him, and he at 
once proposed to take measures for the defence of 
Santiago, pointing out that in and near the national 
capital was a force of 7000 men, and with these a strong 
resistance could be made ; but when the full nature of 
the disaster was known, and the fact appreciated that 
the loyalty of the troops could not be depended upon, 
Balmaceda realised it was useless to continue the struggle. 
He decided to resign office and transfer his presidential 
powers to General Baquedano, who was known to be 
in sympathy with the revolutionary movement, under 
the condition of protection for the persons and property 



1891] RESIGNATION OF BALMACEDA 381 

of all those who had supported his Administration, and 
this General Baquedano promised. The last official act 
of Balmaceda was the following document, issued next 
morning : — 

Santiago, August 29, 1891. — Gregorio Cei'da y Ossa, Intendente 
of the Province. Whereas : 

His Excellency the President of the Republic has decreed as 
follows : — 

Considering that in resisting the armed revolution begun on 
January 7 by the squadron I have complied with my simple duty of 
maintaining the principle of authority, without which Government is 
impossible. 

That my patriotism and duties as a Chilian have placed a limit to 
my efforts. It does not become an honest Governor to prolong a 
struggle that cannot be maintained with reasonable prospects of 
success. 

That the result of the last battle near Valparaiso has been 
unfavourable to the cause I sustain. I have therefore resolved to 
end a conflict that reflects little credit to the Republic and the 
common welfare. 

Decree : 

That citizen General of Division Senor Don Manuel Baquedano 
remains at the head of the Government. I therefore charge all 
chiefs, officers, soldiers, Intendentes, governors, and other officials to 
render him proper respect and obedience. 

Let this be published and communicated by telegraph. 

Balmaceda. 
Manuel A. Zanartu. 

General Baquedano immediately issued the follow- 
ing short decree : — 

I provisionally accept the charge confided to me, in order to 
preserve public order. 

Two reasons prompted Balmaceda to select General 
Baquedano. In the first place, he was popular in con- 
sequence of the prestige he had gained as the victorious 
leader of the Chilians in the war against Peru, and in 
his capacity as a soldier he would be fitted to deal with 
the present situation ; and, secondly, Baquedano was 
known to be on friendly terms with the Congressionalist 
leaders, although taking no active part in the conflict. 



382 CHILE 

Practically, therefore, the resignation of Balmacecla in 
his favour was equivalent to a surrender to the Junta de 
Gobierno, and in these circumstances Balmaceda con- 
sidered that the promise of protection in regard to his 
supporters would be respected. 

The abdication of Balmaceda was soon known. It 
caused consternation on the part of his followers and 
exultation to his enemies. Official returns show that 
448 persons had been incarcerated in the prisons of 
Santiago as political offenders during the latter months 
of the civil war ; as the majority of these belonged to 
families of high social position in Santiago, it is easy to 
imagine the bitter hostility existing, and that these 
people and their friends determined to be revenged for 
their injuries. On the morning of August 29, the police 
in Santiago ceased to resist, the men deserting to the 
country districts and carrying their arms with them. 
The military forces refused to perform duty, and the 
town was absolutely unprotected. Sufferers under the 
late Administration saw their opportunity, and they 
organised bodies of men to wreck the properties of the 
most prominent supporters of Balmaceda. Lists of 
houses to be sacked were made out and handed to the 
leaders of different gangs, and two hundred residences 
were completely gutted ; but no personal violence was 
offered, nor was riotous behaviour in evidence. It was 
not until the afternoon of August 29 that General 
Baquedano was able to organise an adequate police 
force, and by then the destruction had ceased. 

On August 30 Colonel Emilio Korner reached 
Santiago to arrange for barrack accommodation for a 
part of the Congressionalist army, and the day following 
the Junta de Gobierno arrived, and became the de facto 
Government of Chile. It only remained now to disarm 
the troops stationed at Coquimbo and in the south, and 
this was accomplished without difficulty within fifteen 
clays. 



CHAPTER XXI 

chile — continued 

General Baquedano Surrenders Powers. Proclamation by Admiral 
Montt. Work of Reconstruction. Unsettled Conditions. Dis- 
appearance of Balmaceda. Suicide of Balmaceda. Political 
Testament of Balmaceda. Explanation of Suicide. New Con- 
gress. Junta de Gobierno Resigns. Admiral Montt as Presi- 
dential Candidate. Cost of the Revolution. Election of Montt. 
Promotions for Services. Actions concerning Supporters of 
Balmaceda. Law of Amnesty. Chile and the United States. 
The Baltimore Incident. Message of President Harrison to the 
U.S. Congress. Telegram from Santiago to Chilian Minister in 
Washington. United States Ultimatum. Excitement in Chile. 
Apology to U.S. Government. 

On the arrival at Santiago of the Junta de Gobierno, 
General Baquedano immediately surrendered the powers 
with which he had been invested by the decree of 
Balmaceda on August 29. In a communication to the 
Junta, dated August 31, he gave an account of his 
actions during the three days that he was in charge of 
public affairs. 

Baquedano described the absolute confusion follow- 
ing the abdication of Balmaceda. All prominent officials 
under the recent Administration had left their posts, 
and many of the senior officers of the army had fled the 
country. Telegrams from all districts revealed dis- 
organisation in the provinces, and that with the dis- 
appearance of Balmaceda the machinery of government 
had been temporarily suspended. Baquedano accom- 
plished as much as was possible in the circumstances to 



384 CHILE 

resolve order out of chaos, and officers in whom he felt 
confidence were placed in command of the regiments 
forming the garrison of Santiago. Governors of Provinces 
and Intendentes of Departments were nominated, and 
prominent citizens of the National Capital were called 
upon for their advice in connection with the situation. 
The result of these measures was that comparative 
tranquillity had been restored before the appearance in 
Santiago of the Junta, and the task now before the 
Provisional Government was to continue the work of 
reconstruction that Baquedano had begun. 

After the Provisional Government assumed charge, 
Admiral Montt issued the following proclamation : — 

Fellow Citizens : 

After eight long months of bloody combats I arrive at the 
National Capital, having accomplished the task entrusted to me by 
the delegation of the National Congress in the roadstead of 
Valparaiso. 

I heartily congratulate the country, the navy, and the army, that 
have so bravely contributed to the most noble and holy cause that has 
ever convulsed this Republic. 

The Empire of the Constitution and Laws is assured throughout 
the Republic. 

I now call on all Chilians, without distinction of political colour, to 
co-operate in the re-establishment of public order, and the realisation 
of that great work of peace that the Nation has confided to us. 

Fellow countrymen : 

In action and in work look for the remedy from the evils created 
by the dictatorship, with the confidence that you will be protected 
and sheltered by the forces that from to-day are the zealous 
guardians of public order. 

Jorje Montt. 

Santiago, September, 1891. 

The work of reconstruction proceeded rapidly. 
Elections were ordered for Senators and Deputies, and 
for the presidential electors, and the Appeal Courts 
reopened after having been suspended since March 2, 
1891, by order of Balmaceda. A large proportion of 
the army was disbanded. The Executive decreed that 
all members of the judiciary dismissed by Balmaceda 
should be reinstated, and all appointments made after 





General Baquedano. 



Pedro Montt. 





President Errazuriz. 



President Riesco. 



[Face page. 3S4 



1891] AFTER THE REVOLUTION 385 

January 1, 1891, cancelled. Practically the first fifteen 
days of the Provisional Government was occupied in 
undoing the acts of Balmaceda during the previous eight 
months. 

In the towns matters soon settled clown, but in the 
country districts affairs were not so satisfactory. 
Deserters from the army and police had taken to the 
hills after Conc6n and Placilla ; most of these men had 
arms and ammunition, and they developed into bandits. 
The south and centre became infested with groups of 
these robbers, and life and property in outlying districts 
was continually menaced. To such an extent did these 
marauders strike terror that prosperous farming districts 
were abandoned, and the authorities have not been able 
to eradicate this pest in the twelve years that have passed 
since the revolution, its suppression to-day having 
become a most serious problem. 

Much interest was aroused concerning Balmaceda 
after his abdication. He had disappeared absolutely, 
mysteriously, and neither friend nor foe knew where to 
look for him. After signing the decree transferring his 
powers to Baquedano, the late President passed from 
the public rooms of the Casa de Moneda to his private 
apartments, there meeting his wife and a group of 
intimate friends. A few minutes later he left the 
building accompanied by Senor Manuel Zanartu, the 
Minister of the Interior, Senor Cerda y Ossa, Intendente 
of Santiago, and Senor Luis Vergara. After driving for 
a short distance, he and his friends descended from the 
carriage, dismissed the coachman, and proceeded on foot 
to the Argentine Legation. They knocked, and the 
door was opened by the Argentine Minister, Senor 
Uriburu, Balmaceda entering the house after taking 
leave of his companions. It had been arranged that 
Senor Uriburu should give the President shelter if 
necessity arose, and a room at the top of the building 
had been prepared for his reception. Here Balmaceda 
lay concealed for twenty days, his wife and family being 
transferred to the protection of the United States 

2 B 



386 CHILE 

Legation, where they remained until all danger had 
disappeared. 

The intention of Balmaceda had been to surrender 
to the Congressionalist leaders, but this course was 
abandoned when he understood the intense hostility 
against himself. The alternative to his first idea was 
escape from the country under protection of the diplo- 
matic corps ; this was feasible, but was rejected by him 
as too undignified a proceeding. It was impossible to 
prolong indefinitely his stay in the Argentine Legation, 
and in the middle of September Senor Uriburu and his 
guest discussed the best plan to follow. It was arranged 
that Senor Uriburu should inform the Provisional 
Government of Balmaceda's presence in his house and 
request advice, and then the minister was to take 
Balmaceda, accompanied by Senor Concha y Toro and 
Senor Carlos Walker Martinez, to any locality indicated 
by the authorities. In this maimer no attention would 
be called to him in his passage through the streets. On 
September 10, Senor Uriburu was to have carried out 
this programme, but on the morning of that day 
Balmaceda ended his troubles by taking his own life. 
Torn by doubts as to the fairness of any trial if he 
placed his fate in the hands of his enemies, and dis- 
tracted by fear that his hiding-place would be discovered 
by the mob, he resolved to commit suicide rather than 
face the results of the storm he had raised. 

The death of Balmaceda is described by his friend 
Senor Julio Banados Espinosa as having taken place in 
the following manner. He rose early on the morning 
of September 19, attired himself in black clothes, and 
then opened a door leading from his bedroom to a 
balcony. There he stood for some moments looking at 
the great snow-covered ranges of the Andes glowing in 
the sunlight. He closed the door, carefully arranged 
the furniture, and lay down on his bed at 8 a.m. A few 
moments later a pistol shot was heard by Senor Uriburu 
and his wife, and they sent a servant upstairs to ascertain 
what had occurred. The messenger returned with the 



1891] SUICIDE OF BALMACEDA 387 

information that Balmaceda was dead, and Sefior 
Uriburu, calling on Senor Carlos Walker Martinez to 
accompany him, ascended to the apartment. The body 
was lying on the bed with a wound in the right breast, 
and it was evident that death had been instantaneous. 
On the pillow was a letter addressed to Senor Uriburu, 
in which Balmaceda declared his intention of committing 
suicide as the only means of escape from his difficulties. 

The authorities were at once notified of the tragedy 
in the Argentine Legation, and at noon a committee 
assembled to verify the cause of death. It consisted of 
the following members : — Jose Uriburu ( Argentine 
Minister) ; J. Arrieta (Uruguayan Minister) ; Baron 
Gutschmid (German Minister) ; E. de B. Cavalcanti de 
Lacerda (Brazilian Minister) ; Jose Barcelo ; Carlos 
Lira ; J. J. Aguirre ; M. Concha y Toro ; Domingo 
Toro y Herrera ; C. Walker Martinez. The burial took 
place at 7.30 in the evening, and the body was carried 
to the cemetery in a public conveyance of the commonest 
kind, the ceremony being unattended by mourners. A 
picquet of cavalry was detailed to accompany the corpse 
from the Argentine Legation to the cemetery, but no 
hostile manifestation was attempted. 

Among the letters written by Balmaceda on the day 
before his death was one jointly directed to Senor 
Claudio Vicuna and Senor Julio Banados Espinosa, and 
this document is designated by his friends as his political 
testament. In this letter Balmaceda pleads justification 
for his actions during the civil war and for the general 
drift of his policy. In regard to existing principles of 
Government in Chile, a clear opinion is expressed that 
they must inevitably bring a deadlock between the 
Chambers and the Executive, and he says : — " The 
parliamentary system has triumphed on the field of 
battle, but this victory will not prevail. Either investi- 
gation, convenience, or patriotism will open a reasonable 
way to reform and the organisation of a representative 
government, or fresh disturbances and painful occurrences 
will happen among the .same people who united for the 



388 CHILE 

revolution, and who remained united to assure the 
result, but who will end by divisions and conflicts." 
He sets forth his idea of a satisfactory government for 
Chile in these terms: — "Only in the organisation of a 
popular representative government with independent 
and responsible powers and easy means to make that 
responsibility effective will there be parties of a national 
character, derived from the will of the people and ensuring 
harmony between the different powers of the State." 
This latter criticism shows that Balmaceda understood 
the defects of the existing constitution of Chile. His 
prediction as to disturbed political conditions has been 
justified since by the confusion in Congress during the 
presidency of Errazuriz, and later under Riesco, and 
which has made useful legislation almost impossible. 
The contrast between the ideas of Balmaceda in 1891 
and the convictions he expressed at the beginning of his 
political career are interesting, for from 1870 to 1880 
he was the apostle of a political movement for the free 
exercise of a parliamentary system. When holding 
ministerial office after 1881 under President Santa 
Maria, he found that the existing Constitution was incom- 
patible with this doctrine, and from 1886 until 1889 he 
believed the key to the situation was the unification of 
the Liberals and a solid majority to support a Liberal 
Cabinet. For this end he laboured unceasingly, but in 
1890 he was convinced that this was impossible, princi- 
pally owing to the personality of the members of 
Congress, and then he advocated a representative 
Government on the model of the United States rather 
than that any attempt should be made to perfect a 
parliamentary system. 

In a letter to his brothers, written on the eve of his 
death, Balmaceda says : — " I could escape ; but I would 
never run the risk of the ridicule any disaster to such an 
attempt would entail, and which would be the beginning 
of vexatious humiliation which I could not endure for 
myself or for my family " ; and this is probably the true 
explanation of his action in taking his own life. He was 



1891] THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 389 

a proud man, who could not bear the thought of the 
insults he anticipated if he was arrested and brought to 
his trial, and to fall from the possession of absolute 
power and be treated as a criminal was more than he 
could endure. He thought of suicide, and his imagin- 
ative temperament was fascinated by the idea of death. 
One sharp pang rather than a period of lingering torture 
at the hands of his enemies was his dominant impression. 
To assert that he was insane when he killed himself 
would be quite erroneous, as his letters of September 18 
and the morning of his death show that his mind was 
perfectly clear. He had become morose by constant 
brooding over his misfortunes ; to die as he did was in 
some sense to pose as a martyr for his faults, and to him 
the fascination of that idea was irresistible. By his 
death Chile lost one of the most remarkable men she 
ever produced. 

On November 10, 1891, the newly elected Congress 
met, and the Junta de Gobierno, consisting of Admiral 
Montt, Senor Waldo Silva, and Senor Ramon Barros 
Luco, resigned the powers they had held since the 
outbreak of the revolution. In reply to their communi- 
cation to this effect, the Chambers stated that it was the 
unanimous desire of Congress that Admiral Montt should 
continue to discharge the presidential duties until such 
time as a Chief Magistrate was elected, and under these 
circumstances he remained in office. The question of 
the presidential election now occupied public attention, 
and the convention called to select a candidate decided 
on Admiral Montt by a large majority, and finally he 
accepted the nomination, although he had made no 
effort to influence people in his favour and showed no 
strong desire to become a politician. 

The Provisional Government abolished the " Tesoreria 
General de la Escuadra" on November 21, an office 
created during the revolution to account for official 
expenditure, and some interesting details of the expenses 
of the late Administration and the cost of the revolution 
were made public. Between January 7 and August 21, 



390 CHILE 

1891, Balmaceda had devoted $73,446,104 towards 
defraying expenses in connection with warlike opera- 
tions, and during the same period the Congressionalists 
had expended $11,794,654. The contrast is evidence of 
the better management of the Opposition, and it shows 
that Balmaceda would soon have exhausted his avail- 
able funds even if the decisive defeats at Concon and 
Placilla had not occurred. The amount of arms and 
ammunition that reached Chile after peace was re- 
established, and which had been despatched from 
Europe in July and August, proved that the Congres- 
sionalists possessed ample means to continue the 
struggle for a more lengthy period than was required. 

On December 18 the election for the presidential 
electors took place, and there was at once small doubt 
that the feeling of the country was in favour of a con- 
tinuance in power of Admiral Montt, for when two days 
later the Chambers met to scrutinise the presidential 
votes, the result showed that Montt had been unani- 
mously elected. He assumed the Presidency on 
the 26th. 

During November the Chambers agreed to various 
promotions and rewards for services rendered during the 
war. Jorje Montt, who held the rank of a Post-Captain, 
was made Vice-Admiral ; Captain Francisco Molina was 
promoted Rear- Admiral ; and many other steps were 
given to naval officers. Generals Estanislas del Canto 
and Adolfo Holley were gazetted Generals of Division, 
and Colonel Emilio Korner was promoted to General of 
Brigade and granted a gratuity of $20,000. The part 
Senor Waldo Silva and Senor Barros Luco had taken 
was not forgotten, and to each was accorded the 
honorary rank of Vice-Admiral, entitling them to 
receive the customary salutes and honours of that 
grade Avhen visiting Chilian men-of-war ; furthermore, 
the right of free carriage for their personal correspond- 
ence, and also the privilege for themselves and their 
friends of travelling on State railways without payment. 
Senor Waldo Silva was allotted a pension of $9000 






1891] HONOURS AWARDED BY CONGRESS 391 

annually ; on his death, shortly afterwards, his family 
was conceded a yearly subvention of $5250, and 
Congress also ordered a monument to his memory at 
a cost of $12,000. In addition to other honours 
conceded to Senor Ramon Barros Luco, he was pre- 
sented with a library valued at $10,000. 

The question of the persons who had supported 
Balmaceda came before the Chambers in December, and 
it was held that the higher officials of the late Adminis- 
tration were guilty of high treason and could not be 
included in a general amnesty. The law passed on 
December 25 extended free pardon to all partisans of 
Balmaceda except members of the Cabinet between 
January 1 and August 29, 1891, and those who had 
served during that period as members of Congress, 
judges, members of the Council of State, diplomats, 
persons signing the bank-note emissions, legal advisers 
to the military tribunals, and senior military and naval 
officers, yet only some 400 persons in all were excluded. 
Subsequently the law was modified, and on August 28, 
1893, amnesty was extended to all persons except those 
responsible for the events at "Lo Caiias," and the 
Ministers of State who had signed the decree for 
dictatorial powers to maintain military and naval forces 
without the consent of Congress. Two years later even 
this restriction was withdrawn, and Senor Claudio 
Vicuna and his friends were relieved of all impediments 
to their return to Chile. 

At the end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892 
relations between Chile and the United States became 
strained. The question of the transport Itata and the 
attitude assumed by the United States had aroused 
hostile feeling, and this had become accentuated by the 
presence of the U.S. warship San Francisco in Quinteros 
Bay on the morning of August 20, when the Congres- 
sionalist army disembarked. The San Francisco reached 
Quinteros at 2.30 p.m. on that day and immediately 
returned to Valparaiso, arriving at the latter place at 
5 p.m., when Admiral Brown at once sent an officer 



392 CHILE 

ashore with a cable despatch in cypher to advise the 
authorities in Washington of the progress of events. 
The Congressionalists interpreted this as a device for 
providing information of their movements to Balmaceda, 
moved to take that view by the fact that the United 
States had not been favourable to the Congressionalist 
cause. In a letter dated September 8, 1891, being then 
aware of the erroneous conclusions formed as to the 
reason of his visit to Quinteros, Admiral Brown explained 
matters to Mr Egan, and stated that he had received 
information early on August 20 that the Congres- 
sionalists were disembarking, that the Government 
authorities anticipated an important engagement at 
Quinteros, and that he then decided to steam down to 
the scene of the expected fighting. He proceeds : — " I 
arrived at Quinteros Bay at 2.30 p.m. Seeing no signs 
of a battle, I returned to this port. Dropping anchor 
at 5 a.m., I sent an officer ashore with a cablegram that 
had to be submitted to the Intendente to allow its 
transmission. My message to the Secretary of the Navy 
of the United States was in cypher, and nobody could 
become possessed of its substance." The Congres- 
sionalists were convinced that he was acting in the 
interests of Balmaceda, and this engendered a spirit of 
hostility, the unfriendly feeling being augmented by the 
fact that after the battle of Placilla asylum was given 
on the San Francisco and the Baltimore to Ministers 
Domingo Godoy, Ismael Perez Montt, Julio Bailados 
Espinosa, and other refugees. Friction was increased 
by a protest from the United States Minister, Mr 
Egan, complaining to the Provisional Government that 
"the Legation is constantly surrounded by secret police 
without any justifiable motive, persons are arrested and 
sent to prison simply because they have been seen to 
enter the Legation, and some of my employes and servants 
are actually prisoners." Communications on this subject 
were exchanged between Mr Egan and Seiior Matte, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on September 26, the 
former submitted a document containing a deposition 



1891] THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE 393 

made by a Mr Raycraft concerning his arrest and 
imprisonment after leaving the Legation, details descrip- 
tive of nineteen other such arrests having been previously 
forwarded. Seilor Matte stated that the Legation was 
extra-territorial and had the right to grant asylum, but 
the streets in the vicinity could claim no such privilege, 
and that if it was in the interests of public order any 
persons found in those streets would be apprehended by 
the police. It was natural that Chilians who had sup- 
ported the Congressionalist cause regarded United States 
citizens with some animosity, and on October 16, when 
this unfriendly feeling was running high, Captain Schley 
of the U.S.S. Baltimore gave 116 petty officers and men 
shore liberty. This was unwise of Captain Schley in 
view of existing sentiments, and also because the sailors 
who had been long confined on board ship, as might 
have been anticipated, took advantage of their freedom 
to drink freely. A dispute arose between a group from 
the Baltimore and some Chilian sailors, and friends on 
both sides joined in the quarrel until some hundreds 
were engaged in the melee. Knives and revolvers were 
freely used, with the result that Quartermaster Riggin 
of the Baltimore was killed and several of his shipmates 
wounded, one of these so severely that he shortly after- 
wards died. 

This affair was reported to Washington, Captain 
Schley stating that the police of Valparaiso encouraged 
the disturbance, and on October 26, under instructions 
from his Government, Mr Egan demanded satisfaction. 
In reply Senor Matte stated that as legal proceedings 
had been instituted to bring the culprits to justice, no 
further steps could then be taken, and on October 30 
he forwarded to Mr Egan the report of the Intendente 
of Valparaiso demonstrating the good conduct of the 
police in the riot. Affairs were at this pass when 
President Harrison sent his annual message to Congress 
on December 9, 1891, accompanied by the report of the 
Secretary of the Navy, one from Mr Egan, and one from 
Captain Schley. Reference was made to the right of 



394 CHILE 

asylum, and regret was expressed that the Chilian 
Administration showed so little inclination to treat 
courteously with a friendly nation. The remarks of 
President Harrison, cabled to Santiago, caused an out- 
burst of indignation, and on December 11 Seiior Matte 
explained in the Senate the relations existing between 
Chile and the United States, denying the accusations 
formulated by President Harrison, and reading a telegram 
to Senor Pedro Montt, the Chilian representative in 
Washington. 

This telegraphic despatch brought matters to a crisis. 
The text was : — 

Santiago, December 11, 1891. 
Senor Pedro Montt, Washington. 

Referring to the report of the Secretary of the Navy and the 
message of the President of the United States, I think it opportune 
to say that the data on which the report and the message is based 
are erroneous or deliberately inexact. 

In regard to refugees. No threats of cruel treatment have been 
emitted, no attempts have been made to take such persons from 
the Legation, nor has any request been preferred that they should 
be handed over 

The house and person of the Minister, in spite of indiscretions and 
meditated provocations, has not been molested, as is evidenced by 
eleven communications in September, October, and November. 

In respect to the sailors of the Baltimore, there is neither accuracy 
or truth in what is said in Washington. 

The affair took place in the worst quarter of the city — the 
" main-top " of Valparaiso — and between people who are not models 
of discretion or temperance. When the police interfered and quelled 
the riot there were some hundreds of men in the locality, the police 
force being more than half a mile distant when the disturbance 
commenced. 

On October 26 Mr Egan sent a communication couched in pur- 
posely aggressive and irritating language, as is seen by the copy and 
reply despatched October 27. On October 18 investigation into the 
affair was begun, but delayed by the non-attendance of the men from 
the Baltimore, and by pretensions and unnecessary denials on the 
part of Mr Egan. 

This Department has never initiated any provocation, maintaining 
an attitude which, if prudent and firm, has never been aggressive, 
nor will it be one of humiliation whatever interested persons may say 
to the contrary in Washington. 

The telegrams, communications, and letters forwarded to your 
Excellency contain the truth, the whole truth of what has happened 






1891] THE BALTIMORE INCIDENT 395 

in these questions, in which bad faith has not been shown by this 
Department. Mr Tracy and Mr Harrison have been led into error 
concerning us, the people and the Government. Their instructions 
in regard to impartiality and friendship have not been attended to 
either at the present time or previously. If there have been no 
complaints against the Minister and the naval officers, it is because 
the facts, public and notorious in both Chile and the United States, 
have not been allowed to carry weight, however strong the proofs. 
The appeals put forward by Balmaceda and the concessions made in 
June and July, the affair of the Itata, the Sa?i Francisco in Quinteros 
Bay, and the conduct of the cable companies, are proofs of this 
assertion. 

It is absolutely inexact that the North American sailors were 
attacked in different localities at the same time. The investigation 
being not finished, it is unknown whom or how many the culprits may 
be. Your Excellency must have the communication of November 9, 
replying to Mr Egan, as well as that in which he is asked for evidence 
which he has not desired to give, notwithstanding he stated he had 
proofs to indicate the homicide and other culprits in the affair of 
October 16. This and all other communications will be published 
here. Your Excellency should have them translated and published 
also in Washington. 

Meanwhile, deny everything that may be contrary to these advices, 
and feel confident in the exactness of your position, as we are, in the 
certainty of the right of our cause, and the final result for Chile in 
spite of intrigues from below and threats from above now confronting 
us. Matte. 



Senor Montt, the Chilian Minister in Washington, 
communicated this telegram verbatim to the United 
States Government. The result was an ultimatum on 
January 22, 1892, through Mr Egan to the Chilian 
authorities, to the effect that an indemnity must be paid 
for the injury to the men of the Baltimore, and that 
the amount be left to the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Excitement amongst 
Chilians ran high when affairs reached this stage, and 
the question of war was freely discussed. A certain 
section of the population clamoured for an appeal to 
arms, but President Montt took a more calm view of 
the situation. The telegram sent lo Senor Pedro Montt 
had been a mistake, and the only sensible course was 
to withdraw it to avoid the disastrous consequences of 
a rupture with the United States. A new Ministry was 



396 CHILE 

formed, in which Seilor Luis Pereira assumed the 
portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and on January 25, 1892, 
a despatch was sent to the Chilian minister in Wash- 
ington instructing him to withdraw the note presented 
on December 11, and inform the United States Govern- 
ment that no insult had been intended : furthermore, 
that an indemnity on account of the Baltimore incident 
would be paid. On the 28th a telegram was received 
from Washington to the effect that the United States 
Government considered the question ended, and on the 
30th a communication from Mr Egan to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs definitely confirmed this information. 
On July 13 following, Mr Egan was notified that the 
sum of $75,000 was at the disposal of the United 
States Government for distribution amongst the families 
of the men killed or injured on October 16 in Valparaiso, 
and the U.S. Minister promptly accepted this offer. 



CHAPTER XXII 

chile — continued 

Real Issues of the Civil War. Political Situation in 1892. Comision 
Conservadora. Increase of Naval Strength. Military Reorganisa- 
tion. Congressional Elections in 1894. Political Situation. 
Domestic Legislation. Municipal Law. Conversion of the 
Currency. Political Parties in Congress. Coalition Cabinet. 
Complications with Argentina. Sale of the Esmeralda to Japan. 
Understanding with Peru re Tacna and Arica. Treaty with 
Bolivia. A Diplomatic Blunder. Presidential Contest in 1896. 
Election of Senor Federico Errazuriz. Congressional Elections 
in 1897. The Boundary Question with Argentina. War 
Imminent. Attitude of Errazuriz. Arbitration re Tacna and 
Arica. The Bolivian Question. The Konig Note. Presidential 
Contest in 1901. 

President Montt had been elected by the supporters 
of a parliamentary system as opposed to a representative 
regime, for in the recent struggle the real point at issue 
was whether Congress should conduct the national 
business through a Cabinet chosen with the consent and 
support of the Chambers, or if the Executive in the 
shape of the President and his nominees should alone 
govern. 

The advocates of the parliamentary system had won 
the day, and the principles they preached became firmly 
established for better or worse with the downfall of 
Balmaceda. Montt accepted the presidency under 
these conditions, and showed that he intended to 
abide by the responsibilities they entailed. In one 
respect he was well adapted to deal with the political 



398 CHILE 

position ; he had been a naval officer all his life, and 
had taken no part in politics, and it was immaterial to 
him whether his Cabinet represented a Conservative 
or Liberal majority in the Chambers. As was to be 
expected after the desperate struggle in 1891, the 
Congress was composed of members with a common 
political platform who were not inclined to differ 
immediately on legislative questions, and in these 
circumstances political reconstruction after the recent 
upheaval went on so rapidly that by the middle of 1892 
a normal situation was established. 

Previous to 1892 the rights and interests of Con- 
gress when not in session were safeguarded by a com- 
mittee of six Senators and eight Deputies elected for 
that purpose. The duty of this committee was to 
notify the President when privileges of the Chambers 
were endangered, and to suggest the convocation of 
Congress whenever such a course appeared desirable. 
In 1890 this committee, known as the Comision 
Conservadora, had so notified the President, but had 
only obtained a reply that he considered the time 
inopportune for extraordinary sessions. It was the 
action taken in regard to Balmaceda which led to a 
reform in the Law of Constitution, and the proposal 
which was approved by the Chambers in 1892 delegated 
to the Comision Conservadora the power to convene 
Congress in extraordinary session without reference to 
the President, thus securing a permanent check on the 
Executive. The Comision Conservadora represents the 
majority in the Chambers, and in the event of the 
President retaining a Ministry not representative of this 
majority, the Comision Conservadora can force a crisis. 
The first time this right was exercised was in March, 
1901, when Congress was convoked to oust a Coalition 
Cabinet and replace it by Liberals. 

President Montt had taken to heart the lessons of 
the war with Peru and the later experience of the 
revolution against Balmaceda in regard to the effect of 
naval power, and naturally his attention was turned to 



1892] INCREASE OF NAVAL ARMAMENT 399 

the efficiency of the Chilian navy. As a sailor he 
knew what he wanted, and as President he was able to 
put before Congress the information necessary to secure 
the credits required for the purchase of ships and war 
material, with the result that orders were given for the 
construction of the new Blanco Encalada, the OHiggins, 
and the Esmeralda. Congress showed no reluctance to 
vote this expenditure, for the question with Argentina 
was pending in 1893 and 1894 when the heaviest of 
these liabilities were contracted, and the Chambers were 
content to accept the suggestion of the President that 
Chile to be safe must be strong for defensive and 
offensive purposes. Nor was the army neglected, and 
under the direction of General Korner many reforms 
were introduced. German officers were brought to 
Chile ; the equipment of the cavalry and infantry was 
improved ; the artillery was made the subject of special 
attention ; and in an unostentatious manner Montt so 
managed that whilst political and economic reconstruc- 
tion was proceeding in 1892 and 1893, the naval and 
military forces were raised to a high state of proficiency. 
In 1894 the political situation became more compli- 
cated. The Congressional elections were free from 
interference by the Executive, President Montt not 
being a politician, and showing no desire to be involved 
in electoral questions. His advent to the Presidency 
had been due in great part to such intervention by 
Balmaceda, and his honest nature would not allow him 
to throw his convictions to the wind and use his 
influence to secure the return of men on whom he could 
depend for political support in an emergency. As a 
result, a number of representatives who had admired 
Balmaceda were elected to the new Congress, and at 
once the division of parties in the Chambers rendered 
legislation difficult. The newcomers were principally 
Liberals, but they formed a compact party, known as 
Balmacedistas, and were ever ready to unite with other 
dissentient sections to throw difficulties in the way of 
domestic legislative measures. It was in consequence 



400 CHILE 

of this subdivision of parties that frequent ministerial 
changes occurred in the latter half of Montt's term. In 
the first two years of his Presidency four Cabinets had 
been nominated ; but special circumstances occurred in 
1892 and 1893, and the first Ministry, under Senor 
Irarrazaval was forced to resign in consequence of the 
Baltimore incident, after only holding office for a month. 
The second, under Senor Barros Luco, remained in 
power for eighteen months, and it was then reorganised 
for personal reasons ; Senor Edwardo Matte became the 
leader of the Cabinet, but Senor Barros Luco again took 
office after a few months. Then came a Ministry under 
Senor Pedro Montt in 1894, and it was in this latter 
year that the political complications caused by the 
division of parties became really troublesome, no 
Ministry since having been strong enough to hold office 
for more than a few months at a time. 

The domestic legislation to which President Montt 
gave most attention was a law for the local government 
of the municipalities, and the means to establish a 
sound currency. Hitherto the various townships had 
been dependent on the National Government for all 
public works, no expenditure being permitted without 
the sanction of the Executive and no appointments 
made except through the Administration, this system 
resulting in the neglect of local needs. Montt wished 
to decentralise the municipalities and allow municipal 
corporations to raise revenue from local sources, and to 
make them responsible for the administration of their 
own districts. The theory was sound, the more so as 
there is a weakness in Chile, as in most Latin countries, 
to rely solely for initiative and financial aid on the 
Central Government. After much discussion a measure 
creating municipal corporations was sanctioned, although 
not without a strong opposition, owing to the fact that 
local government restricted political influence and patron- 
age. By the law of 1891, the only check the National 
Government retained over the municipalities was that 
the intendentes, governors, or sub -delegates should 



1894J CONVERSION OF THE CURRENCY 40i 

preside over meetings of the municipal councillors and 
suspend any action they considered prejudicial to public 
order. 

The question of the establishment of a gold standard 
currency raised stormy debates in Congress, and personal 
motives caused many members of both Chambers to 
oppose the Government policy. Many Senators and 
Deputies were landed proprietors and employers of 
labour, others were interested in mining enterprises or 
the production of nitrate of soda ; and to these the 
conversion of the notes at a fixed rate inferred a loss, 
in so far as wages would be paid in same number of 
dollars although the intrinsic value would be greater. 
The benefit to the general credit of the Republic from a 
sound monetary system was not considered by the 
individuals adversely affected by the measure. The 
value of the dollar had been forced down to the 
equivalent of a franc, and the Government proposed to 
convert at the rate of eighteen pence. The first intention 
had been to establish a rate of twenty-four pence ; but 
this was abandoned in view of the violent opposition 
aroused, and in the end the compromise of an eighteen- 
penny rate was made and the law approved and pro- 
mulgated in 1895. 

It was during the discussions on the conversion 
question that the unwieldy composition of Congress 
was clearly seen. Liberals were split into three groups, 
any one of which in conjunction with the Conservatives 
could force the Cabinet to resign. The friends of the 
late President after the elections of March, 1894, made 
any unification of the Liberals impossible ; they would 
only agree to join with the other groups as the dominant 
factor of the party, and to this the Liberals as a whole 
would not consent. The Conservatives alone were not 
strong enough to command a majority, so the only 
possible combination was a coalition of Conservatives 
and some one group of Liberals. Further instability 
was introduced by the occasional efforts made to unify 
the Liberals, which, although never permanently success- 

2 c 



402 CHILE 

ful, tended to unsettle political stability and cause 
frequent changes in the Ministry. In these circum- 
stances it was not surprising that little useful legislation 
was enacted between 1894 and the termination of 
Montt's presidential term. 

In 1895 the Argentine Government became aware 
of the largely increased expenditure by Chile for naval 
and military purposes, and this was interpreted as a 
menace in connection with the boundary dispute. It 
was answered by a credit of $50,000,000 for the purchase 
of ships and other war material to counterbalance the 
Chilian preparations, and this was the beginning of the 
ruinous policy which dominated the two countries 
between 1895 and 1901. Any acquirement of war 
material on the one side of the Andes was met by 
corresponding purchases on the other, irrespective of 
cost. Of the two, Chile was better able to stand this 
constant call for money, the export duties on nitrate of 
soda providing a large and easily collected revenue, 
whereas Argentina was hampered by financial difficulties, 
a legacy from the Celman Administration ; but Chile 
found that her rival was determined to keep pace with 
her at any cost. 

Montt consented in 1894 to a transaction reflecting 
little credit upon his judgment. That was the year of 
the Chino-Japanese war, and Japan was in need of 
additional cruisers. A proposition was made to 
purchase the Chilian warship Esmeralda, but a direct 
sale of this vessel to the Japanese Government consti- 
tuted so flagrant a breach of neutrality that it was 
considered inadvisable, so a nominal disposal of the 
Esmeralda to the Government of Ecuador and her 
subsequent transfer to Japan was suggested, and to this 
the Chilian authorities assented. No doubt the price 
was high and the bargain a good one in the sense that 
enough money was obtained by Chile to purchase a 
more modern vessel, but it provoked much adverse 
criticism on the policy of the Administration. 

It was during the Presidency of Admiral Montt that 



1895] INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS 403 

the period fixed under the Treaty of Ancon for the 
Chilian occupation of the provinces of Tacna and Arica 
expired. The plebiscite to decide the permanent 
ownership of that territory should have taken place in 
May, 1894, but the internal conditions of Peru were 
complicated by an 'outbreak of revolution against Presi- 
dent Caceres, and for the moment the Peruvian Govern- 
ment was unable to negotiate on the subject of the form 
in which the vote should be taken. Moreover, the 
resources of Peru were at such low ebb that she was in 
no position to make payment to Chile of the indemnity 
of $10,000,000 stipulated by the treaty of 1883, and an 
understanding was reached between the two Govern- 
ments to take no action until a more opportune occasion 
arose. 

Some attention was devoted to the Bolivian question 
by the Montt Administration with the view to a definite 
treaty of peace between the two countries, and the 
recognition of the sovereign rights of Chile over territory 
occupied after the war of 1879, and in May, 1895, a 
treaty was signed by which Bolivia agreed to transfer 
the territory in question, but with the condition that the 
Chilian Government ceded a port to her on the Pacific 
seaboard. The districts of Tacna and Arica were to be 
handed over to Bolivia to satisfy this desire for an outlet 
to the coast, provided that the settlement with Peru re- 
sulted in favour of Chile, and in event of Tacna and Arica 
not passing to Chilian ownership, another port was to be 
given. This treaty was rejected by the Chilian Congress, 
and it was an error of the Administration to have 
negotiated on any basis which presupposed the right of 
Bolivia to a seaport. The mention of Tacna and Arica 
as territories to be transferred to Bolivia was also a 
diplomatic blunder, for the Chilian authorities were 
perfectly cognisant of Peruvian feeling about them and 
the anxiety invariably demonstrated to recover their 
possession. For Bolivia to obtain control of Tacna and 
Arica was especially galling, because it was the treaty of 
alliance with Bolivia that involved Peru in the war with 



404 CHILE 

Chile, and the idea that Bolivia should benefit by her 
misfortunes and become the owner of her lost provinces 
naturally hurt Peruvian pride. Peru has since raised 
many difficulties in negotiating with Chile in connection 
with Tacna and Arica, all in great measure due to the 
proposals made by Chile to Bolivia ; but on the other 
hand the problem was not easy for Chile. Hostile 
feeling against Argentina was strong ; in event of war, 
Bolivia as a friend was valuable, and as an enemy to be 
feared, and it was this consideration that inspired the 
negotiations in 1895. 

At the beginning of 1896 the question of the Presi- 
dency came before the country. The field was open to 
any candidates the various political parties desired to 
bring forward, President Montt declining to take any 
part in the electoral contest and all the members of his 
Administration being neutral spectators. Only two 
candidates, however, came forward, Senor Federico 
Errazuriz and Senor Vicente Reyes ; the former 
supported by the Conservatives and a section of the 
Liberals, the latter by Liberals and Radicals. Senor 
Errazuriz was the son of a former President, was 
wealthy, and had social and political influence. Senor 
Reyes had been a member of Congress, had held 
ministerial office and other public posts, and was 
respected for his statesmanlike qualities and general 
ability in dealing with public questions. Both candi- 
dates worked hard, and when the decision of the 
electors was given there was only a majority of one 
vote in favour of Errazuriz, who assumed office on 
September 18, 1896. Admiral Montt returned to his 
naval duties, and was shortly afterwards appointed 
Director- General of the Navy. 

On the whole Montt's Administration was satisfactory, 
in view of the difficulties created by the conduct and 
downfall of Balmaceda. Moderation in the treatment 
of opponents was necessary when the Congressionalists 
came into power after a bloody and hard-fought cam- 
paign, and moderation was the keynote of Montt's 



1896] PRESIDENT ERRAZURIZ ELECTED 405 

policy. His Government accomplished more in the 
direction of reconstructing political and economic life 
than could have been achieved by brilliant statesmanship 
unrestrained by a desire to restore domestic harmony. 
Immediately after the success of the Congressionalists at 
Placilla instances of personal violence to some of the 
supporters of Balmaceda did occur, but once Montt was 
in control of affairs after August 31, 1891, all outrages 
of this nature ceased. In one respect the period between 
1891 and 1896 was hampered by unexpected difficulties, 
for an economic and commercial crisis made the adminis- 
tration of public affairs more complicated than would 
otherwise have been the case ; but for the causes of that 
crisis the Government cannot be held responsible. They 
were due to agricultural depression from a series of poor 
crops, the low price of silver and copper, the result of 
the excessive issue of inconvertible paper currency by 
Balmaceda, and the overtrading which occurred at the 
end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892 ; but in spite of 
those difficulties, when Montt left the Government 
confidence in Chile and her institutions was firmly 
re-established. 

Within six months of the accession of President 
Errazuriz the Congressional elections took place, and 
the result accentuated the political confusion in the 
Chambers. The Liberals became more divided than 
formerly, and, although able to claim a majority 
whenever they united, they could never agree amongst 
themselves to sink their differences and form a strong 
combination to support a Cabinet of their own political 
colour. Crisis followed crisis in rapid succession, and it 
was only when Congress was not in session that a 
Ministry could expect to remain in power. The outcome 
was an absolute lack of continuity of policy in all 
matters connected with domestic legislation, for before 
any Ministry could formulate ideas of what action should 
be taken in regard to any question it was succeeded by 
a new Cabinet imbued with different opinions. There 
is a touch of comedy in the manner President Errazuriz 



406 CHILE 

treated this political confusion, and especially the crisis 
in April of 1901. When excitement was running high 
at the deadlock in the formation of a Ministry he sailed 
away to Robinson Crusoe's island to spend a week there, 
out of reach of the telegraph and other worries of modern 
civilisation. 

But the most serious question which confronted 
Errazuriz was the dispute with Argentina. Grave 
differences of opinion arose in connection with the 
delimitation of the frontier, the principal cause of the 
inability of the representatives of the two Governments 
to agree being the interpretation of the wording of the 
treaty. The Chilian authorities claimed that it was 
intended that the divisional line should be the highest 
peaks of the Andes where these divide the watershed ; 
the Argentines insisted that this clause meant only the 
highest peaks of the Cordillera of the Andes. Con- 
stant friction had complicated the question to an 
alarming extent between 1890 and 1898, and in the 
latter year an impasse occurred through the insistence of 
both parties on their respective claims. Congress took 
up the question, warlike speeches were made, and the 
public mind unduly excited. Not content to leave the 
affair in the hands of the Executive, both Senators and 
Deputies created embarrassments by demanding to 
know the exact stage of the negotiations, at times 
even publicly advocating an appeal to arms, and so 
excited the Chilian people that crowds shouting for 
war paraded the streets of Santiago. Preparations 
were pushed forward for the mobilisation of an army 
of 50,000 men, and matters had gone so far in August 
of 1898 that an outbreak of hostilities appeared inevit- 
able. What further complicated the situation was the 
fact that in Congress a numerous group of politicians 
wished to overthrow the sound currency standard estab- 
lished under Montt, and looked upon a war as offering 
an admirable opportunity for their purpose. The war 
scare became so intense in the third week in August 
that the banking institutions of Chile were threatened 



1898] ARGENTINA AND CHILE 407 

with a severe financial crisis, and Congress insisted on a 
suspension of the conversion until such time as calm 
was restored, a proceeding that reflected small credit on 
the Chambers. 

When war was expected almost daily, Errazuriz 
took upon himself the direction of the question with 
Argentina, demanding that the dispute be submitted to 
arbitration, the northern section to be decided by the 
representative of the United States Government in 
Argentina assisted by a Chilian and an Argentine com- 
missioner, and the southern by Her Majesty Queen 
Victoria. At first Argentina was inclined to resist 
these terms ; but it was peace or war, and in the end 
she chose peace. It was largely due to the attitude of 
President Errazuriz at this extremely critical period that 
war was averted. 

During the Errazuriz Administration lengthy negoti- 
ations took place with Peru for a settlement of the Tacna 
and Arica question. The difficulty of establishing any 
mutual understanding between the two Governments 
arose from a divergence of opinion in regard to the 
interpretation of the Treaty of Ancon in respect to the 
voting qualification of the residents in Tacna and Arica. 
That treaty says : — " A plebiscite shall decide by popular 
votation if the territory of these provinces shall remain 
definitely under the dominion and sovereignty of Chile, 
or if they shall continue to form part of the territory of 
Peru." The Chilian representatives in the negotiations 
maintained that in a plebiscite of this nature all residents 
within the territories in question were entitled to vote, 
but Peru contended that the right was restricted to 
Peruvian citizens. By an agreement in April, 1898, 
known as the Billinghurst - Latorre Protocol, it was 
proposed to submit the disputed points to the arbitra- 
tion pf the Queen -Regent of Spain, but the Chilian 
Congress refusing this proposition, a deadlock in the 
negotiations occurred and no solution of the question 
has yet been reached. 

The efforts of Errazuriz to settle the Bolivian ques- 



408 CHILE 

tion also proved abortive. In September, 1900, a note 
was presented by Senor Konig, the Chilian Minister in 
Bolivia, to the Government, offering a basis for a treaty 
of peace between Chile and Bolivia, but in which the 
cession of any seaport in Chilian territory was expressly 
excluded. This communication conveyed the additional 
information that if Bolivia refused a settlement the 
Chilian Government would feel constrained to denounce 
the agreement of truce executed in 1884. This note 
practically amounted to an ultimatum, and provoked 
such adverse expressions of opinion in the majority of 
the South American Republics that the Chilian Govern- 
ment considered it politic to deny that it was authorised. 
Viewed from a neutral standpoint, there is small reason 
why Chile should be exceptionally magnanimous in her 
treatment of Bolivia. The treaty signed in 1895, but 
subsequently rejected by the Chilian Congress, accorded 
valuable concessions to Bolivia, and while that treaty was 
pending ratification Bolivia ceded to Argentina the 
territory of the Puno de Atacama, which Chile con- 
sidered as belonging to the districts occupied by her in 
accordance with the terms of the truce with Bolivia in 
1884. In this matter Bolivia acted in bad faith, and 
after such conduct it is unreasonable to suppose that 
Chile would make unnecessary concessions to her. 

Once more, early in 1901, a presidential election 
came up. In February, Senor Pedro Montt was pro- 
claimed a candidate in Valparaiso, supported by the 
Conservatives and the Liberal - Democractic Party. 
Senor Montt had a long record of public service to 
recommend him to the electors of Chile, having been a 
prominent member of several Ministries and a member 
of Congress for a quarter of a century. In certain 
quarters hostility was shown to his candidature for the 
personal reason that in the two revolutions occurring 
during his father's presidential term many families had 
been harshly treated, and their descendants entertained 
bitter feelings against the son of the man who had 
successfully maintained his position. Montt's opponent 



1901] PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 409 

was Senor Jerman Riesco, whose candidature was pro- 
claimed by a convention of Liberal Senators, Deputies, 
and ex-Congressmen held in Santiago in March. Senor 
Riesco was a member of the Senate, but had taken 
little part in political life, and in the voting for several 
days the nomination hovered between Senor Ramon 
Barros Luco, one of the principal leaders of the revolt 
against Balmaceda, and Senor Claudio Vicuna, the 
President-elect in 1891 ; but neither of these could 
obtain the required majority, and they withdrew their 
names. 

For once the majority of the Liberals sank their 
differences and combined to defeat Senor Montt, and 
Senor Riesco was elected in June, 1901. His Adminis- 
tration has been chiefly remarkable for the final settle- 
ment of the dispute with Argentina in 1902. A few 
weeks after the presidential election, the condition of 
Senor Errazuriz, who had never enjoyed robust health, 
developed alarming symptoms, and these finally caused 
his death. For some time previously his duties had 
been discharged by the Prime Minister, Senor Zanartii, 
who now continued at the head of the Administration 
until the inauguration of President Riesco on September 
18, 1901. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

ch ile — continued 

Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal Disturbances. Movement of 
Population. . Infantile Mortality. Immigration. Araucanian 
Indians. Physical Qualities. Tendency to Drift to the Cities. 
Spread of Alcoholism. Drunkenness in Valparaiso and London. 
Regulation of Liquor Traffic. Chilians and the Government. 
Educational Facilities. Primary Instruction. Educational 
Statistics. German Schools. Secondary and Higher Education. 
Religious Liberty. Church Influence. Administration of Justice. 
Brigandage. National Character. Aggressive Nature of Chilians. 
Means of Communication. State and Private Railways. Pata- 
gonia and Tierra del Fuego. Industrial Zones. Mining Industry. 
Nitrate of Soda. Development of Tarapaca. Copper Mining. 
Want of Transport Facilities. Silver Mining. Gold and 
Manganese. Specimens of Minerals at Santiago. Coal and 
Iron. Borax. Proportion of Minerals to remainder of Exports. 
Agricultui-al Enterprise. Rapid Decadence after 1893. Pro- 
duction of Wheat. The Government and Agricultural Industi'y. 
Viticulture. Pastoral Industry. Sheep-breeding in Patagonia. 
The Lumber Trade. The Fishing Industry. Manufactures. 
Lack of Skilled Labour. Cloth and Cotton Factories. Sugar 
Refineries. Protection for Manufacturing Interests. 

Economic development in Chile has been checked for 
the past twenty-five years by international complications 
and internal disturbances. The war with Spain in 1865 
occasioned heavy monetary losses to the community, 
especially in the trade centre of Valparaiso, and after 
the country had recovered from its effects it was plunged 
into a crisis by the quarrel with Bolivia and Peru. 

This second war was a heavy drain on the country 
owing to the necessity of sending an army to the front. 






1903] FOREIGN AND CIVIL WARS 411 

The able-bodied men engaged in industrial pursuits 
were required for military service in such large numbers 
that between the years 1879 and 1882 the remainder 
of the population consisted in great part only of old 
men, women and children, and in such circumstances 
rapid economic progress could not be expected. A few 
years of peace followed the victory of the Chilians, and 
then came the events of 1891 to throw the country once 
more into confusion. After the downfall of Balmaceda 
economic conditions were unsatisfactory, for the struggle 
had shaken the Republic to its foundations, and from the 
evil effects Chile is still suffering, her troubles having 
been aggravated during the last decade by constant 
alarms of a possible outbreak of hostilities with Argentina 
and by unstable domestic politics. Constant wrangling 
in Congress has so engrossed the attention of the 
Chambers that no time has been available for the con- 
sideration of the true interests of the country, and the 
largely increased naval and military expenditure has left 
no revenue to aid in the development of the country's 
resources. 

In the economic evolution of Chile the movement of 
population is an important factor, and the small rate of 
its increase a serious drawback. In the ten years 
between 1885 and 1895 the population has increased by 
only 184,825 to a total of 2,712,145, of whom 1,240,353 
were urban and 1,471,792 rural. As Chilian territory 
comprises 290,000 square miles, the average is but nine 
inhabitants to the mile. In 1895 the average death-rate 
was 34 per thousand, and very much higher in the cities. 
Santiago being credited with 72 and Valparaiso 67 per 
thousand ; in the former city 12,057 deaths were 
registered in 1899 and only 10,379 births, while in 
Valparaiso the figures were 6256 deaths and 6408 births. 
The high death-rate in Chile is accounted for by the 
heavy infantile mortality from contagious diseases, 
inadequate attention, hereditary alcoholism, and a 
general absence of hygienic precautions. 

Immigration is small, and the number of foreigners 



412 CHILE 

in the Republic in 1895 was placed at 72,812. Of these, 
42,105 were Europeans, 701 citizens of the United 
States, 28,986 natives of other South American countries, 
and 1020 other nationalities ; the total increase in the 
foreign population between 1885 and 1895 being only 
7812 persons. The European residents include 8296 
Spaniards, 7809 French, 7049 Germans, 7587 Italians, 
and 6241 British. In the southern districts near Valdivia 
are many Germans, whilst in Valparaiso and Iquique 
the British community is largely represented, the 
remainder of the foreign population being scattered over 
the country, with, however, one-third of the French 
residents in Santiago. A comparison of immigration to 
Chile with that to Argentina and Brazil is much to the 
advantage of the latter countries ; and this is an im- 
portant fact in view of the low rate of increase amongst 
the natives, since it means that in a few years Chile must 
be overshadowed by the numerical superiority of her sister 
republics, unless means can be found to bring about an 
improvement. Undoubtedly Santiago could be improved 
to the benefit of public health ; but effective action in 
this or any useful direction requires men at the head of 
affairs who will work wisely and patiently for the wel- 
fare of the community, and such men are not prominent 
in Chile to-day. 

The Indian population of Araucania is rapidly dis- 
appearing, becoming merged with the mixed race of 
Spanish and Indian blood forming the majority of the 
Chilians, or dying out, as such Indian races do when 
brought into contact with modern civilisation. With 
the elimination of the Araucanians Chile loses a 
picturesque element in her civic life. In the past they 
were regarded as dangerous to the community, and 
hunted down unmercifully, they in turn raiding settle- 
ments and committing outrages whenever opportunity 
offered ; but for the last twenty years they have steadily 
shrank in numbers and gradually drifted out of the 
more central districts to the forest country of the 
south. They seldom care for steady work, and, as a 



1903] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 413 

rule, live in abject poverty, subsisting on the produce of 
small patches of cultivated ground and such wild food 
and game as they can find in the woods. 

In physique the Chilians are a more hardy race than 
is generally found in South America. They are moun- 
taineers or live by the seashore, where they grow to man- 
hood, always fighting the forces of nature. Thus they 
have developed in all classes a sturdy quality in the strain 
of Spanish blood which showed its value when they 
measured strength with the Bolivians and Peruvians, 
and was proved again in the desperate struggle which 
took place in 1891, but to some extent this hardiness 
has been undermined in recent years by a marked 
tendency of the rural population to drift into the towns 
and by the steady spread of alcoholism. Town-crowd- 
ing is due to the decline of the agricultural industry, owing 
to poor harvests and the absence of adequate security for 
life and property in the country districts, but the 
excessive consumption of strong liquors dates many 
years back. The Chilians were addicted to drink before 
the war with Bolivia and Peru; but it expanded the 
habit, for the soldiers found liquor plentiful during the 
campaigns, and after the war ended and the troops 
returned home the increase of drunkenness became most 
noticeable. To such a height has the abuse of alcohol 
now grown in Chile that official statistics show the 
consumption to be nearly four gallons of raw spirit 
annually per head of population, liquor mostly of the 
worst quality. Spirit distilled from rotten wheat, 
potatoes, maize, and the refuse from the wine-making 
establishments, is the poison eating into the life of the 
Chilian nation, and the Government is supine in the 
matter, while private crusades attempted by a few clear 
sighted individuals have been powerless as yet to check 
the evil. As an example, compare Valparaiso in 1898 
with London. Valparaiso has a population of 140,000 
inhabitants, London one of 5,000,000 ; in Valparaiso 
there were six hundred more cases of drmikenness dealt 
with by the police authorities than came before the 



414 CHILE 

London magistrates in the same year ; probably the 
disparity would be even greater, but in Chile arrests for 
intoxication are seldom made unless individuals are 
unable to walk or dangerous to their neighbours. 

It is in the regulation of the liquor traffic and the 
alleviation of the conditions of the agricultural com- 
munity that the Government has failed in its duty dur- 
ing the last few years, and this inaction has helped 
to intensify the economic depression from which the 
country is now suffering. Primarily the fault lies with 
Congress, where Senators and Deputies are too busy 
attending to their own small political interests to pay 
any attention to the public welfare, but the Executive 
must also bear a portion of the blame. If the President 
was determined to prevent the Chilians from dropping 
into the threatened abyss, he would find strong support 
for his policy ; but no such energetic movement has 
been hinted at, and matters drift from bad to worse 
with hardly a protest. It is clear that unless the liquor 
traffic is controlled and agricultural industry revived, the 
prosperity which Chile enjoyed in former years will be 
greatly curtailed. 

There is another serious peril. A quarter of a 
century ago the Chilians were self-reliant and cared 
little for official assistance, and it is only necessary to 
compare the national feeling in 1875 with that in 1904 
to recognise the change that has occurred in this respect. 
Before the war with Peru the Government was poor 
and had a hard struggle to pay its way, but the capture 
of Tarapaca suddenly made Chile wealthy to an extent 
never previously contemplated. The duties levied on 
exported nitrate of soda brought into the exchequer a 
large and constantly increasing revenue, and gradually 
the Chilians realised that with these abundant resources 
official positions could be created and life made easy in 
various ways. In the past twenty years people of all 
classes have therefore come to look on the Government 
as a milch cow, and succeeding Administrations have 
not possessed sufficient determination to resist this 



1903] EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 415 

popular inclination. This is a fast growing evil to-day 
in Chile, and one every year more difficult to abate. 
Chilians of twenty-five years ago only insisted on liberty 
to work for themselves : Chilians of the present time 
want no work as long as funds are forthcoming from 
official sources for their support. 

Education has received considerable attention from 
the Government at various periods, but there is still 
much room for improvement. Primary education has 
been sacrificed to permit greater support to be extended 
to higher education, with the result that the class of 
inhabitants which benefits most by the bounty of the 
State is the one best able to defray the cost for itself. 
This tendency of the influential classes to monopolise 
the State revenues has led the authorities to neglect the 
general progress of the population and pander to a 
comparatively limited circle. 

How matters stand in regard to elementary educa- 
tion may be judged by the official returns published for 
1895, the most recent available. The census showed that 
out of a total population of 2,712,145 only 756,893 
persons, or 28 per cent., were able to read and write. 
The number of children between the ages of five and 
fifteen was given as 674,955, of whom 141,829 were 
enrolled on the registers of public and private schools ; 
but the actual attendance at public schools for the year 
was 33,746 boys and 36,861 girls, and 15,885 boys and 
10,409 girls more went to private schools, these figures 
showing that only 96,901 children were receiving 
instruction out of the total of 674,955 who should 
have been at school. Nor is the condition of affairs in 
Santiago at all satisfactory, for out of a population of 
256,413 only 116,556 could read and write, while the 
number of children between the ages of five and fifteen 
was 47,025, of whom only 13,066 attended school. 

Public instruction is gratuitous but not obligatory. 
This freedom and the apathetic indifference of the 
public combine to ensure the scanty attendance of the 
children. In 1899 the number of public schools was 



416 CHILE 

1403, and of private 445, the latter including 148 schools 
for boys, 50 for girls, and 247 for both sexes ; the public 
and private schools combined numbering 1848, equal to 
one school for 365 children, so it is clear that the facili- 
ties for primary education are inadequate, and would be 
shockingly so did thirst for knowledge replace indiffer- 
ence among the masses. Instruction in the 1403 public 
schools in 1895 was conducted by 452 masters and 296 
assistants, and by 978 mistresses with 573 assistants — a 
total staff of 2299 ; but the payment of these teachers is 
at a very low rate, often barely sufficient to provide 
actual necessities of life, and never inviting enough to 
secure the services of highly-trained professionals. 

In the south, where the Germans are numerous, 
elementary education is on a much better basis. The 
schools at Yaldivia, Llanquihue, Osorno, and other 
places are under German preceptors, and the contrast 
between these establishments and those left to Chilian 
direction is most marked. The Government recognises 
the benefit these German schools confer upon the 
community, and encourages their existence by an 
annual subvention. In many of them the language used 
is German, Spanish being taught only on certain days 
in the week, but all the formalities required by Chilian 
law are duly fulfilled. 

The supervision of education in Chile is delegated to 
a Council of Public Instruction, comprising the Minister 
of Public Instruction, the Rector and the Secretary- 
General of the University, the five senior members of 
the Faculties, the Rector of the National Institute, 
three members nominated by the President, and two 
delegates elected by the University — in all fourteen 
members. This council has the right to decide what 
qualifications are necessary for teachers, and also to 
maintain a general check on the educational courses and 
the standard required for periodical examinations. 

For secondary and higher education, colleges and 
lyceums have been established in Santiago and the 
provinces, and thirty are open, the principal being the 









' 4 ^Jur 



An Araucanian Type. 



[Face page 412. 



1903] THE CHURCH IN CHILE 417 

National Institute at Santiago, where 1168 pupils 
attended in 1899. Scholarships are given there, and in 
1899 the number of students obtaining money premiums 
was 104. Instruction is free, but the cost of individual 
maintenance must be defrayed from private funds, the 
average expense to the State in 1899 for each student 
under instruction being $218 T w. The number of 
students attending the thirty colleges in the Republic in 
1899 was 4996, and the professors employed 419. There 
are eight colleges for girls, at which the average attend- 
ance in 1899 was 896 pupils, whose studies were 
superintended by 8 male and 87 female professors. In 
addition to the colleges and lyceums directly administered 
by the State, there are Church seminaries to which 
annual subventions are paid by the Government, and 
others under control of the clergy, which are without 
public assistance. 

At Santiago is the State University, where degrees 
in law, mathematical sciences, medicine, and fine arts 
are granted, and some 1700 students were inscribed on 
the rolls in 1899, 573 degrees being conferred in that 
year. In addition to the State University there is the 
Catholic University conducted strictly under the auspices 
of the Church, and this institution also confers degrees 
which are recognised by the State for legal and other 
professions. At both universities the instruction im- 
parted is sound, and in many cases it is directed by 
specialists of Chilian or foreign nationality. In all 
phases of secondary and higher education the careful 
supervision of the authorities is noticeable, the more so 
when the neglect of primary instruction is considered. 

In Chile there is religious liberty for all creeds, but 
the Roman Catholic faith is protected by the State and 
forms an important factor in the national life. In 1899 
the funds devoted by the Government in aid of the 
Church and the various religious institutions was 
$942,508. Both politically and socially, the Catholic 
Church has a widely extended influence, and is 
extremely wealthy apart from the assistance it receives 

2d 



418 CHILE 

from the State. Practically all Chilians are Roman 
Catholics, but of the foreigners some 16,000, chiefly 
Germans, British, Scandinavians, North Americans and 
Austrians, out of a total foreign population of 72,000, 
are Protestants. 

The administration of justice in Chile leaves much 
to be desired. Complaints are frequent that the 
formalities of the courts are often so unwieldy as to 
render equitable dispensation of the laws a practical 
impossibility. The sum allotted from the national 
revenues in 1899 for the maintenance of the judiciary 
was $1,881,360, which is more than adequate payment 
for the duties entailed. The laws are codified, and 
would meet the public needs if reforms were introduced 
to expedite civil and criminal procedure, and, as 
elsewhere in South America, the system is based on 
the Spanish laws in force when these countries were 
colonies of Spain. While the courts are unsatisfactory 
the condition of the police is infinitely worse, and pro- 
tection for life and property can hardly be said to exist 
in any outlying districts, and even near Santiago and 
Valparaiso cases of assault and highway robbery in 
broad daylight daily occur. An organised system of 
brigandage has developed of late years, and although 
the authorities are perfectly cognisant of this condition 
of affairs, no steps are taken to clear the country of a 
pest which retards progress and threatens ruin to many 
branches of industrial enterprise. 

The Chilian national character has undergone a 
marked change in recent years. Previous to the war 
with Peru the dominant note was a desire for peace 
and ample opportunity for industrial pursuits. The 
people were ready to fight if forced into a corner, though 
never anxious for an appeal to arms. But the victories 
over the Bolivians and Peruvians convinced the Chilians 
that they were superior to their neighbours as a fighting 
race, and pride buried the former wish to avert any 
serious conflict. Aggressiveness became dominant both 
in public and private life, but would have done little 



1903] NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 419 

harm had it not been accompanied by those other 
influences already mentioned which modified the qualities 
that had enabled Chile to defeat her adversaries, the 
debasing influences of sudden wealth. Thus the evolution 
of the last twenty years has been productive of arrogance 
of bearing, and the old self-reliant spirit has given place 
to bluster and an inclination to make the Government 
the universal provider. The more wealthy section of 
the population still retains its shrewdness, but warped 
by aggressive tendencies, and the lower class imitate 
their betters. It is hence no exaggeration to say that 
the dominant traits of the national character to-day are 
brusqueness, aggressiveness, and a tendency to domineer, 
arising from the belief that prestige as a fighting people 
and the financial resources of the Government will carry 
Chile successfully through all international difficulties. 
In one respect the Chilians have an advantage over other 
South American countries, they are patriotic because 
they are still one people without any constant influx of 
foreign blood to lessen or alloy their ideals as Chilians 
of the cause for which they must fight and, if necessary, 
give their lives. 

Economic development has been severely checked 
by inadequate means of communication and transport. 
For years railway extension has been contemplated, but 
through lack of funds or political disturbances the work 
has made slow progress, and there is a decided disinclina- 
tion to permit private enterprise to provide the additional 
means of communication so urgently needed. The out- 
come is that the railways at the commencement of 1901 
were only 2890 miles in length, of which the State owns 
1460 and private enterprise 1430 miles. In the central 
centre and south the greater part of the system is 
controlled by the Government and in the north chiefly 
by private owners. The management on the State 
owned lines is the cause of constant complaint— service 
irregular, rolling stock deficient, accidents and loss of 
life frequent — while on the railways belonging to private 
enterprise few of these defects are found. But the 



420 CHILE 

lesson carries no weight with the Government, for State 
lines are an admirable political machine, to alienate which 
would raise the most violent opposition amongst poli- 
ticians. 

In a mountainous country such as Chile roads as 
well as railways are necessary to allow the natural 
resources to be developed. Money is regularly voted 
for repairs to existing highways and the construction of 
new ones, but only a small proportion of the funds so 
provided is legitimately expended. Dishonest contractors 
benefit to a large extent by the appropriations, so the 
agricultural and mining industries struggle along as best 
they can, and must be content with mule tracks because 
the authorities will make no effort at improvements. 
The sea affords a means of easy transport ; but roads 
and railways are needed to reach the coast, and shipping 
facilities required to enable the produce to be handled. 

In one district, however, economic progress during 
the past decade has been exceptionally rapid. The 
Straits of Magellan have undergone a development 
which has converted barren wastes into wealth -producing 
properties, and the sheep farming industry has been 
the backbone of this movement. The town of Punta 
Arenas, in the centre of these districts, from an insignifi- 
cant village has become a thriving city of 10,000 
inhabitants, and streets lighted by electricity have taken 
the place of the mud tracks of ten years ago. Hovels 
have been replaced by comfortable houses, and on all 
sides are signs of vigorous prosperity in this southern 
corner of Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego also sharing in 
this development. 

For convenience in reviewing industrial enterprise 
in Chile, the country may be roughly divided into four 
zones. The most northern of these sections lies between 
the parallels of latitudes 18° to 27°, and includes the 
provinces of Tacna, Tarapaca, Antofagasta, and a part 
of Atacama. In these districts are narrow valleys, a 
limited water supply, no rainfall, sparse vegetation, and 
a comparatively healthy climate. On the coast are 



1903] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 421 

depositions of guano ; a few miles inland is found nitrate 
of soda and borax ; and further in the interior are 
mines of copper, silver, gold, sulphur, and other minerals, 
this section being devoted to mining enterprise. 

The zone lying between latitude 27° and 32°, and 
comprising part of Atacama and the provinces of 
Coquimbo and Aconcagua, contains deposits of copper, 
silver, iron, manganese, lead, cinnabar, and other metals, 
and fertile valleys watered by streams from the Andine 
ranges permit extensive agriculture. The third section 
is between latitude 32° and 43°, and contains the 
Provinces of Valparaiso, Santiago, O'Higgins, Colchagua, 
Curico, Talca, Linnares, Maule, Nuble, Concepcion, 
Bio -Bio, Arauco, Malleco Cautin, Valdivia, Llanquihue, 
and the northern part of the island of Chiloe, and is 
chiefly agricultural, especially in the great central valley 
extending from Santiago to Valdivia. In this zone are 
the coal-mining districts near Concepcion and Arauco. 
The fourth section is the country lying between latitude 
43° and 57°, and here the mainland is rugged and 
mountainous, while an archipelago is formed by the 
islands of Chiloe, Guaitecas, Guayaneco, the Magallanes, 
and Tierra del Fuego. The characteristic features are 
heavy forests, valleys suitable for grazing cattle and 
sheep, and an abundance of fish in the vicinity of the 
islands, industrial enterprise consisting principally of 
cutting lumber, breeding sheep and cattle, and fishing. 

It is from the mining industry that Chile draws her 
principal wealth. The chief branch is the extraction 
and preparation of nitrate of soda for exportation, and 
the development of this enterprise during the past quarter 
of a century has been large. In 1878, when the nitrate 
districts were under Peruvian and Bolivian control, the 
total amount shipped was only 7,023,000 Spanish quintals 
of 102 pounds weight, and in the two succeeding years 
the production fell away during the war. By 1881, 
Tarapaca, the centre of the nitrate industry, was under 
Chilian administration, and a revival of the industry took 
place, the exportation reaching 7,734,000 Spanish quintals, 



422 CHILE 

a steady increase occurring until, in 1884, no less than 
12,152,000 quintals were sent abroad. A crisis in the 
nitrate market then resulted from over-production, and 
in 1885-6 the shipments decreased twenty-five per cent., 
but this check was only temporary, and in 1889 the 
exportation rose to 20,182,000 quintals, and in the 
following twelvemonth further increased to 28,373,000 
quintals. Again the markets were flooded, and for 
three years smaller shipments were made, a widespread 
opinion existing that an annual output of 20,000,000 
quintals was the largest amount the world could absorb. 
The propaganda to demonstrate the value of nitrate as 
a fertiliser altered previously existing conditions, and 
once more the exportation increased, the amount shipped 
in 1895 being 27,285,205 quintals, rising in 1898 to 
28,468,110 quintals, and in 1899 to 30,209,192 quintals. 
In 1900 it increased to 31,549,653 quintals, valued at 
eight millions sterling — equal to two-thirds of the total 
value of Chilian products exported to foreign countries. 
It is evident from these figures that the acquisition of 
the nitrate districts of Tarapaca from Peru entirely 
revolutionised the industrial enterprise of Chile, the 
production of nitrate becoming the factor of most im- 
portance. 

How important the industry has become, apart from 
the value of the product, can be judged from the fact 
that in fifty-eight establishments for the extraction and 
preparation of nitrate 18,914 persons were employed 
in 1900, and no fewer than seven seaports are now 
dependent for their existence on the traffic shipments. 
Through these seven ports the export in 1899 was — 
Pisagua, 77,465 tons; Junin, 112,243 tons; Caleta 
Buena, 262,136 tons; Iquique, 674,397 tons; Tocopilla, 
150,505 tons; Taltal, 90,546; and Antofagasta, 22,328 
tons. 

The danger that the nitrate deposits may be shortly 
exhausted and leave Chile bereft of this great source of 
wealth is not one to be seriously contemplated at present, 
for careful surveys show that in 1899 there still remained 



1903] PRODUCTION OF NITRATE OF SODA 423 

the following quantities of raw material — Tarapaca, 
private property 407,160,000 quintals, and owned by 
the Government 165,888,513 quintals; Toco, private 
138,112,000 quintals, and Government 87,726,769 
quintals; Aguas Blancas and Antofagasta, 153,000,000 
quintals in private hands; and at Taltal, 151,984,500 
quintals privately owned — giving a total of 1,103,871,782 
quintals still to be extracted. Allowing for a large 
annual increase in production, the life of these grounds 
is not less than twenty-five years, and in all probability 
other deposits will be discovered before the present 
ones are exhausted. The capital invested in the nitrate 
industry and the railways to transport the output to the 
ports is estimated at £12,000,000, the greater portion 
belonging to foreigners, principally British. 

Next in importance to nitrate in Chilian mining 
industry is copper. In former years Chile held second 
place in the world's production of this metal, but low 
prices prevailing for a lengthy period so injuriously 
affected the Chilian mines that the output sank until 
the average annual exportation was only 20,000 tons. 
Better values for the last three years have brightened 
prospects ; many new ventures have been started, and 
when these reach the producing stage, shipments will 
show a decided increase. Of low-grade ores Chile has 
an unlimited supply, but lack of adequate means of 
communication has rendered impossible any systematic 
attempt to work the deposits, and it has only been when 
they are exceptionally rich that successful ventures have 
been made. Transport in the copper districts is by 
mules, no roads being available for wheeled traffic. 
The condition of the copper -industry is one urgently 
requiring energetic action on the part of the Govern- 
ment, for with an adequate system of roads and railways 
to cheapen the cost of working and admit of low-grade 
ores being mined at a profit, the output could be increased 
threefold, and long before the nitrate grounds of Tarapaca 
are exhausted, copper mining would be ready to fill the 
void in industrial life that must occur if the exportation 



424 CHILE 

of nitrate of soda declines. The authorities are aware 
of the enormous wealth contained in the copper deposits, 
and they know that difficulty of transport is the principal 
cause of the unsatisfactory condition into which the 
industry has fallen ; but no steps are taken to remedy 
the evil, and this supine policy has prevented Chile from 
reaping any great benefit through the recent high prices 
for the metal. It is not that the Government is without 
funds for the work necessary to place the copper industry 
on a satisfactory basis, for the revenues derived from 
the export of nitrate are sufficient to establish means of 
communication throughout the copper districts ; but 
these resources annually disappear in unnecessarily 
heavy naval and military expenditure, or are utilised to 
maintain employes whose services could be dispensed 
with, and the country be the better administered. 

Silver mining has suffered from the prevalence of 
low prices. The same difficulties which have prevented 
the development of the copper industry have caused the 
abandonment of a large proportion of the silver enter- 
prises, and mines that were profitable when prices were 
higher can only be worked at a loss with silver at its 
present value, not on account of any lack of moderately 
rich ore, but because the cost of carriage renders expenses 
abnormally high. The average annual export of silver 
for the last few years has been 5,000,000 ounces, and 
under improved conditions this amount might be doubled 
or trebled. Gold mining is only attempted to a small 
extent, and the total amount of this metal exported in 
1898 was valued at only £183,621. Of manganese 
21,000 tons are annually shipped abroad, and the quantity 
could be largely augmented. Other metals and minerals 
are exported in small parcels. In no way can an idea 
of the mineral wealth of Chile be better obtained than 
by an inspection of specimens in the museum at Santiago, 
and a glance at this collection shows how widely 
extended is the mineral area, every specimen being 
tabulated with data indicating in what district it was 
found. 



1903J THE MINING INDUSTRY 425 

Coal mining is another most important branch of 
Chilian industry. At present it is confined to the mines 
of Concepcion and Arauco, but deposits exist further 
to the south on the Pacific coast, near Punta Arenas in 
the Straits of Magellan, and in Tierra del Fuego. One 
million tons are mined annually in the Concepcion and 
Arauco districts, and while the coal is described as 
"dirty," and not equal to English or Australian, it is 
the custom of steamers homeward bound to Europe to 
take supplies at Coronel or Lota, and vessels on the 
Chilian coast use it, as also the Chilian fleet and rail- 
ways. For gas-making this coal is stated to be excep- 
tionally good. So far, the production from the mines in 
Concepcion and Arauco has been restricted by the 
scanty labour supply, and the quantity mined has been 
insufficient for the local demand, importation from Europe 
and Australia consequently taking place to a considerable 
extent ; but the future development of this industry is 
assured, all that is needed being additional capital to 
increase the output and so permanently exclude foreign 
coal from the Chilian markets. 

The existence of coal over widely distributed areas 
is especially valuable in view of the fact that iron ores 
are abundant in the central and southern districts, and 
with coal and iron in close proximity there should be 
no doubt of industrial expansion in the future. Hitherto 
the price of Chilian coal has prohibited undertakings for 
the manufacture of iron and steel ; but such conditions 
cannot last, and signs are not lacking that a change is 
coming. The deposits are so extensive, that instead of 
a million tons, four times that amount should be available, 
and competition will lower existing prices to European 
and United States rates. The establishment of smelting 
works and factories to supply local demand for iron and 
steel must follow. 

One other mineral product must be mentioned, viz., 
borax, the export of which has assumed large proportions 
of recent years. The annual output is estimated at 
3200 tons, shipped principally from Antofagasta, but in 



426 



CHILE 



Tarapaca large deposits exist, although few attempts 
have been made to turn them to aceount. But the 
industry is destined to grow. 

To understand the paramount importance of mining 
in the industrial life of Chile, it is only necessary to 
glance at the exports in 1899, and the proportion of the 
different products in the list. The following table 
shows : — 



National Exportation, 1899. 


Dollars of 
18 pence. 


Per cent, 
of total. 


1. Products of mining enterprise 

2. „ agricultural enterprise . 

3. „ manufacturing enterprise 

4. „ viticultural enterprise . 

5. „ pastoral enterprise 

6. „ various enterprises 

7. Gold and silver coin exported . 

8. Merchandise nationalised 

9. Coin re-exported .... 




137,637,603 

10,597,870 

3,862,117 

328,615 

5,050,108 

1,460,424 

2,595,577 

1,172,164 

401,655 


84-39 
650 
2-36 
0-20 
3-09 
0-89 
1-59 
0-73 
0-25 


Total of exports 




163,106,133 


100-00 



With 84 '39 per cent, of the total value of products 
shipped abroad, it is clear that the mineral industry is 
the backbone of Chilian prosperity. 

Agricultural enterprise in Chile has shown most 
unmistakable decadence in recent times. Twenty-five 
years ago the farming industry was the real mainstay 
of the country ; it afforded means of livelihood to more 
than two-thirds of the population, and landed pro- 
prietors resided on their estates and superintended their 
properties. Wheat was a principal article of export to 
Europe, and between 1880 and 1890 Chilian grain was 
a factor of some importance in the Liverpool market. 
The production of barley, although not so great as 
wheat, was also large. To achieve this result necessi- 
tated steady and laborious application by the majority 
of the inhabitants, and this gave a sturdy tone to the 



1903] AGRICULTURE 427 

national character at the critical period when Chile was 
confronted with difficult problems, the solution of which 
depended in great measure on ability to face physical 
hardships of unusual severity. After 1880 the condition 
of agricultural industry changed, and a tendency arose 
for the owners of properties to congregate in the cities, 
the administration of the farms being deputed to agents 
and managers. At first this altered state of affairs made 
small difference in the output of farm products, because 
the men left in charge were, as a rule, old servants who 
faithfully executed the duties entrusted to their care. 
Other causes, however, were at work to undermine the 
supremacy of agriculture in Chile. The development of 
the nitrate industry in Tarapaca called for able-bodied 
men from the central and southern districts, and the 
attraction of high wages drew many thousand agricultural 
labourers to the north. 

When the civil war of 1891 occurred agriculture was 
drifting to a critical stage, and the effects of the struggle 
between Balmaceda and Congress was to accelerate its 
decline, the thousands of men killed and wounded 
creating a shortage of labour in the central districts. 
The military regime during the greater part of 1891 
unsettled the entire population, and produced a constant 
stream of immigration from the rural districts to the 
towns. Then came the disbandment of the troops 
when peace was re-established, and the alarming increase 
in brigandage. These untoward changes were not at 
first noted owing to the extensive areas of new agri- 
cultural lands opened in the south during the years 
immediately preceding 1891. Cultivation of the virgin 
soil of these new districts gave heavy yields of grain, 
and counterbalanced the decreasing production of the 
older agricultural areas. But it was not long before the 
newer districts also began to suffer, and the harvest of 
1892-3 was the last which left any large surplus of grain 
for export, and the decadence of agricultural enterprise 
became rapid after 1893. Inclement seasons accentuated 
the depression, and lack of protection for life and property 



428 CHILE 

made residence a practical impossibility in many of the 
rural districts. Therefore the habit of landed proprietors 
to leave everything in connection with their estates in 
the hands of agents became general, and led to the 
neglect of farming, each year witnessing a decrease in 
production. To such an extent has the mischief now 
spread, that in place of an annual exportation of 200,000 
tons of grain, the present supply is insufficient to meet 
home demands, and in 1901 cargoes of wheat were 
brought from Australia and the United States to make 
good the local deficiency. In 1899 the value of all 
agricultural products shipped abroad only represented 
6 1 per cent, of the total export trade, and even this small 
proportion has been reduced in the last three years. 

The decay of agriculture explains to a great extent 
the extreme poverty among the mass of the Chilians, for 
in the central districts, where the country is most 
densely inhabited, nothing has taken its place. How 
great the shrinkage has been may be judged from the 
value of the surplus products derived from agricultural 
pursuits, which is now estimated to be worth £400,000 
as against £3,000,000 a few years ago ; in other words, 
the average gain for each of the 2,000,000 persons 
directly or indirectly dependent upon agriculture has 
been reduced from thirty shillings per head to four 
shillings. Nor are any adequate steps attempted by the 
Government to remedy this condition of affairs. While 
money is lavished on the naval and military forces, no 
effort is made to establish an efficient constabulary to 
protect farmers from the depredations of the hordes of 
robbers infesting with impunity the rural districts. The 
construction of roads and railways to aid in cheapening 
the cost of farming is sometimes discussed by the 
Executive and Congress, but nothing practical has been 
initiated in recent years, and on all sides Chilian agri- 
cultural prospects are gloomy in the extreme. 

That the Government could accomplish much towards 
the salvation of the country's agriculture, is evident to 
the most unpractical eye. Water is the one essential 



1903] NECESSITY OF IRRIGATION WOBKS 429 

thing in the central and northern districts, for irrigation 
is the keynote to agricultural enterprise in Chile, and a 
cheap water supply would immensely benefit the farmers. 
It is for the Government to elaborate a practical plan for 
storing the abundant supplies in the mountain ranges, 
and to regulate this distribution to districts at present 
under cultivation, and also over the large areas of desert, 
as on the eastern slope of the pampa of Tamarugal, 
which only require moisture to develop amazing fertility. 
That any obstacle exists to prevent adequate protection 
for life and property is not even suggested ; the Govern- 
ment is simply lacking in energy and initiative. Roads 
and railways are a question of the necessary money to 
defray the cost of construction, and the selection of 
competent and honest contractors to execute the work 
required. Money the Government would have in plenty 
if a more economical system guided the general adminis- 
tration of the revenues, and honest contractors can be 
found quickly enough if no favouritism is shown in the 
choice. Such improvements need a policy of progress, 
and that of the Chilian Government during the last few 
years has been one of drift. 

Viticulture is another industry of considerable 
importance, the climate being exceptionally favourable 
for vineyards, especially in the central districts, where 
they chiefly are. Of late years, the area planted had 
increased substantially, and the quantity of wine now 
made is sufficient to meet the home demand. While, 
however, improvements have been introduced in the 
process of the manufacture of both red and white wines, 
there is still room for progress, for the product now 
placed on the market has certain acid qualities that 
militate against its sale in foreign countries, and 
effectually prevent its introduction abroad in spite of 
many trials. By some people this acidity is attributed 
to the excessive amount of copper in the soil, by others 
to a faulty process in the manufacture, but an investiga- 
tion by experts would probably solve the doubt and 
find the remedy. Meanwhile, vine growers and Govern- 



430 CHILE 

pent alike do little or nothing. A species of brandy 
known as "pisco" is also largely manufactured, and 
finds a ready local sale, while another produce is 
"chicha," a liquid made from fresh fruit, and not 
unlike cider. 

Pastoral industry shows a tendency to increase ; but 
the live stock is insufficient to meet home requirements, 
and the custom has been to import annually herds of 
cattle from Argentina to supply the Chilian markets. 
Lately, a heavy tax has been imposed on imported 
animals to encourage local industry, and the higher 
prices now ruling should be an inducement to stock 
breeding on a more extended scale. In the central 
districts, cattle and sheep are raised to a large extent 
on lucerne, and the quality of the meat is excellent, but 
it is in the south that the development of the industry 
may be expected to make most progress, for there 
millions of acres at present lie waste which might pro- 
fitably be stocked. Gradually these districts are being 
utilised ; but here again comes the necessity for pro- 
tection against the gangs of bandits, and until measures 
are taken to suppress them, the development of this 
branch of industrial enterprise must be restricted. In 
Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego sheep breeding has 
been successful, and the sheep thrive in spite of severe 
winter seasons, although in years of exceptional snowfall 
heavy mortality occurs amongst them. It is the sheep 
farming near Punta Arenas which has caused that 
locality to develop from a convict settlement into a busy 
trading centre within the last twenty years. 

Of the less important rural industries, the principal 
are apiculture, in the province of Llanquihue, whence 
some 70,000 barrels of honey are annually exported to 
Europe ; the lumber trade in the south ; and fishing. 
The southern districts of Chile are rich in valuable 
timber, but difficulty of access to the forest regions from 
the seaboard has hindered development of the lumber 
trade, and timber is imported from abroad in large 
quantities instead of utilising the native resources. 




[Face page 430. 



1903] MANUFACTURES 431 

This anomaly is unlikely to last long now, and once the 
natural wealth of the forest area is understood and 
appreciated, and means of transport provided, it will 
supply all home wants and leave an ample surplus for 
export. 

No systematic efforts have been made to develop 
the fisheries, which in the southern waters contain a 
vast variety of fish. Fishing merely provides desultory 
occupation for a small proportion of the inhabitants on 
the coast, and an irregular supply to the towns. The 
oyster beds of Chiloe are worked to some extent, but 
never sufficiently to meet the demand of the northern 
markets. Recently, cod-curing and lobster-canning 
works have been started on the island of Juan Fernandez, 
Robinson Crusoe's Island, the centre of one of the 
richest fishing grounds in the world, and some 400 miles 
from Valparaiso. 

Manufacturing industry has not made great progress 
in Chile in spite of the fact that raw material and fuel 
are abundant, and labour cheap. The reason for this 
backwardness is to be found to some extent in the 
absence of skilled labour to direct the working of 
factories, and the lack of capital to initiate new under- 
takings. Breweries, however, have been erected at 
Valdivia, Valparaiso, Santiago, Concepcion, Limache, 
and other places, and the beer consumed in the country 
is almost exclusively of local manufacture. Tanneries 
also are established on a comparatively extensive scale, 
especially in the vicinity of Valdivia, while at Concep- 
cion cloth and cotton factories on a limited scale are 
now producing textiles of fair quality, and flour mills 
have been built in different districts. The manufacture 
of biscuits, too, is a thriving industry, rapidly ousting 
the foreign article. Sugar refineries import the raw 
material and supply local demand, and iron foundries 
have proved a profitable enterprise, important works of 
this description existing at Valparaiso and elsewhere, 
but the raw material is foreign. Recently, the duties 
on many articles of imported merchandise have been 



432 CHILE 

increased in the hope that the higher tariff would induce 
an extension of domestic manufactures, an expectation 
to some extent realised, factories for the production of 
soap, candles, matches, cigarettes, and many other such 
articles having been established. Circumstances in 
Chile are so favourable that the existing apathy in 
regard to the production of home-made goods cannot 
possibly continue much longer. Both on the score of 
economy and because such enterprises can be made 
profitable, there is every reason for the Chilians to 
extend manufacturing enterprise in all its branches. 
Energetic action and the introduction of skilled 
mechanics to superintend the work, is all that is neces- 
sary to ensure a satisfactory result for such undertakings. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Position of Atacama. Chile and Bolivia. The Guano Deposits. 
Bolivian Claims. Dispute in 1861. Situation in 1864. War 
between Peru and Spain. Treaty between Bolivia and Chile. 
Bad Faith of Bolivia. Intrigues by Peru. Treaty between 
Bolivia and Peru. Relations between Bolivia and Chile. Chilian 
Capital in Atacama. Violation of Treaty of 1874. Peruvian 
Intrigues in Bolivia. Duty on Nitrate of Soda. Ultimatum of 
Chile to Bolivia. Occupation of Antofagasta by Chilians. 
Declaration of War by Bolivia. Peru proposes Arbitration. 
Chile declares War on Peru. Relations between Argentina and 
Chile. Illusions of Bolivia and Peru. Naval Armaments. 
Equipment of Chilian and Peruvian Vessels. Military Forces of 
the Three Countries. Chilian Preparations. Inaction of Bolivia 
and Peru. Embarkation of Chilian Troops. Occupation of 
Antofagasta. Attack on Calama. Occupation of Tocopilla and 
Cobija. Blockade of Iquique. Peruvian Seaboard Harried by 
Chilians. Bombardment of Pisagua. Reconnaissance to Callao. 
Peruvians attempt to raise Blockade of Iquique, Attack of the 
Huascar and Independencia on the Esmeralda and Covadonga. 
Loss of the Esmeralda and the Independencia. Preponderance of 
Chilian Sea-power. Peruvian Reprisals. Chilian Discontent. 
Capture of the Huascar and Pilcomayo. 

The dispute in regard to territorial rights over the 
seaboard of Atacama leading to the conflict between 
Chile and Bolivia in 1879, and involving war with Peru, 
was of long standing, and requires explanation to make 
clear the cause of a struggle which forms a landmark in 
South American history. After Bolivia, Chile, and Peru 
secured independence from Spanish domination, little 
attention was paid to Atacama. This section of country 
433 2 E 



434 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

was regarded as worthless for colonisation ; but so far as 
any authority was concerned, Chilian jurisdiction was 
generally recognised. Chile claimed sovereignty over 
these districts by virtue of the title derived from the 
provisions made for the Chilian vice-royalty by the 
Spanish authorities in laws and ordinances relating to 
the Indies. But 1840 brought a change, for at that 
date the value of guano as a fertiliser became better 
understood in Europe, and the demand for it led to 
inquiries as to the supply from the west coast of South 
America. An expedition despatched by the Chilian 
Government in 1841, discovered guano deposits at 
various points on the seaboard of Atacama, and this 
led to a law to regulate exportation, sanctioned by the 
Chilian Congress on October 31, 1842. It was in 
reference more particularly to the district between 
south latitude 29° and 23° that the Chilian authorities 
took action, and it was a complete surprise when, in 
1843, the Bolivian charge d'affaires, Senor Olaneto, on 
behalf of his Government, claimed recognition of 
Bolivian jurisdiction as far south as latitude 26° to a 
point where the river Salado discharges into the Pacific 
Ocean. A revision of the Chilian titles was made and 
published in 1845, the result being favourable to Chilian 
pretentions ; and to the memorandum containing the 
Chilian argument no answer was given by Bolivia, and 
for a time the matter dropped. In 1847 Bolivia again 
demanded, and was refused by Chile, the recognition 
of rights in Atacama ; but war now broke out between 
Bolivia and Peru, and the dispute was laid on one side 
for the moment. 

In 1858 the question of Atacama was again raised 
by Bolivia. Chilian rights were energetically defended 
by Senor Ger6nimo Urmeneta in a note dated July 11, 
1859, and the discussion was continued in 1861 by Senor 
Jose Maria Santibanez, in charge of the Bolivian Legation 
at Santiago, and Senor Manuel Alcalde, the Chilian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Senor Alcalde pointed 
out that the Bolivian claims were inconsistent : that 



1863] EVENTS PRECEDING THE WAR 435 

in 1843 Bolivia had demanded that the river Salado, at 
the 26th parallel, should be recognised as the boundary ; 
that in 1861 the 24th parallel was mentioned as the 
frontier ; that acts had been committed by Bolivian 
authorities derogatory to the persons and- property of 
Chilian citizens, and that it had been necessary to 
station the Chilian warships Esmeralda and Chile on 
the Atacama coast as a protection for Chilian interests. 
Sharp notes were exchanged between the two Govern- 
ments during the following three years, relations gradually 
becoming more strained, until in March, 1863, the quarrel 
was aggravated by the Bolivian Congress at Oruro 
authorising the Administration to declare war against 
Chile if no other solution of the dispute appeared possible. 
In October, 1864, diplomatic relations between the two 
Governments were suspended, and an appeal to arms to 
decide the question seemed inevitable. 

At this juncture events were influenced by the un- 
expected outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Peru. 
The South American Republics regarded the action of 
Spain as evidence of her desire to attempt to recover 
possession of her former colonies, and they determined 
to prevent this. Bolivia and Chile decided to sink their 
differences and make common cause with Peru, and 
nothing more was heard of war between Chile and her 
neighbour. In place of hostile action the claimants to 
Atacama signed a treaty on August 16, 1866, providing 
for the boundary between Bolivia and Chile at the 24th 
parallel of south latitude, and further that the zone 
lying between the 23rd and the 25th parallel should be 
subject to the common jurisdiction of both Governments 
for the exploitation of the guano deposits and mineral 
products, the revenue from these two sources to be 
equally divided. Bolivia agreed to make the Bay of 
Mejillones the only port through which traffic in guano 
should be permitted, with the condition that Chile 
should nominate an official to intervene in any matters 
concerning Chilian interests. It was provided also that 
neither of the contracting parties could alienate their 



436 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

rights to any foreign Government or private enterprise, 
but in event of a desire to dispose of them they could 
only do so to one or other of the parties to the treaty. 
Private interests in Mejillones affected by this arrange- 
ment were to be compensated by a payment of $80,000 
by each Government. This last clause was fulfilled by 
Chile, but not by Bolivia. 

Chile regarded this settlement as a final solution 
of the long-standing dispute, and it would have been 
had Bolivia kept faith, but, unfortunately, her Adminis- 
tration acted contrary to the letter and spirit of the 
compact. In 1871 a liquidation of the revenue account 
for the guano deposits and duties on mineral products 
in the common zone requested by the Chilian authorities 
resulted in the refusal of the Bolivian Government to 
make the payments required by the agreement of 1866, 
and this attitude excited unusual indignation in Chile, 
as the work in the zone between the parallels 23° and 
25° was conducted chiefly by Chilian capital and 
labourers. Explanation of the Bolivian action was 
found in the intrigues set afoot by Peru to hinder 
friendly relations between Bolivia and Chile, and the 
motive was the desire to establish a monopoly for the 
exportation of nitrate of soda. The agreement of 1866 
stood in the way, as by it Chilian enterprise could work 
freely, and to ensure resistance to the Chilian demand 
for the observance of the treaty, Peru made a secret 
compact with Bolivia in 1873. 

The feeling between Chile and Bolivia now became 
so strained that war was again threatened. Chile, 
however, had no desire for an outbreak of hostilities, 
owing to the inadequate footing upon which her military 
and naval forces had been maintained for some years 
past. So after a long diplomatic controversy matters 
were arranged by a treaty dated August 6, 1874, by 
which Chile agreed to renounce the zone between the 
23rd and 25th parallels of latitude and to resign her claim 
to a share of the duties collected under the treaty of 1866. 
On the other hand, Bolivia accepted the proposal that 



1874] BOLIVIAN AND CHILIAN TREATY 437 

export duties on mineral products from this zone should 
not be increased, and that Chilian capital, industries, and 
persons should not be subjected to higher taxation than 
was in force at the date of the treaty. These conditions 
were to remain unaltered for twenty-five years ; but it 
was this question of taxation that brought the final 
rupture five years later. 

The treaty of 1874 afforded protection for Chilian 
industry in Atacama, and considerable capital was 
invested in mines and the exploitation of nitrate of soda, 
the labourers employed being chiefly of Chilian nation- 
ality and the majority of the inhabitants Chilians, 
Bolivians showing no tendency to become more numerous. 
Bolivia, however, regarded with little favour the flourish- 
ing condition of affairs resulting from the introduction 
of money and labour from Chile, because the treaty of 
1874 prevented additional taxation, and it was not long 
before complaints were heard of the attitude of the 
Bolivian authorities towards Chilian citizens and of 
attempts to levy higher duties. Moreover, Peruvian 
intrigue was again busy because competition, resulting 
from the development of the nitrate of soda industry in 
Atacama, threatened to interfere with the monopoly 
established in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, and 
the object of Lima was to induce Bolivia to place a 
heavy duty on the exportation of nitrate of socla from 
Atacama to check production and maintain better prices 
in Europe. The fact that such action inferred a breach 
of faith with Chile created no scruples in the minds of 
Peruvian diplomatists, and their councils so far prevailed 
that in 1875 an attempt was made by the authorities 
at Antofagasta to impose a tax of three cents per 
quintal on all shipments, but this was abandoned after 
protest by the Chilian Government. 

At this period Peru was considered the superior of 
Chile in both naval and military strength. It was due 
to this fact that Peruvian influence was so strong in 
moulding the attitude of Bolivia, for the understanding 
between Peru and Bolivia in 1873 was an alliance for 



438 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

mutual defence against Chile, and it was this supposed 
source of strength that induced Bolivia to act in defiance 
of her treaty obligations. In 1877 strained relations 
arose between Chile and Argentina about the boundary 
between the two countries, and Peru thought this 
dispute gave a favourable opportunity to urge Bolivia 
to impose once more a heavy duty on the export of 
nitrate of soda. Peru was convinced that the strength 
of her army and navy, combined with the hostility of 
Argentina, would prevent Chile from making any attempt 
to compel Bolivia to respect Chilian rights. Bolivia, 
under the advice of President Hilarion Daza, listened 
to Peruvian counsels, and on February 14, 1878, the 
Congress resolved that all nitrate of soda exported 
should be subject to a duty of ten cents the quintal. 
This was done in the face of the revocation of the duty 
imposed by the municipality of Antofagasta in 1875, 
because "there exists the treaty of limits with Chile, 
by which no new taxes can be collected." The bad 
faith of Bolivia caused earnest remonstrance from Chile, 
but to no effect, and demands were made on the principal 
nitrate company in Antofagasta. On the refusal of the 
manager to pay $90,000 on account of the new tax, he 
was imprisoned and the property confiscated. 

In view of these developments it was imperative for 
Chile to act. Diplomatic representations met with no 
satisfactory response, and on January 3, 1879, the Chilian 
charge d'affaires in La Paz notified the Bolivian Govern- 
ment that if the law of February 14, 1878, was enforced, 
he was instructed to ask for his passports. The Chilian 
representative added :— " The Government of Chile 
considers it also convenient to inform you that the con- 
tinued refusal to suspend the law in question renders 
null and void the treaty of 1874, and consequently Chile 
considers as resumed all rights she had legitimately 
over the territory that treaty refers to prior to 1866. 
For this reason Chile, in the present unfortunate 
emergency, which she has not provoked, nor been able 
to avoid, will take such measures as she deems necessary 



1879] CHILIAN ULTIMATUM 439 

to defend her rights." On January 20, 1879, the Chilian 
Government instructed its representative to press for 
an immediate answer to the ultimatum of January 3. 
The Bolivian Government refused to consider the 
suspension of the export duties, and diplomatic relations 
were broken off on February 10. Four days later, 
Chilian troops landed at Antofagasta and took possession 
of the city and adjoining district without any formal 
declaration of war. It was only when news of the 
occupation of Antofagasta reached the Bolivian Govern- 
ment that the conviction was brought home to the 
authorities that Chile intended to fight, and even then 
the Chilian strength was underestimated by both Bolivia 
and Peru. After the landing of the Chilian troops at 
Antofagasta, the Bolivian Government declared war, 
and a proclamation to that effect was issued on March 
1, 1879. 

During the perpetration of these hostile acts near 
Antofagasta, the Peruvian special envoy at Santiago, 
Senor Jose Antonio Lavalle, proposed that Peru should 
arbitrate between Chile and Bolivia. In answer to this 
offer Senor Lavalle was reminded of the alliance of Peru 
with Bolivia in 1873, and he expressed ignorance of any 
such compact. It has never been quite clear whether 
this assertion was made in good faith, but the Chilian 
Government had possessed a copy of the treaty since 
1874, and it was only natural to suppose that the head 
of such an important mission as that entrusted to Senor 
Lavalle had been informed of a factor vitally affecting 
his negotiations. The propositions submitted by Senor 
Lavalle were : — (1) That Chile should evacuate Anto- 
fagasta pending the decision of the dispute by arbitra- 
tion ; (2) that a neutral administration should be 
established in the territory evacuated, this to be 
maintained under the guarantee of Chile, Bolivia, and 
Peru ; (3) that all revenues from these territories should 
be equally divided between Chile and Bolivia after 
payment of the local administration. These proposals 
were not to the liking of the Chilians, who saw in them 



440 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

a repetition of the bad faith already shown by Bolivia, 
with the further complication of Peru as a party to any 
fresh dispute. Under these circumstances Sefior 
Lavalle was informed that Peruvian mediation was 
unacceptable, and this notification was followed by the 
Peruvian envoy being handed his passports. 

The temper of the Chilians was now thoroughly 
aroused. Peruvian intrigues had resulted in a dispute 
between Chile and Bolivia, involving an armed conflict, 
and the offer of mediation on the part of Peru was 
regarded as only a diplomatic move to further injure 
Chilian interests. The existence of the secret treaty 
between Peru and Bolivia was considered a directly 
hostile act ; in these circumstances the Chilians deter- 
mined to strike home at Peru and endeavour to make 
that country pay dearly for the part she had played, 
and for this reason, on April 5, 1879, war against Peru 
was declared. 

In the published accounts of the attitude of Chile at 
this crisis there is a tendency of most writers to throw 
the whole blame of the war upon the Chilians, on the 
ground they acted in a purposely aggressive manner to 
enable them to carry out a plan of conquest and 
territorial aggrandisement ; but the facts of the case do 
not justify such assertions. In the long-standing 
dispute in connection with Atacama Chile had ceded 
rights to which she considered herself justly entitled 
rather than push matters to extremes, and in 1865, when 
she might have deprived Bolivia of all participation in 
dominion over Antofagasta, she held her hand and 
elected to make considerable sacrifices to assist the 
Peruvians in the Spanish conflict. It is true that this 
policy was dictated by the idea that the action of Spain 
towards Peru portended common danger to South 
America, but it did not necessarily entail the surrender 
to Bolivia of the substantial advantages that country 
gained by the treaty of 1866. Again, in 1874, Chile met 
the Bolivian demands in a conciliatory spirit, and in 
consideration of a solemn covenant by Bolivia she 



1879] CHILE DECLARES WAR ON PERU 441 

renounced all sovereignty over the zone between the 
23rd and 25th parallels of latitude on condition that 
certain protection was extended to Chilian citizens and 
industries. It has been explained how lack of good 
faith by Bolivia rendered this treaty a dead letter, but 
there is also another aspect of the case to which little 
attention has been devoted. Chilian energy and Chilian 
capital converted Atacama from a worthless desert into 
a nourishing industrial centre ; and yet this important 
fact carried no weight with the Bolivian authorities. 

Nor can any great blame be attached to Chile for 
declaring war against Peru. The secret treaty of 1873 
was proof of the part Peru had played in the policy of 
Bolivia, and the fact that Peru was bound to come to 
the assistance of Bolivia to repel the Chilian invasion of 
Atacama showed that the action taken by Chile was the 
only wise course she could adopt under the circum- 
stances. 

The outbreak of hostilities found matters far less 
favourable than the Bolivian Government had anticipated 
when the determination had been reached twelve 
months previously to force the Chilian question to a 
crisis. The dispute between Argentina and Chile had 
assumed a more conciliatory aspect, all prospect of 
armed conflict between those two countries having 
disappeared for the moment, and no active assistance 
could be expected from that quarter. This attitude of 
Argentina enabled Chile to concentrate her whole 
available strength in the north, and so unexpected a 
change in the relations between Argentina and Chile 
was the first serious disappointment Bolivia experienced 
in the conflict, a feeling accentuated by the fact that the 
policy of Peru was by no means as magnanimous as 
Bolivia desired. When war with Chile was inevitable, 
Bolivia claimed fulfilment of the treaty obligations 
secretly contracted with Peru in 1873 ; but the Peruvian 
Government vacillated for some time, then only agreed 
on condition that Bolivia undertook to indemnify it for 
all expenses incurred. 



442 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

For many years popular belief in South America 
had been that in naval and military equipment Peru 
was more than a match for Chile, and that Bolivia 
could place an army in the field fully capable of defend- 
ing her territory against Chilian aggression, and it was 
the general opinion that Chile would be overpowered by 
the combined strength of the Bolivians and Peruvians ; 
but estimates of the relative fighting capacities had been 
formed without close attention to the preparations the 
Chilians had made in event of an emergency. Chile 
recognised that in any war with Peru and Bolivia the 
control of the seaboard would be of paramount value, for 
the railways of Peru which supplied Bolivia ran at right 
angles to the coast, and the possession of their outlets 
was of the utmost importance. With this object in 
view, the Chilian Government since 1870 had steadily 
increased the naval forces. Peru, on the other hand, 
had allowed matters to drift, and little attention had 
been given to possible future developments. The 
country was embarrassed by careless and corrupt 
Administrations, which left no funds available for the 
purchase of ships and war material, and a complete 
reversal of former conditions was found when the war- 
cloud burst in 1879. Chile possessed two powerful 
ironclads of modern construction, designed by Read, and 
built at Hull in 1874-5 ; these were the sister ships 
Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada, of 3560 tons, 
2920 horse-power, and each carried six 9-inch M.L. 
Armstrong guns of 12 tons, a number of light guns, and 
two Nordenfelt machine guns. They had armour nine 
inches thick at the water-line and six to eight inches 
round the battery, and both were fitted with twin screws. 
In addition to these two formidable vessels there were 
two sister corvettes, the Chacabuco and the (JHiggins, 
of 1670 tons and 800 horse-power, armed with three 
150-pounder 7-ton Armstrong guns, and four 40- 
pounders ; the Magallanes, armed with one 150-pounder 
and two small guns ; the Abtao, with three 150-pounders ; 
the Covadonga, a wooden screw gunboat, captured from 



1879] NAVIES OF CHILE AND PERU 443 

the Spaniards in 1866, of 600 tons, and armed with 
two 70-pounders and three small guns ; the Esmeralda, 
a wooden corvette built in 1854, of 850 tons, carrying 
twelve 40-pounders on the upper deck ; and ten steam 
transports. 

The Peruvian navy consisted of the Huascar, built 
at Birkenhead by Messrs Laird in 1866, of 1130 tons, 
300 horse-power, and armed with two 10-inch Arm- 
strong 300-pounders and two 40-pounder Whitworths. 
The armour round her revolving turret was five and a 
half inches thick, and she had a belt of four and a half 
inches, but such protection was useless against the guns 
on the Cochrane or the Blanco Encalada. The next 
ship was a broadside ironclad, built in London in 1865, 
called the Independencia, of 2004 tons, 550 horse-power, 
protected by four and a half inches of armour, and 
equipped with twelve 70-pounders on the main deck, 
two 150-pounders, four 32-pounders, and four 9-pounders 
on the upper deck. In addition to these vessels, there 
were the wooden corvettes Union of 1150 tons, 400 
horse-power, and armed with twelve 70-pounders and 
one 9-pounder; and the Pilcomayo, of 600 tons, 180 
horse-power, and armed with two 70-pounders, four 
40-pounders, and four 12-pounders. There were also 
the monitors Atahualpa and Manco Capac, purchased 
from the United States in 1869, each of 2100 tons, with 
ten inches of armour on the turrets, and carrying two 
15-inch smooth-bore Rodman guns; but these vessels 
were little more than floating forts for coast defence, 
the Atahualpa being stationed permanently at Callao 
and the Manco Capac at Arica. 

A comparison of naval forces shows that Chile had 
twice the number of sea-going vessels, double the 
aggregate tonnage, and a hundred per cent, greater 
weight of metal. Moreover, the complement of both 
officers and men in the Chilian fleet was superior in 
seamanship and fighting qualities to that on the 
Peruvian warships, several of the officers having served 
in the British navy, and the majority of the men being 



444 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

recruited from the hardy fisherman class living on the 
southern coast. Amongst the Chilian officers were many 
whose names indicated British extraction, these includ- 
ing Condell, Cox, Christie, Edwards, Leighton, Lynch, 
Macpherson, Pratt, Rogers, Smith, Simpson, Souper, 
Stephens, Thomson, Walker, Warner, Williams, Wilson, 
and Wood. It was a complete revelation to South 
America when the strength of the Chilian navy was 
understood and appreciated, and it was not until the 
war began that Peru realised how entirely she had 
underestimated the fighting capabilities of the fleet with 
which she was confronted. 

With regard to the military forces the balance was 
also in favour of Chile, if not so much in numbers, most 
assuredly in equipment and physique. On a peace 
footing, the army comprised 2500 infantry, 800 artillery, 
and 700 cavalry, and a force of 25,000 national guards, 
this latter being raised to 55,000 on the declaration of 
war. The men were clothed in a thoroughly workman- 
like outfit of tunic and trousers of brown holland, a cap 
of the same material, and a pair of untanned brown 
leather boots, and the rifle used was the Gras or Com- 
blain. The artillery was provided with Krupp and 
Armstrong field guns, and some Gatlings and Norden- 
felts, and the cavalry was well mounted, and armed with 
sabres and Winchester rifles. Officers and men had 
received practical instruction as a result of the constant 
raids they had undertaken against the Araucanian 
Indians in the south. As a whole, the Chilian army 
was a fairly compact fighting machine and by no means 
badly disciplined. 

At the time of the declaration of war, the Peruvian 
military forces comprised five battalions of infantry, each 
containing 500 officers and men ; three regiments of 
artillery, with a total strength of 1000 officers and men ; 
and two brigades of cavalry, these numbering 780 officers 
and men ; and there was the constabulary, with an 
effective total of 5400 of all ranks. This gave a fighting 
force of 9680 officers and men ; but a decree shortly 



1879] ARMIES 445 

after the outbreak of hostilities authorised the increase 
of the national army to 40,000, and a subsequent order 
on December 26, 1879, called to the ranks the entire 
male population between the ages of eighteen and 
thirty, the remainder between thirty and sixty being 
embodied in the reserve. The regular army was clothed 
in uniforms of white cotton cloth, and the infantry armed 
with the Martini-Peabody rifle. The cavalry was pro- 
vided with Winchester repeating rifles, but was so 
poorly mounted as to be incapable of effective service, 
and the artillery equipment was indifferent, the majority 
of the guns being of local manufacture, and inadequate 
to cope with the modern weapons of the Chilians. The 
bulk of the army consisted of Indians only understanding 
Quichua, who had small stomach for fighting for the 
Spanish- speaking people by whom they were ruled ; but 
when kindly treated they proved patient and obedient, 
and capable of sustaining great fatigue when required 
to make forced marches over long stretches of desert 
country, where only most scanty rations of food and 
water were available. 

The Bolivian army was composed chiefly of Aymara 
Indians. On paper, a large number were liable for 
service, but the Bolivian authorities had been so 
totally unprepared for an outbreak of war that when 
hostilities commenced the only available arms were 
1500 Remington rifles, and even for these the stock 
of ammunition was very limited. 

It was clear that by land and sea Chile was more 
ready for action than her adversaries when the crucial 
moment arrived, and it was not long before the superiority 
of her preparations told its tale in an unbroken list of 
successful engagements. 

In view of a probable refusal by Bolivia to rescind 
the tax on the exportation of nitrate of soda, military 
preparations had been pushed forward by Chile, so that 
by February an army corps of 6000 men was ready to 
embark, fully equipped with artillery and reserves of all 
necessary war material. Transports were waiting at 



446 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Valparaiso to take the troops on board whenever orders 
were issued to that effect. 

The Chilian Government was determined that if 
warlike operations were necessary an expedition should 
take the field immediately, and not waste valuable time 
which the enemy might employ to arrange defensive 
measures for the protection of Antofagasta and other 
points, and this energy was in marked contrast to the 
attitude of Bolivia and Peru. These States left the 
three important seaports of Antofagasta, Cobija, and 
Tocopilla undefended, or held by small garrisons and a 
scanty police force inadequate to repel any organised 
attack. No effort was made to fortify the landing-places 
in the possession of Bolivia, nor did the Peruvian 
Government send naval aid, in spite of its fancied 
superiority at sea — a supineness totally without excuse ; 
for although the Chilian preparations were effected 
quietly, no great degree of secrecy was observed, and 
the representatives of Bolivia and Peru had ample 
opportunity to inform their respective Governments of 
the trend of events. The only feasible explanation is 
that both Bolivia and Peru were convinced that the long 
period of peace which Chile had enjoyed when this 
crisis arose would render rapid and effective warlike 
preparations impossible. Moreover, the concessions 
made by Chile on former occasions when hostilities 
with Bolivia appeared probable, deluded her adversaries 
into the belief that she would not fight ; but all such 
illusions were soon destroyed. 

On February 8, 1879, the embarkation of the Chilians 
began, and by the 14th the transports convoyed by 
Chilian warships appeared off Antofagasta. Five 
hundred men were immediately landed under command 
of Colonel Sotomayor, and took possession of the town 
without resistance, the Bolivian authorities retreating to 
the village of Calama, a distance of eighty miles from the 
coast-line. Any attempt at opposing the invasion would 
have been futile, for the majority of the population of 
Antofagasta were Chilians, and the small garrison was 



1879] OCCUPATION OF ANTOFAGASTA 447 

quite incapable of coping with the invaders. The 
occupation of Antofagasta was the first act of hostility 
in the war, and the prompt manner in which it was 
executed boded well for the subsequent success of the 
Chilian arms. 

Colonel Sotomayor immediately seized Caracoles, the 
centre of a rich mining district about thirty miles in- 
land from Antofagasta, and here also no resistance was 
attempted, the authorities evacuating the place on the 
approach of the Chilians. For the next few weeks 
little was done, the time being occupied in concentrating 
troops at Antofagasta, enrolling local forces recruited 
from the Chilian residents in Atacama, and establishing 
local administration under Chilian authority. In March 
it was decided to despatch an expedition to Calama to 
capture that place and completely shut off the Bolivians 
from access to the seaboard through Atacama, and 
orders for an expedition were issued ; and on March 
21st Colonel Sotomayor left Caracoles to occupy the 
place, which lay to the north on the main road from the 
seaport of Cobija. The expedition numbered 600 men, 
and to oppose it at Calama was a small garrison of 
refugees from Antofagasta and Caracoles under the 
leadership of Dr Zapata, the Prefect of Antofagasta. 
Next evening the Chilians reached the vicinity of the 
town, and found the bridge over the river Loa destroyed ; 
but access was possible by two fords, the lower one 
known as Topater, and the upper as Huaita. At 
daybreak on the 23rd, the attack was begun by the 
cavalry, which was divided into two detachments, one 
going towards the Huaita ford and the other towards 
Topater. Infantry in tw o columns supported the advance 
which the artillery planted on high ground covered. 

The Bolivian position was admirably adapted for 
defence, and in the face of any determined opposition 
would have presented many difficulties, but the tactics 
of the Chilians proved thoroughly successful. Both 
columns crossed the stream, and converging on the 
village soon made short work of the defence. The 



448 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

garrison evacuated the neighbourhood, retiring by 'the 
Potosi road across the Andes. They left 20 men 
dead on the field, and carried off such of the wounded as 
were able to bear transportation ; and as the total force 
of the Bolivian garrison was only 140 officers and men, 
this meant that one-third were killed or wounded before 
the evacuation took place, while the Chilian troops had 
only to record 20 casualties. 

In itself of no great military importance, this affair 
at Calama none the less gave the Chilians undisputed 
control of Atacama, and it was also the only occasion 
when the Bolivians attempted to check the advance of 
the enemy into their territory. Furthermore, the success 
raised Chilian prestige, and greatly encouraged all ranks 
of the invading army. After the capture of Calama, 
Sotomayor proceeded with a small detachment down 
the valley of the river Loa to Tocapilla, but found the 
squadron under Rear-Admiral Williams Rebolledo 
already in possession, as also of Cobija. So, on the 
29th, Sotomayor returned to Antofagasta, leaving 
Colonel Ramirez, who had commanded the infantry in 
the attack on March 23rd, at Calama. 

The short period between the successful expedition 
to Calama and the declaration of war by the Chilian 
Government against Peru was occupied in accumulating 
men and warlike stores at Antofagasta to make this 
town a base for future operations. The squadron was 
ready to steam northwards to harry the Peruvian sea- 
board when instructions arrived from headquarters, and 
on April 5, when the declaration of war against Peru 
was issued, the vessels under command of Rear- Admiral 
Rebolledo sailed to establish the blockade of Iquique, 
and inflict all possible damage on Peruvian commerce. 

For the next few months the war was confined to 
naval operations. The object of Admiral Rebolledo 
was the capture or disablement of the Peruvian war- 
ships, in order that the Chilian army might be thrown 
forward without fear of interruption of communication 
with the base of supplies. To embarrass the Peruvian 



1379] CHILIAN SQUADRON OPERATIONS 449 

Government, the Chilian admiral was instructed to 
destory all facilities on the Peruvian coast-line for the 
shipment of guano and nitrate of soda, thus suspending 
the chief source of the national revenue. Piers and 
wharves were demolished, and lighters wrecked at 
different ports visited by the Chilian ships, and when 
resistance was attempted, as at Mollendo on April 17, 
the towns were shelled, and in some cases serious 
damage was inflicted on defenceless places, a bombard- 
ment of this nature occurring at Pisagua on April 18. 
This town was one of the principal ports of shipment 
for nitrate of soda, and contained 4000 persons, of whom 
many were foreigners. The garrison consisted of a 
detachment of Peruvian infantry, so that the town was 
not entirely without protection, although unprovided 
with artillery. Without communicating with the 
municipal authorities, the Blanco Encalada and the 
(JHiggins despatched their boats inshore to destroy 
the lighters moored near the Custom-house. These 
were private property, and when the owners understood 
the intention of the Chilians they opened fire on the 
boats, and the Peruvian soldiers also began firing from 
the shelter of rocks near the seashore. An attempt was 
made to land, but frustrated by the garrison, and the 
Chilian ships then bombarded the town for two hours, 
setting many of the principal buildings in flames, amongst 
the houses destroyed being that of the British Vice- 
Consul, and those of many other foreign residents. 
This done, the Chilian vessels steamed away. 

The Chilians have been severely criticised for this 
systematic destruction of property, and for the bombard- 
ment of towns which were practically defenceless. It 
must be remembered, however, that it was important 
for their cause that the Peruvian Government should 
be deprived of revenue, and this must be accepted as 
partial justification for the policy followed. In regard 
to Mollendo and Pisagua, the excuse was made that 
resistance was attempted by the occupants of those 
towns, and that consequently they were liable to attack. 

2 F 



450 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Iquique, the principal seaport of the province of 
Tarapaca, was blockaded immediately after the 
declaration of war, and this point formed the rendezvous 
of the Chilian vessels whilst harrying the coast-line. 
The Peruvians showing no inclination to come 
southwards to attack the blockading squadron, Admiral 
Rebolledo decided to make a reconnaissance to Callao, 
and started from Iquique with the Blanco Encalada and 
the OHigglns on May 16, 1879, leaving the Esmeralda 
and the Covadonga to maintain the blockade. On the 
same day, General Prado, the President of Peru, set 
out from Callao to take command of the Peruvian Army 
concentrated at Tacna. The squadron accompanying 
the President consisted of the Huasear, commanded by 
Captain Miguel Gran ; the Independencia, in charge of 
Captain Moore ; and three transports. The Chilian 
vessels kept well out to sea to conceal their movements, 
while the Peruvian squadron steamed as close inshore 
as safety permitted, so the ships passed without sighting 
each other. On arriving at Arica and disembarking 
General Prado and his staff, Captain Grau received 
information of the departure of Admiral Rebolledo from 
Iquique, and the fact that only two vessels were left to 
maintain the blockade. As Arica is only sixty miles 
from Iquique, here was an opportunity thrown in the 
way of the Peruvians to capture the Chilian vessels and 
raise the blockade, and Captain Grau determined to 
proceed to Iquique with the Huasear, and ordered the 
Independencia to keep him company. The two ships 
left Arica on the night of May 20, and at daybreak next 
morning they were close to Iquique. 

Early next morning Captain Prat, in command of 
the Esmeralda, saw the Peruvian vessels approaching, 
and signalled to the Covadonga to prepare for action. 
Captain Prat found time for a short conversation with 
Captain Condell of the Covadonga before the engagement 
began, and it was decided that in spite of the over- 
powering strength of the Peruvian vessels the fight 
should be continued as long as either ship could keep 



1879] NAVAL ACTION OFF IQUIQUE 451 

afloat. At 8 a.m. the action commenced by the Huascar 
opening fire on the Covadonga, but almost immediately 
the Independencia passed directly towards the Covadonga, 
apparently with the intention of ramming the Chilian 
ship, and the Huascar turned her attention to the 
Esmeralda. Captain Prat had endeavoured to take the 
latter vessel into shoal water near the shore when the 
enemy approached ; but a boiler burst, and the Esmeralda 
was almost helpless with a steaming capacity of only 
three miles an hour. 

As the Huascar drew near, the Esmeralda gave her 
a broadside, but without inflicting serious damage, 
owing to her guns not being heavy enough to penetrate 
the armour of her opponent. A continuous cannonade 
was then maintained between the two vessels at a 
distance of 1000 yards, the Huascar not being able to 
approach nearer to her adversary in consequence of the 
shoal water. Meanwhile the Covadonga, keeping close 
into the shore, had drawn away to the southward closely 
pursued by the Independencia. After the fight between 
the Esmeralda and the Huascar had been some time in 
progress, the fire from a shore battery obliged the 
former vessel to move further out to sea, and soon 
afterwards a shell from the Peruvian ship struck her 
close to the water-line, exploding and killing several 
men and setting fire to the vessel. The flames were 
soon extinguished, but the corvette was in sorry plight, 
unable to move on account of her damaged machinery 
and at the mercy of her antagonist, but showed no signs 
of surrender. Captain Grau now determined to end 
the struggle, and rammed the Chilian ship on the j)ort 
side, abreast of the mizen mast. As the Esmeralda and 
the Huascar came together, Captain Prat, sword in one 
hand and revolver in the other, sprang on board the 
Peruvian ship, calling upon officers and men to follow 
him, but the vessels parted so quickly that only one 
man, Serjeant Aldea, was able to join his commanding 
officer. Captain Prat rushed along the deck of the 
Huascar unheeding the demands to surrender, and after 



452 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

killing a signal- officer, Lieutenant Velarde, was himself 
shot down, Serjeant Aldea sharing his fate. The com- 
mand of the Esmeralda now devolved upon Lieutenant 
Luis Uribe, and he, like his predecessor, showed no 
indication of striking his flag. 

Captain Grau now made a second attempt to ram at 
11.30 a.m., and on this occasion the Huascar struck the 
Esmeralda on the starboard bow at an angle of 45\ 
The water rushed in through the aperture, filling the 
engine-room, extinguishing the fires, and flooding the 
magazine, the men serving in this section of the ship 
perishing, as time did not permit their escape. As the 
ships came in contact for the second time, Lieutenant 
Ignacio Serrano and a dozen sailors repeated the action 
of Captain Prat, leaping on to the deck of the Huascar 
and attacking the crew, but both officer and men were 
shot before they could inflict any injury upon the 
Peruvians. The Esmeralda was now a wreck, the guns 
and engines useless, half the crew killed or wounded, 
and the ship settling down, but still the Chilians would 
not surrender. Captain Grau decided to ram a third 
time, and the Huascar struck her adversary full on the 
starboard side abreast the main chains, and at the same 
moment discharging her guns into the doomed vessel, 
which two minutes later sank. Out of a crew of 200 
officers and men only 50 were saved, clinging to pieces 
of wreckage, and picked up by the boats of the Huascar. 
Half an hour after the Chilian ship went down Lieutenant 
Uribe was rescued, having kept himself afloat by means 
of a hammock under each arm, and being completely 
exhausted when taken out of the water. The engage- 
ment had lasted four hours, the casualties on board the 
Huascar being comparatively few owing to the protection 
afforded by the turrets, and the ship herself was practi- 
cally uninjured, the guns of the Esmeralda being too 
light to inflict serious damage. 

To turn to the fortunes of the gunboat Covadonga in 
her efforts to escape from the Peruvian ironclad Inde- 
pendencia. Captain Conclell took his ship as close into 



1879] WRECK OF THE INDEPENDENCE 453 

the land as he dared, to entice his pursuer into shoal 
water, and although a desultory fire was maintained 
from the ironclad, no serious injury was done to the 
gunboat. When nearing Punta Gruesa, ten miles south 
of Iquique, Captain Condell, finding that the Independemia 
was rapidly overhauling him, tried a cunning movement. 
Near Punta Gruesa is a patch of rocky ground with 
only enough water for a small vessel to pass safely, and 
the Covadonga steamed over this shoal. Captain Moore, 
excited by his chase of the Chilian vessel, followed at 
full speed, and in a few minutes the Independemia was 
a total wreck on the rocks. Captain Condel now 
manoeuvred his ship into a position out of reach of the 
enemy's guns, and opened a cannonade on the stranded 
vessel, which he continued until the approach of the 
Huascar obliged him to seek safety in flight. The 
Huascar was forced to remain by the Indspendencia to 
rescue her crew, and the Covadonga reached Antofagasta 
without mishap. 

The loss of the Independeneia was a heavy blow to 
the Peruvians. It left the Chilians an overwhelming 
predominance of sea power, for, with the exception of 
the Huascar, the Chilian squadron had now nothing to 
fear, and it was only a question of time when that ship 
should be captured. That the Huascar gave serious 
trouble to the Chilians before her capture was due to 
the able and energetic manner in which she was handled 
by Captain Grau. After the disaster of the Independeneia 
Captain Grau took the Huascar to Callao, and on this 
voyage the Blanco Encalada was encountered on June 3, 
but Grau out-manoeuvred her after exchanging a few 
shots, and reached his destination on June 7. 

During the next few months Grau in the Huascar 
rendered invaluable services to Peru. The presence of 
this warship paralysed the advance of the Chilian army 
of invasion. Cruising up and down the coast, she 
evaded the enemy's squadron, and kept the Chilian 
authorities in a constant state of alarm by making sudden 
and unexpected appearances and destroying property at 



454 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Carrizal, Chanaral, Huasco, Antofagasta, Tocopilla, 
Taltal, and Caldera, the destruction she caused being 
in the nature of reprisals for the damage inflicted by the 
Chilians at Peruvian ports. On July 23 she captured 
the Chilian transport Rimac carrying a regiment of 
cavalry and 300 horses, and on August 17 she entered 
Antofagasta and engaged the Chilian men-of-war Magal- 
lanes and Abtao, these vessels being only saved through 
the protection afforded by the heavy guns mounted on 
shore. In this action the first torpedo was used during 
the war. It was a " Lay," and launched from the 
Huascar against the Abtao, but through faulty mechanism 
it turned in the water and came straight back towards 
the Peruvian ship, which was only saved from disaster 
by the presence of mind of Lieutenant Diaz Canseco, 
who jumped overboard and deflected its course. This 
was one of the acts of heroism during the war, of which 
there were many examples on both sides. 

Discontent in Chile grew apace, in consequence of 
the inability of the squadron to prevent the Huascar 
from paralysing military operations, and finally became 
so strong that it was decided to overhaul thoroughly 
the various men-of-war and supersede Admiral Rebolledo 
as Admiral-in-chief; but this latter step was rendered 
unnecessary by his resignation on account of ill-health, 
and Rear- Admiral G-alvarino Riveros took his place, 
hoisting his flag on the Blanco Encalada. On October 1, 
the Chilian squadron, ready for sea, sailed northwards 
to hunt down the Peruvian cruiser. Arica was first 
visited, and there information was obtained that the 
Huascar and the Union were cruising to the southward. 
Admiral Riveros now ordered the Cochrane commanded 
by Captain Latorre, and accompanied by the Loa and 
the OHiggins, to cruise off Mejillones Bay, whilst he in 
the Blanco Encalada and attended by the Covadonga 
and Matias Cousino, the latter an armed transport, kept 
a look-out for the enemy further to the south. 

By this time the rank of admiral had been conferred 
on Captain Grau by the Peruvian Government as a 



1879] CAPTURE OF THE HUASCAR 455 

recognition of his energy and gallantry. On the morning 
of October 8, the Huascar with the Union was near 
Antofagasta steaming quietly to the northward, when 
the smoke of three steamers was descried near Point 
Angamos. They proved to be the Chilian squadron 
under Riveros, and Admiral Grau steamed away to 
avoid a fight. His ships seemed to have every chance 
of avoiding the enemy, when suddenly the Cochrane, 
Loci, and OHiggins appeared on the horizon. Escape 
was now impossible, and Grau determined to fight the 
matter out to a finish. The Union was ordered to 
make the best of her way out of the course of the 
Chilian vessels, and this, owing to her high speed, she 
successfully did, while the Huascar prepared for the 
unequal combat she was obliged to face. 

The fight was interesting apart from the fact that 
it was one of the decisive incidents in the war. It was 
the first action that had occurred between modern 
ironclads, and for that reason alone the result claimed 
Avorld-wide attention. The first shot was fired from the 
turret of the Huascar when the ships were 3000 yards 
apart, and it fell short. The second and third rounds 
were equally ineffective, but the fourth struck the water, 
ricochetted, and pierced the armour-plating of the 
Cochrane, although doing no serious damage. The two 
vessels were gradually closing whilst the engagement 
progressed, but hitherto the Cochrane had been silent. 
At 2000 yards distance Captain Latorre gave the order 
to fire, and the two heavy guns opened, the projectiles 
damaging the hull of the Peruvian ship, the fourth shot 
striking the turret of the Huascar, and temporarily 
disabled the revolving gear. The two vessels were now 
at close range, and an attempt was made by Admiral 
Grau to ram his opponent, but the twin-screws of the 
Cochrane enabled Captain Latorre to manoeuvre so 
quickly as to render this effort abortive, and subsequent 
attempts of the Huascar to ram were equally 
unsuccessful, owing to the good judgment and clever 
manner in which Latorre handled his ship. 



456 THE CHILIAN-PERtTVIAN WAR 

Shortly before 10 a.m., thirty-five minutes after the 
first shot had been fired, a shell from the Cochrane 
struck the conning tower of the Huascar, in which were 
Admiral Grau and his flag-lieutenant, and the projectile 
exploded inside the structure, killing both occupants, the 
Admiral being mutilated to such an extent that only his 
right foot and leg were identified as part of the man 
who had been the foremost figure in the Peruvian navy. 
Soon after this catastrophe the Blanco Encalado reached 
the scene of action, and when within 600 yards of the 
Huascar opened fire. A series of misfortunes now 
overtook the Peruvians. After the death of Grau his 
place was taken by Captain Elias Aguirre, the next 
senior officer, but he was decapitated by a shell a few 
minutes after assuming command, and Captain Manuel 
Carbajal, who then took charge, was severely wounded. 
Lieutenant Rodriguez was next in seniority, but had 
hardly time to realise his responsibilities before he was 
killed ; and Lieutenant Enrique Palacios who was left in 
command was so badly injured before the close of the 
action that he was forced to relinquish his post to 
Lieutenant Pedro Garezon. One hour after the fight 
began the dead and dying were littered in all directions 
over the deck, and the number of casualties rapidly 
increased. 

At half- past ten, an hour and twenty minutes after 
the first shot had been fired, the Huascar was com- 
pletely disabled. The explosion of a shell in the turret 
had put one of the heavy guns out of action, the steam 
steering-gear was injured, and both the hull and upper 
work of the vessel were seriously damaged. At one 
time the Chilians imagined the Huascar had surrendered, 
owing to the colours being shot away, and there was a 
lull in the firing, but the flag was run up again and the 
fight recommenced. Further resistance on the part of 
the Peruvians was now useless, and one hour and forty 
minutes from the beginning of the engagement the 
Peruvian flag was hauled down. Lieutenants Simpson 
and Rogers, and an engineer, with half a dozen sailors 



1879] CHILIAN CONTEOL AT SEA 457 

and four marines, were sent from the Cochrane to take 
possession of the prize. Lieutenant Simpson was 
received by Lieutenant Garezon, and a formal surrender 
of the vessel was made. The scene on the decks was 
evidence of the severity of the punishment the Peruvian 
cruiser had sustained. Mutilated corpses lay in every 
corner, and of a total complement of 193 officers and 
men when the Huascar went into action, 64 had been 
killed or wounded. The ship was burning near the 
conning tower, and had three feet of water in the hold, 
and the survivors of the crew were ordered to help to 
extinguish the fire, and were kept at the pumps until 
the water-tight compartments were closed and all 
danger past ; they were then treated as prisoners of 
war. Of the crew on the Huascar, thirty were 
Englishmen, twelve of other foreign nationalities, and 
the remainder Peruvians. 

The Chilian squadron with their prize proceeded to 
Mejillones Bay, and there the interment of the remains 
of Admiral Grau and his companions was attended with 
all due honours. The Huascar was then taken to 
Valparaiso and, after undergoing the necessary repairs, 
incorporated into the Chilian navy. After this action 
the only warships remaining to the Peruvians were the 
Pilcomayo and the Union ; the former was captured on 
November 17, 1879, but the latter evaded seizure to the 
end of the war. The result of the capture of the 
Huascar was to leave the Chilians masters of the sea on 
the Pacific coast of South America, and to remove all 
obstacles in the way of the advance of the invading 
army into Peruvian territory. 



CHAPTER XXV 

the chiltan-peruvian war — continued 

Third Phase of the War. Chilians at Antofagasta. Embarkation of 
Expeditionary Forces. Peruvians defend Tarapaca. Attack 
on Pisagua. Retreat to San Roberto. Occupation of Junin. 
Skirmish near Agua Santa. Attack on Chilians near Dolores. 
Chilian Victory. Retreat to Tarapaca. Occupation of Iquique. 
Stand at Tarapaca. Expedition under Colonel Arteaga. Battle 
of Tarapaca. Peruvian Victory. Peruvians fall back on Arica. 
Defence of Arica. The Chilian Advance. Engagement at Torata. 
Tacna and Arica Isolated. Skirmish near the River Sama. 
Battle of Tacna. Rout of Defenders. Heavy Casualties. Battle 
of Ariea. Sinking of the Manco Gapac. 

The first phase of the war ended with the occupation 
of Antofagasta, Calama, and other districts of Atacama. 
The second was concluded by the fight in which the 
Huascar was taken by the Blanco Encalada and the 
Cochrane, and which signalised the elimination of Peru- 
vian naval power ; and the third covers the advance of 
the Chilian forces into Peruvian territory. 

In the beginning of October, 1879, the army of 
invasion concentrated at Antofagasta numbered 7000 
men, and other troops were in readiness at Valparaiso 
to be pushed forward as opportunity arose. On October 
9, the day after the capture of the Huascar, orders were 
issued for the embarkation of the forces assembled at 
Antofagasta, and active preparations were immediately 
commenced, the command of the expedition being con- 
fided to General Escala, Senor Rafael Sotomayor, the 
War Minister, accompanying the army. The loading of 



1879] INVASION OF TARAPACA 459 

the transports were carelessly and hurriedly effected, 
and in the anxiety to have all ready to sail as soon as 
possible the bulk of the hospital appliances, ambulances, 
and medical stores were left behind. The actual destina- 
tion was kept a profound secret, and beyond a general 
idea of a landing in Tarapaca nothing was known. By 
the 28th preparations were complete, and the expedition, 
now swelled to 10,000 officers and men, set sail for the 
north. The force consisted principally of infantry, but 
included 850 cavalry well mounted and equipped, and 
30 long-range field guns of modern type. The fleet 
comprised 15 transports under convoy of 4 men-of- 
war — the Cochrane, the OHiggins, and two other vessels. 
Not until after leaving Antofagasta was it announced 
that the objective point was Pisagua on the Tarapaca 
coast. 

It was no easy matter for the Peruvians to organise 
adequate defensive measures to repel the invasion. The 
long coast-line of 1400 miles was an insuperable source 
of weakness, more especially on account of the barren 
and mountainous character of the land, which prevented 
the rapid movement of troops from one point to another, 
a difficulty aggravated by the fact that the Chilians now 
controlled the sea and could concentrate on any part of 
the seaboard at short notice-. It was supposed naturally 
that the Province of Tarapaca, with its great wealth, 
would be first attacked by the invaders, and efforts were 
made by the Peruvians to strengthen the defences there. 
In October the troops in Tarapaca numbered 9000 
officers and men, commanded by General Juan Buendia, 
with Colonel Belisario Suarez as chief of staff, and 
supported by many prominent officers, amongst whom 
were Colonel Manuel Velarde, Colonel Justo Pastor 
Davila, Colonel Andres Avelino Caceres, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Lubiaga, Colonel Villamil, the latter in com- 
mand of the Bolivian detachment stationed at Pisagua, 
and Colonel Isaac Recarbarren, military Governor of 
Pisagua. General Daza, the President of Bolivia, who 
had reached Tacna in April, was ordered to march to 



460 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Tarapaca and reinforce the division under General 
Btiendia ; but he delayed his departure, from motives 
of cowardice it was said, and did not arrive before 
disaster had overtaken the Peruvians, nor did he at any 
time render assistance of value. The artillery consisted 
of 16 old-fashioned bronze guns, so antiquated as to be 
powerless against the modern weapons of the Chilians. 

Pisagua now became the centre of operations. It 
is an open roadstead, the shore slightly curving inwards 
where the town is situated, and cliffs of an altitude of 
over a thousand feet rise abruptly behind the buildings 
of the settlement, leaving only a narrow strip of level 
ground for the dwellings of the residents. On either side 
of the town a small fort had been constructed, with one 
gun in each. The railway from the town to the nitrate 
districts zigzagged up the face of the cliffs until reaching 
the summit station known as El Hospieio, thence running 
over the level pampa of Tamarugal. Six miles to the 
south is the open roadstead of Junin, also a port of 
shipment for nitrate of soda. On November 1, 1879, 
General Buendia arrived at Pisagua on a tour of inspec- 
tion and found that the garrison consisted of 600 Boli- 
vians commanded by Colonel Villamil, and, in addition, a 
corps of 800 men recruited from boatmen and labourers 
in the harbour, in charge of Colonel Recabarren. 

At daybreak on November 2, steamers were reported 
rapidly approaching the Pisagua roadstead, and shortly 
afterwards the 15 transports and 4 men-of-war forming 
the Chilian expedition were abreast of the town. The 
garrison was then posted to resist the landing of the 
army of invasion, the Bolivian troops under Villamil 
being stationed along the zigzag of the railway to "El 
Hospieio," and the battalion commanded by Recabarren 
placed near the railway station and wherever the houses 
offorded cover and allowed a clear range of fire, while 
the two forts were manned by detachments of Peruvian 
artillery. Hostilities commenced by the bombardment 
of the forts by the Cochrane and O'Higgins, and the fire 
was so accurate that the gun in the southern fort was 



1879] BATTLE OF PISAGUA 46i 

soon disabled and the northern fort abandoned. The 
necessity of putting these two guns out of action caused 
delay, and it was not until 9.30 a.m. that the boats with 
the first detachment of the Chilian troops left the 
transports, the landing being protected by the squadron, 
whose fire was principally directed against the Bolivians 
holding the railway line. Colonel Pecabarren was 
severely wounded early in the engagement, but Colonel 
Villamil from half-way up the cliff actively encouraged 
his men to repel the invaders, and General Buendia from 
the summit near " El Hospicio " watched the development 
of the fight. The garrison of Pisagua was powerless to 
impede the disembarkation of the Chilians, and although 
a sharp rifle fire was maintained when the landing was 
effected, it was soon silenced by the heavy guns and 
musketry from the ships. General Buendia had sent 
for reinforcements early in the day, but these did not 
arrive in time to take part in the action, and at 10.30 
a.m. the Chilians had possession of the town and 
advanced to clear the face of the cliff. By eleven o'clock 
the position of the defenders had become untenable, and 
Buendia ordered a retreat, the remnant of the garrison 
assembling at San Roberto, ten miles from Pisagua, and 
marching to Agua Santa on the following day, a troop 
of cavalry of 94 sabres commanded by Captain Sepulveda 
forming the rearguard. In this action the defence lost 
500 men killed and wounded, and the Chilian casualties 
were returned as 235, many of the wounded dying through 
want of proper attention, owing to the ambulances and 
medical stores having been left at Antofagasta. 

While the action at Pisagua was proceeding, General 
Escala, the Chilian Commander-in-chief, had landed at 
Junin, six miles to the south, and occupied that 
neighbourhood. The Chilian troops were now jDushed 
forward from Pisagua to obtain possession of the rail- 
way line to Agua Santa, a distance of fifty miles, and 
on November 4 a reconnaissance was made by Colonel 
Jose Vergara with 175 troopers. He encountered the 
Peruvian rearguard under Captain Sepulveda on the 



462 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

6th, close to Agua Santa, and a fight ensued, in which 
the Peruvians were cut to pieces, 70 of them being 
killed ; the Chilian loss was only trifling, owing to the 
fact that they were better armed and mounted than their 
opponents. After this skirmish the Chilians occupied 
the line of railway between Pisagua and Agua Santa, 
the main body being camped near Dolores on the road 
from Iquique to Arica, where there was an abundant 
supply of fresh water, and which was near the hill of 
San Francisco, a naturally strong position. With the 
railway to connect with the base of Pisagua and to 
carry water from Dolores to the detachments on the 
lines of communication, the Chilian position was excep- 
tionally strong. By November 19, 1879, a force of 6000 
men with 32 guns had been concentrated at San 
Francisco, and reinforcements were close at hand if 
the Peruvians attacked in superior numbers. 

General Buendia determined to attempt to dislodge 
the Chilians from Dolores and San Francisco. His idea 
was that if he could seize the water supply at Dolores, 
the enemy would be forced to fall back on Pisagua, and 
even that place might become untenable. Throughout 
the pampa of Tamarugal the lack of fresh water is a 
serious obstacle, and the distances between sources of 
supply are usually great ; and, moreover, the Peruvian 
troops were short of provisions, and immediate action 
was a necessity unless the whole province was to be 
evacuated. Nominally, the Peruvian army in Tarapaca 
amounted to 10,000 men, but when concentrated at 
Pozo Almonte the number had dwindled to between 
6000 and 7000. Hopes were entertained that the 
Bolivians under President Daza would arrive, but on 
November 18 news was received that he had turned 
back to Arica. Notwithstanding this disappointment, 
General Buendia decided to carry out his plans for 
attacking the Chilian position near Dolores, and on 
November 16 he started from Pozo Almonte for that 
purpose. 

It was a long and tedious march over a barren, 



1879] PERUVIAN DEFEAT AT DOLORES 463 

alkaline desert, and not until the morning of the 19th 
did the Peruvians come within striking distance of the 
Chilians. They were able to occupy the establishment 
of " Porvenir " before the action commenced, so obtain- 
ing fresh water, and the buildings serving as the head- 
quarters for General Buendia. The attack was deferred 
until the afternoon, to enable the men to rest after a 
fourteen-mile march since daybreak, but meanwhile a 
reconnaissance was made by Colonel Espinar, who 
reported that conditions were favourable for a flanking 
movement on the San Francisco position at a point 
where the Chilian artillery was much exposed. 

At 3 p.m. the Peruvian division, commanded by 
General Lavadenz and guided by Colonel Espinar, was 
ordered to attack the Chilian flank and attempt to 
capture the artillery, while another column under General 
Villegas advanced to the foot of the San Francisco Hill ; 
but the enemy was not taken by surprise, and a heavy 
artillery fire met the advance. In spite of this, the 
Peruvians gained ground and the Chilian gunners 
wavered, but at this critical moment Colonel Espinar 
was shot through the forehead and killed. Immediately 
following this disaster a body of Chilian infantry came 
up and delivered an effective bayonet charge which 
saved the Chilians' guns, and support now arriving, the 
Peruvians were driven back towards the "Porvenir." 
The frontal attack by General Villegas proved equally 
unsuccessful, the General being severely wounded early 
in the action, and the Chilians working round the 
Peruvian flanks forced their assailants to retreat with 
heavy loss. At 5 p.m. the battle was over, and a decisive 
victory had been won by the Chilians. No attempt 
was made to follow the defeated Peruvians beyond 
"Porvenir," although it was evident that an energetic 
pursuit would have converted the defeat into a rout and 
prevented the enemy from rallying again in this district. 
The casualties on the Chilian side were 208 killed and 
wounded, the Peruvian loss being 220 dead, 76 wounded, 
and 100 men taken prisoners. 



464 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

General Buendia retreated across the pampa of 
Tamarugal to the village of Tarapaca, He began this 
toilsome march of thirty miles across the desert shortly 
before midnight on the day of the battle, Colonel Suarez 
being sent ahead to arrange for rations. Tarapaca was 
reached on November 22, the guns having been abandoned 
en 7-o ute owing to the great difficulty of transporting 
them over the sandy ground. The army was joined on 
the 26th by Colonel Rios and the garrison of Iquique, 
this town having been evacuated when news of the 
defeat at Dolores was received. This disaster to the 
Peruvians was far-reaching in effect, for when the 
garrison evacuated Iquique, the Prefect of the town, 
Senor Lopez Lavalle, took refuge on board the British 
warship Shannon, and on November 20 the city was 
given up to the Chilian squadron. The practical out- 
come of the action at Dolores was to place the Chilians 
in absolute control of the nitrate of soda districts, the 
source from which the Peruvian Government had derived 
the larger portion of the national revenues. 

The town of Tarapaca to which the Peruvians 
retreated is situated at an elevation of 3800 feet above 
sea level. It lies in a fertile valley watered by a stream 
from the Andine ranges, but which is narrow and not 
capable of supporting a large population. It was 
impossible to keep the whole force concentrated in the 
neighbourhood of the town, and General Buendia 
decided to send the vanguard up the valley to the 
village of Pichica, distant fifteen miles. The force 
remaining at Tarapaca to bear the brunt of any sudden 
attack from the Chilians consisted of the Commander- 
in-chief and his staff and 2500 infantry, but this portion 
of the army was without artillery or cavalry, and had 
suffered greatly from the privations endured in the long 
inarches and hard fighting which had taken place since 
the hivasion commenced. Food was scarce, ammunition 
running short, and they were generally in no condition 
to cope with the Chilians, now elated with victory; 
nevertheless General Buendia determined to make one 



1879] ADVANCE TO TARAPACA 465 

more stand, if the enemy followed him across the pampa 
of Tamaragal. 

Buendia was not long kept in suspense. General 
Escala, in command of the Chilian army, shortly after 
the victory at Dolores and the surrender of Iquique, 
detached 2000 infantry, 150 cavalry, and 10 guns, under 
Colonel Luis Arteaga to proceed to Tarapaca and attack 
the Peruvians. This expedition left the railway station 
of Dibujo on November 26, marched half-way across 
the pampa that day, encamped for the night at Lluga, 
and continued the advance at daybreak. At 10 a.m. 
on the 27th, the force, marching in three columns, was 
close to Tarapaca, and its approach not discovered until 
within half a mile of the Peruvian lines. 

The hills on both sides of Tarapaca rise abruptly to 
a height of 1200 feet, and from the slopes the valley can 
be dominated by rifle fire. The object of the Chilians was 
to seize these ridges and compel the surrender of General 
Buendia and his force. One of the Chilian columns 
was directed to march to the point where the valley 
debouches into the plain, and to advance up the slope to 
the village, in order to prevent all possibility of the 
Peruvians breaking away in that direction. When the 
alarm was given, the Peruvians were forced to fight and 
endeavour to hold the ground they occupied, or to 
retreat towards Pichica, where lay the remainder of 
their army, for in front and on both flanks they were 
hemmed in by the Chilians. 

General Buendia lost no time in making his disposi- 
tion for the defence. A division commanded by Colonel 
Andres Caceres was ordered to the ridge to the right of 
Tarapaca to meet the enemy advancing on that flank, 
and a second division was sent to the right, the 
Commander-in-chief with a small force remaining to 
protect the village from a frontal attack. A messenger 
was despatched to the officer commanding at Pachica, 
summoning him to bring up all available troops in 
support of the defence. At 10.30 a.m., the division 
under Colonel Caceres gained the crest on the right, and 

2 G 



466 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

at once became heavily engaged with the Chilian 
column commanded by Colonel Santa Cruz. At first 
the advantage appeared to be with the Chilians, but the 
Peruvians were reinforced by the arrival of the Iquique 
detachment under Colonel Rios and slowly gained 
ground. Both Colonel Zubiaga and Lieut. -Colonel 
Manuel Suarez, commandant of the 20 de Mayo 
Regiment, two of the ablest Peruvian officers, were 
killed in the first quarter of an hour; but still the 
Peruvians pressed forward against their enemies, and a 
charge forced the Chilians to fall back and abandon two of 
their Krupp field guns. The Peruvians again charged, 
and the Chilian infantry was obliged to retreat, in spite 
of supports under Colonel Arteaga, the commander of 
the expedition, having hurried up to assist Colonel 
Santa Cruz. By noon the Peruvians had further 
advanced and captured another section of the Krupp 
field battery, and this artillery was now utilised against 
the Chilian infantry. Finally the Chilians fell back from 
the heights and took up a position near the mouth of 
the Tarapaca valley, the cavalry under Colonel Villagran 
forming an efficient check to any attempt of the 
Peruvians to follow up the success they had gained on 
the right of the valley. 

While this fighting took place on the right, an attack 
had been made on the town of Tarapaca by a detach- 
ment of Chilian infantry advancing up the valley. To 
repel this, the Peruvian troops on the heights on the 
left were brought down to the valley, and these with 
the force remaining in the village with General Buendia 
resisted so effectually that the detachment under Colonel 
Ramirez was obliged to seek shelter at the place to 
where the column under Colonel Santa Cruz had 
retreated. Colonel Ramirez was so severely wounded 
during the fighting, that he was left on the field and 
taken prisoner by the Peruvians. It was now 3 p.m., 
and five hours' hard fighting had taken place, and while 
the Peruvians were exultant with the success they had 
attained, they were exhausted. The Chilians were also 



1879] PERUVIAN VICTORY 467 

discouraged, and were with difficulty rallied and again 
led to the attack. Reinforcements from Pachica began 
to arrive about 3.30 p.m., and when information of this 
fact reached Colonel Arteaga, he ordered a general 
retreat across the pampa of Tamarugal, considering that 
further attack on the Peruvians would be useless. It 
was carried out immediately, unmolested by the Peruvians 
owing to lack of cavalry, but the Chilians left with the 
enemy 8 guns and 1 standard. This was the one 
substantial Peruvian victory during the war. The 
Chilian loss was 687 officers and men killed and 
wounded and 52 prisoners, the Peruvian casualties 
being 19 officers killed, 16 wounded, and 236 non- 
commissioned officers and men killed and 262 wounded 
— giving a total, exclusive of the men captured, of 1220 
casualties during an engagement of five hours. The 
Chilian attacking force engaged consisted of 2000 officers 
and men, with 10 guns, and the Peruvians numbered 
2500 at the commencement of the fight, and 1000 
officers and men arrived from Pichica towards the close 
of the action in response to the summons of General 
Buendia when the advance of the Chilians was first 
known. During the early part of the action the 
superiority in the numbers of the Peruvians was 
counterbalanced by the fact that they were without 
artillery ; towards the end they were not only in greater 
force, but also had the use of the guns captured from 
the Chilians, and it was in view of these circumstances 
that Colonel Arteaga ordered the retreat. 

After the battle of Tarapaca the Peruvians continued 
preparations for retreating to Arica. The route taken 
was along the foot of the great mountain ranges of the 
Andes, and necessitated the crossing of long stretches of 
barren desert where water and food supplies were 
always difficult, and often impossible, to obtain. Arica 
was reached finally on December 18, with the troops in 
sorry condition from the many hardships that they had 
undergone. Both General Buendia and Colonel Suarez, 
the chief of staff, were placed under arrest and charged 



468 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

with the loss of Tarapaca, but were subsequently released 
without trial and appointed to important commands. 
Three days after the departure of the Peruvians from 
Tarapaca an expedition was sent from Dibujo, under 
charge of Colonel Urriola, to bury the Chilian dead and 
bring in any wounded who might be found near where 
the action of November 27 had been fought. 

Tarapaca now securely occupied, the Chilian authori- 
ties turned their attention to the Peruvian army concen- 
trated at Arica and Tacna. Arica was the principal 
seaport of southern Peru, and was closely blockaded by 
the Chilian squadron. It was defended by 20 rifled 
guns, 10 of them mounted on the Morro, a high table- 
like cape to the south of the town, and the remainder 
distributed over the forts of 2° de Mayo, Santa Rosa, 
and San Jose on the north beach, and under the 
protection of these forts was anchored the » monitor 
Manco Capac, supported by a small torpedo brigade 
organised by Lieutenant Prado. During December, 1 879, 
and the opening months of 1880, the Chilian squadron 
kept the garrison and inhabitants in a state of constant 
alarm by occasional bombardments of the fortifications. 
The command of the troops at Tacna and Arica devolved 
on Admiral Montero, President Daza having been re- 
placed by Colonel Eleodoro Camacho as the senior 
officer of the Bolivian contingent. The Peruvian army 
numbered 6000 officers and men and the Bolivians 
4000, making a total defensive force of 10,000 to resist 
the Chilian invasion. In April, General Campero arrived 
from Bolivia and assumed the chief command, Admiral 
Montero remaining under his orders in charge of the 
Peruvians, and Colonel Camacho in a similar position 
with the Bolivians. 

General Manuel Baquedano had succeeded General 
Escala in command of the Chilian army, and on 
February 24, 1880, he ordered the advance on Tacna 
and Arica to begin. A force of 10,000 men was 
embarked at Iquique and Pisagua, and on February 26 
a landing was effected at Yio and Pacocha, further 






1880] INVASION OF TACNA 460 

reinforcements of 4000 men being disembarked on 
February 28. The port of Ylo was eighty miles to the 
north-west of Arica, and Pacocha only five miles from 
Ylo. The object of General Baquedano was to isolate 
the Peruvian and Bolivian forces at Tacna and Arica, 
and cut off communication between those places and the 
fertile district of Moquegua, of which Ylo is the seaport. 
Moquegua was thus an important point for the Peruvians, 
as from it supplies could be drawn for the maintenance 
of the army. An expedition was landed also at Islay on 
March 8, to occupy Mollendo, the port for Arequipa, 
under Colonel Orozimbo Barbosa. Ylo is connected 
with Moquegua by railway, and no opposition was 
encountered by the Chilians on the advance to that 
place on March 20, but at Torata, ten miles beyond 
Moquegua, a Peruvian force under Colonel Gamarra was 
entrenched in a strong position, and it was necessary to 
dislodge the enemy from this stronghold. On March 
22 General Baquedano attacked, preparing the way 
for the assault by heavy artillery fire, and detaching a 
column to make a detour and surprise the garrison by 
a flank attack. For an hour the defenders held their 
ground; but finally they were driven from their 
entrenchments, leaving 28 killed and many wounded on 
the field. The capture of Torata effectually closed all 
communication between Tacna and the north of Peru, 
and the Peruvian army at Tacna and Arica was now 
surrounded. On the north was the Chilian force of 
14,000 men under Baquedano, and on the south was the 
province of Tarapaca in Chilian occupation. The Chilian 
squadron held possession of the sea to the west, and at 
the back of Tacna rose the vast mountain ranges of the 
Andes, preventing any rapid movement to the east. 

The eighty miles which separated the Chilian position 
at Ylo from Tacna is traversed by two fertile valleys, 
through which flow the rivers Locumba and Sama. 
Preparations were begun for the march to Tacna, and a 
reconnaissance of the intervening ground was made by 
Colonel Vergara, and on April 17 an engagement took 



470 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAK 

place between the mounted troops with Vergara and a 
force of Peruvian cavalry under Colonel Albarracain, in 
which the latter was cut to pieces, leaving 150 dead 
bodies on the field. On April 27 a general advance 
upon Tacna was ordered, the troops marching by easy 
stages until reaching the vicinity of Buenavista in the 
valley of the river Sama on May 20, 1880, and it was 
here that Senor Sotomayor, the Chilian Minister of War, 
was taken suddenly ill and died. He was the man who 
had originated the plan of campaign in Tarapaca and 
Tacna, and his loss was severely felt. The Chilian 
advance was continued, and on the night of the 25th the 
army encamped within six miles of Tacna, near which 
place the bulk of the Peruvian and Bolivian forces 
were concentrated. 

To check the Chilian attack, General Campero had 
selected a position on the summit of some barren hills to 
the north-west of Tacna, with deep ravines on either 
side, while the front sloped away at a sharp angle. 
Here entrenchments were thrown up and the troops 
enjoined to remain under cover as much as possible. 
The centre of the defence was entrusted to Colonel 
Pinto, and the left wing was commanded by Colonel 
Camacho. On the right were the Peruvian troops in 
charge of Admiral Montero, with Colonel Velarde 
acting as chief of staff, and here also was Colonel 
Belisario Suarez, already well known in connection with 
the Tarapaca campaign. General Perez, a Bolivian 
officer, was chief of the staff of the whole army. 

The action was commenced at 10 a.m. on May 26, 
by heavy artillery fire from the Chilian long-range 
Krupp guns, and continued for an hour, and then 
General Baquedano ordered a general assault. The 
Chilian infantry advanced in four columns, each 2400 
strong ; the first under Colonel Amengual attacked 
the left of the Peruvian position, while the second and 
third columns, led by Colonels Amunategui and Barcelo, 
were directed against the enemy's centre, and the fourth, 
commanded by Colonel Barbosa, assaulted the right 



1880] BATTLE OF TACNA 471 

flank, where Admiral Montero was stationed. At noon 
the battle was at its height, when suddenly the left 
wing of the defenders gave way. General Campero 
immediately sent reinforcements to support Colonel 
Camacho, and the Chilians were forced back down 
the hill ; but at this critical moment a cavalry charge 
enabled them to rally. With the assistance of a con- 
centration of artillery fire on the defenders' left, the 
attack was again pressed home, and this second assault 
was too much for the men under Camacho. At 2 p.m. 
the left of the position was carried, and at the same time 
the right wing gave way and the centre was overpowered, 
the defeat of the Peruvians and Bolivians being complete. 
General Campero with the remnant of the army retreated 
through the Tacna valley towards Bolivia, reaching La 
Paz without interference from the Chilians. The casual- 
ties on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the Chilians 
losing 2128 officers and men killed and wounded, and 
the Peruvians 147 officers and 1500 men killed, and 
1500 officers and men wounded. The forces engaged 
numbered 14,000 Chilians and 8000 Peruvians and 
Bolivians, and the severity of the fighting may be gauged 
by the fact that one -quarter of the combatants were 
killed or wounded in an action of only four hours' 
duration. 

After the victory at Tacna preparations were made 
to capture Arica, where a Peruvian garrison of 2000 
strong under command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi 
still held out. On June 2, 1880, General Baquedano 
ordered a force of 4000 men in charge of Colonel Lagos 
to proceed to Chacalluta, a short distance from Arica. 
The fortifications in the neighbourhood of Arica had 
been strengthened, and additional sand-bag defences 
constructed on the Morro Hill to render it more formid- 
able from the land side. Towards the sea the face of 
this hill is a perpendicular cliff, 700 feet high. The 
artillery at Arica has already been mentioned ; but extra 
guns had been mounted on the Morro, bringing the total 
number to nine, and a few Gatling guns had also been 



472 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

placed on the summit, so that it was one of the most 
formidable obstacles the Chilians had met. 

On June 5, 1880, General Baquedano sent a flag of 
truce to the town with a summons to surrender, which 
was refused. The Chilian Commander-in-chief then 
gave orders to begin the bombardment of the place, and 
next day the squadron opened fire, and was answered 
by the forts and the guns of the Manco Capac. Some 
damage was done to the Covadonga during the day, 
while 28 men were killed and wounded on the Cochrane. 
General Baquedano now determined to assault the forts 
and defences at the Morro Hill on June 7, and all 
preparations were made accordingly by Colonel Lagos. 
Of the Chilian force, 1000 men were detailed to attack 
the forts on the beach, 2000 were to storm the Morro 
where the sand-bag defences had been constructed, and 
1000 men were held in reserve for emergency. 

The Chilian arrangements were conducted with the 
utmost secrecy. Through the night camp fires were 
kept burning by cavalry patrols to delude the enemy, 
and meanwhile the troops crept up to the positions 
assigned to them, in readiness to assault at the first 
glimpse of daylight. So effectually was the operation 
executed, that at dawn the Chilians were within a few 
yards of the outer works protecting the Morro without 
having been discovered, and a rush was made, the newly 
constructed forts carried, and the defenders bayoneted. 
Simultaneously the redoubts on the beach were seized 
and the Morro Hill captured, in spite of a heavy fire 
from the garrison, but only after desperate hand-to-hand 
fighting, in which 600 Peruvians were killed. By 8 a.m. 
the Chilians were in complete possession of Arica and 
all the defences in the neighbourhood. When Captain 
Lagomarsino of the Manco Capac saw all was lost, he 
ordered the crew into the boats and opened the valves 
of the monitor, and in a few minutes the vessel sank, 
thus preventing her from falling into the hands of the 
enemy. The total Peruvian casualties were returned as 
700 officers and men killed and 100 wounded. Permis- 



i860] CAPTURE OF ARICA 473 

sion was granted by the Chilian authorities for the 
Peruvian steamer Limena to proceed to Arica and 
remove the wounded to Callao, this being the more 
necessary as Arica was crowded with the wounded of 
the battle at Tacna on May 26. The Chilian loss in 
the storming of the forts and the Morro Hill was com- 
paratively trifling, owing to the defence being taken by 
surprise. 

The third phase of the war was concluded with the 
occupation of Tacna and Arica. The invasion of Peru- 
vian territory had been accomplished, the Chilians being 
now in complete possession of the southern section and 
controlling the nitrate of soda industry and the shipment 
of guano, the two principal sources of revenue upon 
which Peru had relied. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

the chilian-peruvian war — continued 

Internal Dissensions. President Prado leaves Peru. Senor Pierola 
heads a Revolt. Blockade of Callao. Bombardment of Callao. 
Sinking of the Janequeo. Loss of the Loa. Sinking of the 
Covadonga, Bombardment of Chancay, Ancon, and Chorillos. 
Expedition to the Northern Coast. Protests from Foreign 
Representatives. Efforts of United States for Peace. Confer- 
ence on U.S. warship Lackcmana. Conditions of Chile. Chilian 
Preparations for Advance on Lima. Army of Invasion. Occupa- 
tion of Pisco and Yea. Landing at Curayaco. Naval Opera- 
tions off Callao. Defences of Lima. Fourth Phase of War. 
Advance on Peruvian Positions. Battle of Chorillos. Fighting 
on Morro Solar. Armistice arranged by Foreign Diplomats. 
Battle of Miraflores. Lima Surrenders. Occupation of the 
Peruvian Capital. 

While Peru was suffering many misfortunes in the 
south the situation was further complicated by the 
outbreak of internal dissensions at the National Capital. 
The President, General Mariano Prado, in view of these 
unsettled political conditions, had resigned command of 
the army at Tacna to Admiral Montero on November 
26, 1879, and returned to Lima to resume his presi- 
dential functions. 

In the absence of the President his duties had been 
discharged by the Vice-President, General La Puerta, 
and on his return to Lima he published a manifesto 
announcing his resumption of office and stating that he 
would use every effort in his power to retrieve the 
recent national disasters. This document was dated 
December 2, 1879, and the astonishment of the public 



1880] DISTURBANCES IN LIMA 475 

can be imagined when, sixteen days later, the President 
issued a decree to the effect that under powers granted 
to him on May 2, 1878, he was proceeding abroad on 
urgent public business, and that the Vice-President 
would fill his post during his absence. Prado had no 
sooner left than indignation became general, and roused 
the populace to armed revolt against the constituted 
authorities, the insurrection being headed by Seiior 
Nicolas Pierola. Fighting took place in the streets of 
Lima, and on December 22nd the insurgents obtained 
possession of Callao. The Vice-President then resigned 
office, and on December 23 Seiior Pierola entered 
Lima, and was proclaimed the Supreme Chief of the 
Republic. While the army at Tacna was making a 
last effort to check the Chilian invasion these turbulent 
events in the National Capital effectually prevented any 
assistance in the quarter from which aid was naturally 
expected. 

The position of Peru was desperate when Seiior 
Pierola assumed control of the Administration. It was 
too late to avert disaster in Arica, for that port was 
blockaded by the Chilian squadron, and this prevented 
the despatch of reinforcements for the garrison. 
Nothing could be done except to strengthen the 
defences of Callao and Lima in view of the fact that 
Chile, flushed with her success in Tarapaca, had already 
made her preparations for the invasion of Tacna and 
Arica, and was evidently determined to carry the 
campaign still further into Peruvian territory when she 
had disposed of the troops under Admiral Montero and 
General Campero, and established an unbroken line of 
communication between Arica and Valparaiso. 

If any doubt existed in regard to the intention of 
Chile to prolong the war beyond the southern districts, 
it was dispelled on April 10, 1880, for on that date a 
Chilian squadron commanded by Rear- Admiral Riveros 
appeared off Callao, and notified the authorities and 
foreign representatives that the blockade of the port 
was established. Neutral merchant vessels were allowed 



476 THE CHILXAN-PEKTJVIAN WAR 

eight days to leave the roadstead, the Chilian admiral 
declaring that he would feel at liberty to bombard the 
town at the expiration of that period. It was not until 
nine months later that this blockade was raised. 

Callao is built on a spit of land in a bay facing 
northwards, eight miles from Lima, and connected with 
that city by two lines of railway. Separated from 
Callao by the Boqueron Channel is the island of San 
Lorenzo, and for some unexplained reason this was not 
fortified by the Peruvians. This island became the 
headquarters of the blockading squadron, and proved 
of great value to the Chilians during the operations. 
The defences of Callao consisted of two round towers, 
one armed with two 500-pounder Blakeley guns, the 
other with four 300-pouncler Vavasseurs, and protected 
by earthworks were two 1000-pounder smooth-bore 
Rodman guns. On the beach were two revolving 
armoured turrets called "Junin" and "Mercedes," the 
former to the north, the latter to the south of the town, 
and each equipped with two 500-pounder Armstrong 
guns. Between these two turrets were the forts 
" Ayacucho" and "Santa Rosa," in both of which two 
500-pounder Blakeley guns were mounted. In various" 
positions were the batteries "Maypu," "Provisional," 
"Zepita," "Abtao," "Pichincha," and " Independencia," 
with two, five, eight, six, four, and six 32-pounders 
respectively. The harbour defence monitor Atahualpa, 
the cruiser Union, three school ships, a Herreschoff 
torpedo-boat, and several steam launches were moored 
inside the basin of the port- works. A torpedo brigade 
was formed to aid in the defence of the harbour, and 
submarine mines were laid in the Boqueron Channel 
and elsewhere. 

The blockading squadron consisted of the Blanco 
Encalada (flagship), the Huasca?% Angamos, Pikomayo, 
and Matias Cousifio, and in May it was rendered more 
effective by the addition of a number of fast torpedo- 
boats, two of which, the Fresia and Janequeo, were 
built by Yarrow. These two vessels were seventy feet 




Nicolas de Pierola. 



[Face pane 476. 



1S80] CALLAO BLOCKADED 477 

in length, with a speed of eighteen knots, and both 
carried a Hotchkiss machine gun, and the Janequeo was 
fitted with three McEvoy patent duplex outrigger 
torpedoes. A third torpedo-boat was the Guacoldo,. 
built in the United States for the Peruvian Government, 
and captured by the Chilian transport Ama zones when 
making the voyage from Panama to Callao. The two 
other torpedo-boats were the Colo-colo and Tucapel, 
built by Thorneycroft, and armed with machine guns 
and outrigger torpedoes. 

On April 22 and 23, 1880, the fleet bombarded Callao 
at ranges of from 5000 to 7000 yards, and the attack 
was answered by the forts, little damage being done on 
either side. On May 10 another bombardment took 
place, the forts and batteries again replying, and a 
school ship and several barges were sunk and some 
injury inflicted upon the dock works. On the other 
hand, the Huascar was struck three times during the 
engagement, one shot rendering her steering-gear 
unserviceable, and another penetrating her side and 
flooding one of her compartments. On May 25, the 
Chilians sustained a serious reverse by the loss of the 
torpedo-boat Janequeo. In company with the Guacoldo 
this vessel was cruising near the entrance to the docks 
before daybreak, and suddenly found herself close to 
the Peruvian armed steam launch Independencia com- 
manded by Lieutenant Galvez. Chase was given, and 
on closing with his adversary Lieutenant Senoret of the 
Janequeo endeavoured to destroy the launch with his 
port torpedo ; but as the projectile was discharged 
Lieutenant Galvez heaved a 100 -lb. case of powder on 
the deck of the Janequeo and exploded it with a pistol 
shot. The torpedo-boat sank at once, her commander 
and crew escaping in a boat, and the Independencia 
foundered immediately afterwards from the effect of the 
torpedo explosion, by which eight of her crew also were 
killed, Lieutenant Galvez and seven of his men being 
rescued by the Guacoldo. The result of the loss of the 
Janequeo was greatly increased vigilance by the Chilians, 



478 THE CHILIAN-PEEUVIAN WAR 

and the utmost care was taken to prevent the recurrence 
of a similar disaster. 

The Chilians, however, were destined to suffer other 
mishaps during the blockade. On July 3 a vessel was 
seen in the direction of Ancon, a port sixteen miles to 
the north of Callao, and the armed transport Loa was 
despatched to overhaul this craft. On nearing her the 
captain sent an officer on board to examine the ship, 
and he found the vessel at anchor, but abandoned. 
The cargo consisted of fresh provisions, and on this fact 
being reported to Captain Pena of the Loa, orders were 
given to tow the prize alongside and tranship the 
contents to the transport. As the last of this cargo 
was being hoisted on board a violent explosion occurred, 
making a gap of 15 feet in length in the side of the 
Loa at the water-line, and in five minutes the Chilian 
vessel sank, with her perishing Captain Pena, three 
officers, and fifty men. Thirty- eight of the crew were 
saved by the boats of the foreign men-of-war which were 
lying four miles away at the time. The cause of the 
explosion was never explained, but was attributed to an 
infernal machine placed at the bottom of the cargo of 
the prize, and so arranged as to go off when relieved 
from the pressure of the freight in the hold. 

Another disaster was the loss of the Covadonga. 
The Chilian Admiral had detached this ship from the 
squadron to blockade the port of Chancay, a little to 
the north of Ancon, and in charge was Commander 
Pablo Ferrari. In the bay of Chancay a launch with 
a smart gig astern was observed anchored near the 
shore, and the launch was fired upon and destroyed, a 
boat being then sent from the Covadonga to bring the 
gig alongside. The boat proved uninjured and service- 
able in appearance, and orders were given to hoist her 
on board the Covadonga, but while she was being hauled 
up to the davits an explosion occurred of such force 
that the starboard side of the Covadonga was crushed, 
and she <sank. Captain Ferrari and a number of the 
crew were drowned, but fifteen men escaped in a boat 



1880] LOSS OF THE COVADONGA 479 

and reached the Chilian sloop Pileomayo, and forty-nine 
were saved by clinging to the upper rigging, and being 
subsequently rescued by Peruvian shore boats. It was 
supposed that an infernal machine had been placed in 
the double bottom of the boat, and exploded under the 
strain of lifting her out of the water. The loss of this 
vessel was a source of the greatest annoyance to the 
Chilians, for the Covadonga had been captured from the 
Spaniards in the war of 1866 and was a valued trophy, 
and she had been instrumental in the destruction of the 
Peruvian ironclad Independemia, and was for that 
reason highly prized ; moreover, she had only recently 
been refitted and equipped with modern armament. 
In retaliation for the destruction of the Loci and Cova- 
donga the bombardment of the undefended towns of 
Chancay, Ancon, and Chorillos was ordered by Admiral 
Riveros, but little serious damage was done. 

The Chilian Government now determined further to 
embarrass the Peruvians by sending an expedition north- 
wards to lay waste the country between Callao and 
Payta, and for this service Captain Patricio Lynch of 
the Chilian navy was selected. Captain Lynch was 
born in Chile of Irish descent, and had served eight 
years in the British navy ; he was an able and energetic 
officer, and at this time sixty years of age. The purpose 
of the expedition was to paralyse all trade and commerce 
on the northern coast of Peru, and to destroy any 
property providing supplies to enable the Peruvian 
Government to carry on the war. A force of 3000 men 
was organised, and in September, 1880, Captain Lynch 
proceeded to carry out his instructions. The coast 
towns of Huacho, Supe, Chimbote, Salaverry, Truxillo, 
Pacasmayo, Eten, Chiclayo, Lambayeque, and Payta 
were visited, all Government property in the shape of 
railways and wharves were rendered useless, and all 
villages and farms within easy reach of the seaboard 
wrecked. In some cases this brought strong protests 
from representatives of foreign governments when 
residents of foreign nationality were the sufferers, but 



480 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

such expostulations did not alter the Chilian policy. 
After laying waste the northern section of Peru, Captain 
Lynch returned to Arica. 

An effort was made by the United States to end the 
struggle in October 1880. On the 6th, Mr Osborn, United 
States Minister at Santiago, addressed a communication 
to the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggesting a 
conference to discuss terms for peace, and offering the 
good offices of the United States. It was further pro- 
posed that in event of the Chilian Government accepting 
this suggestion, the meeting of the delegates from Chile, 
Peru, and Bolivia should be held on an United States war- 
ship off Arica, and that the representatives of the United 
States at Santiago, Lima, and in Bolivia should be present. 
The Chilian Government was willing a meeting should 
take place, and a conference was arranged for October 
22, on board the United States corvette Lackawana, then 
lying at Arica. The delegates from Chile were Colonel 
Vergara, the Minister of War, Seiior Eulogio Altamirano, 
and Seiior Eusebio Lillo. Peru was represented by 
Captain Aureteo Garcia y Garcia, and Senor Antonio 
Arenas, and Bolivia sent Senor Mariano Baptista and 
Senor Juan Carillo. The three United States repre- 
sentatives present were Mr Osborn, Minister to Chile, 
Mr Christiancy, Minister to Peru, and Mr Adams, 
Minister to Bolivia. At the opening of the conference 
Mr Adams stated that the United States representatives 
would take no part in the discussion, although they 
would render any assistance possible by friendly co- 
operation and through the good offices of his Govern- 
ment. 

The business of the conference now commenced. 
A memorandum of the terms on which the Chilian 
Government was willing to make peace was submitted, 
the conditions including the absolute cession by Peru of 
the Province of Tarapaca to the south of the valley of 
Camarones ; the relinquishment by Bolivia of her coast 
province to Chile, thejpayment of $20,000,000, of which 
$4,000,000 was to be in cash ; the return to Chilian 



1880] CHILIAN TEEMS REJECTED 481 

citizens of all private property seized during the war ; 
the surrender of the transport Rimac ; the abrogation of 
the treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia ; the 
retention by Chile of the Peruvian provinces of Moquegua, 
Tacna, and Arica until peace was established ; and, 
finally, an obligation on the part of Peru that Arica 
should remain unfortified. With the submission of this 
memorandum, the first meeting concluded and the 
conference adjourned. At the second meeting, Senor 
Arenas (Peru) stated that the Chilian demands were 
based on the right of conquest without regard to equity, 
and that if they were not modified all hope of an 
agreement must be abandoned. To this Senor Alta- 
mirano replied, that Chile must be compensated for the 
sacrifices she had made, and that the conquered province 
of Atacama owed its prosperity and development to 
Chilian capital, energy, and labour. Senor Baptista 
(Bolivia) admitted that Chile by reason of her success 
might rightly claim an indemnity, and he proposed that 
she should remain in occupation of the territory which 
she now held until that indemnity had been received out 
of the revenues of those districts, but he could not accept 
the idea of a permanent alienation of the area in question. 
Captain Garcia y Garcia proposed that the matter 
should be referred to the arbitration of the United 
States Government, but this was promptly rejected by 
the Chilian representatives, and they also refused to 
consider the payment of an indemnity as suggested by 
Senor Baptista. With this the futile conference ended. 
Immediately after preparations were begun by the 
Chilians for an advance from Tacna towards Lima. The 
expeditionary force organised to attack Lima consisted 
of 30,000 men, in three divisions. The first comprised 
9000 officers and men, and was commanded by Captain 
Patricio Lynch ; the second, under General Sotomayor, 
numbered 9500 ; the third was 6560 strong, and was in 
charge of Colonel Lagos ; and in addition to these three 
divisions, a reserve of 1250 officers and men was held in 
readiness to follow the main body when all preparations 

2h 



482 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

were completed. With the army were 77 guns, 8 
Gatlings and 2 Nordenfelts. The composition of the 
force was : — Infantry, 1008 officers and 22,169 men; 
cavalry, 91 officers and 1301 men ; artillery, 103 officers 
and 1486 men — a total of 1202 officers and 24,956 men. 
In addition to this combative force, there was the 
commissariat, ambulance corps, teamsters, and camp 
followers, which raised the total of the army to more 
than 30,000. General Baquedano was Commander-in- 
chief, General Maturana the chief of staff, Colonel 
Velasquez in charge of the artillery, and Colonel Letelier 
commanded the cavalry. The Chilian authorities fully 
understood that the object they had in view would not 
be attained without desperate fighting, and they took all 
precautions to avoid possible disaster; the army con- 
tained the best of the fighting forces of Chile, and no 
expense was spared in the matter of equipment. On 
November 19, the first division under Captain Lynch 
disembarked at Pisco, which was occupied with practi- 
cally no resistance from the small Peruvian garrison ; 
and then the valley and town of Yea were seized. 
Captain Lynch had instructions to march to the north 
from Pisco to Curayaco Bay, 107 miles distant, where 
the remainder of the expeditionary forces would be 
landed, and which was the base for the final advance on 
Lima. Captain Lynch remained at Pisco until the 11th 
of December before attempting to move northwards to 
Curayaco. 

The landing of the main body of the Chilian army at 
Curayaco began on December 22, 1880, and was com- 
pleted in two days, when a force of cavalry was immedi- 
ately pushed forward to occupy the valley of the river 
Lurin, twelve miles from Curayaco, the district being held 
by a weak Peruvian garrison quite incapable of effec- 
tual resistance. On the 27th a detachment of Peruvian 
cavalry was surprised by Colonel Barbosa and captured, 
leaving the valley clear of the enemy and free for the 
advance of General Baquedano, and on the 25th the 
division under Captain Lynch which had marched from 



1880] THE ADVANCE TO LIMA 483 

Pisco formed a junction with the main body. On 
December 28 the expedition moved forward to the 
river Lurin and encamped in a position ten miles from 
the first line of the Peruvian defences of Lima, and in 
the valley of the Lurin a halt was made for fifteen days 
while the country round Lima was thoroughly recon- 
noitred and final preparations made for the attack. 

While the Chilian army was gradually approaching 
Lima the blockade of Callao was closely maintained by 
the Chilian squadron, and on December 6 the last 
action of the war in which the navy was engaged took 
place. A Peruvian launch with a lighter in tow was 
observed outside the Callao docks, and the torpedo- 
boats Fresia, Tucapel, and Guacoldo steamed in to 
intercept her. The launch opened fire from two 40- 
pounder Armstrong guns on her pursuers, and the shore 
batteries joined in the cannonade. This brought up the 
squadron, and a bombardment of the forts began, the 
firing lasting for an hour and a half. The Fresia was 
struck by a shell and foundered, but was subsequently 
raised and repaired ; and a shell from the Angamos hit 
the Peruvian cruiser Union lying in the dock basin, and 
caused considerable damage, but no other serious injury 
was done. 

The futility of the peace conference on the U.S. 
warship Lackawana in October, 1880, brought home to 
the Peruvian authorities the fact that they must prepare 
to meet the Chilians in the vicinity of the National 
Capital. There remained no doubt now that the 
invasion had Lima as its objective point, and prepara- 
tions for resistance were begun with feverish haste. By 
a decree of the Government all able-bodied men between 
the ages of sixteen and sixty were enrolled in the army 
for defensive purposes, and after the landing of the 
Chilian expedition at Curayaco all public offices and 
commercial establishments were closed between the 
hours of 3 and 6 p.m. by official orders, to allow the 
army of defence to be drilled and disciplined, the tolling 
of the Cathedral bell notifying the men when their 



484 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAK 

attendance was required. These measures were directed 
by Seftor Nicolas Pierola, and resulted in the organisa- 
tion of 26,000 men in the fighting ranks and a reserve 
numbering 18,000, although a large proportion of this 
latter body was unfit for active service. The vast 
majority of the men in this army were recruits, and the 
time for imparting military training was so short that 
the bulk of the troops could only be regarded in the 
light of raw levies when the final struggle occurred. 
The army was organised in four divisions, commanded 
respectively by Colonel Suarez, Caceres, Davila, and 
Iglesias. In the matter of artillery the Peruvians were 
very deficient, the total number of field guns only 
reaching 100, most of these being of local manufacture, 
and of such poor quality as to be of little use against 
the modern equipment of the Chilians. 

When information of the Chilian landing at Curayaco 
was received in Lima, Sefior Pierola determined to form 
a first line of defence on the range of low hills situated 
immediately to the south of the town of Chorillos. 
Close to the sea at this point rises the high bluff known 
as the Morro Solar, and this was selected as the 
extreme right of the Peruvian position. The top of 
Morro Solar is 2000 feet above sea level, and from 
there to the eastward is a chain of hills, of which the 
most prominent are Santa Teresa and San Juan. The 
length of this defensive line was eight miles, and it was 
intersected by three roads connecting Lima with the 
Lurin valley, by which route the Chilians were expected 
to advance. Trenches were thrown up and guns 
posted in all commanding positions so effectively that 
in the hands of trained troops the line would undoubtedly 
have been a most formidable obstacle to overcome, but 
the natural strength of the position was counteracted by 
the lack of military experience of the rank and file of 
the men. This first line of defence was ten miles from 
Lima, and a second line was formed six miles from the 
city, the right flank resting upon the village of Miraflores, 
thence extending in a north-easterly direction for four 



1881] THE PERUVIAN DEFENCE 485 

miles until reaching the hill of San Bartolome, which 
rises to a height of 1476 feet above sea level. This 
second line was over farm lands, where fields were separ- 
ated by mud walls which were loopholed and transformed 
into efficient cover for infantry, and they constituted a 
serious impediment to the manoeuvring of any cavalry 
the attacking force might throw forward. The positions 
selected were regarded as impregnable by Senor Pierola 
and his staff, and they looked forward with confidence 
to the result of the battle. 

The fourth phase of the war was now at hand. 
From his encampment near the river Lurin the Chilian 
Commander-in-chief sent out a strong force on January 9, 
1881, under Colonel Barbosa, to make a reconnaissance 
on the left of the Peruvian position, and a slight 
skirmish took place. Senor Pierola, anticipating a 
general attack in this quarter, immediately reinforced 
the position by detailing the division under Colonel 
Davila to assist the defence of this part of the line. 
The project of moving the whole Chilian army to the 
north-east of Lima and so outflanking the Peruvian 
position had been carefully considered by General 
Baquedano, but the idea was abandoned in view of 
the information brought in by Colonel Barbosa, and 
also because it necessitated a march of fifteen miles 
over waterless desert with the probability of a hard 
fight when the troops were tired ; moreover, this 
flanking movement entailed the army losing touch with 
the ships. In these circumstances General Baquedano 
decided to advance with his left wing resting on the sea 
shore, and to make a frontal attack on the first line of 
the Peruvian defence. 

On the evening of January 12 orders were issued 
for the advance, the plan being to deliver the attack at 
daybreak on January 13, and if possible take the enemy 
by surprise. The First Division, under Captain Lynch, 
formed the left wing, and marched parallel to the 
seashore, with instructions to assault the Peruvian 
positions between the Morro Solar and Santa Teresa, 



486 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

then to occupy Chorillos. The Second Division, com- 
manded by General Sotomayor, was in the centre, and 
was ordered to force the Peruvian line near San Juan, 
and form a junction with the First Division at Chorillos. 
The Third Division in charge of Colonel Lagos was on 
the right, and to it was assigned the duty of holding the 
enemy's left in check and supporting General Sotomayor 
if necessary. The reserves under Colonel Martinez 
were in the rear between the left and centre, with 
instructions to support Captain Lynch or General 
Sotomayor as occasion required. The details of the 
march were carried out successfully, the army arriving 
in front of the Peruvian position shortly before midnight, 
and there resting until daylight. 

The Peruvian right on the Morro Solar was in charge 
of Colonel Iglesias with a force of 6000 men ; the centre, 
in which were the hills of Santa Teresa and San Juan, 
was commanded by Colonel Andres Caceres ; on the 
left was Colonel Davila ; the strength of the centre and 
left was each about 6000 men. The Fourth Division 
of the Peruvian army under Colonel Suarez formed the 
reserve. Seilor Pierola, acting as Commander-in-chief 
of the Peruvians, had his headquarters at Chorillos, and 
with him were General Buendia, Admiral Montero, 
General Silva, the chief of staff, Captain Garcia y Garcia, 
and a number of other officers. 

At dawn on January 13 the Chilians attacked, and 
the division on the left under Captain Lynch first 
became engaged, but the action was soon general along 
the line. For the first hour the defenders at the base 
of the Morro Solar held their ground tenaciously, 
although subjected to a heavy fire from the Chilian 
squadron in addition to that of the division led by 
Captain Lynch. In view of this obstinate resistance, 
General Baquedano ordered the reserves under Colonel 
Martinez to attack the Peruvian right wing on the 
flank extended towards Santa Teresa, and the enemy 
gave way at this point, retreating up the hill of Morro 
Solar. Meanwhile, at 6 A.M., the centre under General 



1881] BATTLE OF CHOKILLOS 487 

Sotomayor had carried the defences in front of San 
Juan by a brilliant and daring bayonet charge. At 
7.30 a.m., two and a half hours after the commencement 
of the battle, the defending army was in full retreat, 
and this was soon converted into a rout by the Chilian 
cavalry charging the fugitives again and again. The 
Peruvian centre under Colonel Caceres maintained a 
show of order in the retirement, and fell back upon 
Chorillos, but with this exception, and the troops under 
Colonel Iglesias concentrated on the hill of Morro 
Solar, the army of the first line of defence was dispersed. 
The Morro Solar was surrounded, but the position 
was admirably adapted for defensive tactics, and 
Captain Lynch found the task before him no easy 
matter. After three hours' heavy fighting, the Peruvians 
were driven to exposed ground, where a steady artillery 
fire was brought to bear upon them ; and seeing that 
their case was hopeless, Colonel Iglesias surrendered to 
save further sacrifice of life. The combat was now 
transferred to Chorillos, where Colonel Caceres with 
2000 and Colonel Recabarren with 1000 men were 
making a last stand ; but the Second Chilian Division 
under General Sotomayor finally carried the town at 
the point of the bayonet, losses on both sides being 
heavy. After the capture of Chorillos, the army was 
halted preparatory to attacking the second line near 
Miraflores, and to this place Senor Pierola, who had 
escaped from Chorillos when he saw the day was lost, 
had proceeded to direct the defence. In this engage- 
ment the Chilian losses were 800 officers and men 
killed and 2500 wounded, and the Peruvian casualties 
amounted to 5000 officers and men killed, 4000 
wounded, and 2000 officers and men taken prisoners. 
This was a total loss of 12,300 officers and men killed 
and wounded out of 42,000 engaged. 

The 14th of January was spent by the Chilians in 
attending to the wounded and burying the dead, and in 
making a reconnaissance of the second line of the 
Peruvian defence. Plans were drawn up for attacking 



488 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAH 

this last obstacle to the entry into Lima, and General 
Baquedano decided to assault the position on January 
15, but was deterred from doing so by representations 
from the foreign diplomatic corps in Lima, who 
requested an armistice to allow time for Senor Pierola 
to consider if further bloodshed could be avoided. It 
was at the suggestion of Senor Pierola that this 
diplomatic intervention took place, and the representa- 
tions were made to General Baquedano by Sir Spencer 
St John, Minister for Great Britain, M. de Vosges, 
Minister of France, and Senor Pinto, Minister for 
Salvador. The Chilian Commander-in-chief agreed to 
suspend hostilities until midnight on January 15, but 
only on condition that certain movements of troops then 
in course of execution should be concluded. To this the 
foreign diplomatists assented, but added a rider to the 
effect that the main body of the Chilian army should not 
advance from the position it then held. The Ministers 
returned to Miranores and communicated the terms of 
the armistice to Pierola ; but hardly an hour had elapsed 
before heavy firing was heard, and it was found that 
General Baquedano had himself unwittingly broken the 
terms of the armistice by riding out with his staff in 
front of the Chilian line. Some Peruvian artillery, mis- 
taking this for an advance of the Chilians, had opened 
fire, and at 2 p.m. the action became general. 

Twelve thousand Peruvian troops were concentrated 
on this second line, partly the survivors of the battle of 
Chorillos, and partly men from the reserves who had 
not been engaged in the former action. After a 
bombardment of the position by the Chilian artillery 
and the squadron consisting of the Blanco Encalada, 
the Huascar, Pilcomayo, O'Higgins, and Toro, the Third 
Division of the Chilian army, led by Colonel Lagos, 
advanced in skirmishing order under the protection of 
the field guns. A desperate charge on the Peruvian 
right at 4.30 p.m. carried that part of the defence after 
a severe struggle. On the left, the defenders, supported 
by five redoubts and the artillery mounted on the 



1881] BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES 489 

heights of San Bartolome and San Oistoval, made a 
stubborn resistance ; but they were forced back when 
the Chilian line was reinforced and additional batteries 
brought into action, and at 5 p.m. only the Peruvian 
centre remained to be taken. Half an hour later, this 
section of the defence was overcome by another bayonet 
charge ; and at 6 p.m. all firing ceased, the Peruvians 
taking refuge in flight. Senor Pierola, when he saw 
that the victory of the Chilians was inevitable, rode off 
accompanied by General Buendia, Colonel Suarez, and 
Captain Garcia y Garcia, and reached the town of 
Cauta situated in the mountains and at some distance 
from the seaboard, and many other Peruvian officers 
escaped from the field and found asylum in the 
mountainous regions of the interior. In this engage- 
ment the Chilians lost 500 officers and men killed and 
1625 wounded, and the Peruvian casualties were 3000 
killed and wounded. At Miraflores, the number of 
Chilians in the fighting line was 13,000, and out of a 
total of 25,000 officers and men engaged on both sides, 
the casualties were 5125, a clear proof of the severe 
nature of the combat. The total loss in killed and 
wounded in the two fights was 17,425 of all ranks — of 
these, 5425 were Chilians, and 12,000 Peruvians. 

The result of the battle of Miraflores left Lima at 
the mercy of the invading army. Early on January 16, 
Senor Rufino Torico, the Municipal Alcalde, tendered 
the formal surrender of the National Capital to the 
Chilian Commander-in-chief, and on the following day 
General Cornelio Saavedra, with a division of 4000 
troops, took possession of the city. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — Continued 

Panic in Lima. Asylum given by the Legations. Action of British 
and French Admirals. Urban Guard. General Saavedra 
re-establishes Order. Conduct of Chilians. Entry of General 
Baquedano into Lima. Vessels Destroyed at Callao. Admiral 
Lynch Commands in Peru. Government of Dr Calderon. 
Recognition of Calderon Administration by United States. 
Admiral Lynch overturns Calderon. The Montero Government. 
Situation in 1882. Caceres and Guerilla Warfare. Peruvian 
Army at Arequipa. Expedition against Arequipa. Peruvians 
Defeated. Government of General Iglesias. Conditions of 
Peace. Treaty between Chile and Peru. Evacuation of Lima. 
Ratification of Treaty. Negotiations between Chile and Bolivia. 
Text of Agreement between Chile and Bolivia. Result of the 
War. 

The approach of the invading army towards Lima had 
created panic amongst the peaceable inhabitants of the 
city. Stories had been set afloat of the atrocities com- 
mitted by the Chilians in the south of Peru, and 
although obviously exaggerated, they found credence in 
the ears of a section of the population only too willing 
to believe accounts of outrages committed by the 
victorious troops. 

When all able-bodied men were withdrawn from the 
city to swell the fighting ranks for the defence, affairs at 
Lima were in bad plight. No police were left to 
preserve order amongst a numerous class of vicious 
characters who avoided military service by skulking in 
the slums, and robbery and murder were committed 



1881] OCCUPATION OF LIMA 491 

almost with impunity, adding terror to the situation. 
The foreign legations were crowded with refugees of all 
ranks of society, and the British Legation became an 
asylum for hundreds of people, Peruvians and foreigners 
alike begging a resting-place within its friendly doors. 
The crowd of persons asking admittance was so great 
that additional buildings were annexed, and even then 
many of the refugees were forced to live and sleep in 
corridors, passages, and outhouses for lack of better 
accommodation. Other foreign representatives followed 
the example of Sir Spencer St John, and provided pro- 
tection for the rush of panic-stricken applicants. 
Imbued with the idea that Lima would be looted by 
the Chilians, the Peruvian families buried or hid away 
all valuables in the shape of plate, jewellery, and 
pictures — in fact everything not too bulky to be stowed 
into a small compass. Luckily for the townspeople, the 
British and French Admirals assisted in the prevention 
of undue excesses, and detachments of bluejackets and 
marines were landed from the foreign warships to guard 
the Legations and suppress serious rioting. An Urban 
Guard was recruited from the foreign residents, and 
armed for patrol duty in the streets and suburbs. Nor 
were these precautions unnecessary, for after the 
Chilian victories at Chorillos and Miraflores fugitives 
from the Peruvian army poured into the city, and were 
only checked from committing excesses by the steps 
that had been taken to maintain order. In some cases 
the authority assumed by the detachments from the 
men-of-war and the Urban Guard required to be 
enforced by strong measures, but the determined atti- 
tude of the men who had taken control saved Lima 
from any outrage by an unprincipled rabble. 

The action of the foreign representatives and the 

British and French Admirals in regard to the entry of 

I the Chilian forces into Lima after the battle of Mira- 

! nores was deserving of the highest commendation. 

They insisted that it would be inadvisable to allow the 

troops, flushed with victory, to take possession of the 



492 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

city immediately after the rout of the Peruvian army, 
and they were so firm in their attitude that the Chilian 
Commander-in-chief deferred to their request for a short 
delay before the army assumed possession of the 
Peruvian capital, and it was for this reason that the 
Chilian troops did not arrive in Lima until January 
17, 1881. Immediately the Chilians were in possession 
measures were taken by General Saavedra to guard 
against disturbances, and in twenty-four hours order 
was re-established and quiet ensured by. peremptory 
punishment when necessary. 

Unfortunately the accusations levelled against the 
Chilians of acts of vandalism during the military occupa- 
tion of Lima have some foundation in fact. The 
property of the Peruvian Government was confiscated 
to an unnecessary extent, an instance in point being the 
seizure of scientific instruments intended for the Lima 
Observatory and their transmission to Santiago, and 
little effort was made to safeguard certain national 
property deserving of careful consideration. A battalion 
of infantry was quartered in the national library, where 
a collection of most valuable books and manuscripts 
had been accumulated, and numbers of the volumes 
disappeared, priceless manuscripts were taken from the 
cases and thrown away or sold for a few dollars by a 
soldiery ignorant of their worth. Many artistic trea- 
sures were appropriated by unscrupulous Chilians 
without the knowledge of their superior officers, and 
the owners were too terrified to make complaint in the 
proper quarter ; but innumerable thefts were committed 
by persons entirely unconnected with the army of 
occupation, and such robberies were invariably attri- 
buted to the Chilian troops. Away from Lima the 
Chilian soldiers undoubtedly did treat the Peruvians 
with unnecessary harshness in districts to which 
expeditions were despatched, but such conduct could 
only be expected when due appreciation is given to the 
material of the Chilian forces ; moreover, Peru was a 
conquered country, and the inhabitants could not 




General Caceres. 



[Face page 496 



1881] ACTS OF VANDALISM 493 

expect any kid-glove courtesy. In the towns per- 
manently garrisoned by Chilian troops all depredations 
were quickly suppressed by the military authorities, and 
hostile feeling between natives and soldiers was allowed 
small scope for the disturbance of public order. 

On January 18, 1881, the Commander-in-chief of 
the Chilian army with his staff made a formal entry 
into Lima and occupied the presidential palace. 
Arrangements were commenced for the establishment 
of a temporary administration for the city and surround- 
ing districts, and officials were appointed to take charge 
of the municipal revenues and attend to the distribution 
and disbursement of the funds collected. The blockade 
of Callao was raised and the port opened to international 
trade, and the reconstruction of the economic life of the 
occupied districts, which had been thoroughly dis- 
organised during the past twelve months, was under- 
taken with as little delay as possible. 

When the news of the defeat of the Peruvian army 
reached Callao, the naval authorities determined to 
destroy the vessels in the harbour to prevent them 
falling into the hands of the Chilians. The Union was 
dismantled of her armament and wrecked, the coast- 
defence monitor Atahualpa was sunk, and the school 
ships Apurimac, Meteoro, and Maranon, and the trans- 
ports Rimac, Chalaca, and Talisman were destroyed. 
In view of the fact that the conquest of Peru was 
accomplished when this action was taken, it is not 
surprising that the destruction of these vessels pro- 
foundly irritated the Chilians. 

Towards the end of March, General Baquedano 
resigned command of the army of occupation and 
returned to Chile, his successor being Admiral Patricio 
Lynch, who had been promoted to flag rank for his 
services during the campaign. The task of Admiral 
Lynch required more than ordinary ability to accomplish 
in an efficient and successful manner. The Chilian 
Government was anxious to make peace with the 
Peruvians, and to withdraw its troops from Permian 



494 THE CHILIAN-PEEUVIAN WAP 

territory under a satisfactory treaty, but the difficulty 
was that no representative Peruvian Government existed 
with which to deal. An attempt was made to open 
negotiations with Senor Pierola, but he and his friends 
were irreconcilable to any terms which included the 
permanent cession of Peruvian territory to Chile, and 
it was only on those conditions that the Chilian 
Government was prepared to discuss peace proposals. 
With the consent of the military authorities, a meeting 
of prominent citizens was called in Lima, about one 
hundred representatives attending, and Dr Francisco 
Garcia Calderon finally agreed, as the result of this 
conference, to undertake the responsibity of forming an 
Administration. With the sanction of Admiral Lynch, 
the village of Magdalena, three miles from Lima, became 
the headquarters of the new Government, and here Dr 
Calderon formally assumed his functions as President 
on March 12. A ministry was appointed, Admiral 
Montero was nominated as Vice-President, and a 
meeting was summoned of the Congress existing be- 
fore the invasion of Lima by the Chilians. A certain 
number of these legislators assembled in due course at 
Chorillos in the military college, that building having 
been placed at the disposition of the Peruvians by order 
of Admiral Lynch. 

On June 23, 1881, the Government presided over by 
Dr Calderon was formally recognised by the United 
States, and for a time matters appeared to be in a fair 
way towards the reconstruction of a National Adminis- 
tration. The stumbling-block proved to be the action 
of the Congress in refusing authorisation to the President 
to agree to terms of peace with Chile which were based 
on a permanent alienation of any section of Peruvian 
territory, and the Congress was dissolved on August 23, 
leaving President Calderon without authority to treat 
with Chile. In September, 1881, Admiral Lynch sus- 
pected Dr Calderon of intriguing with the scattered I 
Peruvian forces in the interior of the country for further 
resistance against the Chilians, and also of endeavouring 






1881] THE CALDERON ADMINISTRATION 495 

to induce the United States to intervene between Peru 
and Chile. Whether these suspicions were confirmed or 
not subsequently has never been made clear, but acting 
on them the Admiral caused the Calderon Administra- 
tion to be disbanded, and the President exiled to Chile 
as a person dangerous to the maintenance of public order. 
In these circumstances Admiral Montero, in view of the 
fact that he had been chosen Vice-President under 
Calderon, arrogated to himself the position of President 
of Peru, and in August he proceeded to Arequipa, where 
the Peruvians were still in possession, and there formed 
a government. His first ministry consisted of Captain 
Camilo Carrillo, Minister of Interior ; Dr del Valle, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Dr Epifanio Serpe, Minister 
of Justice ; Dr Oviedo, Minister of Finance ; and Colonel 
Manuel Velarde, Minister of War. This Government, 
although not recognised by Chile, was accepted by the 
Peruvians, the more readily as Senor Pierola had 
resigned his powers to an Assembly convoked by him 
at Ayacucho on July 28, 1881. The delegates then pro- 
claimed the former Supreme Chief as Provisional Presi- 
dent ; but, on November 28, Pierola again resigned, and 
leaving Peru retired into private life. 

Many unexpected complications arose during 1882 
to prevent Chile from obtaining the desired treaty of 
peace to enable her to withdraw the army of occupation. 
In the mountainous districts of the interior to the east 
of Lima the remnants of the Peruvian forces had been 
collected by Colonel Andres Caceres, and a guerilla 
warfare was initiated against all isolated Chilian detach- 
ments that could be attacked with a fair prospect of 
success. The presence of these groups of armed men 
necessitated constant small expeditions of Chilian troops 
to the interior of the country, and tended to a condition 
of uneasiness militating against Chilian interests. 
Towards the close of the year the position was rendered 
still more difficult by the concentration of a Peruvian 
force of 5000 men at Arequipa, where a supply of arms 
and ammunition was obtained through Bolivia, whose 



496 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Government bought war material in Buenos Aires, 
conveying it by way of La Paz and Lake Titicaca to 
Admiral Montero. When 1883 opened, there appeared 
no better prospect of a settlement between Chile and 
Peru than immediately after the capture of Lima. 

Admiral Lynch was not easily daunted, and he 
determined to act so energetically against the armed 
groups in the interior and the Administration at 
Arequipa as to convince the Peruvians of the futility of 
further resistance. Detachments of troops were 
despatched against the guerilla bands of Colonel 
Caceres, with instructions to allow them no rest until 
they were crushed, and these orders were resolutely 
carried out. Against the Peruvians at Arequipa 
stronger measures were necessary, and a w r ell-equipped 
expedition was prepared to attack the district ; the 
troops detailed for these operations were embarked at 
Callao in July, 1883, and reached their destination early 
in the following month, when a series of skirmishes at 
Huamachuco and elsewhere occurred, in which the 
Peruvians were worsted, Arequipa was captured, and 
the Administration of Admiral Montero broken up, and 
Admiral Lynch then determined to make another effort 
to bring the Peruvians to listen to proposals for a treaty 
of peace. For this purpose he turned to General 
Iglesias, the officer who had commanded the division on 
the hill of Morro Solar on January 13, 1881. 

General Iglesias held more common-sense views on 
the subject of making peace than his compatriots in the 
central and southern sections of Peru, and previous to 
the overtures made by the Chilian Commander-in-chief 
he had called a convention of his fellow-countrymen in 
the northern districts to discuss the advisability of some 
arrangement, no matter at what sacrifice, to ensure the 
speedy retirement of the Chilians from Lima and the 
central districts. The majority of the people in the 
north was in favour of a policy that would restore the 
National Capital to them, even if this entailed the 
permanent alienation of Tarapaca ; and when, in August, 



1883] ADMINISTRATION OF IGLESIAS 49? 

1883, a proposal was made by Admiral Lynch to 
General Iglesias to organise a National Government 
with which the Chilian authorities could treat it was 
favourably received, and an Administration was formed 
by Iglesias with the co-operation of his friends. Chilian 
support was extended to the new Government, and 
early in October matters had so far advanced that the 
basis of a treaty of peace between Chile and Peru was 
discussed. Shortly afterwards the conditions were 
formally accepted, and on October 23, 1883, they were 
signed provisionally by the representatives of the two 
Governments. It was the only course Peru could 
adopt at the time to ensure the departure of the Chilian 
army, and it was undeserving of the bitter opposition 
shown by Colonel Caceres and his followers and by the 
supporters of Montero. 

The terms of the treaty did not differ greatly from 
the conditions proposed by the Chilian representatives 
at the abortive peace conference held on the Lackawana 
in the harbour of Arica on October 6, 1880 ; but certain 
modifications were made in view of the existing financial 
condition of Peru, the principal being the reduction of 
the Chilian claim for a money indemnity, otherwise the 
basis of the negotiations, especially in regard to the 
absolute cession to Chile of Tarapaca and the temporary 
occupation of Tacna and Arica, remained unchanged. 
The wording of the treaty is important, as it has been a 
political factor ever since in both countries and must 
continue to be the keynote of the situation for some 
time to come. This document, known as the Treaty of 
Ancon, reads : — 

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE 
REPUBLICS OF CHILE AND PERU. 

The Republic of Chile on the one part, and the Republic of Peru 
on the other, wishing to establish friendly relations between the two 
nations, have determined to celebrate a Treaty of peace and friend- 
ship, and with this object have named and appointed their pleni- 
potentiaries, to wit : — 

His Excellency the President of Chile appoints Senor Jovino 

2 I 



498 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Novoa, and His Excellency the President of Peru nominates Senor 
Jose Antonio Lavalle, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Senor Mariano 
Castro Zaldivar. The before-mentioned plenipotentiaries, after 
having shown their full powers and authority, and these being in due 
and correct form, have agreed upon the following articles : — 

Article 1st. — Relations of peace and friendship are re-established 
between the Republics of Chile and Peru. 

Article 2nd. — The Republic of Peru cedes to the Republic of Chile, 
perpetually and unconditionally, the territory of the coast province of 
Tarapaca, the limits of which are : — On the north, the valley and river 
of Camarones ; on the south, the valley and river of Loa ; on the east, 
the Republic of Bolivia ; and on the west, the Pacific Ocean. 

Article 3rd. — The territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, 
limited on the north by the river Sama, from its origin in the Andes 
coterminous with Bolivia to its mouth where it flows into the Pacific 
Ocean ; on the south, by the valley and river Camarones ; on the east, 
by the Republic of Bolivia ; and on the west, by the Pacific Ocean, 
shall remain in the possession of Chile, subject to Chilian laws and 
authorities, during the term of ten years, to be counted from the date 
of the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace. The term having 
expired, a plebiscite shall decide by popular vote if the territory of 
these provinces shall remain definitely under the dominion and 
sovereignty of Chile, or if they shall continue to form part of the 
territory of Peru. The Government of the country in whose favour 
the provinces of Tacna and Arica shall be annexed shall pay to the 
other ten millions of dollars ($10,000,000) Chilian silver money or 
Peruvian soles, of equal percentage of fine silver and of equal weight 
as the former. A special protocol, which shall be considered an 
integral part of the present Treaty, shall establish the form in which 
the plebiscite shall take place, and the terms and conditions in which 
the ten millions of dollars shall be paid by the nation remaining in 
possession of Tacna and Arica. 

Article ith. — In conformity with the disposition of the Supreme 
Decree of February 9, 1882, by which the Government of Chile 
authorised the sale of a million tons of guano, the net product of this 
substance, after deducting all expenses, as indicated in Article 13 of 
the said Decree, shall be divided in equal parts between the Govern- 
ment of Chile and the creditors of Peru whose titles of credit appear 
to be based upon the security of guano. On the termination of the 
sale of the million tons referred to, the Government of Chile will 
continue delivering to the creditors of Peru the 50 per cent, of the 
net proceeds of guano sold, as laid down in Article 13 of the before- 
mentioned Decree, until the debt of the creditors is wholly paid or 
the guano deposits in actual exploitation are exhausted. The product 
of the guano deposits that may be discovered in the future in the 
territories ceded to Chile shall belong exclusively to the Chilian 
Government. 

Article 5th. — If deposits of guano be discovered in the territories 



1883] TREATY OF ANCON 499 

remaining under the dominion of Peru, both Governments in common 
accord, in order to avoid competition in the sale of this substance, 
shall previously determine the proportions and conditions under 
which each shall dispose of this fertiliser. This stipulation shall also 
refer to the existence of guano already discovered that may remain on 
the Lobos Islands at the time of the delivery of these islands to Peru, 
in conformity with Article 9 of the present Treaty. 

Article 6lh. — The creditors of Peru to whom the concessions 
referred to in Article 4 are made shall submit, for the due qualifica- 
tions of their titles and other proceedings, to the regulations estab- 
lished by the Supreme Decree of February 9, 1882. 

Article 1th. — The obligation accepted by the Government of Chile 
under Article 4, of delivering 50 per cent, of the net product of guano 
from the deposits actually in exploitation, shall hold good if the 
extraction takes place in conformity with the existing contract based 
on the sale of one million of tons, or if it be effected by virtue of 
another contract for the exclusive account of the Government of 
Chile. 

Article Sth. — Except in virtue of the declarations specified in the 
preceding Articles, and of the obligations the Government of Chile 
has spontaneously accepted under the Supreme Decree of March 28. 
1882, regulating the nitrate property of Tarapaca, the aforesaid 
Government of Chile will recognise no claims of any class affecting 
the new territories acquired by the present Treaty, whatever may be 
their nature and antecedents. 

Article 9th. — The Lobos Islands will continue to be administered 
by the Government of Chile until the existing guano deposits have 
furnished one million tons of guano, as stipulated by Articles 4 and 7. 
When the million tons have been extracted, the islands will be 
returned to Peru. 

Article 10th. — The Government of Chile declares that there shall 
be ceded to Peru, from the day that the present Treaty shall be 
constitutionally ratified and exchanged, the 50 per cent, corresponding 
to that Republic from the product of the guano from the Lobos 
Islands. 

Article 11th. — While no special treaty is made, the mercantile 
relations between the two countries shall subsist in the same status as 
existed before April 5, 1879. 

Article 12th. — The indemnity owing by Peru to Chilians who have 
suffered damages on account of the war shall be determined by a 
tribunal of arbitration, or by a mixed international commission, 
immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, and in the 
form established for the conventions recently agreed upon between 
Chile and the Governments of England, France, and Italy. 

Article 13lh. — -The contracting Governments recognise and accept 
the validity of all administrative acts and judicial sentences made and 
passed during the occupation of Peru, derived from martial law 
exercised by the Government of Chile. 



500 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

Article lith. — The present Treaty shall be ratified and the 
ratifications exchanged in the city of Lima as soon as possible, and 
within a maximum period of one hundred and sixty days counting 
from this date. 

In proof of which, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and 
sealed it with their private seals. 

Dated at Lima, the twentieth day of October, in the year of our 
Lord One thousand eight hundred and eighty-three. 

Jovino Novoa. 
J. A. Lavalle. 
Mariano Castro Zaldivar. 

While this treaty between Chile and the Govern- 
ment established by General Iglesias was opposed by 
the irreconcilable section of Peruvians, it was considered 
by the Chilian authorities as sufficiently binding to 
meet the exigencies of the case, and preparations were 
commenced for the withdrawal of the army of occupa- 
tion. On October 22, 1883, the city of Lima was 
evacuated, and the troops embarked for Chile as rapidly 
as circumstances permitted ; but a force of 5000 men 
was retained in camp at Chorillos pending the ratifica- 
tion of the treaty by the Chilian and Peruvian 
legislatures, and also to support the Administration of 
President Iglesias until the ratification was an accom- 
plished fact. The treaty finally was ratified on May 8, 
1884, and a few weeks later the last of the Chilian 
troops sailed from Peru on their homeward journey — 
five years and three months after the declaration of war 
in 1879. 

While the Treaty of Ancon brought the war with 
Peru to an end, there remained the question with 
Bolivia. Negotiations had been opened in 1882 for 
concluding a permanent peace with that country, but 
were abortive in consequence of the insistence of the 
Bolivian Government that Chile should treat simultane- 
ously with Peru and Bolivia in the matter. A second 
attempt to bring about an understanding with Bolivia 
proved equally futile, on account of the Government of 
the latter country imposing the condition that Chile 
should recognise the Administration of Admiral 



1884] CHILIAN AND BOLIVIAN TRUCE 501 

Montero in Peru. After the Treaty of Ancon the 
Bolivian Government took a more sensible view of 
the situation, and in December, 1884, a special mission, 
consisting of Senor Belisario Salinas and Senor Boeto, 
was despatched to Santiago to open negotiations. The 
envoys demanded the territories of Tacna and Arica 
for Bolivia in compensation for the coast region now 
held by Chile ; but to this proposition the Chilian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the territory in 
question was not the absolute property of Chile, and, 
therefore, could not be ceded to a third party. As the 
Bolivian representatives insisted in their demands, the 
Minister stated that apparently it was impossible at 
present to conclude a treaty of peace on terms satis- 
factory to the two Governments, and he suggested that 
a truce should be drawn up and formulated in order to 
place relations on a better footing and bring about a 
definite cessation of hostilities until a more opportune 
occasion arrived to reopen the negotiations for a treaty 
of peace. After some discussion the Bolivian envoys 
consented to this suggestion, and what has been known 
since as the " Pacto de Tregua " was signed on April 4, 
1884. The text of this compact reads :• — 

AGREEMENT OF TRUCE BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA. 

Until the opportunity of celebrating a definite Treaty of Peace 
between the Republics of Chile and Bolivia shall arise, both these 
nations duly represented, the former by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Senor Anicleto Vergara Albano, and the latter by Senor 
Belisario Salinas and Senor Boeto, have agreed to an Agreement of 
Truce on the undermentioned basis : — 

1. The Republics of Chile and Bolivia celebrate an indefinite 
truce, and, in consequence, they declare the state of war terminated, 
and that the same cannot be again carried on unless one of the 
contracting parties notifies the other with at least one year of 
anticipation of its determination to resume hostilities. In such case 
the notification shall be made directly, or through the diplomatic 
representative of a friendly nation. 

2. The Republic of Chile, during the period this Agreement is in 
force, shall continue to govern according to Chilian law the terri- 
tories situated between 53° S. and the mouth of the river Loa, these 



502 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

territories being bounded on the east by a line drawn from Zapalegui 
from the intersection of the frontier of the Argentine Republic to the 
volcano of Licancaur. From this point the boundary extends to the 
summit of the extinct volcano Cabana, thence in a direct line to the 
spring of water found to the south of Lake Ascotan, and from this 
point the limit will be a straight line terminating on the volcano of 
Ollagua. From Ollagua the divisional line shall run to the volcano 
of Tua, thence joining the frontier between Tarapaca and Bolivia. 
In ease of difficulties arising, both parties shall appoint a commission 
of engineers to fix the limits as herein indicated by the landmai-ks 
described. 

3. The property and goods confiscated from Chilian citizens by 
Government edict, or by the order of civil and military authorities, 
shall be immediately returned to their owners or representatives, and 
the products the Government of Bolivia may have received from 
these properties shall also be returned upon the necessary proofs 
being submitted. The damages suffered by Chilians shall be indem- 
nified upon good and sufficient proof of the extent of the injury being 
brought before the notice of the Bolivian Government. 

4. If no settlement can be reached by the Bolivian Government 
and the injured parties in respect to the amount of indemnity to be 
awarded, the disputes shall be submitted to a commission of arbitration 
composed of three members, one named by Chile, one by Bolivia, 
the third selected by Chile from the representatives of foreign nations 
resident in Chile. 

5. Commercial relations shall be re-established between Chile and 
Bolivia. In future raw material produced in Chile and articles manu- 
factured in that Republic shall enter Bolivia free of all duties or 
custom-house dues ; and Bolivian productions of the same class and 
manufactured on the same terms shall enjoy a like freedom in Chile 
on their importation and exportation through a Chilian port. The 
commercial freedom of Chilian and Bolivian manufactures and the 
enumeration of these products shall be the subject of a special 
protocol. Nationalised merchandise entering through the port of 
Arica shall be considered as foreign merchandise for purposes of 
custom-house entry. Foreign merchandise introduced into Bolivia 
via Antofagasta shall have free passage, but subject to such measures 
as Chile may adopt to check smuggling. Until a special convention 
is made, Chile and Bolivia shall enjoy the commercial advantages and 
freedom that either nation accords to the most favoured nation. 

6. At the port of Arica foreign merchandise shall, even when 
entered for consumption in Bolivia, pay the duties in force under the 
Chilian tariff, and this merchandise shall not pay any further duties 
in the interior. The sums received in payment of these duties shall 
be distributed as follows : — 25 per cent, shall be applied as duties 
received for goods to be consumed in the territories of Tacna and 
Arica, and to defray the cost of custom-house administration, the 
remaining 75 per cent, shall be for account of Bolivia. This 75 per 



1884] CONDITIONS OF THE TRUCE 503 

cent, shall be distributed in the following manner : — 40 units of the 
total shall be retained by the Chilian Administration to liquidate the 
claims for which Bolivia may be responsible under Article 3 of this 
Agreement, and for the amortisation of the Bolivian loan raised in 
Chile in 1867 ; the remainder shall be handed over to the Govern- 
ment of Bolivia in cash or drafts to its order. The loan of 1867 
shall be considered in regard to payment as being on equal footing 
with the sums due for damages caused during the war to personal 
property. The Bolivian Government when it thinks proper is at 
liberty to examine through its agents the accounts of the Arica 
custom-house. As soon as the indemnity specified in Article 3 has 
been paid, and the motive for the retention of the 40 units ceases, 
Bolivia is at liberty to establish custom-houses in the interior of her 
territory if such a course be considered fit. In the event of this 
being done, foreign merchandise imported via Arica will be permitted 
free passage at that port. 

7. Any acts of the subaltern authorities of either nation that tend 
to alter the situation formed by the present Agreement of Truce, 
especially where they may concern the limits of the territory in 
Chilian occupation, shall be suppressed and punished at the official 
request of the respective Governments. 

8. As the object of the contracting parties in celebrating this 
Agreement of Truce is to prepare and facilitate the way for a solid 
and stable Treaty of Peace between the two Republics, they promise 
to reciprocally act in a manner conducive to that end. 

This Agreement shall be ratified by the Government of Bolivia 
within the term of forty days, and the ratifications exchanged at 
Santiago during the coming month of June. 

In proof of which the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile and 
the Plenipotentiaries of Bolivia who showed their respective 
authorisation and powers, signed in duplicate the present Agreement 
of Truce at Valparaiso, on the fourth of April, in the year One 
thousand eight hundred and eighty-four. 

A. Vergara Albano. 
Belisario Salinas. 
Belisario Boeto. 



The various points stipulated having been subse- 
quently regulated by a protocol, the ratifications of this 
agreement of truce were exchanged in Santiago on 
November 29, 1884. This agreement is not only 
important as formally terminating hostilities, but also 
as having a direct bearing on the long-standing dispute 
which has now reached an acute stage. 

The result of the struggle brought about by the 



504 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 

intrigues of Peru in Bolivia was a complete reversal of 
the expectations with which South America generally 
had viewed the approach of the conflict in 1879. The 
strength of Chile by land and sea was then unknown, 
and hardly even suspected, by the two countries which 
dared her to go to war or lose all the privileges she 
claimed for Chilian capital and labour in the Atacama 
districts. The outcome of the conflict left Peru in a 
condition of economic collapse and financial ruin, both 
in regard to public resources and private enterprise, 
and Bolivia lost her maritime territory and became 
isolated in the interior of South America. Chile 
enlarged her dominion and obtained control of districts 
that offered an immediate rich return to compensate 
her for her sacrifices, and provided a permanent outlet 
for capital and industry which assured great additional 
wealth to her people, and she won for herself recogni- 
tion as the paramount military and naval power on the 
west coast of South America. 



CHAPTEK XXVIII 



PERU 



Constitution of 1860. President San Roman. Revolution against 
Pezet. Dispute with Spain. Squadron under Admiral Pinzon. 
Incident at Talambo. Memorandum of Spanish Commissioner. 
The Chincha Islands. Action of Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. 
Loss of the Triunfo. Treaty between Peru and Spain. Pezet 
driven from Office. War with Spain. Capture of the Covadonga. 
Suicide of Spanish Admiral. Naval Fight near Abtao. Bombard- 
ment of Callao. Withdrawal of Spanish Squadron. Dictatorship 
of Prado. Revision of Constitution. Prado proclaimed President. 
Revolution against Prado. Reforms of 1867. Election of 
Colonel Balta. Financial Embarrassments. The Dreyfus Con- 
tract. Railway Construction. Presidential Candidates in 1872. 
The Gutierrez Conspiracy. Death of Colonel Silvestre Gutierrez. 
Assassination of Balta. Death of Colonel Tomas Gutierrez. 
Presidency of Manuel Pardo. Economic Conditions. Revolu- 
tionary Attempts of Pierola. Foreign Policy. Alliance with 
Bolivia. Election of Prado. Revolutionary Outbreak. The 
Huascar and the Shah and Amethyst. Treaty with Spain. Murder 
of Pardo. Complications with Chile. Outbreak of Hostilities. 
President Prado commands the Army. The President abandons 
Peru. Revolution under Pierola. Fighting in Lima. Pierola 
proclaimed Supreme Chief. Occupation of Lima. Pierola leaves 
Peru. Administration of Iglesias. Revolution under Caceres. 
Insurgents attack Lima. Second Assault on Lima. Iglesias 
Resigns. Election of Caceres. Quiet Conditions. Economic 
Crisis. Presidency of Bermudez. Death of Bermudez. Colonel 
Borgoiio assumes Office. Revolutionary Rising. Chambers 
Dissolved. Caceres again President. Spread of Revolution. 
Pierola attacks Lima. Caceres Defeated. Provisional Adminis- 
tration. Pierola Elected. Insurrection at Iquitos. Reforms 
under Pierola. Revolution in 1898. Election of Romana. 
International Questions. 

For the first four decades after the proclamation of 
independence in 1821, Peru was a prey to internal 



506 PERU 

disturbances, which checked economic development and 
material prosperity. In 1860, during the presidency of 
General Castilla, a reform of the Law of Constitution 
was effected, and under its statutes the Government 
has since been conducted. 

In 1862 the election to the presidency of General 
San Roman took place, and was formally ratified by 
Congress in October of that year, but the President 
only survived his inauguration a few months, dying on 
April 3, 1863. The first Vice-President was General 
Pezet, at the time absent in Europe, and, pending his 
return, the presidential duties were discharged by 
General Canseco in virtue of his position as second 
Vice-President. In August, 1863, General Pezet arrived 
and assumed control of public affairs, continuing at the 
head of the Administration until 1865, but in this latter 
year he was deposed and obliged to fly the country in 
consequence of a revolutionary movement initiated by 
General Prado and actively supported by General 
Canseco. 

The motive alleged by Prado and Canseco for the 
revolt against Pezet was his vacillating policy in the 
dispute with Spain, which reached an acute stage in 
1864, finally leading to an outbreak of hostilities between 
the two countries. In 1860 certain claims were put 
forward by a group of Peruvians who held bonds of the 
debt contracted in the Spanish colonial period, and who, 
through the influence of the authorities in Madrid, 
hoped to obtain recognition of these obligations by the 
Peruvian Government. While the question was under 
discussion, a Spanish naval squadron commanded by 
Rear- Admiral Pinzon was despatched to the west coast 
of South America, nominally for scientific purposes and 
exploration, which arrived in Peruvian waters in 1863. 
This was considered a menace by the authorities, and 
the relations between the two Governments became 
strained. The situation was complicated further by an 
unfortunate affair which occurred near Talambo in the 
Province of Chiclayo. In the locality was a settlement 



1863] SPAIN AND PERU 507 

of Spanish Basques, and a quarrel arose between these 
settlers and some Peruvians, resulting in a fight in which 
a Basque and a Peruvian were killed. A demand from 
Madrid for immediate satisfaction accentuated the exist- 
ing hostility between the two Governments. 

A special Commissioner, under the title of Comisario 
regio, was now sent from Madrid to investigate the 
Talambo affair. The Peruvian authorities declined to 
receive this representative unless the nature of his 
mission was clearly defined, and Senor Eusebio Salazar y 
Mazarredo, the Commissioner, presented a memorandum 
in which it was stated that no treaty of peace existed 
between Spain and Peru ; that the former country con- 
sidered the truce in force at an end ; and Spain further 
claimed the right to regain possession of her lost colony 
if such policy was deemed advisable. This note occa- 
sioned intense indignation in Peru, and when on April 
14, 1864, the Spanish squadron took possession of the 
Chincha Islands the cry for war was everywhere popular. 
Moreover, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, alarmed at the 
attitude assumed by Spain, gave the Peruvians assur- 
ance of active support in event of hostilities breaking out. 
Soon after the occupation of the Chincha Islands a dis- 
agreement took place between the Spanish Commissioner 
and Admiral Pinzon, and resulted in Senor Salazar y 
Mazarredo returning to Europe. 

The Government of Spain now showed an inclination 
to draw back from extreme measures, and Lima was 
notified that both Commissioner and Admiral had 
exceeded instructions, and that the seizure of the 
Chincha Islands was not approved in Madrid. Admiral 
Pinzon was relieved, and his command transferred to 
Admiral Jose Manuel Pareja. The accidental destruc- 
tion of the warship Trianfo by fire reduced the Spanish 
naval forces in Peruvian waters to the frigate Resolution 
and the gunboat Covadonga. Matters now assumed a 
more pacific aspect, and negotiations were begun for a 
settlement of the dispute. General Vivanco was 
nominated by President Pezet to treat with Admiral 



508 PERU 

Pareja ; after lengthy discussion a treaty was celebrated, 
providing for the evacuation of the Chincha Islands by 
the Spaniards on condition that Peru defrayed the cost 
of the Spanish expedition and became responsible for 
the bonds of the former colonial debt. Congress was 
not in session when this treaty was made, nor was it 
called together to consider the arrangement, and the 
document was signed on January 27, 1865. On the 
same day, it was ratified by President Pezet. 

When the conditions of this agreement with Spain 
were made public there was pronounced dissatisfaction 
with the Administration, and these hostile symptoms 
ripened into a determination to oust the President from 
office. On February 28 the standard of revolt was 
raised by General Prado in the city of Araquipa, and 
from all sections of the country people flocked to join 
the movement. By the end of June a formidable army 
had been organised to attack Lima, where Pezet had 
concentrated all his available strength. The revolu- 
tionary forces were designated the Ejercito restaurador 
de la honra national, the leaders expressing the intention 
of leaving no stone unturned to cancel the treaty with 
Spain, and proclaiming General Canseco, the second 
Vice-President of the Republic, the head of the National 
Government. In October a rapid march was made 
towards Lima, and on November 6, 1865, the National 
Capital was captured, President Pezet seeking refuge 
on board a British warship anchored off Callao. 

The control of public affairs was offered to General 
Canseco by the victorious revolutionary army, but was 
declined. In these circumstances public opinion 
favoured the nomination of General Prado, and on 
November 8, 1865, he assumed direction of the 
Government. Arrangements were made with Chile for 
an offensive and defensive alliance on December 5, 1865, 
and similar action was taken in regard to Ecuador and 
Bolivia. On January 14, 1866, war against Spain was 
declared, and the Peruvian squadron, reinforced by the 
newly acquired corvettes Union and America, was 



1865] VALPARAISO BOMBAKDED 509 

ordered to attack the Spanish vessels. The latter 
comprised the Resolution, the Villa de Madrid, the 
Numancia, the Berenguela, and the Blanc a, the four last- 
named ships having arrived recently from Spain. The 
Covadonga had been captured in January by the Chilian 
man-of-war Esmeralda, and her loss had preyed so 
greatly on the mind of Admiral Pareja that he com- 
mitted suicide, his place being taken by Captain Castro 
Menclez Nunez. On February 6 the Spanish squadron 
attacked the Peruvian and Chilian vessels in the vicinity 
of Abtao ; but it was beaten off after two hours' fighting, 
and the Spanish Commander then decided to bombard 
Valparaiso, putting this resolution into effect on March 
31. The Spanish ships then sailed northwards, appear- 
ing off Callao on the morning of April 25, and on the 
following day Captain Nunez notified the foreign consuls 
that he intended to attack the fortifications of the city, 
and would allow four days for foreign residents to move 
to a place of safety. During this respite the Peruvian 
authorities worked unceasingly to strengthen the 
defences, and succeeded in mounting 50 guns. 

On the morning of May 2, 1866, preparations for 
the bombardment were made by the Spanish squadron. 
Shortly before midday the enemy entered the bay, 
taking up a position close to the land, the Numancia open- 
ing the action and being answered by the Merced tower, 
the engagement then becoming general, and the ships 
and shore batteries maintaining a vigorous cannonade. 
An hour after the firing commenced, the Villa de Madrid 
was so badly injured that it was necessary to tow her 
out of the port, and shortly afterwards the Berenguela 
was observed making signals that she was in a sinking 
condition. Meanwhile the defence suffered severely. 
A shell from the Numancia burst between the two guns in 
the Merced tower and exploded a supply of powder, 
killing the Minister of War and causing other casualties. 
At 5 p.m. the Spanish ships ceased firing, and withdrew 
to the shelter of San Lorenzo Island, five miles from 
Cailao. In the engagement 200 Peruvians were killed 



510 PERU 

and 500 wounded, while the Spanish loss was heavy, no 
fewer than 40 men being killed and 200 wounded. 
None of the vessels escaped without serious damage. 

No further offensive operations were attempted by 
the Spaniards, partly on account of a scarcity of 
ammunition, and partly for lack of sufficient force to 
effect a landing. After remaining at San Lorenzo for 
ten days, Captain Nunez sent a notification ashore to 
the effect that having inflicted severe punishment upon 
the Peruvians he intended to raise the blockade, and set 
sail for Spain. This decision of the Spanish Commander 
was due to the knowledge that the two new Peruvian 
war vessels, the Huascar and the Independencia, were 
daily expected, and that these modern ironclads would 
prove formidable antagonists for the squadron under his 
command. On May 12 the Spanish ships left San 
Lorenzo homeward bound, and the war was ended ; but 
it was not until some years later that a treaty of peace 
between the two countries was signed. 

After the close of the hostilities with Spain the 
direction of public affairs remained in the hands of 
General Prado, pending a return to normal political 
conditions, and during a period of fourteen months he 
exercised dictatorial powers. By a decree dated 
July 28, 1866, presidential and congressional elections 
were ordered, and reforms in the Law of Constitution 
were submitted to the new Chambers for consideration. 
Whilst the proposed alterations were under discussion 
General Prado was proclaimed Provisional President. 
The projected reforms met with determined opposition, 
and this discontent found expression in a revolutionary 
movement headed by Castilla. In September, 1867, the 
revised law was approved by Congress, and promulgated, 
the immediate result being the proclamation of General 
Prado as Constitutional President. Following on the 
heels of this event came a further outburst of revolt 
near Arequipa, General Canseco being chosen leader of 
the opposition to Prado, and his supporters demanding 
the abrogation of the reforms of 1867, and a return to 



1867] REVOLUTION AGAINST PRADO 511 

the Law of Constitution of 1860. Resistance to General 
Prado gained further strength in November, 1867, by a 
rising near Chiclaya headed by Colonel Jose Balta, and 
matters soon reached a critical stage. 

At this juncture the President decided to take the 
field in person to crush the revolt. Congress was 
adjourned, the presidential duties entrusted to General 
Luis La-Fuerta, and Prado at the head of the army set 
out for Arequipa. That place was reached without 
encountering serious obstacles ; but an effort to assault 
the city proved abortive, and, disheartened at this 
reverse, Prado retreated to Lima, arriving at the National 
Capital on January 6, 1868. Finding public opinion 
decidedly adverse to his cause, he determined to resign, 
and next day abandoned the country to seek asylum in 
Chile. 

After the flight of President Prado the adminis- 
tration of public affairs was assumed temporarily by 
General Canseco, representing the victorious revolution. 
The constitutional reforms introduced by Prado were 
revoked, the law of 1860 again declared in force, and 
Congress convened for July 28. A presidential election 
was ordered, and on August 2 Colonel Jose Balta was 
proclaimed Chief Magistrate, his selection being due to 
the fact that he was one of the principal opponents to 
General Prado in the matter of constitutional reform, 
and because he was thought to possess administrative 
ability. 

President Balta found his post no sinecure. The 
financial situation was most unsatisfactory, the result of 
constant internal turmoil and the war with Spain, and a 
reorganisation of the public services was necessary in 
consequence of the existing corruption and inefficiency. 
One of the main sources of the national revenue was 
the shipments of guano to Europe, and from this product 
Balta proposed to obtain funds to defray the obligations 
of the National Administration. In 1869 a contract 
was celebrated with Messrs Dreyfus & Co. of Paris, 
for exportation of all guano from Peru up to 2,000,000 



512 PERU 

tons, in return for monthly payments of 700,000 soles as 
long as the shipments continued. This arrangement 
temporarily relieved the Administration, the income 
obtained sufficing to meet the expenses of government 
and cover the service of the indebtedness. But Presi- 
dent Balta was not contented with placing the financial, 
situation on a fairly sound basis, and he determined on 
a policy which included the construction of public works 
to establish communication from the seaboard to the 
interior to develop the natural resources of Peru. For 
this purpose loans were contracted in Europe, the 
outstanding obligation of £4,000,000 being raised to 
£15,000,000 in 1870, and further increased to £50,000,000 
in 1872 ; railways were built to many districts hitherto 
inaccessible, and to all appearances the country was on 
the eve of an era of prosperity. While there is no 
doubt Balta's policy was guided by a patriotic sense of 
duty in regard to these public works, it must be re- 
cognised as shortsighted, and his schemes for better 
means of communication and transport were too 
vast for Peru in view of the limited immediate benefit 
accruing to the national exchequer. With the stop- 
page of credit abroad before the new undertakings 
were completed, the heavy obligations contracted were 
a most onerous burthen, and finally caused national 
bankruptcy. 

As the close of Balta's term drew near an unsettled 
feeling was apparent. Seven candidates came forward 
for the presidency, four being military officers ; but the 
majority of the electors were in favour of Senor Manuel 
Pardo, who had shown his ability as director of the 
Municipality of Lima. In July, 1872, sinister rumours 
were afloat of a military conspiracy to establish a 
dictatorship, and precautions were taken to guard the 
Government palace and other official centres ; but Balta 
had confidence in the senior military officers, and he did 
not fear any serious danger. It was not until a few 
days before the expiration of the presidential period 
that this conspiracy came to a head. 



1872] THE GUTIERREZ CONSPIRACY 513 

In the army were three brothers, by name Gutierrez, 
and ranking as colonels. On July 22, 1872, at 2 p.m., 
Colonel Silvestre Gutierrez with a company of the 
Pichincha Regiment arrested Balta, and confined him in 
the prison of San Francisco, and at the same time 
Colonel Marcelino Gutierrez occupied the principal 
square in Lima with the Zepita Regiment together with 
a battery of artillery, and proclaimed the revolution with 
the cry of Viva el Caronel Tomas Gutierrez! Muera 
el traidor Balta ! An armed force was despatched to 
the Congress Hall, the Chambers dispersed, and orders 
issued to seize Seiior Manuel Pardo ; but the President- 
elect had escaped to Callao and embarked on the 
warship Independencia, the officers and crew of that 
vessel and the remainder of the squadron remaining 
faithful to his cause. Congress then issued a manifesto 
declaring Colonel Tomas Gutierrez and his fellow 
conspirators guilty of treason, and public opinion showed 
no sympathy with the outbreak ; but for the moment 
the military element was in control, and Colonel Tomas 
Gutierrez was proclaimed Supreme Chief of Peru. Only 
four days, however, after the arrest of Balta, a reaction 
against the conspiracy took marked form. As Colonel 
Silvestre Gutierrez was entering the railway station for 
Callao, a group of persons raised the cry of Viva Pardo ! 
Fuera Gutierrez! Colonel Gutierrez turned and fired 
his revolver four times at these people. The shots were 
answered, and Colonel Gutierrez fell close to the entrance 
door of the railway station, mortally wounded. On the 
news of his death reaching his brother Marcelino, who 
had remained in charge of General Balta, an order was 
given for the President to be shot, and he was immedi- 
ately assassinated. The murder of the President roused 
the people of Lima and Callao against the. Gutierrez 
family and Colonel Tomas Gutierrez, who shut himself 
up in the Santa Catalina barracks with a small force 
and here was besieged by the populace. A sortie was 
made to endeavour to clear the surrounding streets, but 
it proved unsuccessful, and the supporters of the Dictator 

2k 



514 PERU 

were overpowered and Colonel Gutierrez was killed by 
the mob. 

While these events were occurring in Lima the 
people of Callao had risen against the garrison com- 
manded by Colonel Marcelino Gutierrez and he was 
forced to retreat to the forts near the city, where 
preparations were made to open fire on the town with 
the heavy guns, but a stray bullet struck the Colonel 
and caused his death. He was buried immediately in 
one of the ditches of the Baquijano cemetery, and it 
was not until some hours later that the inhabitants of 
Callao learnt he had been killed. With the loss of 
Marcelino Gutierrez the last resistance of the dictatorial 
movement disappeared. The populace took absolute 
control of affairs in spite of the protests of the Vice- 
President, Senor Mariano Herencia Zevallos, and Lima 
gave full vent to the wave of passion that had instigated 
the reaction against the Gutierrez family. The bodies 
of Tomas and Silvestre Gutierrez were dragged to the 
principal square on the afternoon of July 26, and there 
were hanged to lamp-posts for the inspection of the 
inhabitants. The corpse of Marcelino Gutierrez was 
disinterred at Callao and brought to Lima to be treated 
in similar fashion ; while the remains of President Balta 
were removed from the prison and conveyed to the 
chapel of Santa Rosa de Vitervo, and there installed 
with ceremonious state. On the morning of July 27, 
the bodies of Colonels Tomas and Silvestre Gutierrez 
were discovered suspended to two spires of the Cathedral. 
At midday they were lowered to the ground and, with 
that of Marcelino Gutierrez, were burned in the principal 
square, all endeavours of the leading citizens to stop 
this proceeding being unavailing ; and after this holocaust 
was ended, the ashes of the leaders of the recent con- 
spiracy were scattered to the winds as a last indignity. 

By July 28 order was re-established in Lima and 
Callao, and the first Vice-President, Senor Mariano 
Zavallos, assumed the duties of Chief Magistrate for 
the few remaining days of the unexpired term for which 



18721 PRESIDENT PARDO ASSUMES OFFICE 515 

Colonel Balta had been elected ; on the same date Con- 
gress met, and on August 1 proclaimed Senor Manuel 
Pardo duly elected to the Presidency. On July 31 the 
funeral of Colonel Balta took place in the Cathedral at 
Lima, and was conducted with all pomp as a State 
ceremony. 

President Pardo assumed office on August 2, 1872, 
and his Administration initiated many reforms. He 
represented the civilian interests of Peru as opposed to 
the long series of military Governments which had con- 
trolled the country in former years, and his policy was 
guided by a desire to improve the country and restrain 
the spirit of militarism which had played so important 
a part hitherto in the national destinies. Public instruc- 
tion was a subject to which attention was specially 
devoted, and schools for primary education were estab- 
lished on a comparatively extensive scale. Scientific 
and technical colleges were founded, and educational 
facilities encouraged and supported where privately 
initiated. Military and naval requirements were not 
neglected, and a naval academy was created, and schools 
instituted for the instruction of non-commissioned officers 
of the army. Reforms in military organisation were 
introduced, and plans approved for placing the National 
Guard on a serviceable footing. Of the public works 
completed during the Pardo Administration, the most 
notable were the railway from Lima to Magdalena, the 
monument at Callao in memory of the defence of that 
city against the Spanish squadron, and the public hospital 
known as the "2 de Mayo." 

Notwithstanding the endeavours of President Pardo 
to advance the highest interests of Peru, a spirit of 
discontent was openly manifested during his Adminis- 
tration in both the northern and southern districts, and 
on several occasions this dissatisfied feeling took the 
form of armed revolt. The principal instigator of these 
conspiracies was Senor Nicolas de Pierola, and on 
November 1, 1874, he disembarked with a body of 
insurgents from the steamer Talisman at Pacocha, pro- 



516 PERU 

ceeding thence to Moquegua and Torata, and finally 
occupying a strong position known as "Los Angeles." 
When the news of this expedition reached Lima, the 
President asked permission from Congress to conduct 
in person a force of Government troops to the neighbour- 
hood of Torata to re-establish public order, and the 
Chambers approved the proposition. Pardo lost no 
time in putting his plan into execution, and with several 
regiments of the regular army, strengthened by a few 
battalions of the National Guard, a rapid march was 
made against the insurgent headquarters at " Los 
Angeles," and that stronghold was carried by assault. 
With this defeat of the insurgents in the south the 
movement against the Government was crushed, for 
while Pardo directed these operations near Torata 
another expedition was despatched against the rebels 
in the northern provinces and no formidable resistance 
encountered. A few skirmishes occurred, but the 
Government troops were everywhere victorious and the 
opposition soon melted away, and in the first few months 
of 1875 order was once more established. 

The weak point in the Administration of Pardo was 
his foreign policy. The financial situation had become 
extremely complicated owing to heavy obligations con- 
tracted during the preceding presidential period, and in 
consequence of the decreased value of guano and nitrate 
of soda, the two principal sources of the national revenue. 
To obtain relief from financial liabilities, Pardo con- 
ceived the idea of creating a monopoly for the production 
of nitrate of soda, and to effect this two things were 
necessary. The first was the expropriation of the nitrate 
properties in the hands of private owners, and the second 
was joint action with the Bolivian authorities in restrict- 
ing the output of nitrate of soda to ensure abnormally 
high prices. So far as the expropriation of private 
ownership in the Tarapaca district was concerned, no 
great difficulties stood in the way, for the concessions 
were subject to the right of the Government to assume 
control of the nitrate fields in return for adequate 



1875] FOREIGN POLICY OF PARDO 517 

monetary compensation, if such a course was considered 
desirable. When the policy of the President was laid 
before Congress, the consent of both Chambers was 
readily obtained, but with Bolivia many obstacles 
occurred. The port of Antofagasta was the subject of 
long controversy with Chile, and had been ceded to 
Bolivia under conditions which prohibited export charges 
on any products of Chilian industry in the Atacama 
districts, and under such circumstances it was useless 
to restrict the output of nitrate of soda in Tarapaca. 
The only effect of such action would be to give an 
enormous impulse to production near Antofagasta. It 
was under these conditions that the Peruvian authorities 
endeavoured to induce the Bolivian Government to 
adopt a policy in regard to the Atacama nitrate industry 
similar to that proposed for Tarapaca ; as this entailed 
direct violation by Bolivia of her treaty obligations to 
Chile, it was only in return for the protection Peru 
could offer under an offensive and defensive alliance 
that the Bolivian Government consented. As a result 
of many negotiations, a secret alliance was celebrated 
between Bolivia and Peru in 1873, the ultimate conse- 
quences of this compact being the war of 1879-83 
between Chile and the allies ; but the disastrous events 
which signalised this compact of Peru and Bolivia did 
not take place during the Pardo Administration, and it 
was left to his successor to face the calamities his policy 
entailed. 

When the term of President Pardo was approaching 
completion, the question of his successor excited wide 
attention. The two candidates brought before the 
electors were General Mariano Ignacio Prado and Rear- 
Admiral Lizardo Montero, and the former, although 
absent from Peru, carried most weight. General Prado 
had commanded the garrison at Callao when the 
Spanish squadron attacked that city on May 2, 1866, 
and his name was always associated with the successful 
defence of the town. Pie was elected by the popular 
vote, and returned from Chile to assume his office, his 



518 PERU 

presidency proving to be one of the most stormy periods 
in Peruvian history. Internal disturbances and a 
disastrous foreign war caused loss of territory and 
subsequent acute economic and financial depression, 
which lasted for twenty years. 

Seiior Nicholas Pierola promoted a series of 
intrigues and conspiracies against the constituted 
authorities in 1876, and these resulted in a rising 
near Moquegua. The movement was suppressed by 
the defeat of the insurgents at Yacango, but only after 
severe fighting, in which both sides sustained heavy 
losses. Some eighteen months later another revolt was 
organised by Pierola at Callao, and on this occasion the 
rebels seized the monitor Huascar, and proceeded to 
Pacocha. A decree of the Government declared the 
Huascar a pirate, and two British men-of-war, the Shah 
and Amethyst, attempted her capture. A severe 
engagement took place near Pacocha, and the in- 
surgents on the Huascar found they were outmatched 
and their capture only a matter of time. Pierola then 
determined to capitulate to an admiral of the Peruvian 
navy in the neighbourhood rather than allow the Huascar 
to fall into British hands. With the surrender of the 
Huascar the revolution ended, and Pierola left the 
country for Chile ; but his influence continued to be a 
disturbing factor in the political situation. 

The year 1878 was memorable for two other events 
besides the revolution ; these were the celebration of a 
treaty of peace and friendship with Spain, and the 
assassination of the ex-President, Seiior Manuel Pardo. 
By the terms of the treaty Spain recognised the in- 
dependence of Peru, and the differences which occa- 
sioned hostilities between the two countries in 1865-6 
were finally adjusted. The murder of Senor Pardo was 
one of those acts by which the history of South America 
has been so frequently besmirched ; when President of 
the Republic, he had performed his duties with consci- 
entious honesty, and the effect of his foreign policy 
between 1872 and 1876 was not apparent at the time of 



1878] ASSASSINATION OF PARDO 519 

his death, and could not, therefore, be quoted to his 
detriment. At the date of his assassination he was 
President of the Senate, and in Congress had supported 
a measure for certain military reforms by which no 
non-commissioned officer could rise to commissioned 
rank. On September 22, 1878, as he was leaving the 
Senate Chamber after a discussion of these measures, he 
was shot at and killed by the sergeant of the guard on 
duty at the Congress Hall, a man named Montoyo. 
President Prado entered the Congress Hall a few 
moments after Senor Pardo was murdered, and when 
he asked who had committed the act, Sergeant Montoyo 
was indicated. The President ordered the man to be 
shot, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs urged that if 
such action was taken the people would infer that the 
President had instigated the murder and insisted upon 
the execution of the sergeant to remove all evidence. 
This argument prevailed, and Sergeant Montoyo was 
arrested and subsequently tried and condemned to 
death, his execution taking place a few months later. 
Towards the close of 1878 the political situation 
gave many indications of complications with Chile in 
consequence of strained relations between the latter 
country and Bolivia in connection with the nitrate 
industry of Atacama. The inclination of President 
Prado was adverse to war with Chile ; but this was not 
the feeling of the majority of the inhabitants, and 
public opinion lost no opportunity of attempting to 
force the hand of the Government. In 1879 the Chilian 
authorities despatched an expeditionary force to occupy 
Antofagasto and the vicinity, and no active measures 
were taken by General Prado to restrain this aggres- 
sion. Discontent augmented ; Prado was accused of 
sympathy with Chile as the outcome of his long resi- 
dence in the latter country, and dissatisfaction at his 
attitude grew apace. Possibly, if left to follow his 
own policy, Prado might have avoided war, but this 
could only be accomplished by breaking faith with 
Bolivia. In these circumstances, and in view of public 



520 PERU 

opinion, the President decided to abandon all idea of 
conciliation, and to accept the alternative of an inter 
national conflict. On April 5, 1879, the Chilian Govern- 
ment formally declared war against Peru, and the 
struggle, which ended in such appalling disaster for the 
latter country, now actively commenced. 

President Prado, in view of the national danger from 
the Chilian invasion of Tarapaca in 1879, decided to 
take command of the army in the south, and Congress 
agreed to this course. The operations in 1879 are 
recorded in the description of the war between Chile, 
Bolivia, and Peru, and it is not necessary to refer to 
the campaign further than to mention that the disastrous 
outcome resulted in internal political changes deserving 
of a place in history. In November, 1879, Prado, con- 
vinced that Peru could not stem the Chilian advance, 
returned to Lima, and in a letter published on 
December 2 announced his arrival in the National 
Capital, and his determination to use every effort to 
retrieve the misfortunes which had befallen Peruvian 
arms. Sixteen days after this document was made 
public he issued a decree entrusting the Administration 
to the Vice-President, General La Puerta, stating that 
he intended to absent himself from Peruvian territory 
under the permission conceded by the Chambers on 
May 2, 1878, and next day he embarked at Callao for 
Europe, abandoning his country to any consequences the 
war with Chile might entail. 

The unpatriotic action of General Prado at this 
crisis has never been explained. He was not lacking 
in physical courage, as had been demonstrated when he 
commanded the defence of Callao against the Spanish 
squadron on May 2, 1866 ; but the services he had 
rendered to his country in former days could not con- 
done his conduct in leaving Peru when calamities were 
falling thick upon her, and his action caused an out- 
burst of indignation. It was now that Senor Nicolas 
de Pierola again became prominent. Pierola was 
residing in Chile at the outbreak of hostilities between 



1879] REVOLT UNDER PIEROLA 521 

that country and Peru in 1879, and on the declaration 
of war in April of that year he offered his services to 
the Peruvian Government. This offer was accepted, 
and Pierola returned to Lima, and was nominated to 
an important military post. On the flight of Prado the 
moment was opportune for him to seize the direction 
of public affairs, and he organised a revolutionary 
movement to oust the authorities then in power. The 
obstacle to the immediate success of this conspiracy 
was the opposition offered by General Manuel Gonzalez 
de La Cotera, then Minister of War, who decided to 
support the Vice-President, General de La Puerta, and 
counted on the garrison of Lima for aid. The first 
indication that mutinous designs were entertained by 
the troops was the refusal of Colonel Arguedas to 
detail a guard for duty at the Palace. General de La 
Cotera immediately marched against Colonel Arguedas, 
but was forced to retire by the heavy fire of a number 
of disaffected citizens on the house-tops. At this 
juncture, Pierola, with another body of mutineers, 
appeared, and a fusillade was maintained for some 
hours in the principal square of the city, the casualties 
being 60 killed and 200 wounded. Soon afterwards 
the police joined the revolutionary cause, and the 
position of the Government momentarily became more 
critical. On the evening of December 21 Pierola with his 
supporters marched against Callao, occupying that city 
without resistance early next day. The Archbishop of 
Lima now intervened in the struggle and persuaded Gene- 
ral de La Puerta to end the conflict by tendering his 
resignation, and on December 23, 1879, Pierola entered 
Lima once more, and was proclaimed Supreme Chief of 
the Republic pending the outcome of the war with Chile. 
Seiior Pierola at once commenced energetic measures 
to defend Peru against the Chilian invasion by organising 
additional bodies of troops, and by fortifying and occupy- 
ing a number of strategic positions. The Peruvians were 
so far satisfied with the man now at the head of affairs 
that no active opposition was raised to his assumption 



522 PERU 

of dictatorial attributes. But the efforts of Pierola 
proved abortive to check the victorious onward progress 
of the Chilians, and reverse followed reverse in the 
course of the ensuing twelve months until the occupation 
of Lima in January, 1881, crowned the tale of defeat. 
After the disasters of Peru had culminated in the 
rout of the defence at the battle of Miraflores, the 
power of Pierola for the time was ended, and he retired 
to the interior of the country, and there unsuccessfully 
endeavoured to organise further resistance ; but finding 
such action of little practical avail, he returned to 
Lima under the protection of a safe-conduct issued by 
the Chilian authorities, and then left the country, to 
reside first in Europe and afterwards in Chile. Pierola 
was still a young man, having been born on January 5, 
1839, and could count on support from the Church Party, 
for he had been educated at Arequipa, a stronghold of 
clerical influence. In spite of the fact that under the 
Administrations of Sefior Pardo and General Prado he 
had been a constant menace to public order, he retained 
a powerful following, and was destined at a later period 
to play an important part in the national history. 

From 1881 to 1884 the political developments in 
Peru are more particularly connected with the occupa- 
tion of the country by the Chilians as the immediate 
consequence of the war, and as such are described in 
the account of that struggle. The thread of the present 
story, therefore, is picked up at the point where the 
evacuation of Peruvian territory by the Chilian forces 
took place. General Miguel Iglesias had been installed 
as President by the assistance of the Chilian authorities, 
although he was not recognised by a dissentient section 
of the population of which General Caceres was the 
leader ; but as it was with the Administration of 
President Inglesias that the Treaty of Ancon was 
celebrated, and as this treaty was accepted by the 
Peruvians, he must be regarded as formally ranking 
amongst the list of presidents holding office since the 
country became independent of Spain. 



1884] DISTURBED INTERNAL CONDITIONS 523 

From 1884 to the end of 1885 the country was torn 
by internal dissensions. Iglesias was supported in 
Lima by the people approving the treaty of peace made 
in October, 1883, and which had led to the withdrawal 
of the Chilian army of occupation ; but Chilian influence 
in 1884 was still strong, and on this support General 
Iglesias could rely at the commencement of his Admini- 
stration. The opposition was concentrated at Jauja, 
and it was from this point that General Caceres 
organised his forces to attack the de facto Administration. 
On March 8, 1884, the Chambers formally ratified the 
Treaty of Ancon, and peaceful relations were established 
with the Chilian Government ; but this fact carried 
small weight with General Caceres and his friends, and 
their preparations were continued for the invasion of 
the territory over which the Iglesias Administration 
was acknowledged. In July and August of 1884 
the forces under Caceres approached the National 
Capital, and on the 24th of the latter month Lima was 
attacked ; but the garrison of the city succeeded in 
holding its own, and Caceres was repulsed with such 
heavy loss that a retreat to Arequipa was ordered to 
allow him to reorganise his army. For the next year 
constant skirmishes occurred between the two parties ; 
but no decided successes were gained by either side, 
although Caceres was enabled to strengthen his position, 
and towards the close of 1885 he made a second attempt 
to capture Lima. In November of that year he moved 
to the vicinity of the Peruvian capital, and on December 
1, 1885, attacked the city, and after hard fighting he 
occupied the upper portion of the town as far as the 
Plaza de la Inquisicion. Next day Caceres and Iglesias 
held a conference, and both leaders agreed to resign 
their pretensions to a council of Ministers comprised of 
Senor Antonio Arenas, Senor Jose Sanchez, Monsenor 
Manuel Tovar (now Archbishop of Lima), General 
Manuel Velarde, and Senor Pedro Correa y Santiago. 
The duties of this council were to take steps for the 
election of the President, Vice-President and Members 



524 PERU 

of Congress, and to administer public affairs until the 
political situation became normal. Immediately after 
surrendering his power to this council, Iglesias left the 
country, while Caceres remained in Peru and worked 
actively for his election to the Presidency, His efforts 
were successful, and in May, 1886, Congress declared 
him chosen as Chief Magistrate, and with his accession 
to office on June 3, 1886, all serious internal political 
disturbances ceased for the time. 

The Administration of President Andres Caceres 
from 1886 to 1890 was barren of historical events. The 
people of Peru were wearied with a condition of warfare 
that had existed first with Chile and afterwards against 
the authority of Iglesias, and little energy was left to 
foment disturbances against the authorities. Every- 
where was misery and poverty, for Peruvian industrial 
enterprise had been ruined in the struggle against Chile, 
and the spirit of the inhabitants was so far broken that 
small scope remained for the establishment of new 
undertakings. The national resources dwindled away 
to insignificant proportions, the revenue was barely 
sufficient for the maintenance of the Government, and 
no funds were available for the assistance of the 
sufferers in the recent defence of the country against 
the Chilian invasion or the internal disturbances 
occurring between 1884 and the end of 1885. In such 
circumstances the Administration of Caceres lived from 
1886 to 1890. Towards reconstruction nothing was 
attempted, and public affairs were allowed to drift in 
haphazard fashion. The national income supported a 
small favoured clique, but when this limited circle was 
satisfied nothing was left for the alleviation of the 
general distress. When the term of Caceres ended in 
1890, the official candidate, Colonel Morales Bermudez, 
was declared elected, and no opposition to this arrange- 
ment was suggested. 

The first and second Vice-Presidents for the term 
of Colonel Morales Bermudez were, respectively, Seilor 
Pedro A. del Solar and Colonel Borgono. This fact is 






1890] PRESIDENT BERMUDEZ ELECTED 525 

important, as on it hinged a subsequent revolutionary 
movement which spread through the country in 1894, 
and which was only ended after a severe struggle, 
entailing heavy loss of life. Between 1890 and 1894 the 
power behind the Government was Caceres, and under 
his guidance the Bermudez Administration conducted 
public affairs in uneventful fashion. No effort at im- 
provement was made, nor was there any attempt to check 
the corruption rampant in every official department. It 
was only natural that discontent arose among a large 
section of the inhabitants, and this feeling became more 
marked as the population began to recover from the 
state of depression which prevailed at the close of the 
war with Chile. Under Caceres the Government had 
been practically a military dictatorship, and small change 
in the system occurred under Bermudez because of the 
influence of his predecessor over the Administration ; 
but the civilian element recognised that a continuance 
of dictatorial methods was a direct obstacle to sub- 
stantial progress, and an agitation was set afoot to 
secure the election of a civilian to the Presidency when 
the term of Bermudez expired. It was not the intention 
of Caceres to allow the control of affairs to slip through 
his hands, and he handled the situation in such manner 
as to prevent his opponents obtaining their object by 
constitutional means. At the commencement of 1894 
it was evident that he had so manipulated matters that 
he would be proclaimed President when the formal 
result of the election was announced. 

An unexpected event marred the intrigue. President 
Bermudez died suddenly on April 1, 1894, three months 
before the expiration of presidential term, and the first 
Vice-President, Senor Pedro del Solar, should have 
succeeded. Senor Solar represented the civilian element, 
and his advent to office did not accord with the views 
held by General Caceres ; so, to avoid the complications 
likely to arise if he did, Caceres induced Colonel Borgono, 
the second Vice-President, to seize control of the 
Government. This illegal proceeding provoked a 



526 PERU 

revolutionary rising in the south, which was nominally 
headed by Senor Solar, but in reality directed by Pierola 
from Chilian territory. The Chambers were opposed to 
the course taken by Colonel Borgono, and in view of 
this hostility he dissolved the Congress and ordered 
elections to be held to secure representatives to support 
the new Administration. In due course the Chambers 
constituted under these conditions met in Lima, and 
shortly afterwards Caceres was proclaimed President, 
assuming office formally on August 10. 

The revolutionary movement was continued against 
General Caceres, and found many supporters ; but the 
army was opposed to it, and for several months the 
insurgents made no substantial progress. Arms and 
ammunition were not easy to obtain, and little money 
was available for the purchase of supplies, but Pierola 
gradually succeeded in overcoming the difficulties in the 
formation of a force of sufficient strength to march on 
Lima. From September, 1894, to February, 1895, a 
series of skirmishes occurred with the troops, but no 
marked advantage was obtained by either side. Mean- 
while the strength of the rebel army had grown steadily, 
and in March, 1895, an order was issued by Pierola to 
concentrate near Lima, in response to which 5000 
insurgents assembled on March 15 and 16, in the 
locality indicated. For the defence of the National 
Capital Caceres counted on 4000 men, but many of the 
officers could not be trusted if the insurgent cause 
showed signs of success. 

On the morning of March 17, 1895, the rebel army 
under Pierola attacked, and after desperate street fight- 
ing the upper portion of the city was captured. For the 
next two days the struggle continued ; but the sympathy 
of the residents was obviously with the revolutionary 
cause. Caceres became convinced that further resist- 
ance was useless, and under the protection of the 
foreign diplomatic corps he abandoned Lima for Callao, 
where he embarked on a neutral vessel. In the three 
days' fighting 3000 men lost their lives, either killed or 





[Face page 526. 



1895] REVOLUTION AGAINST CACERES 527 

dying afterwards from wounds, and as many more were 
more or less seriously injured. When the triumph of 
the revolution was assured, steps were taken to restore 
order ; but some days elapsed before the streets were 
cleared of the dead and dying, and normal conditions 
re-established. Credit is due to Mr Alfred St John, at 
the time H.B.M.'s Consul in Peru, for arranging a 
suspension of hostilities on March 19, and it was 
through his representations that Caceres was induced 
to abandon a hopeless struggle and accept the protec- 
tion of the foreign diplomats. The purpose of Mr St 
John was to avoid further bloodshed. 

A Provisional Administration was now formed 
under Seiior Candamo, assisted by Senor Villaran, Seiior 
Espinosa, Senor Malpartida, and Senor Bustamante y 
Salazar. Elections were held, and the dictatorial 
methods of Caceres replaced by a constitutional regime, 
and when a condition of law and order had been 
reinstated, a presidential election was ordered. This 
resulted in the choice of Pierola ; and on September 8, 
1895, the new President was installed in office, once 
more assuming control of Peru after an interval of 
fourteen years. The country had obtained the object for 
which the struggle of 1894-5 had been undertaken, and 
military ascendency gave place to civil administration. 

President Pierola had only been a few months in 
power when an insurrection broke out in Iquitos, in the 
interior of the Republic, near the principal tributaries of 
the Amazon, but the movement did not meet with much 
sympathy, and was suppressed without great difficulty 
in 1896. Several reforms with important bearing on 
the political and economic life of Peru were introduced 
under the new Administration, and an electoral law was 
voted by which a committee of nine members was 
entrusted with the examination of all electoral returns 
and the proclamation of successful candidates for the 
Legislature. In the constitution of this committee two 
representatives were nominated by the Senate, two by 
the Chamber of Deputies, four by the Supreme Court, 



528 PERU 

and one by the President with the consent of the 
Ministry. Another important measure was the legal- 
isation of marriages performed by foreign diplomatic 
ministers, consuls, and ministers of dissenting churches, 
when such contracts were duly inscribed in the civil 
registers. A third reform was the adoption of a gold 
currency in place of a fluctuating silver one, the new 
coinage providing for the introduction of a gold piece of 
equal fineness and weight to the pound sterling, and 
also for this latter coin to be exchangeable for ten silver 
soles of 100 cents. In 1899, shortly before the expira- 
tion of the presidential period, another attempt at 
revolution was made, the alleged motive being the 
temporary suppression of the electoral committee created 
under the Law of 1897. The leader of the movement 
was Senor Durand, a man who had played a prominent 
part in the rebellion against Caceres ; but the rising did 
not find favour, and although it lingered on for some 
months, no really serious fighting took place. In July, 
1899, the country was called upon to elect a successor to 
Pierola, and the choice fell on Senor Romaila, a member 
of a well-known family of Arequipa. Pomana had been 
educated at Stoneyhurst in England, and graduated sub- 
sequently as a civil engineer at King's College, London, 
and, although he was a man of little experience in politi- 
cal life, his election met with unanimous approval. 

On September 8, Senor Pomana was installed as 
President. The revolutionary movement under Durand 
gave intermittent signs of existence, but prompt measures 
were taken to bring it to an end, and when 1899 drew 
to a close little evidence remained of any desire to 
dispute the authority of the Administration. The whole 
population wished for peace, to allow opportunity for 
economic * development and industrial progress, and, 
consequently, the Pomana Administration was not 
embarrassed by serious internal disturbance, although 
petty political intrigue was not lacking on the part of 
ambitious politicians desiring to create difficulties to 
serve the purposes of themselves and their friends. 



1903] INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS 529 

During the past five years a greater sense of tranquillity 
has been experienced than was known at any former 
period in Peru since the establishment of republican 
institutions, and the people are fully alive to the bene- 
fits arising from the existing internal peace. In May, 
1903, Senor Manuel Candamo was elected to succeed 
Senor Romafia in the Presidency, and his selection en- 
sured a continuance in power of the party which had so 
greatly helped to further the prosperity of the country.* 

In regard to international questions, the most 
important is that open with Chile in connection with 
the ownership of Tacna and Arica. The settlement of 
this matter should have taken place in 1894 by the 
terms of the Treaty of Ancon, but Peru was then in 
such an unsettled state from internal complications that 
it was impossible to open negotiations on the subject. 
For the past ten years every attempt at a satisfactory 
agreement has proved abortive. Peru mistrusts the 
policy of Chile, and believes she is determined to remain 
in possession, and acting in this spirit the Peruvian 
Legation has been withdrawn from Santiago and no 
further effort is being made to bring about an under- 
standing. This attitude is regrettable, for the absence of 
a definite agreement with Chile keeps an old sore open. 

In 1895 the dispute with Colombia regarding the 
boundary with that Republic was brought to an 
amicable conclusion by the withdrawal of part of the 
claims put forward by the Colombian Government and 
the reference of the remaining points to the arbitration 
of the Spanish Crown, but a similar controversy with 
Ecuador has still to be settled. With both Bolivia and 
Brazil the boundary of Peru has yet to be definitely 
fixed, but in neither case should there be any difficulty 
unless unexpected complications arise. 

* President Candamo died at Arequipa on May 7, 1904, and for 
some weeks previously during his illness the Government was admini- 
stered by Vice-President Calderon. Senor Calderon is a member of 
the Civilista Party, and took part in the opposition to President 
Caceres, which ended in overturning the military regime that was in 
force from 1884 to 1895. 

2L 



CHAPTER XXIX 

peru — continued 

Movement of Population. Effect of Wars and Revolutions. Decrease 
of Inhabitants. Races of Peru. Conflicting Elements in Popula- 
tion. Japanese Immigration. Infantile Mortality. Unhygienic 
Conditions. Alcoholism. National Language. Similarity with 
Semitic Customs and Words. Topographical Zones. Education. 
Primary Instruction. Educational Statistics. Secondary and 
Higher Education. Justice. Legal Procedure. Influence of 
the Roman Catholic Church. National Character. Municipal 
Government. Typical Spanish Features in Lima. City of 
Arequipa. The Commercial Situation. Trade Conditions. 
Financial Situation. Contract with Bondholders. The Peruvian 
Corporation. Internal Debt. Taxation. The Currency Ques- 
tion. Industrial Occupations. Sugar Enterprise. Labour 
Question. Cotton Production. Coffee and Cacao. Minor 
Agricultural Products. Pastoral Industry. Llamas and Alpacas. 
Minerals. Difficulties of Mining Enterprise. Cerro de Pasco. 
Silver Production. Petroleum. Coal. Borax. Mining Laws. 
The Rubber Districts. Manufacturing Industry. Cotton and 
Woollen Mills. Panama Hats. Motive Power for Manufactur- 
ing. Development and Transport. 

The question of the movement of population is one of 
the many serious problems confronting Peru at the 
present time. No census has been taken since 1876, 
when the total number of inhabitants was returned as 
2,621,844 ; but these statistics were based largely on 
guesswork, and the figures given cannot be accepted as 
accurate, although they are an indication of the state of 
affairs a quarter of a century ago. 

Since 1876 the conditions have been materially 
modified. The war with Chile resulted in the deaths 

530 




President Romana. 



if dee page 530. 



1903] ECONOMIC SITUATION 531 

of 30,000 able-bodied men by land and sea between 
1879 and 1883, and as many more died of wounds 
received and hardships endured in Tarapaca, Tacna, 
and Arica, the vicinity of Lima, and in the desultory 
warfare in the interior after the Chilian occupation of 
the National Capital. In the revolutionary movements 
against Iglesias in 1884 and 1885, and in the rising 
against Caceres in 1894 and 1895, the loss of life was 
also heavy, and the misery resulting from this constant 
turmoil since 1876 has told its tale with overwhelming 
effect, and caused unusually high mortality in both towns 
and country districts. Weakened by privation from an 
insufficiency of the common necessaries of life the 
people have been unable to withstand sickness, and 
ordinary ailments have proved as disastrous as serious 
epidemics would have been under different circum- 
stances. The outcome is that districts fairly well 
populated when the census of 1876 was compiled are 
now practically deserted, and everywhere semi- 
abandoned villages are striking proof that a shrinkage 
of the population has occurred with startling rapidity. 
Nor has the urban population increased to counter- 
balance the diminution in the rural districts, for in most 
cases there is also a marked falling off in its numbers. 
The authorities have hesitated to order another census 
through a disinclination to show the true state of 
affairs, but the opinion of well-informed persons who 
have devoted attention to the matter is that an accurate 
census to-day would fall short of 1.500,000 — about one- 
half of the population in 1876. 

The people of Peru comprise several distinct races, 
each with its clearly defined traits. The dominant 
element consists of the descendants of the Spanish 
conquerors ; but, naturally, in a community where the 
ruling element is small in numerical proportion to the 
subjugated population, a mixture of races occurred. In 
the course of the last four centuries, Indian blood has 
filtered into the veins of the Spanish residents, and few 
exceptions to this rule are found at the present time ; 



532 PEEU 

and amongst the Indian population, forming the great 
mass of the inhabitants, the evidence of a Spanish strain 
is also apparent in every district, although dwarfed by 
the preponderance of native blood. In place of Spanish 
blood raising Indian civilisation to a higher level, it has 
been thrown into the background by the superior weight 
of surrounding circumstances. Apart from the Spanish 
and the Indian sections are the negroes and Asiatics, 
the former brought to the country from Africa, and the 
latter introduced as labourers after the emancipation of 
the slaves. A mongrel element has arisen in more 
recent years from a mixture of negro blood with Spanish 
and Indian, and Asiatic with Indian and negro and 
that of Spanish descent. Little love is lost between the 
varied people who make up the present population, and 
racial quarrels are common. According to statistical 
returns in the census of 1876, no less than 75 per cent, 
of the total population consisted of Indians ; 23 per 
cent, was classified under Cholo (mixed Indian and 
Spanish) and Zambo (mixed negro and Spanish) ; the 
remaining 20 per cent, was of Spanish descent, 18,000 
Europeans, and 25,000 Asiatics, principally Chinese. 
With the exception of the Chinese, who have decreased 
during the last three decades, the proportion of nation- 
alities is now only slightly different from the census of 
1876. 

Immigration is practically nil. From Europe a few 
persons drift to the country, and from South American 
states individuals find their way to Peru, but the 
departure of foreign residents counterbalances any 
addition to the population from outside sources. 
Recently, the experiment of introducing Japanese for 
work as labourers was attempted, but did not prove 
satisfactory. There is little inducement for foreigners 
of European or American nationality to choose Peru 
for permanent settlement ; the climate is uninviting for 
the inhabitants of northern Europe, and the people 
from southern zones find more suitable conditions 
prevailing in Argentina and Brazil, where Italians, 



1903] MOVEMENT OF POPULATION 533 

Spaniards, and Portuguese meet with large colonies of 
kindred blood. 

There are two principal causes tending to check 
increase in the population of Peru. The first is the 
unprecedented rate of infantile mortality, the absence 
of all proper attention and nourishment for newly-born 
infants being the reason alleged for this unsatisfactory 
condition. Extreme domestic poverty is certainly con- 
ducive to carelessness in regard to children, and an 
inability to attend to their welfare ; but the natural 
physique of the Indian is not sturdy, and this inclination 
to bodily weakness is unduly fomented by the unhygienic 
conditions under which the poorer portion of the 
inhabitants dwell in town and country, and no attempt 
is made by national or municipal authorities to remedy 
the existing unsanitary state of affairs. The second 
factor threatening the depopulation of Peru is alcohol- 
ism, the abuse of strong drink largely contributing 
towards the debility which characterises the infantile 
population. It is impossible that the offspring of 
drink-sodden fathers and mothers can grow to maturity 
with sound health, and unfortunately poverty is no 
obstacle to indulgence in spirituous liquor. The local 
manufacture of cheap drink is extensive, and the product 
is sold at such low prices that for a few cents a large 
quantity can be purchased. The impurity of this cheap 
spirit is notorious, and the harmful result from its 
constant use cannot be overestimated. The Government 
could mitigate the evil by imposing restrictive taxation 
on its manufacture ; but no steps have been taken in 
this direction, and it is to this supine attitude in regard 
to national hygiene and the liquor traffic that many of 
the economic difficulties of to-day can be traced. The 
depopulation of the country means the ruin of industrial 
enterprise for lack of labourers, a condition yearly 
more keenly experienced, and which must be rapidly 
accentuated unless effective measures are adopted to 
check its course. 

While Spanish has been the official language of 



534 PEPU 

Peru since the conquest of the Inca Empire, a very 
large proportion of the inhabitants retain the vernacular 
of Quichua in some districts, Aymara in others ; in some 
sections of the country these latter tongues are the only 
means of communication, and this fact is one evidence 
of the limited efforts for the education of the poorer 
classes. Both Quichua and Aymara contain many 
words of Semitic origin, and this similarity suggests the 
theory that the Inca people were not the aborigines of 
South America, but descendants of Asiatics. Although 
no satisfactory evidence has been discovered to support 
this supposition, there are many customs and practices 
of the Indians which bear striking resemblance to those 
in vogue during the later Babylonian era. 

For rough purposes of topographical description, 
Peru may be divided into four zones. These are the 
districts bordering on the coast-line, the lower ranges 
and valleys of the country a short distance inland, the 
great Cordillera of the Andes, and the section sloping 
to the tributaries of the Amazon. On the coast-line 
there is almost no rainfall, except in the territory a few 
degrees south of the equator, and in the second zone 
little rain falls, but the valleys are fertile on account of 
abundant water from the rivers fed by snow from the 
high altitudes. The third zone comprises the great 
Andine ranges, many sections of these lying above the 
perpetual snow-line ; and the fourth consists of 
mountainous forest country broken by high ridges and 
deep valleys, the altitude rapidly descending until the 
vicinity of the rivers Napo, Maranon, and Beni is 
reached, where the climate is moist and warm, and the 
country clothed with dense vegetation. 

Elementary education is more backward in Peru 
than in Chile or Argentina. Nominally, primary instruc- 
tion is compulsory, but no efforts are made to secure 
the attendance of children by the various municipalities 
which control the system. So lax are the methods that 
no regular returns are furnished to the National Govern- 
ment, and no regular inspection is attempted. As a 



1903] EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 535 

rule, the payment of teachers is on so low a scale that 
few persons can be induced to give their services. In 
addition to other defects, no attempt is made to bring 
the Indian population under educational influence, and 
this section of the inhabitants, by far the most numerous 
in Peru, is regarded as so far beyond the pale of 
modern civilisation that only a minute proportion arrive 
at maturity with a knowledge of reading and writing. 
Under such conditions, no wonder the religious orders 
control the educational system of the country, for in 
many cities clerical schools are maintained and the 
children are sent to these in preference to the public 
establishments. 

According to a report recently submitted to Congress 
by the Minister of Justice, Worship, and Instruction, 
the number of schools open for primary education in 
1898 was 1465, and of these 1152 were under official 
and 304 under private control. The number of pupils 
attending the official schools was computed at 32,904 
boys and 15,830 girls, and the attendance at the private 
establishments was returned as 6643 boys and 5355 girls. 
If these figures are approximately correct, the number 
of children between five and fifteen years undergoing 
elementary instruction was 60,663, or 10 per cent, of 
that part of the population to which the law of com- 
pulsory education applies. The cost of primary instruc- 
tion was 476,889 soles, about 238,000 gold dollars, an 
average per head of $4.90 for the twelve months. The 
number of male certificated teachers employed in public 
schools was 349, and uncertificated 661, and of female 
certificated teachers 450, and uncertificated 158, while 
the attendance in each school was 43, and the average 
salary paid to teachers in the public schools was 162 
gold dollars. While these statistics are published under 
official authority, they cannot be considered reliable, 
returns being only forwarded by a small proportion of 
the municipalities. 

For secondary education there are twenty-two colleges 
for males and one for females, and the cost of their 



536 . PERU 

maintenance is defrayed from the national revenue. 
The number of students inscribed in 1898 was 1984, 
the average attendance 1403 ; out of 1562 students 
examined 1186 satisfactorily passed the required test, and 
the cost per student for the year was 103.50 gold dollars. 
The requirements of higher education are met by four 
Universities, situated respectively at Lima, Arequipa, 
Cuzco, and Trujillo, the San Marcos University at Lima 
being the most ancient in America, its charter having 
been granted by Carlos V. in 1551. The Universities 
have faculties of jurisprudence, medicine, political 
science, theology, and applied science, and degrees are 
granted in these subjects. In 1898 the number of 
students matriculating was 1551, and 1220 under- 
graduates passed satisfactory final examinations. For 
technical education a school of mines and civil engineer- 
ing was founded at Lima in 1874, and there is also an 
agricultural college, while High Schools under British, 
German, and Italian superintendence exist and are fairly 
well supported. 

The educational system of Peru inclines more to the 
benefit of the classes able to pay for instruction than 
towards the mass of the inhabitants with no available 
funds for such purposes. For the Indian, who possesses 
many qualities in the shape of aptitude for industrial 
occupations, nothing is done, nor has any effort in this 
direction been made since the Spanish conquest de- 
stroyed Inca civilisation. 

The administration of justice in Peru could not be 
more unsatisfactory than it is, and to designate as justice 
the manner the laws are administered is to convey an 
erroneous impression. To obtain a favourable verdict 
bribery must be practised, and it is a question of who 
has the longest purse when a decision is reached. To 
this widely sweeping assertion there are no exceptions, 
the Supreme Court being no cleaner than the lower 
tribunals, it differs only in that payment must be on a 
higher scale. An example of the existing conditions 
occurred recently, when an important suit involving 



1903] THE JUDICIARY 537 

250,000 gold dollars was pending in the Supreme Court. 
On the bench were five judges, and the evidence on one 
side was clear and concise, leaving no doubt of the 
rights of the case. A few days before judgment was 
delivered, the principal litigant received information that 
an adverse verdict would be given unless a bribe was 
forthcoming, and not having the necessary funds, he 
applied to a banker for an advance of 10,000 gold dollars 
to buy a third vote, explaining that he had secured two 
others. The loan was obtained, and after a favourable 
judgment was pronounced the 10,000 dollars were paid to 
the member casting the deciding vote. In this case a 
just verdict was bought, but it happens quite as often 
that injustice is obtained by similar means. 

The judicial officials are, as a rule, too ignorant to 
turn to best use the legal power entrusted to them. 
They are so inadequately remunerated that they are 
tempted to corrupt practices at every turn, and it is 
due to these circumstances that blackmailing has become 
of such common occurrence. No redress can be obtained 
as affairs are conducted to-day, and the most hopeless 
feature of the situation is that the ordinary citizen does 
not appreciate the necessity for an impartial administra- 
tion of justice. He has a vague idea that there are such 
persons as honest judges in other parts of the world, 
but he is not sure that an upright judiciary in Peru 
would be an unmitigated blessing. 

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Peru 
is widespread, and its power is felt in both public and 
private life. The city of Arequipa is the clerical strong- 
hold, and the fact that better educational facilities are 
afforded by its religious institutions than elsewhere in 
the Republic enables the influential standing of the clergy 
to be maintained to an unusual extent in national affairs. 
It is worthy of note that in the many revolutionary 
movements the possession of Arequipa has almost 
always been the turning-point of the revolt, and when 
public opinion in that city is in accord with the inhabitants 
of Lima, the Government has no reason to fear serious 



538 PERU 

complications. The reverse is disastrous, and it was so 
in 1884 in the rising against Iglesias, and again in the 
movement headed by Pierola in 1894-5, when President 
Caceres was driven from office. In regard to domestic 
life the dominating influence of clerical authority is most 
marked, even to the dress of women when attending 
church services ; and it is an unwritten edict that they 
appear au religious functions in the manta in place of 
hat or bonnet ; so rigorously is this enforced, that it is 
seldom any member of a congregation dare infringe the 
custom. While the men may not be imbued with 
marked religious inclination, they dread disobeying the 
authority of the Church, and among the Indian popula- 
tion the Catholic priesthood is regarded with superstitious 
awe and fear. The memories of the cruelties of past 
centuries have been handed down, and the conduct of 
the clergy in recent years has not inspired any great 
confidence in the reserved and timid nature of Quichuas 
or Aymaras, and the fact cannot be ignored that the 
parish priest in outlying districts has been corrupt and 
oppressive. Of course exceptions are to be found, and 
there are men who labour to perform good work in the 
face of many difficulties, but these are in the minority. 

Any diagnosis of the national character of the Indian 
population is difficult, for there is little in common 
between the descendant of the Spaniard and the survivor 
of the Incas. The Peruvian Indian is reserved in all 
intercourse with the race which conquered him, and the 
stamp of a vanquished people is everywhere apparent. 
He has little individuality, and small effort is ever made 
by him to adopt the methods and ways of the conquerors. 
There is no communication of thought between Spaniard 
and Indian, the former still retaining the traits of the 
victor, and the latter an attitude of patient endurance 
and suffering which has become ingrained, and beyond 
this cloak the inner man seldom emerges. Nor is there 
anything in the life of the Indian to induce any effort 
for a higher ideal. The civilisation of the Incas was 
crushed beyond any hope of reconstruction, and nothing 



1903] NATIONAL CHARACTER 539 

has replaced it. From a fairly high standard of intelli- 
gence enjoyed five hundred years ago, the Indian has 
sunk to a level little better than that of brute creation ; 
these people labour that they may gain a livelihood, but 
beyond this their mental capacity does not reach. 

Municipal government in most of the cities is far 
behind the times. To a great extent this is due to the 
poverty-stricken conditions prevailing in recent years, 
and even in the National Capital, at Arequipa, and in 
Callao, little effort is made to safeguard the inhabitants 
from disease. In the municipalities foreigners are 
accorded equal rights with natives, and in many cases 
foreign residents are chosen as alcaldes. In Lima some 
progress has been made recently in lighting and paving 
the streets, but the city lags far behind other South 
American centres in regard to modern improvements. 
Lima, however, has some redeeming features contrasting 
favourably with the other more modern communities. 
It is a bit of old Spain, and four centuries have failed to 
erase the typical features of Spanish architecture im- 
planted by the colonists who followed Pizarro from the 
Mother Country. Thoroughfares flanked by flat-roofed 
houses with their overhanging balconies of carved 
wood ; great doorways leading to gaily-coloured court- 
yards ; open, sun-bleached squares at intervals ; iron 
gratings over doors and windows, rusted with age, 
uncared for, but artistic ; these and other reminiscences 
of Spain and Spaniards are found at every turn. In the 
cathedral lies the body of Pizarro, the founder of Lima, 
his remains encased in a glass coffin, to satisfy the 
curiosity of the wayfarer. From the cathedral steps on 
the one side can be seen the quarter where the con- 
spirators assembled to assassinate the first viceroy of 
Peru, and on the other side of the square is the 
Government Palace where he was done to death. His 
murderers crossed the Plaza, forcing an entrance to the 
vice-regal residence, and to escape his assailants Pizarro 
took refuge in the chapel, the assassins killing him on 
the altar steps. Changes there have been, but the main 



540 PERU 

outlines of local colour are hardly modified since the 
time when the conqueror of Peru was struck down by 
the men he had led so often to victory. 

A story illustrates the small intelligent interest 
taken by Peruvians in the history of their country. 
One day Mr Galenga, the Times correspondent, was 
visiting the cathedral in company with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and paused to examine the body of 
Pizarro. He remarked on the peculiar shape of the 
head, and said it showed many features similar to 
Indian skulls he had seen in Peru. " That is not 
extraordinary," said the Minister, " nearly all Peruvians 
have Indian blood in their veins." 

Another spot in the Peruvian capital which carries 
one back for many long years is the Plaza de la 
Inquisicion. The headquarters of that awful institution 
were lodged in the building now used as the Congress 
Hall, and under the great shade trees surrounding this 
place and giving grateful protection from a tropical sun, 
was where men and women were sacrificed for refusing 
to acknowledge a religious faith for which they had no 
sympathy. Many houses in the Inquisition Square at 
the present time were standing when those helpless 
victims were dragged from the torture chambers to 
suffer the last penalty a distorted fanaticism could 
devise. 

Callao gives rise to other feelings, for it is a modern 
town created when Peru was wealthy and her foreign 
trade flourishing. The bombardment by the Spanish 
squadron in 1866 laid a portion of the city in ashes, and 
the war with Chile completed the ruin. The trade is 
gone, the town reduced to one-quarter its former im- 
portance, and the population decreased to one-third of 
the number it contained in prosperous times. 

Arequipa as a city has a personality distinct from 
other Peruvian centres. Often have the streets been 
laid in ruins by earthquakes, and to guard against such 
destruction every room in the one-storied dwellings is 
built like a cell, the curved stone roof of each chamber 



1903] CITIES OF PERU 541 

rendered strong by the presence of a heavy keystone. 
Towering over the city is the great mountain of the 
Misti, regarded with superstitious awe by the inhabitants, 
and from its snow-capped peak come puffs of smoke, 
inducing a sense of mystery that time cannot modify. 
In Arequipa black-robed priests are in every street ; and 
the fact that it is the stronghold of Catholicism can 
never, never be forgotten, for clerical influence dominates 
the community, and controls political and social life to 
an extent that is mediaeval in effect. 

Commerce in Peru has passed through many 
vicissitudes in the last quarter of a century. When 
the exportation of guano reached high-water mark 
money was abundant, and the trade of the country was 
benefited proportionately ; but the outbreak of the war 
with Chile in 1879 was a severe blow to the commercial 
community, and all business interests suffered in direct 
ratio to the gravity of the reverses sustained by the 
Peruvian arms at sea and on land. 

The restoration of peace and the evacuation of 
Peruvian territory by the Chilians was followed by 
internal disturbances, and this effectually checked any 
revival of commercial prosperity. The producing 
centres of Peruvian industry were paralysed, owing to 
the large percentage of able-bodied men who had been 
killed or crippled in the war, and because the country 
had lost the wealth of the nitrate fields of Tarapaca and 
a part of the guano deposits, on which the value of 
exports had largely depended in former years. Stagna- 
tion in all branches of trade was inevitable, and the 
importance of Peru as a market for foreign mer- 
chandise dwindled to small proportions. It is true 
that between 1886 and 1894 no serious internal dis- 
turbances took place ; but corruption in the public 
administration during that period provoked such uneasy 
feeling that lack of confidence in the future prevented 
any expansion of trade, and when the revolution of 
1894-5 broke out, the probability of any immediate 
revival of commerce was nipped in the bud. With the 



542 PERU 

accession of President Pierola in 1895 prospects became 
brighter, and continued to improve steadily until 1898, 
when the influence of a more settled political situation 
became clearly apparent and trade showed indications 
of expanding. The volume of imports and exports 
increased and a more hopeful spirit in everyday 
business transactions developed, an improvement that 
has continued and that promises to attain substantial 
proportions in the next decade. 

Peru, therefore, shows signs of emerging from the 
intricate complications created by reckless borrowings 
and the irresponsible administration of former days. 
An external indebtedness which, with arrears of interest 
on the bonds, amounted to £54,000,000 in 1889, has 
been compounded for by a contract made to transfer to 
the bondholders for a term of sixty- six years the State 
railways and other privileges, including an annual 
money subsidy of £80,000. The outcome of this trans- 
action was the formation of the Peruvian Corporation, 
a company in which the Peruvian State creditors 
became ordinary shareholders. In this way Peru was 
relieved of her debt charge, the bondholders perforce 
accepting the terms offered as the only chance left to 
them. But the contract has proved a fruitful bone of 
contention, and has consequently done more to check 
the rehabilitation of Peruvian credit abroad than any- 
thing else. Under the agreement the Corporation 
undertook to construct extensions of the existing 
railway system, the understanding being that the 
annual subvention would be utilised to defray the 
interest on the capital required for this purpose. But, 
as was evident to impartial observers, tins subvention 
was greater than the national resources could bear, and 
the Government soon dropped into arrears with the 
payments, whereupon the Corporation abandoned the 
construction of the additional railways until such time 
as the terms of the contract were fulfilled. The dispute 
has dragged on to the present date, the Government 
declaring that the Corporation has forfeited valuable 



1903] THE PERUVIAN CORPORATION 543 

concessions granted under the agreement of 1890 
through not completing the required railway extensions. 
The Corporation has a nominal capital of £9,000,000 in 
ordinary shares, £7,500,000 in 4 per cent, preference 
shares, and debentures in circulation for £3,700,000, out 
of an authorised issue of £6,000,000. For some years 
it was necessary to reduce the debenture interest to 
3 per cent., but in 1901 the earnings were sufficient to 
admit of a higher rate, and in 1903 payment in full was 
made. 

The internal indebtedness of the Peruvian Govern- 
ment consists of the following obligations :— 

Soles. 

1. Interest-bearing funded debt . . 26,600,000 



2. Non-interest-bearing funded debt 

3. Floating debt 

4. Various claims 

Total 



5,140,000 

4,000,000 

500,000 

36,240,000 



Interest on the interest-bearing funded debt is paid 
at the rate of 1 per cent, annually, and the stock is 
quoted in the local markets at 7 per cent, of the face 
value of the bonds. The non-interest -bearing debt is 
being liquidated at the rate of 20,000 soles per month by 
public tender. From these figures it will be seen that 
the present total indebtedness is small. 

The revenue of £1,300,000 sterling is derived from 
custom-house duties levied on imported and exported 
merchandise, yielding about 60 per cent, of the total j 
from internal taxes, which are farmed out and 
represent 20 per cent, of the receipts ; from the salt 
monopoly ; posts and telegraphs ; and various small 
items aggregating about 1,000,000 soles annually. Of 
the expenditure, 25 per cent, is due to the Department 
of War and Marine ; an equal amount is devoted to 
charges in connection with National Finances ; the 
Ministry of Interior absorbs 20 per cent. ; 15 per cent, 
is nominally expended on Justice, Worship, and Educa- 
tion ; and the remainder is credited to the conduct of 



544 PERU 

foreign affairs, Congress, and public works. While 
the revenue is not large, it has augmented considerably 
in the last five years, and with improving commerce 
there is a prospect of a substantial increase in the 
receipts of the custom-house, so that the actual position 
of the Government is by no means unsatisfactory. The 
country is poor ; but there is no heavy burthen of 
indebtedness to be confronted, and so long as internal 
peace endures, the resources should be sufficient to 
enable certain improvements to be effected and to 
obviate the danger of any serious deficit. 

Peru has been through the general experience of 
South American republics in regard to the question of 
currency. Silver took the place of gold as the circulat- 
ing medium, then came the inconvertible note issue ; 
and in the epoch of the war with Chile the resources of 
the Government were reduced to such a low ebb that 
further emissions of paper money were made. Gradu- 
ally the value of the notes became depreciated to such 
an extent as to be practically worthless, and a silver 
currency was then again established ; but the fall in 
value of this metal resulted in such violent fluctuations 
in the exchange rate of the sol that the authorities 
determined to revert to a gold standard. So, during the 
Administration of President Pierola in 1898, gold once 
more became the standard currency of the Republic. To 
make matters more easy, the value of the pound sterling 
was fixed by law at 10 soles, the half-sovereign being- 
legal tender for 5 soles, and a limited number of 
Peruvian libras of equal fineness and weight as the 
English sovereign were coined, the supply being gradu- 
ally augmented during the last five years. Thus the 
present coinage is simple and convenient ; 1 libra equals 
10 soles, 1 sol 100 cents, and the change from a silver 
to a gold standard was effected without producing serious 
difficulties, although at the time it was enforced the 
exchange value of the sol was only equal to 40 gold 
cents, while the new law arbitrarily raised the legal 
value to 50 gold cents. 



1903] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 545 

Industrial occupation in Peru is principally confined 
to agriculture and mining. The growth of cane and the 
manufacture of the juice into sugar is one of the chief 
sources of wealth, and affords employment to large 
numbers of labourers. The total production of sugar at 
the present time is about 150,000 tons annually, this 
amount comparing favourably with the returns of half a 
dozen years ago, when only 70,000 tons were available 
for export after the home demand was covered. In 
many districts the climate offers exceptional advantages 
for the sugar industry ; in the valleys the soil is rich, and 
when water can be obtained for irrigation the yield is 
unusually prolific. The fact that rain seldom falls has 
two advantages which are lacking in Cuba and other 
islands of the West Indies ; first, a very high density in 
the juice, and, consequently, less difficulty in evaporation 
during manufacture ; and secondly, the grinding of the 
canes can be continued the year round, because there is 
no wet season. This dryness is of undoubted value, as 
smaller machinery is required than in countries where 
the milling can only be conducted during the short 
period when dry weather prevails, and the saving 
effected in the amount of capital required in a manu- 
facturing plant permits of the production of sugar at 
such an unusually low cost as allows profits to be made 
even in years when prices were depreciated by the keen 
competition of beet sugars grown under the continental 
bounty system. 

At present the area under cultivation with cane is 
estimated to be 150,000 acres, and an additional 50,000 
acres on the estates is utilised to maintain the work 
animals employed in the fields and to grow food for the 
labourers. In the course of the next few years the 
yield from this area should reach 200,000 tons annually, 
and as the local demand rarely exceeds 20,000 tons, the 
surplus available for shipment abroad will form a valu- 
able item in the national wealth. One, however, of the 
great difficulties in the sugar industry is an adequate 
labour supply, the field hands employed being Indians, 

2 M 



546 PERU 

negroes, and Chinese. As regards the Indians the 
condition of affairs is not satisfactory. Occasionally an 
ample supply of labourers can be obtained ; but the men 
only work when they require money for special purposes, 
and cannot be depended upon at all seasons of the year. 
Negroes make fairly good plantation hands; but their 
number is limited, and they prove refractory and trouble- 
some when employed on equal terms with Chinamen 
or Indians. Chinamen have given the best results, but 
for some years past the Chinese Government has refused 
to allow emigration to Peru, and the number at present 
in the country is rapidly diminishing. A few years ago 
800 Japanese coolies were introduced for plantation 
work ; but they proved deficient in physique and unable 
to withstand the long hours and severe strain incident 
to cane cultivation, and the experiment has not been 
repeated. 

In former years Great Britain was the market for 
the bulk of Peruvian sugars, but the trade has changed. 
The United States and Chile have been the principal 
purchasers since 1898, the refineries of those two 
countries offering better terms to producers than could 
be obtained in Europe. Shipments of sugar to New 
York are made by way of Panama, and by direct 
steamers via the Straits of Magellan ; and notwith- 
standing the heavy freight charged, the Peruvian product 
competes successfully in New York with that of Cuban 
origin. 

The cultivation of cotton is another important 
industry in Peru. In 1898 the quantity exported was 
6712 tons, the United States being a purchaser of 655 
tons, and the bulk of the remainder being shipped to 
Great Britain. There are six cotton mills in Peru, these 
chiefly producing the cheap calicoes in use among the 
poorer classes. Cotton seed and oil cake is also 
exported, the amount sent abroad in 1898 being 3322 
tons and 1469 tons respectively. One of the principal 
cotton-producing centres is Piura in the north, but there 
the crop is dependent on a precarious rainfall and the 




Gold Drinking-Cup of the Inca Period. 
(Now in possession of C. W. Gould of New York.) 



[Face page 54(3. 



1903] AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONS 547 

yield is frequently scanty, whereas in those sections of 
the country where the fields can be irrigated, this risk is 
reduced to a minimum. A large proportion of Peruvian 
cotton is long staple fibre, and is used in many foreign 
factories for mixing with silk and other material. 

Next to cotton in importance comes coffee. This 
industry was only attempted on an extensive scale 
during the last decade, and the total area under cultiva- 
tion is only 6000 acres, the average annual export being 
1300 tons, and, in addition, about 800 tons is consumed 
locally. The districts in which the development of coffee 
plantations has principally taken place are Chanchamayo 
and the Pirene, the industry having been fostered by the 
Peruvian Corporation to give value to the land owned 
in that neighbourhood ; but the difficulties in the way of 
cultivation have greatly hindered expansion, labourers 
having been scarce and transport to the seaboard 
exceedingly costly. At present the coffee is carried on 
mules or donkeys for a journey of seven or eight days 
before the nearest railway point is reached, and small 
profit is left to the grower when all charges are paid. 
The cultivation of cacao is attended with similar 
obstacles. Cuzco is the centre of the industry, and in 
1898 the surplus available for export to foreign countries 
was 618 tons, the bulk being sent to Germany and 
Bolivia. Rice is grown to some extent, and the quantity 
shipped abroad annually is 5000 tons. Peruvian bark, 
the coca leaf, some cocaine, and other minor articles 
find a market outside the country. 

Pastoral industry is not attempted on any extensive 
scale. Cattle breeding is confined to an effort to meet 
local demand for beef animals, and the supply is often 
inadequate. The hides are utilised for manufacturing 
leather, a surplus of 2127 tons remaining for export in 
1898, and of this the United States purchased 509 tons, 
the greater part of the rest being shipped to Great 
Britain. Sheep are raised for mutton and wool, but 
are not numerous, and goats for meat and their skins. 
Llamas and alpacas are bred for beasts of burthen and 



548 PERU 

for the wool they give, the total of this wool shipped in 
1898 being 3488 tons. A considerable quantity of this 
material is required in the woollen factories at Lima 
and Arequipa, and a certain amount is consumed by 
the Indians in the manufacture of handmade fabrics 
for use by themselves. Alpaca wool is valuable ; but as 
the animals are only clipped once in every two years, the 
yield is not sufficiently remunerative to induce any great 
addition in the number bred. Besides, climatic condi- 
tions in Peru offer only limited inducements for pastoral 
industry, and little development in this direction can be 
anticipated in the future. 

It is in minerals that the great natural wealth lies. 
At present the immense deposits of copper have been 
worked to a most limited extent, silver mines have been 
developed only when exceptionally rich ores have been 
found, and the search for gold has seldom been systema- 
tically attempted. Difficulty of transport and disturbed 
internal conditions have been two prominent factors 
against mining enterprise, and are largely responsible for 
the small output to-day, the total value exported hitherto 
not exceeding 6,000,000 gold dollars annually of recent 
years. It is only since 1898 that the copper deposits 
have received careful attention in view of a possibility 
of opening them up to commerce. The Cerro de Pasco 
district has long been worked for silver, and although 
copper was known to exist in that neighbourhood, it was 
considered worthless in view of the heavy cost of trans- 
port to the seaboard ; but a rise in the value of this 
metal placed matters on a different footing, and investi- 
gation into the character of the deposits near Cerro de 
Pasco revealed the fact that the ore was extremely rich 
and could be obtained in immense quantities. All 
expert mining engineers who have visited the district 
since 1898 are agreed as to the great possibilities of the 
industry, and in spite of the many difficulties of com- 
munication with the coast, much development has taken 
place, copper worth 1,500,000 gold dollars having been 
shipped abroad in 1899. In 1900 the exportation 



1903] MINERAL RESOURCES 549 

remained stationary, but in 1901 much greater activity 
was noted. The project of a railway to connect Cerro 
de Pasco with the Central Railway of Peru is now in 
course of realisation, and once this is finished the pro- 
duction of copper ores in Cerro de Pasco will expand to 
5000 tons per month instead of 1000 tons as at present, 
if credence be given to the opinion of experts who have 
examined the districts. According to apparently trust- 
worthy reports on these deposits, the supply of ore, 
averaging from 30 to 40 per cent, of copper, can be 
calculated in millions of tons, and in the vicinity is coal 
for smelting purposes. Transport to the seaboard and 
capital for development are the two things required to 
place the industry on a sound commercial basis, and 
both these requisites will be forthcoming through the 
aid of American energy, which has now taken the matter 
in hand. 

The district of Cerro de Pasco promises also to add 
largely to the silver production of Peru. Its great silver 
mines have been flooded for a long period, but a company 
has been formed to drain them by a tunnel, at an 
estimated cost of 600,000 gold dollars. At present the 
value of silver exported from Peru is 3,500,000 gold 
dollars annually ; but with the draining of the flooded 
district this should be doubled, and possibly more than 
doubled. Naturally, the low prices for silver during the 
past few years have affected this branch of mining, but 
in spite of that many mines have been steadily worked 
over a wide area. 

While gold is known to exist in considerable quan- 
tities in Peru, there has not been as yet any great 
development in this branch of mining, and as a rule 
the discoveries of payable gold have been made in 
localities difficult of access, and where the climate has 
been a deterrent. In the districts of Carabaya and 
Sandia valuable mines have been worked during the 
last few years, and fair quantities of gold recovered from 
both quartz reefs and alluvial washings, and all informa- 
tion tends to indicate that these sections of the country 



550 PERU 

are comparatively rich ; but until better protection for 
life and property is accorded, and communication with 
the littoral made easier, there is no great prospect of 
rapid development. Probably the best known of the 
Peruvian gold mines is Santo Domingo, in Carabaya, 
which has been worked by a North American syndicate. 

Petroleum is found in large quantities in the north, 
and more especially in the department of Piura, and 
£400,000 has been invested in undertakings to work 
the oil fields, the bulk of it British. The principal 
concern is the London Pacific Company, established at 
Talara, near Payta, where several wells have been sunk 
to a depth of 900 feet, and the crude oil is run through 
pipes for 6J miles to the refining works at Talara. 
Kerosene is made for local use in Peru, and crude oil 
is shipped to supply fuel to various factories and railways, 
but no export trade in this product has been created. 
Coal is found at Cerro de Pasco, Trujillo, and Hualgayoc, 
and the deposits are stated to be extensive, but lack of 
transport has prevented it from reaching the seacoast 
for general use. Several railways are projected to tap 
the coal districts, and it is probable that one or other 
of these schemes may take practical form in the near 
future. 

The discovery of an extensive borax deposit in a 
locality forty-five miles to the south-east of Arequipa 
led to an industrial development of considerable import- 
ance. The property was purchased by a British syndicate, 
and a company known as "Borax Consolidated" com- 
menced active operations. In 1897 the amount exported 
was 11,850 tons ; in 1898 the total shipped fell to 7177 
tons ; but the work is continued energetically, and has 
brought prosperity to the neighbourhood. The supply 
comes from a lake covering an area of 51,000,000 
metres, and the thickness of the deposit is stated to 
be from 8 to 10 inches. 

In one respect the Government could aid materially 
in the development of mining enterprise of all descrip- 
tions. The mining laws in force are defective in many 






1903] DEFECTIVE MINING LAWS 551 

directions, but especially because they permit unjust 
claims against companies or individuals who have pur- 
chased properties in good faith and invested money in 
development work. In many such cases the claims 
put forward are of a blackmailing order, yet no redress 
can be obtained in the Peruvian courts because of the 
expense and worry the proceedings entail, and the know- 
ledge that these practices are frequent deters capitalists 
from investing in Peruvian mining ventures. 

In the forest regions on the Atlantic slope of the 
Andine ranges Peru has a source of wealth not yet 
touched, although the districts watered by the tributaries 
of the river Amazon contain vast numbers of rubber- 
yielding trees. Occasionally, however, expeditions are 
despatched by private enterprise to collect the gum, 
and in the vicinity of Iquitos, a point on the upper 
waters of the Amazon to which ocean-going steamers 
regularly ply, the gathering of rubber has become an 
established industry. In 1898 a route was opened from 
the terminus of the Oroya railway to Iquitos to facilitate 
communication with Lima, and this highway runs from 
the end of the line to Puerto Bermudez on the Pichis 
river, thence a service of steam launches under Govern- 
ment supervision is established to connect with Iquitos. 
Twenty days is required to make the journey from Lima 
to Iquitos under existing conditions, while previous to 
the opening of this route Iquitos was inaccessible for 
all practical purposes from the seaboard of the Pacific. 
It is difficult to estimate the amount of rubber annually 
exported from Peruvian territory, for a percentage of 
the total yield is forwarded through Brazilian ports and 
is classified as coming from that country. In 1898 the 
official returns showed that 1525 tons had been shipped, 
and it is safe to calculate that the quantity actually 
collected in Peru and sent abroad does not fall short 
of 2000 tons annually at the present time. In the 
future, when communication to the rubber districts 
becomes less difficult, the annual exportation should sub- 
stantially increase. Other products of the Peruvian 



552 PERU 

forests are Peruvian bark, dye woods, and many valuable 
classes of timber, but the lack of transport renders the 
timber useless, although with altered conditions it will 
be an item of no little importance in the national 
resources. 

Manufacturing industry is confined to six cotton 
mills ; two factories for the production of woollen fabrics, 
one at Lima and the other at Arequipa ; a match factory 
at Callao, in which United States capital is invested ; 
concerns for making soap and candles ; a brewery and 
ice manufactory at Lima ; the local trade in bootmaking 
and other leather work ; and the manufacture of straw 
hats near Payta and Piura. The hats are made from a 
fine straw imported from Ecuador, and are known 
abroad under the name of Panama ; the finer kinds 
so delicate in workmanship that they can only be made 
at night, because the heat during the daytime renders 
the straw too brittle for weaving. In 1898 the value 
of the shipments was 53,000 gold dollars. At many 
places in Peru abundant water supply is available for 
motive power, and coal will be easy to obtain when 
transport to the districts in which the deposits lie is 
established, so that there is no reason why manufactures 
should not expand. 

But development is everywhere checked by deficient 
means of communication and transport. At the begin- 
ning of 1901 the total length of railways open was 
917 miles, and of these, 816 miles belonged to the 
Peruvian Corporation, 47 miles were worked by the 
National Government, and 21 miles were in the hands 
of private companies ; but the majority of these lines are 
quite isolated from each other, and lateral branches are 
everywhere needed to tap areas of territory rich in 
mineral and agricultural resources. The Cerro de 
Pasco district is a case in point, where great wealth lies 
unutilised on account of difficulty of access, and the 
non-production of coal in Peru is another example of 
this lack of equipment. At present the conveyance of 
all merchandise to and from the interior is largely 



1903] INADEQUATE MEANS OF TRANSPORT 553 

dependent on the use of mules, donkeys, or llamas, a 
method at once costly and tedious. Roads for wheeled 
traffic are found only in a few isolated instances near 
populous centres close to the coast-line, and where 
these have been constructed they are seldom properly 
maintained. 

While the attention of the Government has been 
repeatedly called to these shortcomings, little practical 
effort is made towards improvement. Occasionally 
money is voted for road-making, as was done in the 
case of the opening up of communication to the Iquitos 
district ; but one such experiment exhausts all available 
funds, and years elapse before anything more is 
attempted. Possibly the resources of the National 
Exchequer may be too limited to permit substantial 
expenditure on means of transport ; but the difficulty 
might be overcome by granting concessions to private 
individuals for the construction of roads and railways, 
and the establishment of more adequate wharf accom- 
modation at the various ports. In time, doubtless, 
better means of communication will be created ; but 
until then, the expansion of industrial enterprise must 
be slow. 



CHAPTER XXX 

BOLIVIA 

Political Conditions before War with Chile. Conservatives and 
Liberals. Peruvian Intrigues. President Daza. Situation of 
Bolivia when Hostilities Ceased. President Carapero. Reform of 
the Constitution. Negotiations with Chile. Presidency of 
Senor Pacheco. President Arce. Argentine and Chilian 
Pretensions. Treaty with Argentina. Indian Outbreak. 
President Baptista. Attitude of Chile. Seiior Severo Alonzo 
succeeds Baptista. Sedition fomented by Liberals. Outbreak 
of Insurrection. Abdication of Alonzo. Provisional Government 
under Pando. Casualties during the Revolution. Election 
of Pando. Question with Chile. The Konig Note. The 
Acre Dispute. The National Capital. Means of Com- 
munication and Seditious Outbreaks. Internal Politics. 
The White Population. The Political Significance of the 
Indians. Stories of Indian Ferocity. Geographical Posi- 
tion. Disturbed Internal Conditions and Economic Pro- 
gress. Area and Population. Classification of Inhabitants. 
Bolivian Cities. Topographical Features. The Four Zones. 
Bolivian Languages. Local Colour. Native Customs. Educa- 
tion. Primary Instruction. Secondary and Higher Education. 
Administration of Justice. National Character. Communication 
with Bolivia. Lack of Internal Transport Facilities. Industrial 
Enterprise. Agriculture. The Mining Industry. Silver Pro- 
duction. Indiarubber. Pastoral Industry. The Financial 
Situation. Commercial Conditions. 

The political condition of Bolivia, after its independ- 
ence from Spain and until comparatively modern times, 
is aptly illustrated by an anecdote told of the treatment 
of a Consul for Holland by a certain President. The 
Consul, who had suffered serious injury through illegal 
action of the Executive, personally demanded protection 



1879] POLITICAL SITUATION 555 

from the President, and the latter stated he was aware 
of the circumstances but could not interfere. "But," 
said the Consul, " I represent the Paises Bajos " (Low 
Countries). "Well," replied the President, "I control 
the Paises Altos (High Countries), and if you make 
trouble, I will put you in prison and keep you there." 

Previous to the outbreak of war with Chile in 1879, 
political development in Bolivia was practically confined 
to the centralisation of the Administration in the hands 
of a limited group of whites. This oligarchy contained 
two factions, classified under the designation of Con- 
servatives and Liberals ; but there was little difference in 
their political principles, and no very marked variety 
distinguished their policy when in office. The terms 
Conservative or Liberal merely served as a political war- 
cry for ambitious politicians anxious to control public 
affairs, and for this reason they have survived through 
the many political vicissitudes of the past quarter of 
a century. 

In the decade between 1869 and 1879, Peruvian 
intrigues were active in Bolivia, and exercised marked 
influence on the policy of the Government, more especi- 
ally in connection with the attitude assumed towards 
Chilian citizens and Chilian enterprise near Antofagasta 
and other districts of Atacama. The result of this 
intriguing was an offensive and defensive alliance in 
1873, which subsequently led to disastrous results to both 
countries. As details of this treaty and its consequences 
are described in the account of the war of 1879, it is 
only necessary to make this slight reference to them 
here. When the conflict with Chile broke out in 1879, 
President Hilarion Daza was head of the Executive in 
Bolivia, and it was due to his short-sighted policy and to 
the fact that he lent a ready ear to the insinuating 
suggestions of the Peruvian representatives, that Bolivia 
drifted into a struggle from which no satisfactory result 
was looked for by those who had any knowledge of the 
facts. The incapacity of Daza was only too fully 
demonstrated as warlike operations developed and mis- 



556 BOLIVIA 

fortunes rapidly accumulated, for when the crisis came he 
lacked energy to organise resistance to the Chilians, and 
made no effort through diplomatic channels to mitigate 
the disaster into which he had plunged his country. 

Bolivia was in sorry plight when hostilities ceased. 
The maritime provinces on the Pacific Ocean were 
occupied by the Chilians ; the Peruvian territory of 
Tacna and Arica, through which the larger proportion 
of the foreign commerce of Bolivia passed, was in their 
hands ; and the control of the valuable deposits of 
nitrate of soda in Atacama was lost. The country had 
become landlocked as a result of the war, and was in 
so friendless a situation that no effective resistance was 
possible to any terms the victors might propose. 
Thorough disorganisation in domestic affairs was the 
natural consequence of these misfortunes, and confusion 
was at its height in foreign relations also when, in 
December, 1879, Daza was deposed, and a temporary 
Administration formed for the remainder of his term of 
office. 

The next occupant of the Presidency was General 
Narcisco Campero, who, like his predecessor, was a 
soldier, but who entertained intelligent ideas as to the 
immediate necessity of establishing peace with Chile 
and reducing internal disorders. He introduced the 
Law of Constitution of October 28, 1880, under which 
Bolivia is at present administered. By its provisions 
the executive power is vested in a President, elected 
for a term of four years by direct popular vote, and 
not eligible for re-election when that term expires, with 
the legislative authority in the hands of a Congress 
of two Chambers — the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The suffrage is granted to all adult male 
Bolivians qualified by a knowledge of reading and writ- 
ing. The Senators, 18 in number, are chosen for a 
term of six years ; the Deputies, of whom there are 64, 
are elected for four years. Senators and Deputies 
receive a salary of 200 pesos per month, and an allowance 
to cover travelling expenses — the latter no small item 



1880] LAW OF CONSTITUTION 557 

in consequence of the long journeys necessary in a 
country where roads are few and railways almost 
unknown. The Law of Constitution provides for two 
Vice-Presidents and a Ministry with five portfolios, viz., 
Foreign Relations and Worship, Finance and Industry, 
Government and Colonisation, Justice and Public 
Instruction, and War. In each department the supreme 
political, administrative, and military authority is vested 
in a prefect nominated by the President. 

In the direction of restoring internal order and 
peaceable relations with Chile, President Campero 
accomplished results which, if not all that could be 
desired, were a distinct relief to the community. 
Administrative functions resumed a normal course after 
a period of confusion following the collapse of the 
Bolivians in their struggle with Chile, and in 1882 
negotiations were opened with Chile, with the result 
that in 1884 the Pacto de Tregua (Agreement of Truce) 
was signed. Five months afterwards the presidential 
period expired, and Campero resigned office to his 
successor, Senor Pacheco. 

President Pacheco's Administration lasted from 
August, 1884, to August, 1888, but was not remarkable 
for occurrences exercising permanent influence on the 
national history. Internal affairs drifted along without 
any substantial effort to improve them. The modus 
vivendi established by President Campero with Chile 
continued in force, and no attempt was made to bring 
about a modification of the agreement, or to celebrate 
a permanent treaty of peace in place of the temporary 
truce patched up in 1884. At the expiration of his 
term Pacheco was succeeded by Senor Arce, the official 
candidate for the Presidency, and who had been declared 
elected. 

President Arce had not been long in office before he 
turned his attention to the Chilian question. The 
Bolivian Government was in no position to negotiate 
directly with Chile for a mitigation of the conditions 
imposed in 1884, and Arce determined to appeal to 



558 BOLIVIA 

Argentine sympathy to strengthen the case of Bolivia 
in her anxiety to regain a seaport on the Pacific, and 
a section of territory which would allow the passage of 
Bolivian commerce to the seaboard under the Bolivian 
flag. The President in approaching the Argentine 
Government was influenced by the fact that the jealous 
feeling existing between Argentina and Chile would 
ensure a hearing for any proposals put forward by 
Bolivia, and he was not far wide of the mark. Sefior 
Baptista was nominated Minister to Argentina, and the 
Argentine authorities were carefully sounded about 
supporting Bolivian pretensions for regaining some 
portion of the lost territory. 

The idea of any direct alliance between Bolivia and 
Argentina found small favour in the latter country if 
such action was for the sole purpose of assisting the 
Bolivians, and a further proposal was then made that 
Bolivia should join the Argentine Confederation. While 
this project held out many possibilities to the Argentines, 
it was not acceptable to the Bolivians, and after con- 
siderable discussion the matter was dropped. A treaty 
was concluded finally in 1891 by Senor Baptista with 
Argentina, by which the latter country agreed to support 
the Bolivian cause, but only on the understanding that 
the question of the absorption of Bolivia by Argentina 
should be brought forward again when an opportunity 
occurred. Subsequent events in the Administration of 
Senor Baptista, after he succeeded Arce in the Presi- 
dency, made this compact a dead letter. 

Apart from this endeavour to enlist Argentine 
sympathy in favour of Bolivia, little of interest occurred 
during the Arce Administration. An outbreak of the 
Indian population took place in consequence of certain 
arbitrary acts committed by the Government in con- 
nection with land to which the Indians laid claim, and 
had been accustomed to farm for generations. The 
rising was not a serious danger to the Government, and 
was suppressed without extraordinary effort, although 
not without a considerable sacrifice of life amongst the 



1891] NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA 559 

national forces and the deaths of a large number of 
Indians in the skirmishes that occurred before peace 
was restored. 

In August of 1892 President Arce vacated the 
Presidency in favour of Senor Baptista, for whose 
election official influence had been unsparingly used. 
The new President thoroughly approved the policy of 
the former Administration in regard to Argentina as a 
set off against Chile, and endeavoured to consummate 
the task initiated by his predecessor, but events occurred 
that put an end to the attempt. 

In 1893 the Chilian authorities became aware of the 
negotiations between Bolivia and Argentina, and immedi- 
ately took steps to annul the friendly understanding the 
two neighbours had established, with such effect that a 
protocol was signed by which Chile promised to concede 
to Bolivia a port on the Pacific and made many other 
concessions that the Bolivians deemed of paramount 
importance to their welfare. Whether these conces- 
sions were made in good faith or not is impossible to 
say, but they were never carried out in the spirit put 
forward from 1893 to 1895, when they formed the 
subject of negotiation between President Baptista and 
the Chilian Government. The practical result was to 
tie the hands of Baptista in dealing with Argentina 
and to give time for Chile to decide, without undue 
haste, upon the most advantageous attitude to adopt 
towards the critical nature of the developments. While 
all remained unsettled the term of President Baptista 
expired, and in August, 1896, he was succeeded by 
Senor Severo Fernandez Alonzo, who had occupied 
the post of Minister of War under the Baptista Ad- 
ministration and was the official candidate for presi- 
dential honours. 

President Alonzo had not been many months in 
office before discontent was fomented by his political 
adversaries. The so-called Liberal Party had long 
been kept out of power, and now, under the leadership 
of Colonel Pando, determined to make a strong effort 



560 BOLIVIA 

to obtain control of public affairs. The nominal issues 
on which the movement was based were an agitation 
for a decentralising reform of the Law of Constitution, 
by which the Departments would become self-governing 
Provinces, and to make the city of La Paz the National 
Capital. Alonzo was aware of the inclination of 
Colonel Pando to head the revolutionary outbreak ; but 
he hoped to draw him to his side by making various 
personal concessions to him, one being the grant of a 
large tract of land in the rubber districts, which for a 
few months so occupied Pando's attention that he 
temporarily left political matters alone. On his return 
from these lands the question of revolution was again 
discussed, and in 1898 armed insurrection broke out 
against the Administration. 

At first the insurgents made little progress. Ammu- 
nition and arms were difficult to obtain, and the uprising 
was practically confined to guerilla warfare in the out- 
lying districts. Towards the close of the year, however, 
Colonel Pando succeeding in collecting a supply of war 
material, and with the aid of these fresh consignments 
of rifles and cartridges he raised strong contingents 
from the Indian population to swell the rebel ranks. 
Matters now began to look serious for President Alonzo, 
and his cause was sensibly weakened in the early part 
of 1899 by the desertion of many military officers to the 
insurrection. The revolution was further strengthened 
in April, 1899, by a series of successful skirmishes, the 
prestige of which brought many recruits, so that 
gradually the position of Alonzo became untenable. 
District after district fell into the hands of his enemies, 
and, finally, in July he decided to abandon the Presi- 
dency — a resolution carried into effect when he with 
his immediate supporters left the country by way of the 
railway from Oruro to Antofagasta to take refuge in 
Chile. 

Immediately after a Provisional Government was 
formed under Colonel Pando, and measures were taken 
to hold a presidential election. The Chambers were also 



1899] ELECTION OF PRESIDENT PANDO 561 

convened and other normal conditions re-established. 
It is interesting to note that with the success of the 
insurrection against the Alonzo Administration, the 
question of any reform of the Law of Constitution for 
the extension of self-government to the Departments 
was dropped, as well as the agitation for making La 
Paz the National Capital. The two objects for which 
the revolution had been ostensibly supported were 
entirely lost sight of, and the fact at once became 
obvious that the movement had been initiated only to 
oust President Alonzo and his followers, and to permit 
the Liberals under Colonel Pando to obtain control of 
the country. 

Although the insurrection had continued for eighteen 
months and reports of battles and heavy losses of life 
on both sides had been freely circulated abroad, the 
actual number of casualties throughout the period of 
disturbance was extremely limited. In place of the 
thousands of men supposed to have been killed and 
wounded during the operations, the official reports 
published after the restoration of peace showed that 
only 157 deaths had occurred, and that the number of 
wounded was not large. Some difficulty was experi- 
enced in disarming the Indians, who had formed a 
strong section of the insurgent forces, but it was 
accomplished in the end without serious trouble. 

In due course the presidential election was held and 
Colonel Pando formally declared Chief Magistrate, for 
no opposition was offered, his defeat of President Alonzo 
having given him such prestige that he carried all 
before him when the question came before the con- 
stituencies. The term of Colonel Pando expired in 
1904. He had been confronted with some intricate 
problems, but he held common- sense views on domestic 
and international affairs, and proved of service to Bolivia 
when the complicated dispute with Chile required much 
tact, and also w T hen occurrences in connection with the 
district of Acre threatened to strain relations with 
Brazil. 

2n 



562 BOLIVIA 

The crux of the dispute with Chile is the keen 
desire of Bolivia to recover a seaport on the Pacific. 
In 1895 the Chilian Government promised to concede 
an outlet to the coast-line as the consideration for a 
definite treaty of peace by which Chilian ownership 
of the territory occupied since the war of 1879 should 
be formally recognised. Certain developments occurred 
which prevented Chile making this concession, and at 
the close of 1900 a note was presented to the Bolivian 
Government by Senor Konig, the Chilian minister, 
suggesting other means of settling the differences 
between the two countries without the seaport. This 
new proposal is not palatable to the Bolivians, but it is 
difficult to see how they can obtain better terms. They 
have no military force to resist the conditions Chile 
may impose, and active assistance from Argentina 
cannot now be expected. In regard to Acre the danger 
lay in the possibility of a conflict with Brazil through 
the majority of the inhabitants being Brazilians ; but, 
with the exception of an insignificant portion, the 
territory was recognised as belonging to Bolivia by 
boundary treaties between the two countries. The 
inhabitants, however, objected to the establishment of 
Bolivian authority, and this feeling led to the proclama- 
tion of Acre as an independent State, a step followed in 
1900 by the despatch of troops under General Velesco to 
overthrow the new Republic and install Bolivian officials. 
Early in 1901 Velesco reported that his mission had 
been successful, and the dispute has since been settled 
amicably by mutual concessions embodied in a treaty 
defining the boundary, signed in November, 1903. 

The existing arrangement as to the National Capital 
is inconvenient for the inhabitants, and unsatisfactory 
from a political point of view. The official seat of 
Government alternates between La Paz, Sucre, Oruro, 
and Cochabamba, and the Congress is convoked some- 
times at one and sometimes at another of these places, 
with the result that Government offices have to be moved 
and archives transferred at great expense and risk. 




[Face page 564. 



1904] THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 563 

Only a few years ago a baggage train conveying most 
important documents and official records was crossing a 
swollen ford when the animals were swept away, and a 
large amount of most valuable Government property 
was irretrievably lost. Sucre is generally regarded as 
the political headquarters of the Government, but the 
Constitution obliges Congress to hold sessions at all 
these places, and official work is consequently dis- 
organised and retarded. While Sucre is central and 
has a suitable climate, it is so isolated that the journey 
occupies a week by horse or mule from the nearest 
railway. La Paz is the commercial capital and is fairly 
easy of access, and from time to time agitations arise 
calling for it to be made the permanent centre of 
Government. Individual interests have hitherto pre- 
vented this change, although it would be for the general 
benefit of the community. 

It is the difficulty of communication throughout 
Bolivia that makes its political organisation so insecure 
whenever discontent is fomented against the Adminis- 
tration. A district up in arms against the Government 
can be assured of ample time to organise rebellion 
before the authorities are able to send troops into it. 
Permanent political quiet cannot be anticipated until 
the problem of transport between the principal centres 
of population is solved. 

In the political situation of Bolivia there are two 
principal factors with which the Government has to 
reckon in the question of the preservation of peace. 
The first is the comparatively scanty white element of 
the population, with whom, however, a revolutionary 
outbreak is the invariable product of discontent, and it 
is the office-seeking proclivity of this section of the 
inhabitants that most frequently leads to disturbances. 
Moreover, when one or other of the political parties 
obtains control, it is seldom that anything short of 
actual force can again bring the Opposition into power. 
Practically, all elections for the Presidency and National 
Congress are a farce, and official influence is so unstint- 



564 BOLIVIA 

ingly exercised to ensure the return of the Government 
candidate that no peaceable political combination is 
allowed sufficient latitude to attempt to secure a 
majority at the polls. Hence the governing element 
has become an oligarchy, sometimes represented by 
so-called Conservatives, as was the case before the 
uprising of 1898, and at others by an equally restricted 
circle of Liberals, as at present. 

The second prominent force in the political life of 
the Republic is the Indian and half-caste, or cholo, 
population. So far as active participation in public 
affairs is concerned, the Indians and cholos show no 
desire to exercise the privileges they are entitled to 
under the Constitution ; but when any question affecting 
lands or other property arises care is necessary to 
avoid serious disturbances. The low standard of 
intelligence amongst this portion of the inhabitants 
does not permit them to discriminate in regard to the 
justice of measures dealing with landed property. In 
their eyes long residence on any section of national 
territory constitutes a claim to ownership with which 
the Government has no manner of right to interfere, 
and their great numerical superiority makes it no light 
matter for the authorities to disregard this feeling. 
It often serves to restrict the development of mineral 
and agricultural resources that the Government may 
desire to foster. 

Apart from this question of land occupancy the 
Bolivian Indians are docile when treated with ordinary 
justice, the many stories circulated illustrative of their 
tendency to serious crimes being much exaggerated. 
For example, in 1899, a Swede, his wife of Bolivian 
nationality, and a companion, also a Swede, took a 
journey to the seaboard when the last revolution was in 
progress. On arriving at a frontier village the party 
were told by the authorities that they could not proceed 
without the necessary written permission to leave the 
country. Having none such they were detained 
pending enquiries. A hut was allotted to them in the 



1904] INDIAN ATROCITIES 565 

village, and the Indian population crowded round to 
satisfy their curiosity about the newcomers. At this 
the travellers became alarmed, took it into their heads 
that the Indians intended to murder them after torture, 
and opened fire with their rifles on the villagers. 
When their ammunition was nearly exhausted, the first 
Swede shot his wife, and then the two men committed 
suicide. This incident was characterised far and near 
as a brutal murder by the Indians, whereas the facts of 
the case did not justify any such assertion. At present, 
the Indian inhabitants are controlled by caciques, or 
native chiefs, and it is through these that the Govern- 
ment is forced to work when measures affecting this 
part of the population are enacted. The Indian 
standard of intelligence must be raised to a higher level 
before any other system of administration is possible. 

The geographical position of Bolivia in South 
America and its resources are not dissimilar to the 
characteristic features of the Transvaal. Access to the 
seaboard, however, has been secured to the Transvaal 
by various lines of railway, whereas only in the western 
section of Bolivan territory has any attempt been made 
to provide facilities of transport. Like the Transvaal, 
the chief source of wealth lies in the mineral deposits, 
but difficulty of communication has prevented any ade- 
quate development of the mining industry. 

As already detailed, many causes have arisen in 
Bolivia in the last quarter of a century to check pro- 
gress and accentuate its isolation, and only now are 
indications becoming visible that some practical attempt 
will be made to break down the barriers which caused 
the country to be regarded as a terra incognita to 
Europeans and North Americans, in spite of the records 
of fabulous riches extracted by the Spaniards between 
1600 and 1800. 

While Bolivia claims 840,000 square miles of terri- 
tory, the actual area under her jurisdiction is con- 
siderably less, the Department of Antofagasta containing 
29,910 square miles which must be considered as 



566 



BOLIVIA 



Chilian, because Chile sticks to it. Futhermore, the 
ownership of one section of territory is claimed by 
both Bolivia and Brazil, the whole of it being included 
in the official estimates of the extent of Bolivia. The 
eight Departments of which the area is approximately 
known are : — 



Departments. 


Area, 
square miles. 


Population. 


1. La Paz de Ayacucho 

2. Potosi 

3. Oruro 

4. Chuquisaca (Sucre) . 

5. Cochabamba 

6. Beni 

7. Santa Cruz de la Sierra 

8. Tarija 






171,130 
52,100 
21,350 
39,890 
21,430 
100,580 
126,340 
34,610 


593,779 
360,400 
189,840 
286,710 
360,220 

26,750 
112,200 

89,650 


Total 






567,430 


2,019,549 



This estimate of a population of 2,019,549 was made 
in 1893, and shows an average density of 3*5 persons to 
the square mile, and it includes all classes of whites, 
half-breeds, civilised and wild Indians. Approximately, 
there are 250,000 persons of white blood ; 500,000 half- 
breeds ; 1,000,000 domesticated Indians, and 250,000 
uncivilised Indians. 

La Paz, with a population of 62,320, is the chief 
city, and the recognised commercial centre. It lies at 
the foot of the beautiful mountain of Yllamani, in the 
basin forming the head of the Yungas Valley at an eleva- 
tion of 11,000 feet above sea level, within reach of 
perpetual snow on the one side and semi-tropical 
valleys on the other. So marked a feature is this 
proximity to extremes of hot and cold that the saying 
is common in La Paz that two messengers despatched 
in the early morning can return in time for the midday 
meal, the one bearing ice for the household and the 



1904] PRINCIPAL CITIES 567 

other pineapples and such tropical fruits. Sucre, the 
present political capital, has a population of 27,345, and 
is situated at an elevation of 7000 feet above sea level, 
in the midst of an agricultural district. Other important 
towns are, Oruro, with 15,900 residents ; Cochabamba, 
with 20,530; Santa Cruz, with 12,100; and Tarija, with 
11,942. 

For topographical description, Bolivia may be 
divided into four zones. The first contains the higher 
peaks and mountain ranges above the line of perpetual 
snow. Next comes the great plateau, lying at an 
altitude between 10,000 and 14,000 feet above sea level, 
and there the principal mineral deposits are known. 
In these regions the mean temperature seldom exceeds 
43° P. At the northern end of this plateau, at an 
altitude of 13,000 feet, is the great inland sea of 
Titicaca, replenished by melting snows from the 
Andes. Within sight of Titicaca is the snow-capped 
peak of Sorata and the magnificent pyramid -shaped 
mountain of Yllimani — two of the most remarkable 
features of the Cordillera of the Andes. The third 
zone comprises the semi-tropical valleys, at elevations of 
from 4000 to 8000 feet, for the most part containing soil 
and climate adapted for all sub-tropical agricultural 
enterprise. The fourth section embraces the low-lying 
lands sloping towards the river Paraguay, and the rivers 
Madera and Beni, and other tributaries of the Amazon. 
Here the conditions are tropical, the climate moist, and 
the country clothed with dense vegetation. In these 
localities the Indians classified as uncivilised are chiefly 
found, their means of sustenance being the products of 
the chase or fruit and roots which grow wild in the 
forests. 

While Spanish is the official language of Bolivia, it is 
by no means universal. Among the Indians, the use of 
Quichua or Aymara, and in some districts Guarani, is 
more common than Castilian. The half-breeds are 
inclined to adopt the language of their surroundings 
rather than that of a higher civilisation, and they more 



568 BOLIVIA 

often grow to maturity accustomed to speak Aymara or 
Quichua than Spanish. One of the most curious 
linguistic traits in Bolivia is that frequently in a 
district where Quichua is the common means of com- 
munication, an isolated settlement is found where 
Aymara is commonly used. The explanation is that 
the practice of the Inca dynasty was to transport bodily 
a whole community inclined to disaffection, the tribe 
participating in seditious practices being removed to 
some distant spot and refused permission to communi- 
cate with people of its own clan. Thus the exiles 
preserved their language and customs, and their 
descendants to-day, after five centuries, retain the 
habits of their forebears. 

Bolivia is rich in local colour. The troops of llamas 
patiently journeying from sunrise to sunset, with their 
loads of 100 lbs. weight strapped upon their backs, 
are constantly in the path of the traveller, and following 
these beasts of burthen are the Indian drivers, trudging 
along through the heat of the day barefooted, and dressed 
only in cotton trousers and shirt, with a rough home- 
spun poncho over their shoulders and a broad-brimmed 
hat of coarse straw on their heads. Each carries his 
pouch of coca leaves and box of lime, and with no more 
sustenance than is obtained by chewing these two 
ingredients, they cover long stretches of country without 
feeling the pangs of hunger. The custom of the 
Bolivian Indians is to spin yarn for their domestic use 
as they tramp monotonously after the llamas, carrying a 
wooden spindle for the purpose, and it is in this manner 
that much of the wool from the alpacas and vicunas 
passes through the first stage of manufacture for the 
clothing used by the peasant classes. In the cities the 
Indian characteristics of these people are markedly 
apparent, and in the market-places the vendors spread 
their wares on the ground and squat beside their scanty 
stores of local produce, to await the coming of a pur- 
chaser. The women, with bright-coloured handkerchief 
on head and neck, make typical examples of Inca 



1904] NATIVE TRAITS 569 

civilisation, and their ceaseless chatter in the drawling 
Aymara heightens the effect, and leaves an impression 
that modern methods and European ways have made 
small alteration in the prevailing customs of centuries 
ago. 

The authorities have paid little attention to the 
subject of the education of the majority of the popula- 
tion, although nominally primary instruction is gratuitous 
and obligatory ; but the latter clause is a dead letter for 
all practical purposes, and no efforts are made to enforce 
the attendance of children at the schools. Public 
elementary education is in charge of the various muni- 
cipalities, and in 1897 there were 366 primary schools, 
on which an aggregate sum of 139,566 bolivianos (silver 
dollars) was expended, while, in addition, there were 
121 private establishments for elementary instruction, 
and 82 industrial schools ; at which in all there were 
36,690 pupils enrolled, or less than 2 per cent, of the 
total population. Difficulties of language are one reason 
why the attendance is sparse, the instruction being in 
Spanish while the common idioms are Quichua, Aymara, 
or Guarani ; but it is more to the apathy of the people 
in all matters concerning the education of their children 
that the slow progress of primary instruction is due. 
The majority of the domesticated Indians have no 
ambition to acquire a knowledge of reading and writing, 
and until this attitude is greatly mitigated it is unlikely 
that education in Bolivia will show substantial advance- 
ment. 

Secondary instruction is provided for by eight 
colleges, five establishments under the direct autho- 
rity of the Roman Catholic Church, and four lyceums, 
the number cf teachers employed being 91, and of 
students under instruction 2057. For higher educa- 
tion there are six universities with 506 students in 
1895, and at four of these medical science is taught. 
Seminaries exist for the education of aspirants to the 
priesthood, and were attended in 1897 by 146 students. 
There is a military college with 60 pupils under a staff 



570 BOLIVIA 

of nine professors, and three schools of arts and trades 
founded at the initiative of the Salesian Mission, the 
members of this Order imparting a knowledge of the 
ordinary mechanical crafts. Bolivia is a field offering 
wide scope for missionary work in connection with 
education, and it is from this direction rather than 
through action by the Government that improvement 
may be expected in the immediate future. 

Justice in Bolivia is administered by a Supreme 
Court, eight District Courts, and a number of local minor 
courts presided over by magistrates empowered to deal 
with petty crimes. The judiciary is corrupt and legal 
process is dilatory and costly, and in the civil courts 
blackmailing practices, especially in connection with 
mining claims, are so notorious that few people refer 
disputes to the judicial power, preferring to pay or make 
some other arrangement to avoid legal proceedings, no 
matter how far in the right they may be. Bolivian law, 
as that of other South American states, is founded on 
that existing under the former Spanish regime, is codified 
in all branches, and not ill-adapted to serve the ends of 
justice if intelligently and impartially administered. 

In any attempt to analyse Bolivian national char- 
acter, it must be remembered that the whites have 
retained to a great extent the methods of thought and 
habits of life of their Spanish forefathers, and the fact 
that they have been brought in contact with little else 
has resulted in the maintenance of Spanish customs to 
even a more marked degree than in Argentina, Chile, or 
Peru. Bolivia's isolation has tended to restrict the 
mental perspective of the whites to narrow limits in both 
political and private affairs, and living for generations 
amongst Indians, who are treated as an inferior race not 
far removed from serfdom, has developed an arrogant 
bearing out of keeping with surrounding circumstances. 

It is with Indian rather than Spanish character that 
interest lies ; but the descendants of the Incas were so 
crushed by their Spanish conquerors that pride or 
national spirit has small place in their lives. They are 



1904] NATIONAL CHARACTER 571 

simple people enough, asking little more than to go 
their ways in peace, and so long as they are not under 
alcoholic influence they seldom interfere with any way- 
farer, be he Bolivian or stranger; but unfortunately 
they have developed the curse of drink to an abnormal 
extent, and in their cups they are often dangerous. 
Nominally they are Christians, and recognise the authority 
of the Roman Catholic Church in all matters pertaining 
to religion, and their superstitious tendency makes them 
show outward reverence to Church ritual ; but their 
general ignorance on all subjects beyond their limited 
domestic life renders it unlikely that they hold any 
religious convictions. It is this same ignorance that 
strengthens the influence of the clergy, and causes the 
priesthood to be regarded with superstitious awe. 
While easily led, these Indians are difficult to drive, and 
in many cases where trouble has occurred among the 
workmen in the mines, the cause has been traced to 
some stupidity interpreted by the Indians as an injustice 
in the method of superintendence rather than to any 
deliberate tendency on their part towards criminal acts. 
There are five routes by which Bolivia communicates 
with the outside world, the principal one for traffic being 
Antofagasta, the centre of the seaboard seized by Chile 
in 1879. Between this outlet and the Bolivian town of 
Oruro, a distance of 600 miles, a twenty-eight inch 
gauge railway has been built under the auspices of the 
Huanchaca Mining Company, and between these two 
points the journey is made in three days. Owing to 
the narrow gauge and the sharp curves on this line, the 
trains are only run in daylight, and then at slow speed. 
The second route is by Arica, in the occupation of the 
Chilians, thence by train to Tacna, a distance of forty- 
seven miles ; from Tacna a journey of six days on mule- 
back over mountain ranges, ascending to 15,000 feet, 
brings the traveller to La Paz. A third route is via the 
Peruvian port of Mollendo by railway to Arequipa and 
Puno, thence by steamer across Lake Titicaca to Bolivian 
territory, and from the shores of the lake to La Paz, 



572 BOLIVIA 

distant thirty-five miles. On the north, Bolivia is acces- 
sible by the Amazon to the rivers Beni and Madera. 
On the south, a route, formerly much frequented, ran 
through Tupiza to the frontier of Argentina, thence to 
Salta or Jujuy to Tucuman, and thence to Rosario or 
Buenos Aires. This route is no longer much used now 
that the railway runs between Oruro and the port of 
Antofagasta. There is a project afoot to extend the 
Argentine railway system from Salta or Jujuy, the 
present terminal points, to the central districts of 
Bolivia, whose Government would arrange for the con- 
struction of the sections of the line within its territory, 
and the execution of this proposal will give Bolivia 
direct railway communication with the river Plate. 
This would mean an immense advance, the journey 
to Europe becoming possible in twenty-five days in 
place of six weeks as now. No great outlay is in- 
volved, the estimated cost of the line from the southern 
frontier to the town of Sucre being but £3,000,000, a 
small amount in comparison to the benefit to be con- 
ferred. 

Not only is access to Bolivia difficult and tedious, 
but when once the country is reached there is a lack of 
all modern methods of transport everywhere. Roads 
for wheeled traffic do not exist except in very few places, 
and then only for limited distances ; passengers and 
cargo are carried on muleback, ten or twelve days' travel 
in such fashion being of common occurrence. No 
wonder progress of all kinds is checked. During the 
dry season on the high plateau, of which Oruro is the 
centre, it is possible to haul cargo in carts over a large 
area of country, and industrial expansion has taken 
place to a restricted extent ; but in the wet season in 
these districts, and at all times of the year in many 
others, when agricultural or mineral products must be 
carried on mules or llamas, the heavy cost and the delay 
attendant on the conveyance of merchandise and produce 
is an insuperable bar to the development of industry 
and trade. Railways and roads are everywhere needed, 




o 



o 



[Face page 572. 



1904] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 573 

but, once established, capital and energy will be forth- 
coming to push forward commerce and production. 

Agriculture makes little progress in Bolivia, and the 
cereals produced are insufficient to meet home necessities, 
limited though the consumption of bread stuffs is. In 
the plateau lands near La Paz and Oruro, and in the 
country between these two cities, barley is grown, and 
a considerable area annually sown with potatoes ; but the 
yield of both crops is meagre, in consequence of poor 
soil and the constant frosts which occur at night during 
summer. The potatoes are partly consumed fresh, and 
partly made into what is known as chuno, by a process of 
freezing and drying. The wants of this primitive people 
are few, and with a stock of c/iufio, some coarse barley 
or maize meal, and a supply of coca leaf to keep off the 
cravings of hunger, most Indian families exist the year 
round in a condition which in their imaginations is one 
of comparative comfort, animal food being looked upon 
as a luxury and only indulged in by the poorer classes 
on holidays. 

The semi-tropical valleys produce fruit in great 
abundance, and there the banana, pineapple, yam, and 
sweet potato form the principal diet. In sections of 
the lower lands, especially those in the Yungas Valley, 
the cultivation of coffee and cacao is carried on, and 
here also are the principal plantations of coca. Both 
the coffee and cacao of Bolivia have a high reputation, 
and small shipments are regularly made to Chile and 
Argentina ; but the bulk of the produce is required to 
meet the local demands, while in regard to the coca leaf 
the small surplus finds its way abroad chiefly in the 
form of cocaine. Sugar-cane is grown in the valleys, 
and utilised for distillation into rum, only a very small 
proportion being manufactured into sugar. 

It is in the mineral wealth of Bolivia that the main 
industrial enterprise is centred. According to ancient 
records in connection with the Royal Mint at Potosi, the 
gold and silver bullion shipped to Spain between the 
date of the Spanish conquest and Bolivia's independence 



574 BOLIVIA 

reached the value of £120,000,000. But for the last 
hundred years all mining industry has been checked 
by internal disorders, and the development of the rich 
deposits known to exist that might have taken place has 
yet to occur —probably within the next decade. In 
spite, however, of many difficulties, silver mining has been 
conducted on a comparatively large scale, notably so by 
the Huanchaca Company, which exported 8,000,000 
ounces annually between 1892 and 1897. In the latter 
year the lower workings of the Pulacayo mine, from 
which this Company extracted the bulk of its ores, were 
flooded with hot water and temporarily abandoned ; but 
steps are now being taken to drain it. Other important 
silver-mining districts are Colquechaca, output 1,500,000 
ounces annually ; Oruro, the same ; Guadaloupe, 700,000 
ounces ; Potosi, 400,000 ounces ; and other districts with 
an aggregate yield of 3,000,000 ounces annually. In 
normal circumstances the total yearly output of the 
Bolivian silver mines is 15,000,000 ounces, and this 
weight could be doubled if adequate facilities of 
transport existed. 

Another valuable metal to which attention in 
Bolivia has been turned of late is tin. Hitherto the 
chief deposits worked have been those near Huanuni in 
the district to the south of Oruro, and the amount 
shipped abroad through Antofagasta 7000 tons annually, 
but the high prices ruling render probable a substantial 
increase in the near future. Copper is mined to some 
extent, 3000 tons in the form of barilla passing through 
Mollendo each year for shipment to Europe, but such 
minerals as antimony, bismuth, and borax are only 
exported on a small scale. About gold mining little is 
known beyond the fact that prospectors report rich 
alluvial and quartz deposits in different localities ; but 
they lie, as a rule, above the line of perpetual snow, or 
in such isolated spots as the Tapnani Kiver, and diffi- 
culties of communication have prevented their develop- 
ment. 

Another valuable product of which the extent is not 



1904] NATURAL RESOURCES 575 

yet known is rubber. Throughout the great forest area 
adjoining the rivers Beni and Madera rubber trees exist 
in great numbers, and expeditions are sent from time to 
time to collect the gum, the bulk of which is shipped 
down the Amazon, passing through the Brazilian port of 
Para on its way to foreign markets. It is estimated by 
the Bolivian authorities that the yearly amount gathered 
in Bolivian territory exceeds 5000 tons of a value of 
£1,200,000. Of other forest products a small quantity 
of Peruvian bark (Cinchona) is collected on the Atlantic 
slope of the Andes and exported to Europe. In the 
province of Santa Cruz, and to the south-east of the 
Republic, are lands suitable for pastoral enterprise, and 
in some of these districts herds of cattle are numerous. 

Bolivian state finance places no obstacle in the way 
of the future development of the country, the public 
debt being insignificant and taxation comparatively light. 
The monetary unit is the silver dollar, known as the 
boliviano. At present the mint at Potosi issues only 
silver coins of 50 cents, 20 cents, 10 cents and 5 cents, 
and 10 and 5 cent nickel pieces. In 1896 the national 
revenue was 3,566,777 bolivianos, and the expenditure 
4,264,681 bolivianos, the principal sources of revenue 
being the duties levied on imported merchandise and 
exported products, the sale of stamps and stamped 
paper, and the amount collected from licenses. 

Bolivia's external debt originated in the claims for 
damages done to the properties of Chilian citizens in the 
war of 1879, but the total amount outstanding in 1898 
was only 1,084,555 bolivianos. Its service is met by 40 
per cent, of the duties on merchandise for Bolivia passing 
through the Chilian custom-house at Arica, these being 
collected by Chilian authorities at that port. The 
Government had an internal debt in 1898, consisting of 
advances from banks and other borrowings amounting 
to 3,707,541 bolivianos, so the total debt of all kinds was 
only 4,000,000 bolivianos, or about £400,000. 

The commerce of Bolivia is principally in the hands 
of Chilian, German, and native merchants, the two first 



576 BOLIVIA 

having a strong hold over both wholesale and retail 
trade. Imports, consisting chiefly of hardware, liquors, 
cotton and woollen textiles, silks and ready-made 
clothing, were valued in 1897 at 24,467,100 bolivianos, 
and exports at 23,121,320 bolivianos, comprising silver, 
bullion, copper, tin, bismuth, antimony, rubber, hides 
and skins, and other articles of minor value. 

In spite of the backward economic condition of 
Bolivia and her people there are signs of substantial 
progress, at least in the direction of mineral development. 
For the last few years many districts have been care- 
fully prospected by experts ; the result is seen already 
in the beginning of fresh mining ventures. Once the 
question of transport is solved, progress is assured. A 
flourishing mining industry will bring immigrants from 
all parts of the world, whose arrival must eventually 
effect a decided change, let us hope for the better, in its 
national life. 



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CHAPTER XXXI 

ECUADOR 

Acts of Constitution. Administration of President Moreno, and his 
Assassination. Presidency of Dr Borrero. Revolt under General 
Veintemilla. Defeat of the Government. Provisional Admini- 
stration. Election of Veintemilla. Veintemilla declared Dictator. 
Revolt against Veintemilla, and his Flight. Administration of 
Dr Placido Caamano. Seditious Conspiracies. Election of Dr 
Flores, and his Policy. Presidency of Dr Luis Cordero. The 
Esmeralda Incident. Indignation against Cordero. Revolution 
under General Alfaro. Flight of Cordero. Provisional Govern- 
ment under Alfaro, and his Election. Alfaro and the Clergy. 
Conspiracies against Alfaro. Laws regarding Sedition. Political 
Conditions and Economic Progress. Lack of Immigi'ation. 
Area and Population. Cities of Ecuador. Fires in Guayaquil. 
Topography of Ecuador. Educational Progress. Justice. 
National Character. Indian Characteristics. Means of Com- 
munication. Industrial Enterprise. Pastoral Pursuits. Mineral 
Wealth. Financial Situation. Revenue and Expenditure. 
Commercial Situation. Future Prospects. 

Ecuador, in common with Colombia and Venezuela, 
has passed through stormy times since the country- 
became a separate Republic as a result of the civil war 
in New Granada after independence from Spanish 
dominion was established. It was first created a 
Republic by the Act of Constitution dated May 11, 
1830, but since that year no fewer than ten Acts have 
been sanctioned by assemblies summoned to effect 
radical alterations for the conduct of the Adminis- 
tration. 

These different Acts and their duration are im- 

577 . 2 Q 



578 



ECUADOR 



portant. They were approved and promulgated at the 
following places :— 



Place. 


Duration. 


1 . Riobaniba 

2. Ambato 

3. Quito . 

4. Cuenca . 

5. Quito 

6. Guayaquil 

7. Quito . 

8. Quito 

9. Ambato 
10. Quito . 








1830-1835 
1835-1843 

1843-1845 
1845-1850 
1850-1852 
1852-1859 
1861-1869 
1869-1876 
1877-1883 
1883- 



The Law of Constitution of 1883, promulgated in 
1884, was amended in 1887 and again in 1896. Each 
change inferred a complete political upheaval, and was 
rarely achieved without severe fighting and heavy 
sacrifice of life. So it is not difficult to understand 
why Ecuador has been racked by internal dissensions in 
the past three-quarters of a century. The early portion 
of her political history relating to the struggle against 
the Spanish Crown and the revolutionary movements 
between 1830 and 1870 has been already told, and it 
is with the record of the last thirty years that this 
chronicle deals. 

In 1875 an unsettled political situation existed under 
President Moreno. The suppression of a series of 
revolutionary outbreaks and the severe punishment of 
the leaders of these movements led to a feeling of bitter 
hostility against the President, the outcome of which 
was a conspiracy for his assassination, which was carried 
out in August, 1875, when he was murdered at Quito. 
Dr Borrero succeeded, but discontent with his Adminis- 
tration also spread rapidly, and in the following year 
General Veintemilla, the military commandant of 
Guayaquil, headed a revolt. By seizing Guayaquil, the 



18761 REVOLUTION UNDER VElNTEMILLA 579 

principal port of Ecuador, the leaders of this insurrection 
were able to cut off supplies from the Government and 
obtain the war material they needed, thus making the 
position of President Borrero difficult from the first. 
For months strong efforts were made to reduce the 
rebels to submission, but with little success. Towards 
the close of 1876 the insurgent forces commanded by- 
General Veintemilla advanced into the interior, and a 
decisive battle was fought near Galte on December 14 
with the Government troops under General Aparicio. 
It ended in a complete victory for the revolutionists, 
who occupied Quito shortly afterwards without further 
serious opposition. President Borrero, finding his 
position untenable, left the country, and a Provisional 
Administration was established under General Veinte- 
milla, who was virtually invested with dictatorial 
powers. 

In 1878 this victorious leader of revolt determined 
to be legally appointed to the Presidency, and ordered 
an election accordingly, thereby getting himself declared 
President for the next four years. The first half of 
this period passed in comparative quiet, Veintemilla's 
enemies lacking strength to make any effective demon- 
stration against his authority ; but the discontented 
feeling was only latent, and became more apparent as 
his presidential term drew to a close. The General 
saw that he could not secure continuance of power if 
he was dependent on a free election, and in 1882 he 
took matters into his own hands by declaring himself 
Dictator, assuming absolutely autocratic powers. This 
action defeated itself, setting on foot a revolutionary 
propaganda which brought on a general rising early in 
1883. For some months the Dictator maintained his 
position ; but his authority rapidly became undermined, 
and, finding his cause hopeless, he fled the country on 
July 9, after having been its strong man for seven years. 
Little had been attempted though, under his Adminis- 
tration, towards improving the state of the country, his 
tyrannical methods of government causing constant 



580 ECUADOR 

intrigues against him and entailing heavy drains on the 
exchequer to maintain sufficient force to hold his enemies 
in check. 

After the fall of Veintemilla the Administration was 
temporarily confided to Dr Placido Caamano, and in 
February, 1884, a presidential election was held, which 
made him chief magistrate for the usual term ; but the 
friends of the fallen dictator had no idea of permitting 
the new President to discharge his duties in peace. 
Revolutionary outbreaks were fomented in various 
quarters, but the majority of the Ecuadorians gave 
them little support, being tired of a continual state of 
warfare. So the Government experienced small diffi- 
culty in suppressing conspiracies which never developed 
sufficient importance to be really dangerous to public 
authority. In 1888 the term of President Caamano 
ended, and the election held in February of that year 
put Dr Antonio Flores in his place. 

In comparison to former Administrations, that of 
President Flores proved to be the most enlightened yet 
known. Civil rights were respected, and reforms intro- 
duced in many directions to check the corrupt practices 
which had developed to marked extent in every depart- 
ment of the Government. The question of primary 
instruction for the people was given serious considera- 
tion, and several projects were proposed to place this 
important factor on a satisfactory footing. Four years 
of office was too limited a period to permit of the 
majority of the reforms President Flores advocated 
being put into practice, and he actually accomplished 
little more than to prepare the way for the subsequent 
realisation of his ideas ; but what he did succeed in 
was to reduce to order the chaos into which the Govern- 
ment had drifted before his assumption of the Presidency. 
That the people of Ecuador appreciated his policy and 
methods of Government was proved by the fact that 
during his term no serious attempts were made to 
disturb the public peace, a state of affairs foreign to 
Ecuador these many years. When in 1892 Dr Flores' 



1891] PRESIDENT FLORES 581 

term closed, he refused to allow himself to be renomi- 
nated for all his supporters could say. So Dr Luis 
Cordero took his turn in February 1892. 

The public hoped that Cordero might amplify the 
reforms introduced into the administration of national 
affairs by President Flores, and that projected improve- 
ments would crystallise into facts ; but it was doomed 
to disappointment. The new President was only a few 
months in office before the corrupt methods which his 
predecessor had tried to eliminate became again pain- 
fully apparent, and, this seen, discontent spread so 
rapidly that before he had been a year at the head of 
affairs active conspiracies for his downfall were afoot. 
These internal troubles involved extraordinary expendi- 
ture which the treasury could not bear, and in July, 
1894, default took place in the service of the external 
debt. 

In November of that same year Cordero lent himself 
to a transaction that brought about a movement which 
eventually led to his ejection from the Presidency. The 
war between China and Japan was in progress, and the 
Japanese Government, desirous of acquiring warships, 
sounded Chile on the subject of the purchase of the 
cruiser Esmeralda. The Chilian Administration was 
fully aware of the breach of international law entailed 
by the disposal of this vessel in view of active hostilities 
between the Chinese and Japanese, but at the same 
time urgently wished to sell. Under these circumstances 
President Cordero was approached with an offer of a 
substantial commission in money if he would arrange 
for the vessel to be transferred from the Chilian flag 
to that of Ecuador, and subsequently handed over to 
Japanese representatives in Ecuadorian waters. A firm 
in New York acted for Japan, and the transfer of the 
cruiser to Ecuador was made in the harbour of Val- 
paraiso, whence the vessel was taken to Chatham Island, 
in the Galapagos group, and there turned over to the 
Japanese. 

When this flagrant abuse of the national flag was 



582 ECUADOR 

known an outburst of violent indignation occurred, 
giving the opportunity "that the enemies of the President 
had been waiting for. They took advantage of it to stir 
up a popular rising, and under the leadership of General 
Eloy Alfaro a revolutionary movement was organised 
and supported in nearly all districts. Guayaquil, the 
commercial capital of Ecuador, was occupied, and became 
an important element in the success of the insurgent 
cause. President Cordero was not to be driven from 
power without a struggle, and collecting all available 
forces he determined to retain possession of Quito and 
trust to some lucky stroke of fortune for means to 
defeat the rebels if they attempted to attack the city. 
For nearly a year the country was a prey to the desultory 
warfare between the Government and the insurgents, 
but gradually Cordero found his enemies gaining strength, 
and in 1895 he realised that his position was no longer 
tenable. Unable to make terms with the rebel leaders, 
the President fled the country, leaving public affairs at 
the mercy of General Alfaro and his friends. 

An Administration was now formed by General 
Alfaro, who took the title of Supreme Chief of the 
Nation with dictatorial functions, and no change was 
made in this autocratic form of Government until 1897, 
when he determined to be proclaimed the constitutional 
President of the Republic. This was done on February 
6, when the Dictator became legal President for a term 
of four years ending in February, 1901. The new head 
of the State lost no opportunity of curtailing the power 
of the Church, no easy matter in a country where the 
inhabitants were so priest-ridden. This attitude of 
Alfaro towards the clergy aroused bitter hostility in 
many quarters, and on more than one occasion efforts 
were made to fan it into revolutionary action against 
the authorities ; but the various seditious outbreaks that 
took place between 1896 and 1900 were not of serious 
importance, and were for the most part nipped in the 
bud before the leaders could consolidate their resources. 
Alfaro was therefore able to maintain his position until 



1901] IMMUNITY FOR SEDITION 583 

the end of his term, and was succeeded in office by 
General Leonidas Plaza, elected under official influence 
as usual. 

Unfortunately the laws of Ecuador are of small avail 
in checking revolutionary outbreaks, and until stronger 
penalties are provided against seditious practices there 
is little hope of durable peace. When political motives 
are pleaded in excuse of treasonable acts punishment is 
seldom inflicted, and only in rare instances is the 
property of persons taking part in insurrections con- 
fiscated. Under the Law of Constitution, passed in 
1883 and promulgated in 1884, the death penalty for 
political offences was abolished. This was modified in 
1887 and again in 1896, and now reads : — " There shall 
be no death penalty for political offences except in the 
case of those who are armed and organised as regular 
military forces, and shall attempt any armed movement 
against the constitutional authorities." Practically 
every civilian can conspire with impunity against the 
Government, risking only his life if he happens to be 
present at a fight, but not endangering his civil rights 
in event of defeat, and no change in this respect appears 
likely soon to take place. Nominally, the authorities 
are placed in power by the people ; in reality, the 
Government is in the hands of two small political 
factions, neither of which wishes to see any radical 
change. Although the Indians were admitted to the 
rights of citizenship in 1896, they take no part in the 
political life of the country, which is left to the white 
population, who form only 7 per cent, of the total. 

It is easy, therefore, to understand why Ecuador 
has had few opportunities for economic development. 
Occasionally an interval of quiet, such as the Adminis- 
tration of President Flores, has allowed some progress 
to be made, engendering hope of a change for the better 
in the future : but these periods of lucidity have been 
brief, and the result is seen to-day in the extremely 
backward state of civilisation in this part of South 
America. Ecuador, too, has been so isolated from the 



584 ECUADOR 

remainder of the world that neither European nor 
North American example has counted for much in her 
evolution, and no immigration except from other South 
American countries has taken place since her independ- 
ence. A few foreigners have wandered into the 
country, but only in such limited numbers as to have 
no influence, and what civilisation there is has been 
inherited from Spanish ancestors. What should have 
been normal progress has been hindered at every turn 
by the unrestful state of internal politics, that constant 
bar to all moral expansion and material development. 

To turn to details. The area of Ecuador is stated to 
be 120,000 square miles ; but no survey of the country 
has been made, and the figures given are necessarily far 
from accurate. A similar vagueness exists in regard to 
the number of inhabitants, but the estimate of popula- 
tion now generally accepted places the total number of 
inhabitants at 1,270,000, including 100,000 whites, 
300,000 of mixed blood, and 870,000 Indians. If 
these estimates of area and population are relatively 
correct, they mean a density of only 1*5 inhabitants to 
the square mile, which is smaller than in any other South 
American State. 

Of the towns of Ecuador the national capital, Quito, 
has a population of 35,000, and contains 1800 inhabited 
houses. The city is very old, for it was at Quito that 
Atahualpa held his court. It stands at an altitude of 
10,000 feet above sea level, and is seven days from the 
port of Guayaquil in the present state of communica- 
tion. As the political centre of the country alone is 
Quito important ; for it enters but little into either the 
commercial or economic side of national life, no trade 
radiating from it, and no produce of any value coming 
from its vicinity. Guayaquil is the headquarters of all 
commercial business, both imports and exports being 
centred at this port, and 30,000 persons dwelling in the 
municipal limits in addition to a considerable floating 
population, due to the fact that it is the only seaport at 
which foreign shipping regulariy calls. This city is 



1903] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 585 

built chiefly of wood, and has been singularly unfortunate 
in damage by fire, a conflagration taking place in 1899, 
when nearly one-third of the buildings were totally 
destroyed, followed by another almost equally disastrous. 
The other important cities of Ecuador are Cuenca, with 
25,000 inhabitants ; Riobamba, with 12,000 ; Ambato, 
Loja, and Latacunga, each with 10,000. 

The three principal topographical features of Ecuador 
are the low-lying lands on the sea coast and near the 
river Guayas, the great mountain ranges of the interior, 
and the valleys that intersect them. The flat country 
near the seaboard contains a large area of fertile soil, 
but the malarious climate precludes all idea of the land 
being available for settlement by immigration from 
abroad. In the valleys at elevations of 4000 feet and 
upwards, the climate is temperate and combined with 
rich virgin lands, suggesting a possibility of develop- 
ment some day when means of transport are created to 
overcome the physical obstacles to locomotion which 
now hinder all progress. From the higher mountain 
ranges rise up the great peaks of the Andes, among 
which the most notable are Cayambi, Antisana, Cotopaxi, 
Llanganati, Sincholagua, Sangai, Sara-urcu, Tunguragua, 
Collanes, and Assnay in the eastern Cordillera ; and 
Chimborazo, Illiniza, Casalagua, Cotacachi, Pichincha, 
Corazon, Atacazo, Chiles, Carahuiraso, Yana-urcu, and 
Quilindana to the west, all covered with perpetual snow. 
At the junction of the eastern and western Cordilleras 
is the mountain of Imbabura, remarkable for its vast 
eruptions of mud and water. Cayambi is situated 
exactly on the equator, and is consequently distinguished 
from every other snow-capped peak in the world, and is 
the highest mountain of the eastern Cordillera. Chim- 
boraso, the " Mountain of Snow," in the western 
Cordillera, is one of the most beautiful peaks in South 
America and rises to 21,420 feet. 

Ecuador economically is the most backward of all 
South American countries, and not least in education, 
for which little has been accomplished since the effort 



586 ECUADOR 

made by President Flores between 1888 and 1892. 
For primary instruction, there are 1090 schools, and 
the number of pupils on the rolls in 1898 was 68,380, 
but the attendance is most irregular. Instruction is 
gratuitous and obligatory ; but no adequate measures 
are taken to enforce the attendance of the children to 
which the law applies, nor is it possible to do so in 
many cases owing to the difficulty of communication in 
the districts of the interior. As in Colombia and 
Venezuela, the lower classes are apathetic, and slow to 
take advantage of existing facilities. For secondary 
and higher education, there are 35 schools, and 9 other 
establishments for more advanced instruction ; and at 
Quito there is the University, with a staff of 32 
professors and an attendance in 1898 of 216 students. 
University Faculties exist also at Guayaquil and Cuenca, 
and technical and commercial schools at both Quito 
and Guayaquil. In all matters of education, the 
Church until recently has exercised a strong influence, 
but latterly the attitude of President Alfaro towards 
the clergy has tended to restrict the direct interference 
of the priesthood, especially in primary instruction. 

In the administration of justice, Ecuador lags 
behind the standard of other republics in South 
America — a severe condemnation, for in none is it on a 
satisfactory footing from the standpoint of modern 
civilisation. Less is heard abroad of corrupt methods 
in the Ecuadorian courts because the number of foreign 
residents is limited, but the entire system is degenerate. 
The laws, as in all former Spanish colonies, are founded 
on those in force before independence, and reproduce 
the worst faults of the Spanish system, with the 
additional mischief of interpretation by ignorant officials, 
who possess neither capacity nor intelligence to dis- 
charge the duties of their posts. The Supreme Court 
is at Quito, and there are six superior courts which sit 
at different centres, with the addition of 33 superior, 
and 359 subordinate magistrates to deal with civil, 
criminal, and commercial cases in the country districts, 



1903] NATIONAL CHARACTER 587 

while Consular courts are held at Quito, Guayaquil, 
and Cuenca. Ecuador has only one penitentiary, at 
Quito, and in this male and female prisoners convicted 
of serious crimes are confined ; but as a general rule, the 
people have small tendency towards really serious 
offences, although petty crime is frequent in all parts of 
the country. The police system is under municipal 
authority, with the exception of a small force maintained 
by the National Government at Quito and elsewhere 
for special duty. 

In any consideration of the national character of the 
Ecuadorians the fact must be always remembered that 
there is only a small community of white residents, 
people of European origin, who retain the characteristic 
features of their Spanish ancestry, modified by local 
conditions and the effect of many generations of life 
amongst Indian tribes treated as a lower race, whose 
lot is not far removed from the slavery under Inca rule. 
The preponderance of Indian blood has been so great, 
that in mixed marriages the offspring has been absorbed 
into the Indian population, burying there the traits of 
character inherited from the alien race that conquered 
the land 400 years ago, and amongst this Indian 
population the influence of the Roman Catholic Church 
is paramount. The majority of the people are ignorant 
and superstitious, and the outward forms of Christianity, 
as preached by the Catholic priesthood, appeal forcibly 
to their imaginations ; but that they possess intelligent 
ideas of the principles of religion is doubtful, although 
they are fearful of the penalties they are taught to 
expect for direct disobedience to priestly injunctions. 
It is difficult to conceive the existence of any other 
mental condition amongst a race whose traditions 
include the fate meted out to Atahualpa under the guise 
of Christianity, and who have never known modern 
civilisation except such as was forced on them by 
the Spanish conquerors. 

Means of communication in Ecuador are most 
primitive. The one railway open to public service 



588 ECUADOR 

connects Duran, near Guayaquil, with Chimbo. It is 
58 miles long, and is to be continued to Quito, con- 
siderable work in this direction having been accom- 
plished under a concession granted in 1896. The 
difficulties, however, in the way of bringing this 
enterprise to a successful termination are great and 
the available traffic on the route so limited that con- 
nection with Quito depends on the ability of the Govern- 
ment to maintain substantial monetary subventions 
to the constructors. Of roads there are few, except a 
highway built to facilitate communication between 
Quito and Guayaquil for 115 miles, which of recent 
years has fallen into bad repair, and bridle paths are 
the means by which the conveyance of passengers and 
cargo to the interior is effected. The rivers Guayas, 
Daule, and Vinces afford waterways to the lower lands 
at the foot of the western Cordillera, and a service of 
steamers carries the traffic, the majority of these river 
boats being the property of an American Syndicate. 

Industrial enterprise, with the exception of the 
production of food stuffs for home consumption, has 
been confined chiefly to the cultivation of cacao, mostly 
in the neighbourhood of the river Guayas, where the 
rich soil is moist and the climate warm, all admirably 
adapted for it. In 1895 the cacao shipped abroad 
reached 16,122 tons; in 1896 the amount was 15,327 
tons ; and in 1897 the total exports were 14,800 tons, 
valued at £960,031. Coffee is also grown to some 
extent, and the area of the plantations is increasing, the 
value sent abroad in 1896 being £94,105, and a year 
later £49,640, a decrease due to the fall in prices. 
Sugar is manufactured, but only a small quantity is 
exported. Large tracts covered by rubber trees exist 
in the forests, and the collection of the gum has attracted 
some attention since high prices ruled, with the result 
that in 1897 the shipments were valued at £47,232. 
Stock-keeping is only attempted on a small scale, neither 
climate nor general conditions offering strong induce- 
ments for cattle breeding. Although mineral wealth, 



1903] INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTION 589 

and especially gold and silver, is known to exist, 
attempts at systematic mining work have been few ; but 
at Zarama, in the province of Oro, quartz crushing is 
carried out with ore averaging over 1 ounce to the ton, and 
at Esmeralda a company is extracting gold by hydraulic 
methods from gravel beds which are stated to yield 50 
cents to the cubic yard. A little gold is annually 
washed by the Indians in different parts of the country, 
but not in sufficient quantities to be important. Other 
minerals known to exist, but not worked, are petroleum, 
copper, iron, lead, and coal. With improved means of 
transport the mining industry may develop and become 
an important source of wealth, but until the mountainous 
districts are made accessible by railways or roads all 
progress must be difficult. 

The foreign indebtedness of Eucador is her share of 
the Colombian external obligations when the separation 
of Venezuela and Ecuador from Colombia took place, 
the original amount allotted to Ecuador being £1,820,000 
in 1830. At intervals payments were made to the 
bondholders, although in 1891 the arrears of interest 
reached £428,640, and in 1892 an arrangement was 
made by which the capital of the debt was reduced to 
£750,000 ; but in 1894 its service again fell into default. 
In 1898 the bonds in circulation amounted to £693,160, 
and arrangements were then made by the concessionaires 
of the projected railway to Quito to assume responsibility 
for this obligation as one of the conditions of the conces- 
sion. While there is a large internal floating debt due by 
the Government to various creditors, no details of this 
liability are available. To meet all expenses the revenue 
is £1,000,000 in round figures, 70 per cent, of this being 
derived from Custom-house duties, and the remainder 
from taxes on cacao, real estate, rum distilled in the 
country, tobacco, the salt and gunpowder monopolies, 
stamps and stamped paper, and the receipts of the 
telegraph department. As a rule the revenue falls 
short of the expenditure, and it is in consequence of 
these recurring deficits that the floating debt has been 



590 ECUADOR 

acumulated. The commerce of Ecuador has been 
severely depressed recently on account of low prices for 
cacao and coffee. Yet the value of imported merchandise 
has averaged £1,000,000 annually during the past few 
years, and the exports £1,200,000 for same period. 

The future of Ecuador is wrapped in obscurity. 
The condition of the people could be greatly improved 
by education and a more honourable and impartial 
administration of justice, but without immigration from 
abroad it is difficult to see how present characteristic 
defects are to be eliminated within reasonable time, and 
there is no incentive to immigration from the north. It 
is possible that the opening of the Panama canal may 
influence affairs beneficially by bringing Ecuador within 
easier reach of the outside world ; but the assistance 
towards economic progress can be little more than 
tentative until better means of transport to the interior 
of the country exist, and before substantial development 
can occur railways and roads must be constructed, and 
of this there is small present prospect. 






CHAPTER XXXII 



COLOMBIA 

Various Titles of Colombia. Internal Political Troubles. Political 
Parties. Election of Sefior Rafael Nunez. Revolution in 1881. 
Settlement with Costa Rica. President Laldua. General 
Obaldi'a. Liberals support Sefior Nunez. Boundary Question 
with Venezuela. President Nufiez in 1884. Nunez and the 
Conservatives. Rebellion in 1885. Re-establishment of Peace. 
Occupation of Panama and Colon by United States Forces. 
President Nunez at Cartagena. Revision of the Law of Consti- 
tution. Discontent between 1888 and 1892. Nunez again 
elected. Seiior Miguel Caro Vice-President. Death of Nunez. 
Revolt in 1895. Election of Seiior Sanclemente. Seiior 
Marroquin as Vice-President. Revolution in 1898. President 
Sanclemente temporarily Resigns. Vice-President Marroquin 
supercedes Sanclemente. Panama Secedes. Incapacity of 
Colombians for Independent Government. Topography and 
Revolutionary Practices. Reason of Present Political Conditions. 
Economic Progress and Political Disturbances. Topographical 
Features. Climate. Area and Population. Hygienic Con- 
ditions. Education. Primary Instruction. The Peasant Class 
and Education. Secondary and Higher Education. Justice. 
The Roman Catholic Church. Religious Seminaries. Missionary 
Work and the Indians. National Character. Alcoholism. 
Industrial Enterprise. Mining. Manufactures. The Pradera 
Iron Works. The Panama Canal < Financial Situation. Future 
Prospects. 

The present Republic of Colombia has been known 
under several different titles since it was a Spanish 
colony. In 1819 the inhabitants obtained their inde- 
pendence from Spain, and on December 27 of that year 
the country was officially proclaimed as the United 
States of Colombia. On February 29, 1832, the territory 



592 COLOMBIA 

was divided into three States, each with independent 
Administrations under the names of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and the Republic of New Granada. 

Under the reformed Constitution of April 1, 1858, 
this Republic of New Granada was altered to a con- 
federation of eight States, and adopted the title of 
Confederation Granadina. Another alteration occurred 
on September 20, 1861, when it was constituted into 
the United States of New Granada with nine States ; 
and on May 8, 1863, a new Law converted the Republic 
into the United States of Colombia. Again, in August, 
1886, another revision of the Law of Constitution 
abolished the autonomous privileges of the several 
States, and changed them into provinces administered 
by Governors nominated by the President of the 
Republic, the original designation of the Republic of 
Colombia being once more adopted. Colombia, in 
common with Venezuela and Ecuador, has been the 
scene of constant internal strife during the nineteenth 
century, which has checked the moral and material 
development of the community at every turn, and for 
the present there are no indications of immediate radical 
change in this respect. The opening of the new century 
found the country devastated by armed insurrection 
against the constituted authorities. 

The two great political parties in Colombia are the 
usual Conservatives and Liberals, and it has been the 
endless struggle for office between these two factions 
that has caused constant recurrence of revolutionary out- 
breaks. While, however, the incentive for frequent 
bloodshed between the two parties is largely due to a 
desire of the opposition to enjoy the spoils that fall to 
the Administration and its friends, there are yet certain 
clearly defined political principles forming a raison d'etre 
for a difference of opinion as to which faction should 
govern. The Conservatives are essentially the Church 
and State party, and they wish to establish clerical 
influence as a dominant factor in all educational 
questions. The Liberals advocate the severance of 






1875] CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS 593 

Church and State, education on a basis entirely free 
from Church influence, and a general restriction of the 
power the priesthood has hitherto exercised in political 
and domestic affairs. Doubtless the Liberals have 
grounds for their objection to the influence the clergy 
have wielded in the past, and the part they play to-day 
in the national destinies ; but too often the movements 
ostensibly set afoot for a more progressive policy in the 
public Administration have degenerated into attempts 
to obtain control of the Government for the personal 
ends of ambitious political adventurers who are far from 
seeking reforms for the general welfare ; and while the 
principles of the Liberals may be worthy of support the 
instruments chosen for their execution are too often 
faulty. Under these circumstances the Conservatives, 
aided by Church influence, have maintained their position 
as the dominant faction in spite of the strenuous efforts 
of their political adversaries. 

For the five years previous to 1880, during the presi- 
dencies of Aquiles Parra and Trujillo, the Liberals made 
steady progress in national politics, although unable to 
command a majority for the presidential election. 
Under President Trujillo several reforms were initiated, 
greater political freedom was permitted, efforts were 
made to place the national finances on a more satis- 
factory basis, and material prosperity was increased by 
a substantial reduction in the public indebtedness. As 
a result, the Liberal representation in Congress became 
an important force in politics ; and in 1880, when 
President Trujillo completed his term of office, the 
question of the nomination of his successor created deep 
public interest. The Liberals, convinced that they 
could not then hope to bring in a man of their own 
political colour as Chief Magistrate, determined to 
support the candidacy of Senor Rafael Nunez, a member 
of the Conservative party, but strongly imbued with 
advanced ideas in regard to public administration. By 
following this course, they hoped to gain ground to an 
extent that would enable them at no distant date to 

2p 



594 COLOMBIA 

claim a majority over their opponents, hopes not 
unjustified although events occurred to deter their 
fulfilment. While President Nunez was prepared to 
deal fairly with the Liberal Party, many of his Conserva- 
tive supporters held different views on the subject, and 
they forced him in 1881 to bring official influence to 
bear in various electoral matters and appointments to 
high offices, to the detriment of the Liberal cause. 
These unpopular acts led to an armed uprising in the 
provinces of Cauca and Antioquia supported by a 
number of the Liberal leaders, and although the move- 
ment was suppressed by the authorities, this was only 
done at a considerable sacrifice of life. The result of 
the outbreak was injurious to Liberal influence, and it 
left the Opposition powerless to resist the nomination 
for the Presidency of the Conservative candidate, Senor 
Laldua. 

During the period President Nunez was in power, 
important questions came up for settlement or discussion. 
The long-standing dispute concerning the boundary with 
Costa Rica was definitely settled in July, 1880. A 
proposal for the confederation of the Republica of 
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador was made in the 
Chamber of Deputies, and approved by that branch of 
the legislature, but fell through in consequence of 
objections raised by Venezuela and Ecuador to the terms 
on which the amalgamation of the three countries was 
projected. Efforts were also made by Nunez to deal 
with the education problem, but not with much success, 
although increased facilities for primary instruction were 
provided and attention drawn to some of the defects of 
the existing system for secondary and higher education. 

President Laldua, who succeeded Nunez, was only a 
brief period in office when he died suddenly in 1883, 
and this led to the accession of the Vice-President, 
General Otalora. The Liberals now determined to 
make another attempt to improve their position, and 
decided to support the candidacy of Senor Nunez, rely- 
ing on his progressive policy to help their cause. Nunez 



1884] NUNEZ AGAIN ELECTED 595 

was in Europe at this time, but in April, 1884, while 
still absent, he was elected to succeed General Otalora. 
The only event of importance occurring during the short 
presidential term of General Otalora was the settlement 
of the boundary dispute with Venezuela, which it was 
agreed in 1883 to refer to the arbitration of the Spanish 
Crown. A Commission of five members was nominated 
by King Alfonso XII. to investigate the contending 
claims, but the decision was not reached until eight 
years later, in April, 1891, when the Queen-Regent of 
Spain gave her verdict. 

With the assumption of office by Nunez in 1884, 
there began a period in which he was virtually Dictator 
of Colombia, occupying a similar position to that of 
General Guzman Blanco in Venezuela, and he kept the 
control until his death on September 18, 1894. His 
ideas had undergone a marked change during his visit 
to Europe, and the Liberals soon recognised to their 
dismay that the man they had assisted to power had 
become saturated with the opinions they most disliked 
amongst the Conservatives. This change meant that 
the influence of the Church again became paramount 
in politics. The Liberals found themselves stripped of 
the concessions they had obtained under former Adminis- 
trations, and all participation in public affairs was 
denied to them. If they wanted to be heard it was 
clear that the only course open to them was to take 
sword in hand and by force of arms win for themselves 
a recognition of their civic rights. Discontent spread 
rapidly in 1884, and in the beginning of the ensuing 
year several conspiracies were discovered. In outlying 
districts the standard of revolt was raised, and in April, 
1885, the insurrectionary spirit had so far developed 
that, with little warning, the country was plunged into 
a civil war of more serious proportions than any which 
had taken place since the Colombians fought the 
Spaniards for their freedom. 

The rebellion centred mainly in the provinces of 
Panama, Boyaca, Magdalena, and Cundinamarca, and 



596 COLOMBIA 

Generals Reyes and Velez were its principal leaders. 
While the Government was not taken by surprise at the 
outbreak of the insurrection the strength of the 
insurgents was underrated, and before an adequate 
number of troops could be placed in the field the rebels 
had obtained several successes, adding greatly to their 
prestige and bringing many recruits to their ranks. 
President Nunez was not wanting in energy when 
occasion demanded, and in the course of a couple of 
months he had 10,000 men equipped and ready for 
service. Several engagements were fought with the in- 
surgents in July, 1885, the legal forces generally obtaining 
the advantage because better supplied with arms and 
ammunition. These repeated reverses discouraged the 
leaders of the revolt, a feeling accentuated when they 
found desertions from their cause becoming every day 
more frequent. At the end of July peace negotiations 
were proposed by the Government, and General Reyes 
and his companions, in view of the fact that they now 
saw small chance of victory, agreed to lay down their 
arms. Accordingly, on August 4, the formal surrender 
of the rebel leaders took place, and, on September 5, 1885, 
a proclamation announcing the restoration of peace 
throughout Colombia was issued by the Government. 
The result of this struggle was that the Administration 
of President Nunez and the Conservative Party obtained 
absolute control of the country. All war material 
possessed by the insurgents was confiscated, and the 
Liberals found themselves with their hopes shattered, 
and with no prospect in the immediate future of being 
able to offer effective resistance to any policy Nunez and 
his friends might pursue. 

During this rebellion active hostilities occurred on 
several occasions on the Isthmus of Panama. From 
Colon on the Atlantic to Panama on the Pacific coast, 
runs the railway built by a company registered in the 
United States, and working under a concession from 
the Colombian Government. By the terms of this con- 
cession the railway company was permitted to appeal 



1885] AMERICAN TROOPS AT PANAMA 597 

for protection to the United States Government, should 
their property be threatened by internal political dis- 
turbances, and Colombia agreed in such event to put 
no obstacles in the way of troops landed by that 
Government in response to the appeal. Now in 1885 
the civil war in Colombia did seriously menace the rail- 
way traffic, and in this emergency the officials of the 
company applied to the Administration of President 
Cleveland for protection. It promptly complied, landing 
detachments of marines at Colon and Panama to occupy 
those towns and insure the railway against molestation. 
This is interesting, as an example of armed forces from 
the United States being disembarked in foreign territory 
to protect a private corporation, for the Panama Railway 
Company certainly comes under that description, no 
matter how important its maintenance may be for 
United States national interests in connection with 
transcontinental trade. 

When President Nunez returned to Colombia after 
his election to the Presidency in 1884, he had pleaded 
physical incapacity as an excuse for not residing in 
Bogota, the National Capital, and not without reasonable 
grounds, for Bogota stands 10,000 feet above sea level, 
and Senor Nunez was not in good health. While 
nominally President of the Republic, he exercised his 
authority through a deputy, directing affairs from his 
own house near Cartagena. This was highly incon- 
venient, in view of the fact that the journey from 
Cartagena to Bogota could not be accomplished in less 
than ten days, that telegraphic communication was 
irregular, and that no important action could be under- 
taken without the personal knowledge and consent of 
the President. When the revolutionary troubles in 
1885 seriously menaced his Administration, he tem- 
porarily emerged from his retirement and assumed 
the direction of the Government, but when peace was 
restored and certain measures necessary to guard against 
a repetition of the recent disturbances arranged, he 
returned to his home to rule by deputy as before. 



598 COLOMBIA 

To safeguard the country against further revolutionary 
movements, a drastic reform in the Constitution was 
promulgated on August 6, 1886. It provided for the 
abolition of the federal system of government, the States 
being deprived of their semi-independent administrations 
and becoming provinces under the control of a governor 
nominated directly by the President ; and in each 
Province or Department a local assembly, elected by 
the inhabitants, was created to superintend local affairs. 
The life of the National Congress- — Senate and House 
of Representatives — together with the presidential term 
was extended to six years, in place of two as hitherto, 
and other minor changes decreed. Murder had hitherto 
been punishable by imprisonment for only ten years, 
and by allowances for good behaviour during confinement 
this could be reduced to two-thirds of the sentence, but 
by the new act the penalty became death. The Press 
was made responsible for libellous and seditious publi- 
cations, and other means were taken to check the spread 
of disaffection. After the promulgation of this revised 
law Nunez was again elected President for the six 
years to August 7, 1892. In 1888 Senor Carlos Holguin 
was appointed to discharge provisionally the duties of 
the head of the Administration, but the real control 
remained as formerly in the hands of President Nunez, 
and all important matters were submitted to him at 
Cartagena for his advice and approval. 

For a brief period there was comparative internal 
peace. The defeat of the revolutionary movement 
organised by the Liberals in 1885 had been so decisive 
that no immediate outbreak was possible, but the spirit 
of insurrection was scorched, not killed. The Opposi- 
tion began secretly to arrange plans of action against 
opportunity, and between 1888 and 1892 the discontented 
faction fomented a feeling of irritation and dissatisfaction 
against Nunez, and more than once this took the form 
of armed resistance ; but such local risings were sup- 
pressed with small difficulty, and when, in 1892, the 
term of Nunez expired, his hold upon the country was 



1892] DEATH OF NUNEZ 599 

so strong that he was again installed for the ensuing 
six years. The plea of ill-health was once more put 
forward as an excuse to avoid residence at Bogota, and 
his duties were as before delegated to the Vice-President, 
Seiior Miguel Caro. For the next two years no develop- 
ments of special interest occurred, but the Liberals 
gained ground in many directions, and from time to 
time incidents happened tending to show that a serious 
movement against the Government would not be long 
deferred. Nunez died in September, 1894, and his 
death was the signal for a renewal of the internal 
disturbances which his Administration had held in 
check for nine years. 

As Vice-President of the Republic, Senor Miguel 
Caro assumed the Presidency for the unexpired portion 
of the term for which Nunez had been nominated in 
1892. Once again the Liberals determined to make an 
effort to wrest control of the country from the Con- 
servatives, their leaders imagining that success would 
be less difficult against the new President than against 
his predecessor ; but in this they were mistaken. 
Revolt broke out in several districts, but little progress 
was made against the Government forces ; and although 
the revolutionary movement was not entirely stamped 
out, it never attained greater proportions than those of 
a desultory guerilla warfare conducted in inaccessible 
mountain regions. It was never dangerous to the 
Administration, but it served the purpose of the Liberals 
in keeping alive a spirit of unrest under cover of which 
intrigues could be set afoot for a more widely extended 
conspiracy at a later date. Such was the state of 
internal affairs until 1898, when President Caro's term 
expired. 

To succeed Caro the Conservatives chose Senor M. 
A. Sanclemente, a man imbued with the extreme political 
views of his party and a strong supporter of clericalism. 
The Vice-President nominated was Senor J. M. Mar- 
roquin, and it soon became evident that he was a man 
to be reckoned with. No sooner was President 



600 COLOMBIA 

Sanclemente in the chair than the insurrection promoted 
by the Liberals rapidly assumed more serious propor- 
tions, and in Antioquia, Cauca, and Panama the 
insurgents gained ground in spite of all efforts of the 
Government to check them. Arms and ammunition 
were obtained by the rebels from Venezuelan sources, 
but the supply was limited, and it was due to this that 
greater results were not obtained by the insurrection. 
President Sanclemente, then eighty years of age, was 
unable to withstand the strain, and, his health giving 
way, he temporarily abandoned his duties to the Vice- 
President, Senor Marroquin. 

In spite of the attempts of the Vice-President to 
crush the insurrection, the rebels held their ground at 
nearly all points and gained occasional success. On the 
Isthmus of Panama severe fighting occurred, and the 
insurgents succeeded in capturing the city of Panama 
and the town of Colon, but subsequently were forced 
to evacuate both positions on the arrival of reinforce- 
ments of Government troops. During the latter months 
of 1900 reports were published by the Government from 
time to time that the rebellion has been completely 
suppressed, but how little reliance could be placed on 
such statements is shown by the fact that some revolu- 
tionary success almost invariably occurred within a few 
days of these announcements. Such an event was the 
sinking of the steamer Lautaro off Panama in January, 
1902, when General Alban, Governor of Panama, on 
board at the time, was drowned. 

In 1900 Vice-President Marroquin determined to be 
President in name as well as act. With the assistance 
of a group of his political friends in Bogota, a plan was 
formed to depose President Sanclemente and proclaim 
Senor Marroquin as President, and this plot was executed 
without resistance. Marroquin was duly recognised as 
President for the unfinished portion of the term for 
which Sanclemente was chosen, and which expires on 
August 7, 1904. Sanclemente died eighteen months 
after his deposition. 



1900] THE PANAMA QUESTION 601 

In 1900 the question of the construction of the 
Panama Canal was actively taken up by the United 
States Government. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which 
.had been a stumbling-block, was abrogated in 1901, and 
a new agreement reached with the British Government 
by which the United States was to construct an inter- 
oceanic canal. The next step was the negotiation of 
treaties with Colombia, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica for 
the right to build a waterway, and these were duly 
signed and subsequently ratified by Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica, but rejected by Colombia. It was under- 
stood that Colombia could have been placated by an 
increased money indemnity, but this was unacceptable 
in Washington. Colombian opposition therefore threat- 
ened to deprive Panama of the immense benefit antici- 
pated from the construction of the canal, and to transfer 
it to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Here was the 
Opposition's opportunity. For three years the revolu- 
tionary leaders had preached the doctrine that opposition 
in Bogota to a canal treaty was a deathblow to Panama, 
and this bore fruit when the treaty was rejected in 
1903. The people of Panama, incited by the insurgent 
leaders and others interested in the Isthmus, announced 
the secession of Panama from Colombia, and proclaimed 
it an independent republic in November, 1903. The new 
State was recognised immediately by the United States 
Government, and aid was lent by American warships 
to prevent the landing of Colombian force to suppress 
the revolt. By this help the insurgents for the moment 
gained their object and obtained a territory, where they 
could not only participate in the Government, but also 
secure a place for the organisation of future action 
against the Administration at Bogota. As for the 
United States, they have doubtless removed an obstacle 
to the Panama route for the canal, but in the manner 
of doing so they have roused hostility and suspicion 
throughout every section of Latin America. 

This short epitome of Colombian events during the 
past quarter of a century seems to demonstrate the 



602 COLOMBIA 

incapacity of the inhabitants for independent Govern- 
ment. On the part of the rulers there is a constant 
tendency towards dictation and absolutism, and the con- 
sequence is a widespread spirit of unrest. The Liberals 
foment dissatisfaction by every means in their power to 
assist their own political aim, the overthrow of the 
Conservatives ; but whether Liberals or Conservatives 
be in power there is small prospect of contentment with 
political surroundings, for what has occurred during the 
past twenty-five years has happened ever since the 
revolt against Spanish jurisdiction. The result of 
generation after generation growing to manhood amongst 
a series of insurrectionary outbreaks, is an utter want 
of appreciation of the benefits of peace and administra- 
tive stability. Colombia does not stand alone in this 
respect, for similar conditions prevail in Ecuador and 
Venezuela. Moreover, the topography of these countries 
lends itself to revolutionary practices ; in the mountain 
fastnesses of the northern part of South America it is 
easy to defy with impunity any law which the Govern- 
ment of the day may wish to enforce, and the naturally 
unruly temperament of these Latin people is thereby 
encouraged. 

The present-day insurgents of Colombia are not far 
separated from brigands, and the political character 
given to the revolutions is generally a cloak to cover 
illegal forms of pillage and rapine. It is from such 
elements that political adventurers of one or other party 
factions, striving to control the Administration, draw 
elements for armed revolt against the authorities, and 
the rank and file of the men who enter the contest know 
little, and care less, about the merits of the cause. It 
is convenient for them to maintain the fiction that they 
are engaged in this or that struggle for patriotic motives, 
rather than be classified as robbers and outlaws, and 
this spirit makes armed insurrection easy in Colombia. 
Nor does any punishment follow an unsuccessful re- 
bellion. Property is seldom confiscated, treason is 
rarely made an offence demanding severe castigation, 



19WJ PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION 603 

participation in seditious conspiracies entails no loss 
of civic rights ; this immunity being probably due to the 
fact that the individual privileges of citizens are so 
mythical as to be thought little of where respect for law 
and order is practically unknown. In this part of South 
America, the general conditions more closely resemble 
the early middle ages in Europe than anything in modern 
civilisation ; the injured must seek redress by the sword, 
or bear without remonstrance all indignities heaped 
upon them. 

Both Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia strive 
to rule the country by a limited oligarchy. The Con- 
servatives have done this during the last two 
decades ; and the Liberals, in attempting to reach the 
same end, have never been chary of sacrificing human 
life or devastating the country. "When it is remembered 
that more than fifty per cent, of the population cannot 
read or write, it is easy to realise how small a part in 
the lives of the people any political action of the 
Government can play ; and in such circumstances it is a 
farce for the leaders of the political parties to urge, as 
they constantly do, that the inhabitants are in favour of 
any particular policy. President Nunez showed his 
appreciation of this state of affairs by revising the Law 
of Constitution in 1886, and reducing the semi- 
independent States to Departments over which 
governors appointed by the Central Government 
exercised absolute control. To deem the Government 
of Colombia republican in principle is therefore mislead- 
ing, if not absurd. 

Colombia suffers as an organic State from the nature 
of the country and the extreme difficulty of intercom- 
munication. With the exception of the district border- 
ing on the headwaters of the river Orinoco, and, to a 
less important extent, the territory touching the tribu- 
taries of the river Amazon, Colombia consists of a net- 
work of mountain ranges rising to elevations of 12,000 
to 14,000 feet. As the crow flies, the distance to the 
headquarters of any Department may be only 200 miles, 



604 COLOMBIA 

but the journey over mountains and valleys occupies 
many days. Communities are thus isolated from the 
outside world and from each other, and communication 
with the National Capital is only possible at compara- 
tively long intervals by the tedious process of saddle 
mules, with poor accommodation by the wayside. Each 
district is perforce wrapped up in its own small life, and 
the advent of strangers is uncommon. Little knowledge 
of what passes in the outside world is disseminated 
amongst the residents, with the result that the mental 
perspective of the people is abnormally contracted. It 
is easy, therefore, to understand that when a representa- 
tive of the National Administration comes from Bogota 
to make a change, generally an increase, in taxation, or 
to perform other attributes of government distasteful to 
these people in the wilderness, he meets with a short 
shrift if he insists on carrying out his instructions in 
defiance of the popular will. In many parts of the 
interior the people are practically savages, and in such 
districts as the country inland from Buenaventura travel- 
ling is impossible for a foreigner, in consequence of the 
hostility of the natives. 

It is difficult to see how immediate improvement is 
to be effected. All hinges on the question of better 
facilities for transport and communication, and so long 
as these are absent, there is small hope for the better- 
ment of the political status of the inhabitants. The 
problem to be solved is to find money for the con- 
struction of railways and roads to unite the isolated 
districts with Bogota or some other centre, and so open 
the way for a consolidation of the scattered units of 
population into one homogeneous nationality. With the 
establishment of transport through the country, foreign 
immigration will filter into the Republic in search of the 
natural wealth that lies waiting for the hand of man to 
give it to the world, and contact with foreigners will do 
much to broaden the ideas of the Colombians in regard 
to the advantages of modern civilisation. Efforts have 
been made by different Administrations to interest 



1904] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 605 

European capitalists in providing railway transport for 
Colombia, but the bad faith shown towards such 
undertakings has deterred all progress. If the 
Government could assure adequate protection for capital, 
a railway system of sufficient proportions to remove the 
obstacles now choking development would be speedily 
provided, and the fact that no such protection has been 
forthcoming has stopped all progress. Nor are there 
any indications that immediate marked change in this 
respect is probable ; but the fact must be borne in mind 
that the Atlantic coast of Colombia is only five days by 
steamer from New York, and it is almost inevitable that 
in time the influence of the United States will extend 
to this quarter and overcome the obstacles now existing 
to moral and material advancement. 

Under existing circumstances, almost insuperable 
obstacles check industrial and commercial expansion ; 
there is no inducement for the investment of capital to 
exploit the latent wealth when vested interests are 
threatened continually by civil war or insurrectionary 
outbreaks, and labourers for mining or agricultural 
undertakings are subject to compulsory conscription in 
the Government ranks or revolutionary forces. The 
same causes equally hinder moral progress ; education, 
especially primary instruction, is neglected, and the 
administration of justice is on a low standard and deeply 
tainted with political corruption. On all sides the 
interests of the people are lost sight of in the struggle 
for place and power. 

The principal topographical features of Colombia 
are the great mountain ranges rising precipitously from 
the seaboard ; the fertile valleys intersecting this region ; 
and the vast plains stretching away towards the river 
Orinoco, known as the llanos. In the mountain ranges 
lies the mineral wealth that proved so strong an 
attraction to the early Spanish settlers ; the valleys are 
abundantly watered by rivers and mountain streams, 
and the soil is rich ; and the plains to the south-east 
provide all the requirements for pastoral industry. 



606 



COLOMBIA 



Climatic conditions vary, as in Venezuela, with the 
elevation above sea level. The malarious belt lies on 
the shores of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, stretches 
across the isthmus of Panama, and embraces certain 
areas of the low-lands in the vicinity of the Orinoco and 
the Amazon. The valleys above 3000 feet have a 
temperate climate not unlike the late spring in northern 
countries, and there is no menace to health for 
Europeans who may settle in these districts, the heat 
seldom interfering with outdoor work during the 
daytime. On the high peaks of the mountain ranges 
snow is often seen, and in cases such as the Sierra 
Nevada, at 23,779 feet the line of perpetual snow is 
reached. Thus there is the choice of climate from 
tropical to extreme cold, the mean average temperature 
at Bogota being 63° Fahrenheit. 

The estimated area of Colombia is 513,938 square 
miles, about one-sixth that of the United States. Of 
this, 330,756 square miles lie to the north and the 
remainder to the south of the equator. No census has 
been taken since 1870, when the population was 
2,951,323, but an official estimate published in 1881 
showed 3,878,600 inhabitants distributed as follows : — 









Density 






Departments. 


sq. miles. 


Pop. 


per 

sq.mile. 


Capital. 


Pop. 


Antioquia 


22,316 


470,000 


21 


Medellin 


40,000 


Bolivar 


21,345 


280,000 


13 


Cartagena . 


20,000 


Boyaca 


33,351 


702,000 


21 


Tunja . 


8,000 


Cauca . 


257,462 


621,000 


2-4 


Popayan 


10,000 


Cundinamarca 


79,810 


569,000 


7 


Bogota 


120,000 


Magdelena . 


24,440 


90,000 


3-7 


Santa Marta 


6,000 


Panama 


31,571 


285,000 


9 


Panama 


30,000 


Santander 


16,409 


555,600 


35 


Bucaramanga 


20,000 


Tolima 
Total 


18,069 


306,000 


17 


Ibague 


12,000 


504,773 


3,878,600 


7-7 










1904] VITAL STATISTICS 607 

This estimate includes 220,000 uncivilised Indians, 
the majority of whom dwell near the Orinoco. One- 
third of the population is classified as white, the 
remainder as half-breeds or Indians. Of negroes the 
number is limited, and they are principally found on the 
Isthmus of Panama or in the neighbourhood of Buena- 
ventura on the Pacific coast. 

Accurate vital statistics are impossible to obtain, 
and the official returns are little better than guess- 
work, but they must be accepted as some indication of 
the standard of health. In 1898 the death-rate was 21 
per 1000 inhabitants, and of this 20 per cent, was 
credited to infants of less than twelve months, and 30 
per cent, to children under five years of age. Epidemics 
of smallpox are frequent and the mortality heavy, and 
yellow fever occasionally breaks out in the malarious 
districts of Panama and other towns near the sea coast, 
no proper precautions being taken to check the spread 
of the disease. With ordinary sanitary measures in the 
cities and towns the general hygienic conditions would 
compare favourably with many countries in the world 
far removed from tropical latitudes, for it is only on the 
low-lying lands on the sea coast and near the Orinoco 
that the prevailing conditions are inimical to health, and 
these districts only comprise one-fifth of the total area. 

Colombia has the reputation in South America of 
possessing more than average educational facilities, and 
in higher education there may be some foundation for 
this, but in primary instruction the methods are defective 
and unsatisfactory from every point of view. Elementary 
education is controlled by the municipal authorities, and 
money grants-in-aid are made by the National Govern- 
ment, but no adequate supervision is attempted by the 
Central Government to ensure the maintenance of the 
requisite number of schools, nor is any inspection made 
to see that a satisfactory standard is reached. Primary 
instruction is free, but not obligatory. Large numbers 
of children naturally, therefore, receive no tuition, but 
to some extent this is due to the sparsity of the popula- 



608 COLOMBIA 

tion and the difficulty of reaching school in districts 
where the mountainous country renders all journeying 
arduous. In addition to these physical obstacles there 
is the apathetic indifference of the peasant class to 
education, and they care little whether their offspring 
can read and write even when schools are near at hand 
and the benefit of primary instruction has been carefully 
explained to them. The children themselves are seldom 
sufficiently interested in their own welfare to attend 
school voluntarily, but more striking evidence of the 
small value placed on education is found in the fact that 
peasants who have learned to read and write in their 
youth practise these two accomplishments so rarely that 
they forget entirely these rudiments of knowledge a few 
years after reaching manhood. 

Statistics about education are also far from reliable, 
the national authorities complaining that the munici- 
palities are dilatory and careless in making the returns, 
therefore such figures as are given must be considered 
partly guesses. The number of primary schools is 
stated to be 1820, and the children on the rolls 86,000, 
showing that only 2 '2 per cent, of the total population 
is receiving elementary instruction, even allowing for 
the regular attendance of all children enrolled. In all 
probability the actual attendance does not average more 
than 15 per cent, of the population — a result telling its 
own tale. For secondary education there are 34 public 
and private colleges to which the children of more 
wealthy parents are sent, the private concerns being 
under the guidance of the Roman Catholic Church. 
For the education of teachers there are 15 normal 
schools, and at these 600 students attend ; while the 
requirements of higher education are filled by four 
Departmental and one National University, with a total 
attendance of 1100 students. The four technical schools 
are patronised by 800 pupils, and a School of Arts is 
attended by 160 students. There is also an Artisans 
Institute and a Salesian Institute, the former with 150 
and the latter with 200 pupils. Bogota has a national 



1904] THE JUDICIARY 609 

free library containing 40,000 volumes, and a museum 
where national products and antiquities are exhibited. 

The Government annually devotes 400,000 gold 
dollars to education, a sum inadequate for the require- 
ments, but little improvement can be expected until 
present conditions are radically changed. In place of 
the miserable pittance doled out to the teachers in 
primary schools, a living wage must be regularly paid, 
and the system of public education superintended by 
the National Government ; adequate inspection of 
schools should also be provided for, and the attendance 
of the children made obligatory. 

The administration of justice in Colombia is on no 
more satisfactory footing than in Venezuela and 
Ecuador, the procedure in the courts being dilatory 
and costly, and corrupt practices frequent. But con- 
stant protests against this state of affairs pass unheeded, 
and no attempt at reform has been made during the 
past quarter of a century. Both civil and criminal law 
is codified, and does not in itself offer ground for serious 
complaints. It is only the interpretation that fails. 
The basis is Spanish law, as everywhere in Latin 
America, and the Supreme Court consists of seven 
members appointed for life, who elect one of their 
number as President for four years. Superior tribunals 
sit in the various departments, where are also inferior 
courts and a number of magistrates (jueces de paz) 
appointed for the rural districts, these officials frequently 
gaining considerable local power and using their influ- 
ence most unjustly. The National Government 
maintains a police force of 1000 men to ensure order 
in the capital and at a few other points, but these men 
are more often utilised as troops to suppress revolu- 
tionary outbreaks than for ordinary police duty. The 
municipalities furnish local police, occasionally effective, 
at other times affording no protection against crime. 

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church is still 
most powerful, in spite of the edict issued by the Arch- 
bishop of Bogota in 1874, forbidding the clergy to take 

2q 



610 COLOMBIA 

part in political questions. It permeates the Adminis- 
tration now, and a large proportion of the educational 
establishments, especially secondary schools, are under 
its direction. It has a widespread influence over both 
upper and lower classes in the affairs of everyday life, 
and it regards with intense jealousy any attempt of 
other religious sects to establish places of worship. 
The law admits the right to practise all creeds provided 
that they are not contrary to morality or subversive to 
the public welfare, but this concession has only been 
taken advantage of to a limited extent, Catholicism being 
so deeply rooted that there is small scope for missionary 
work of other denominations. Numerically, moreover, 
the Roman Catholic Church is strong, with an arch- 
bishop, 10 bishops, 8 vicars-general, and 2170 priests 
in holy orders, serving 270 Catholic churches and 312 
chapels, while monastic and religious orders occupy 10 
houses with 750 inmates. In every diocese there is a 
seminary for training students for the priesthood over 
which the State has no control, nor does it contribute 
towards their support. The opportunity offered to the 
priesthood to educate and civilise is of a most wide 
description, but little taken advantage of; for, as in 
many other South American countries, the priesthood is 
often recruited from the lower strata of the community, 
and the men have neither tradition nor ambitious desire 
to spur them on to the work of regeneration so urgently 
required. Foreign priests from Spain and Italy, of 
whom there are many in Colombia, make no determined 
effort either to bring about any strong reaction against 
the low moral standard everywhere apparent. 

In national character the white Colombians resemble 
their Spanish ancestors more closely than elsewhere, 
owing to the isolated position of their country during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Few foreigners 
visit Bogota by reason of its inaccessibility, and this has 
caused the Spanish spoken by its residents to retain more 
purity of pronunciation than elsewhere in South America. 
In nearly all circumstances the people are courteous and 



1904] EFFECTS OF ALCOHOLISM 611 

hospitable to compatriots and strangers without distinc- 
tion — a survival of the custom of extending shelter to 
the traveller when facilities of transport were even more 
difficult than at present. In Bogota and some of the 
older settlements at high elevations, the principal families 
have kept the race pure, with seldom any strain of Indian 
blood ; but on the low-lying lands near the Orinoco and 
in the valleys close to the sea coast, the copper-coloured 
skins and the general features of the natives show far 
more of Indian than white blood. 

The drink curse, prevalent here, accounts to some 
extent for the inertia of the national character, and it is 
curious that this love of strong drink is chiefly confined 
in South America to people living in high altitudes. In 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Mexico the con- 
sumption of alcohol, as in Colombia, is abnormally great, 
whereas in Argentina, where the bulk of the population 
dwells in the plains, drunkenness is rare. No effort is 
made in Colombia to check this blight, whether by the 
Government or the clergy, and its evil effects are seen in 
the high infantile mortality and the frequency of criminal 
violence in all parts of the country. 

Industrial occupation in Colombia includes agri- 
culture, coffee and cacao production, pastoral industry, 
mining, the collection of indiarubber for export, and a 
few minor local manufactures. In farming, little energy 
or initiative is shown, although both soil and climate 
over a large area are well adapted for cereal and root 
crops, and the annual output is insufficient for home 
demands, considerable quantities of breadstuffs being 
imported annually. With cheap land suitable for wheat, 
barley, maize, and other grains, and with local labour 
fairly abundant and cheap, such a condition can only be 
explained by the disturbed internal state of the Republic 
and the indolence of the population. 

Coffee has hitherto formed the staple industry, but 
the low prices of late years have seriously menaced the 
prosperity of the plantations. In 1895 the total exported 
was 20,504 tons, valued at 8,504,312 dollars ; and in 



612 COLOMBIA 

1896, 28,521 tons, worth 10,474,752 dollars ; but in 1897 
the total fell to 17,564 tons. In addition, however, to 
these shipments, a further allowance of 5 per cent, must 
be made for Colombian coffee despatched through the 
Venezuelan port of Maracaibo, and not appearing in the 
Colombian returns. The area under cultivation covers 
75,000 acres, and the bean is of high grade, bringing 
much better prices than the Brazilian product, a fact 
that has enabled the majority of the plantation owners 
to continue working their properties in spite of the low 
prices of the last few years. The area devoted to cacao 
is not large, the output being principally used for home 
demand. Sugar-cane is also cultivated, and the juice 
manufactured into rum and sugar for local use. Tobacco 
is raised in some districts and made into cigars and 
cigarettes, also for home consumption. 

Of other vegetable products, the most important is 
indiarubber, collected in the forest area near the 
Orinoco and the tributaries of the Amazon. Its 
increased value in recent years has turned attention to 
this commodity, and the number of expeditions sent 
into the forests has been greatly augmented, but there 
is still room for expansion. Ivory nuts are another 
article of value in exports, and dyewoods, copaiba and 
balsam of tolu also figure. Official statements classify 
no less than 68*8 per cent, of the population as engaged 
in agricultural pursuits or dependent on agricultural 
production for a livelihood. 

Pastoral industry is widely distributed, live stock 
being reared in nearly all valleys where cultivation of 
the soil is attempted, and also on the lower lands wher- 
ever grass is abundant. It is, however, on the llanos, 
the great plains stretching away towards the Orinoco, 
that the principal centre of the cattle breeding is found. 
No reliable statistics of the number of animals are I 
available, but it is estimated that the horned cattle 
reach a total of 3,500,000. The herds are composed of 
small-bodied, long-horned animals, descendants of the 
live stock brought from Europe by Spanish colonists, 









1904] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 613 

and practically no attempt has been made to improve 
the breed by introducing foreign blood. The hides of 
these cattle are valuable, and during the scarcity of beef 
animals in Cuba in 1898 and 1899 many shipments of 
bullocks were made to that island from Cartagena. 
Both sheep and goats are raised to supply the local 
demand for wool and mutton, and swine are bred for 
home use, but with the exception of cattle pastoral 
industry in Colombia is unimportant. 

The great mineral wealth of the country is almost 
untouched, but how important the mining industry was 
formerly may be judged from the fact that during the 
300 years of Spanish dominion gold and silver to the 
value of £60,000,000 was extracted in various sections of 
what is now Colombian territory. At present mining 
enterprise is directed towards the search for gold and 
emeralds, little attention being paid to the large deposits 
of silver-bearing ore known to exist. From the depart- 
ment of Antioquia, gold to the value of £40,000 has been 
exported annually of late years, and in all other districts 
the average annual output is reputed to be between 
£600,000 and £800,000. In 1891 the number of mines 
on which taxes were paid was 4961 ; of these, 3398 were 
in Antioquia, 794 in Tolima, and 571 in Cauca. Deposits 
of coal are found, and iron ore of exceptionally rich 
quality is abundant. Other minerals known, but not 
worked in consequence of difficulty of transport, are 
copper, platinum, tin, cinnabar, petroleum and sulphur. 
The salt mines are a Government monopoly and form a 
valuable source of revenue. In July, 1899, a wild 
outburst of speculation occurred in connection with 
emeralds, gems to the value of £800,000 changing hands 
in a few weeks, and often at higher prices than their 
value in foreign markets. 

Manufacturing industry exists on only a very limited 
scale. A few establishments are found, but play no 
part in the national life, the most important concern 
being the Pradera Iron Works situated to the north-east 
of Bogota, whose plant has a daily capacity of thirty tons 



614 COLOMBIA 

of pig-iron ; and the manufacture of wrought iron, rails, 
sugar mills, castings for machinery, and other articles for 
local use is carried on with some success. Near these 
works are deposits of coal, iron, limestone, sand, 
manganese, and fire-clay. Other branches of manu- 
facture comprise breweries, distilleries, soap and candle 
factories, tanneries, leather works, and cigar and cigarette 
making. With coal close at hand and raw material easy 
to produce, there is no reason why manufacturing enter- 
prise in Colombia should not expand under properly 
directed energy. 

That Colombia will benefit by the completion of the 
canal across Panama cannot be doubted. Up to the 
present time the expenditure on the works has been 
772,545,412 francs by the old, and 65,000,000 francs by 
the new company, but for a very large proportion of this 
sum there is nothing to show. The transit trade across 
the isthmus averages 130,000 tons for outward and 
120,000 tons for homeward freights annually, and this 
will increase substantially when the canal is opened, if 
the statistics and estimates of the United States Panama 
Canal Commission are approximately correct. 

The financial situation in Colombia is not a happy 
one. The external indebtedness in 1896 was £3,514,442, 
chiefly due to British creditors ; in 1897 new bonds for 
£2,700,000 were issued to cancel this obligation, these 
to bear 1J per cent, interest, increasing at the rate of J 
per cent, every three years until 3 per cent, is reached ; 
but the debt is again in default. The internal funded 
debt is 6,000,000 pesos, and the floating obligations 
7,000,000 pesos, but the situation is complicated by an 
inconvertible paper currency issued by the Government 
through the Banco Nacional, and amounting to 50,000,000 
pesos. The exchange value of these notes constantly 
fluctuates, and complicates all commercial business. On 
the Isthmus of Panama the Colombian silver dollar of 
25 grammes weight and '825 fine is in use, and for 
purposes of convenience the national revenue and 
expenditure is calculated in this money, and also the 



1904] 



THE NATIONAL FINANCES 



615 



published statements of Colombian trade. The exchange 
value of the silver dollar varies from 45 to 50 cents in 
United States currency. While the French metric 
system has been adopted for the legal standard of 
weights and measures, it is seldom used in commercial 
transactions in the interior, the Spanish pound of 
1102 pounds avoirdupois, the arroba of 25 pounds, and 
the cargo, of 250 pounds, being generally accepted ; but 
corn is measured by the fanega. Lineal measurement is 
calculated on the basis of the vara of 80 centimetres. 

The national revenue and expenditure is sanctioned 
by the Congress for biennial periods. The budgets of 
1893 to 1900 were :— 





Revenue. 


Expenditure. 


1893-1894 
1895-1896 
1897-1898 
1899-1900 


Pesos. 

22,312,381 
26,266,300 
34,361,000 
34,305,000 


Pesos. 

33,502,386 
35,773,882 
35,771,013 
34,000,000 



The principal sources of revenue are the Custom- 
house duties on imported merchandise and exported 
produce, these producing 18,697,823 pesos in 1896, and 
13,256,353 pesos in 1897, but in this latter year the 
export duty on coffee was abolished. Other taxes 
contributing are the charge on the meat-drying establish- 
ments {saladeros), the sale of stamped paper, the match 
monopoly, the cigarette monopoly, and the receipts of 
the post and telegraph offices. Of the expenditure the 
War Department absorbs annually 5,000,000 pesos, and 
a much larger sum in years when revolution is active. 

Future development is dependent on the freedom 
from internal disturbance, and improved transport 
facilities. With great natural advantages of soil and 
climate, mineral wealth, large forest reserves of valuable 
timber, and admirable conditions for pastoral enterprise, 



616 COLOMBIA 

rapid progress would take place if a strong Administra- 
tion was established. Moreover, the comparative 
proximity of Colombia to the markets of the United 
States is a factor that will benefit her greatly when 
internal tranquillity is assured. With peace from political 
disputes will come the construction of railways and 
other means of transport, and the land and mineral 
deposits will no longer be allowed to lie idle. 






CHAPTER XXXIII 

VENEZUELA 

Internal Dissensions. Struggle between the " Yellows " and the 
" Blues." General Blanco. Revolt under General Salazar. 
Policy of Blanco. Conspiracy in 1889. Blanco Overthrown. 
Election of General Palacios. Revolt under Crespo. Provisional 
Government. Crespo Elected. Revolution under Dr Rojas 
Paul. Boundary Question with Great Britain. The Uruan 
Incident. Venezuela and the United States. Mr Olney and 
the Marquess of Salisbury. The Monroe Doctrine. The United 
States and Great Britain. The Cleveland Message. Venezuela 
and British Trade. Dignified Attitude of Crespo. Boundary 
Dispute centres in Washington. The Cleveland Commission. 
The Arbitration Tribunal. The Award. Diplomatic Relations 
between Great Britain and Venezuela. The Crespo Administra- 
tion. Election of Senor Andrade. Revolt against Andrade 
Administration. Death of Crespo. Victory of the Revolution. 
Election of President Castro. Modification of the Constitution. 
Political Division of Venezuela. Seditious Practices. Revolu- 
tionary Tendencies. Climate and Topography. Statistics of 
Population. Immigration. Municipalities. Public Education. 
Justice. Influence of the Church. Aversion to the Marriage 
Ceremony. The Priesthood. National Character. Indian 
Characteristics. Industrial Enterprise. Mining Enterprise. 
Manufacturing Industry. Means of Communication. Financial 
Situation. Estimates for 1899-1900. The Commercial Situation. 
Low Prices for Coffee. Imported Merchandise. Exports. Com- 
parison of British and United States Trades. German Competi- 
tion. Future Prospects. 

The political history of Venezuela is an almost unin- 
terrupted record of internal dissension, armed uprisings, 
civil war, and an absence of all respect for law and order. 
Since the Venezuelans threw off Spanish dominion in 



618 VENEZUELA 

1830, after a long-drawn struggle, and obtained their 
independence as a part of Nueva Granada, no fewer 
than fifty-one revolutionary movements have swept over 
the country, and of these eleven overturned the Govern- 
ment of the day and obtained control of public affairs. 

The great majority of these insurrections were the 
outcome of ambitious designs of politicians desirous of 
the spoils of office, and it was easy for such men to 
collect a following and take the field once that arrange- 
ments were made to acquire arms and ammunition. To 
the Venezuelan there were many inducements to revolt 
against the legal authorities, for rebellion meant oppor- 
tunity for looting, freedom from manual labour, sub- 
stantial reward if the movement was victorious, and 
the fact that if the peasant class did not join the 
insurrection they were impressed into the Government 
ranks and obliged to fight with no prospect of remunera- 
tion when hostilities ended. 

The period now under review begins when General 
Guzman Blanco was the central figure on the stage, and it 
was in the long struggle between the " Yellows " and the 
"Blues" that he first became prominent. The former 
ostensibly represented a Liberal policy, and the two 
factions may be considered as the Liberals and Con- 
servatives of Venezuelan political life, but so far as 
fundamental principles were concerned in actual methods 
of Government there was no choice between them. 
From 1847 to 1870 there was continual friction between 
the "Yellows" and the "Blues" for the upper hand, and 
it was not until the country was brought to the verge 
of ruin by the civil war lasting from 1866 to 1870 that 
the former obtained a decisive success. Blanco, who 
had been a leading personality on the winning side 
during this five years conflict, was now called upon to 
undertake the reorganisation of the political and economic 
situation, and to deal with the financial chaos to which 
the national exchequer was reduced. He was then 
forty-one years of age, having been born in 1829, and 
was clever and ambitious, iairly well educated, and 






1870] GUZMAN BLANCO 619 

possessed remarkable energy and determination of 
character. 

Although nominally elected President for the usual 
term, Blanco became virtually Dictator of Venezuela for 
twenty years, his authority being absolute between 1870 
and 1889. He actually occupied the Presidency from 
1870 to 1877, again from 1879 to 1884, and also from 

1886 to 1887 ; but when not formally in the chair he 
exercised power through one of his partisans, whom 
he placed at the head of the Executive on the under- 
standing that all official acts must be submitted to him 
for his approval, and that the policy of the administration 
at home and abroad should be dictated by him. The 
position of Blanco was not undisputed by his enemies, 
for many efforts were made to oust him from power, 
and one of these, headed by General Salazar, threatened 
serious consequences, but this was finally crushed in 1872 
and the insurgent leader captured and shot. Although 
the government of Blanco was autocratic, it was not 
without substantial benefit in many directions to the 
Venezuelans. The construction of railways was en- 
couraged, roads into the interior for wheeled traffic were 
opened, improvements were effected in the principal 
cities, the building of a harbour at La Guayra was 
undertaken, and measures were adopted to encourage 
foreign trade. Blanco spent the years when his sub- 
stitutes filled the Presidency in Europe, accredited as 
Minister Plenipotentiary to France, and directing Vene- 
zuelan affairs from Paris. To all outward appearance 
his popularity was assured after his first years of power ; 
statues were erected to him in Caracas and other centres, 
and he was commonly depicted as the "Illustrious 
American " and the regenerator of his country. 

Underlying this outward show of satisfaction with 
the Blanco regime there was a current of deep hostility 
only awaiting opportunity to come to the surface. In 

1887 General Lopez was placed in office by Blanco as 
his substitute for the ensuing two years, Blanco then 
proceeding to Paris, as was his custom. An active 



620 VENEZUELA 

conspiracy was set afoot in 1888 to excite public opinion 
against the Administration, and in 1889 this movement 
came to a head, the Venezuelan Congress declaring that 
the Republic would no longer endure the dictatorship of 
Blanco, and driving his nominee, Dr Rojas Paul, who had 
succeeded General Lopez, from the Presidency. Once 
the power of Blanco was broken, the bitter feeling long 
dormant against him burst out with unrestrained fury. 
A mob took possession of the principal streets of Caracas, 
the statues of Blanco, of which there were half a dozen 
in different parts of the municipality, were thrown from 
their pedestals and broken in pieces, and pictures of the 
Dictator were torn from their frames and cut to strips. 
Every possible insult was offered to the man who for 
many years had controlled Venezuelan destinies, and the 
temper of the people was such that they talked openly 
of assassination if he attempted to return. 

While there was no justification for the usurpation 
of dictatorial power by General Blanco, in some respects 
the continuity of policy it ensured was distinctly advan- 
tageous to the Venezuelans. The country enjoyed a 
more quiet condition of internal affairs between 1872 
and 1887 than at any period in its history, and economic 
amelioration progressed steadily in so far as expansion 
of industrial enterprise was concerned. Moreover, it 
was under Blanco that the national finances were placed 
on a fairly satisfactory footing, and the debt service 
attended to with a certain degree of regularity. In 
1887 his autocratic character was clearly demonstrated 
by his attitude towards Great Britain in connection with 
the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British 
Guiana, when he insisted that the question of the owner- 
ship of all territory to the west of the river Essequibo 
should be submitted to arbitration. Her Britannic 
Majesty's Government pointed out that certain sections 
of this region were indisputably British, and that no 
arbitration in regard to such portions was possible, but 
that where doubt existed, as in the case of the country 
near the Uruan and Cuyuni rivers, they were prepared 



1889] REVOLT UNDER CRESPO 621 

to meet the views of Venezuela. In reply to this com- 
munication, General Blanco sent the British Minister, 
Mr St John, his passports. Although efforts were made 
by Blanco to induce the Government of the United 
States to bring pressure to bear on Great Britain in 
connection with this dispute, they were unavailing at the 
time, and it was not until nine years later that active 
measures were taken in Washington for a settlement of 
the question. After the events of 1889, Blanco made no 
attempt to regain control of Venezuela, and settled 
down with his family in Paris, where he died in 1898. 

After the overthrow of Blanco, the Congress elected 
General Palacios for the statutory term of two years. 
His Administration was uneventful, except for a proposal 
to reform the Law of Constitution to extend the presi- 
dential term from two to four years, and to effect some 
other minor modifications, and on the question of this 
extension of the presidential period important develop- 
ments arose. In 1892 President Palacios completed 
the two years for which he had been elected, but insisted 
that the reform of the law then projected entitled him 
to remain until 1894, and his refusal to vacate office led 
to the outbreak of a serious revolution under the leader- 
ship of General Joaquin Crespo. It was not until 
October, 1892, after many months of severe fighting, that 
peace was restored by the victory of the insurgents and 
the flight of Palacios and his ministers from the country. 
A Provisional Government was then installed under 
General Crespo, the Chambers convened, and the reform 
in regard to the four years tenure of the Presidency 
approved and promulgated. In the following year the 
election was held, the choice falling on General Crespo, 
the leader of the recent revolt; and in March, 1894, the 
new President assumed his duties, but had not been 
long in power before a revolutionary movement, instigated 
by Dr Rojas Paul, broke out. Although this insurrection 
lingered on with some show of force until February, 
1896, it was never really dangerous to the Administra- 
tion and was only supported in the outlying districts. 



622 VENEZUELA 

General Crespo himself took the field in command of 
the Government troops, and his success against the 
insurgents added to his prestige and popularity. 

Illustrative of presidential authority in Venezuela, a 
story is told of an occasion when General Crespo was 
ailing and ordered by his doctor to a small village near 
La Guayra for change of air. One of the Ministers 
protested that by law the President could not leave the 
Federal District without permission from Congress, and 
that this village was outside such limits. " Make it part 
of the Federal District at once," said Crespo. Forthwith 
a decree was issued to that effect. 

Early in 1895 the Guiana boundary question again 
cropped up. The authorities of British Guiana had 
established a police post on the river Uruan, in territory 
claimed by Venezuela, and the Venezuelan Government 
instructed their representative to eject the British officials 
and occupy the disputed ground. These orders were 
executed, the two British European police officers, 
Inspector Baker and sub-Inspector Barnes, arrested and 
conveyed inland, and the half dozen native constables 
ordered away from the locality, the British flag being 
hauled down and that of Venezuela hoisted at the post. 
Strong representations were forwarded to the Britisl 
Government by the authorities at Demerara when news 
of this occurrence was received. These communications 
were repeated on the return of Inspector Baker and his 
companion, who had been released by the Venezuelans 
"after suffering some weeks of confinement and consider- 
able hardships. With no direct diplomatic relations with 
Venezuela, the British Government could only proceed 
through the German Minister, who was in charge of 
British interests in Caracas, to ask for an explanation 
of the affair. President Crespo gave little satisfaction 
by his reply, and for several months nothing was heard 
from either side ; but the fire was only smouldering, and 
soon burst into flame. 

In the middle of 1895 the Venezuelan Government 
was informed that a demand would shortly be made by 



1895] THE URUAN INCIDENT 623 

Great Britain for an apology and indemnity for the 
incident on the river Urnan. In these circumstances 
President Crespo decided to lay the matter before the 
United States Government for advice and assistance, 
and the situation was explained to Mr Olney, then 
Secretary of State, by Sefior Andrade, the Venezuelan 
Minister in Washington. In July and August, 1895, 
notes were exchanged between Mr Olney on behalf of 
the United States Administration, and the Marquess of 
Salisbury in regard to Venezuela. Mr Olney brusquely 
demanded that the difference between Her Majesty's 
Government and that of Venezuela in connection with 
the boundary between the latter country and British 
Guiana should be submitted to arbitration. The Uruan 
affair was only a side issue in this controversy, the 
policy of the Monroe doctrine being the motive ostensibly 
given for the action of the Washington authorities, based 
on the supposition that the British Government was 
deliberately encroaching on Venezuelan territory. The 
reply of Lord Salisbury to Mr Olney was most temperate 
in tone, and he pointed out that the title of Great 
Britain to that part of South America over which juris- 
diction was claimed by the authorities of British Guiana 
was abundantly clear and thoroughly established, with 
the exception of a comparatively small area which Her 
Majesty's Government had repeatedly offered to submit 
to arbitration. 

This answer did not satisfy President Cleveland and 
Mr Olney. A further request for arbitration on practi- 
cally the same basis as that made by the Venezuelan 
Government in 1887 was put forward, and this brought 
strained relations between the United States and Great 
Britain. Meanwhile, preparations were in progress for 
the formal demand on Venezuela by Her Majesty's 
Government for reparation for the treatment of the two 
police officials, Inspector Baker and Sub-Inspector 
Barnes. There was no change in the situation until 
December, 1895, but on the 18th of that month, 
President Cleveland sent a message to Congress which 



624 VENEZUELA 

nearly caused an outbreak of hostilities between Great 
Britain and the United States. He declared that unless 
Her Majesty's Government agreed to the demands of the 
United States Administration concerning arbitration in 
connection with the Venezuelan question, force would 
be used to compel the evacuation of all such territory 
as a Commission appointed by the United States authori- 
ties considered rightfully belonged to Venezuela. This 
action of President Cleveland placed the dispute between 
Great Britain and Venezuela on an altered footing, and 
the Uruan incident dropped into insignificance beside the 
complication which hoav threatened to develop into a 
war between two great nations. Although the demand 
for compensation for the outrage on the two British 
police officials was made in due time, and £1500 paid by 
the Venezuelan Government to settle the affair, the 
matter no longer occasioned any interest in view of the 
more important question which had arisen. 

When the news of the Cleveland message reached 
Venezuela, a scene of frantic excitement ensued. The 
text of the document was cabled to Caracas, printed 
copies were immediately posted in every section of the 
city, and the announcement of the attitude of the United 
States in the dispute with Great Britain was telegraphed 
far and wide throughout the country, meetings being 
held to applaud the action taken by President Cleveland 
and to shower abuse on the British. Processions 
paraded the streets of Caracas with banners and flags, 
speeches were made glorifying the magnanimous conduct 
of the United States in protecting republican institutions 
in South America, patriotic displays of all kinds were 
the order of the day ; but the Venezuelans entirely failed 
to distinguish between the policy of President Cleveland 
as prompted by a desire to establish a principle of the 
Monroe doctrine, and the situation created by the attack 
on the British police post on the river Uruan. In the 
minds of the great majority of the people the idea was 
fixed that the United States had taken up the cudgels 
for Venezuela because Great Britain had demanded 



1895] THE GUIANA BOUNDARY DISPUTE 625 

reparation for the outrage perpetrated on the British 
representatives, and that from motives of philanthropy 
the moral and material force of the Americans was to be 
used to drive the British out of all territory to which 
Venezuela laid claim, as well as to prevent any aggressive 
action by England in connection with the Uruan 
incident. In speeches delivered to crowded meetings in , 
Caracas, this theory was advanced in such form as to 
amount to a definite statement of fact that the conflict 
between the United States and Great Britain was a 
struggle between republican and monarchial institutions, 
and that all the republican governments of the world 
would join forces with the United States in the contest. 
It is no wonder that the people lost their heads under 
the influence of inflammatory rhetoric of this description, 
gravely expounded by leading members of the Govern- 
ment. 

Leagues were formed in Caracas and at other points 
hostile to British trade, the members binding themselves 
to purchase no merchandise of British origin, and pre- 
parations were begun for the embodiment of the militia 
forces in event of the outbreak of war between the 
United States and Great Britain, while the project of 
an invasion of British Guiana was freely discussed. 
Batteries were mounted near La Guayra to protect the 
harbour against attack from the sea, and the newspapers 
were replete with bellicose articles, urging the people to 
show patriotic feeling in every possible manner ; but in 
spite of all this excitement few cases occurred where 
personal outrage was offered to British residents in 
Venezuela. Only one authenticated instance is recorded, 
and that was in connection with the British Vice-consul 
in the town of Barcelona, on the river Orinoco. This 
man was a merchant, and his life was menaced by a 
group of ill-disposed neighbours ; threats were made to 
the effect that his property would be destroyed if he did 
not abandon the city, but the authorities intervened 
before mischief could be done. 

In the carnival festivities in February, 1896, the 

2 k 



626 VENEZUELA 

feeling of hostility against the British reached its height. 
It is customary to arrange representations of prominent 
events, and these are paraded through the principal 
thoroughfares during carnival week, and on this occasion 
some clever emblematic devices were to the fore, in which 
Venezuela and Great Britain were the chief figures. 
Venezuelan soldiers dragging British troops and sailors 
along the streets formed a centre of attraction and 
roused the wildest enthusiasm amongst the spectators, 
while caricatures of Englishmen, many of these extremely 
comical, were another favourite exhibition. In equal 
ratio to the hostility towards everything British was the 
sympathy for all designs representative of the United 
States ; but the carnival proved to be the culminating 
point of the excitement, the temper of the people 
rapidly cooling down when they realised that for the 
present there would be no war between England and 
America. A slight recrudescence of hostile feeling 
occurred in March, when a rumour reached Caracas that 
a British squadron had called at the Island of Curacoa, 
bound for Venezuela, to enforce the demand for indemnity 
in connection with the Uruan incident, but this flash in 
the pan died away when it was found that Her Majesty's 
Government held no such intention. While the 
Venezuelans still bore a latent hostility towards Great 
Britain, no sign of it was visible on the surface in April, 
1896, and all resolutions in regard to the cessation of the 
purchase of British goods disappeared completely, the 
people discovering that a large portion of the merchandise 
they most needed could be imported more cheaply from 
Great Britain than elsewhere, and this was sufficient to 
counterbalance the agitation set afoot against the 
trade. 

The one man in Venezuela who never lost his head 
while these developments were taking place between 
the British and the United States Governments was 
President Crespo, and his attitude throughout the 
controversy was worthy of all praise. He was quiet 
and dignified, reserved in regard to the questions at 



1896] THE CLEVELAND COMMISSION 627 

issue, and showed no outward sign of hostility towards 
the British. Crespo took a sensible view of the situation, 
asserting that he neither wished nor expected to see 
war result from the action of the United States 
Administration in connection with the boundary dispute, 
but sincerely hoped that the question of the frontier 
would now be settled once for all by arbitration, and 
that a long-standing cause of dissatisfaction would be 
thereby eliminated. It was this moderate attitude of 
the President that led to the peaceable arrangement for 
the payment of the indemnity to Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment on account of the Uruan affair, in spite of the 
strong opposition this policy evoked on the part of many 
politicians entertaining more narrow-minded views. 

All interest in the boundary question was now 
transferred to Washington, where the Commission 
nominated by President Cleveland to inquire into the 
validity of the Venezuelan claims held constant sittings. 
Venezuela was represented by Sefior Andrade, the 
Minister accredited to the United States, by Mr 
Storrow, a well-known lawyer of Boston, and by Mr 
Scruggs, a former diplomatic representative of the 
United States in Caracas. The task of this Commission 
was to examine all documentary evidence bearing on 
the Venezuelan cause, and to report to President 
Cleveland the result of the inquiry, but it was not long 
before the inconvenience of this arrangement became 
evident to the United States authorities. There could 
be at best only an ex-parte statement under the 
circumstances, for Great Britain was unrepresented, 
although it was chiefly with British interests that the 
Commission was concerned. An investigation of this 
nature could only lead to a communication to Her 
Majesty's Government of the deductions drawn by the 
Commission in Washington, and if these were favourable 
to Venezuela, to a further request for arbitration. Under 
such conditions the danger of war between the United 
States and Great Britain would again be imminent, a 
possibility which President Cleveland had no wish to 



628 VENEZUELA 

provoke, in view of the injurious effect on financial and 
commercial interests such action would entail. Towards 
the end of 1896, therefore, a modus vivendi was 
suggested for an arbitration tribunal to decide the merits 
of British and Venezuelan claims, the representatives of 
those two nations in Washington formulating the 
arrangement. A treaty in this sense was signed on 
June 14, 1897, and the tribunal subsequently met in 
Paris under the presidency of Dr Martens, a most 
distinguished Russian jurist. With the acceptance of 
this arbitration by Great Britain and Venezuela, the 
intervention of the United States in the matter ceased, 
and the Commission appointed by President Cleveland 
was dissolved, no report of its proceedings being 
submitted. In October, 1899, the award of the Paris 
tribunal was given, and, although not satisfying the- 
extreme pretensions of the Venezuelan advocates, was 
loyally accepted by General Crespo. This decision was 
closely in accord with the delimitation shown by the 
Schomburk line, but while giving Barima Point and the 
Cuyuni gold fields to Venezuela, it confirmed the British 
title to 60,000 square miles of the territory claimed by 
the Venezuelans. Diplomatic relations were subse- 
quently renewed between Great Britain and Venezuela, 
Mr Haggard being appointed Minister-Resident at 
Caracas, and Dr Pietri representing Venezuela at the 
Court of St James. 

In March, 1898, the presidential term of General I 
Crespo expired, and he vacated office in favour of his; 
successor. His Administration more nearly satisfied I 
the needs of the country than any former one had done, , 
and although he was a soldier and attained power 
through a successful revolutionary movement, he gave no ) 
place to militarism in his direction of public affairs. 
His Government was firm without being despotic, and 
he showed undeniable tact in dealing with domestic and I 
foreign questions, and that the people felt confidence in I 
him was demonstrated by the improvement in the public 
credit during his term of office. 



1898] ELECTION OF ANDKADE 629 

To succeed General Crespo, the choice fell on Senor 
Andrade, the Venezuelan Minister in the United States. 
It was not an unnatural choice, in view of the important 
services he had rendered in connection with the 
boundary question, for it was due to the course 
followed by him in his diplomatic relations with the 
Cleveland Administration that the intervention of the 
United States between Venezuela and Great Britain 
occurred, and the attitude assumed by President 
Cleveland in the matter was precisely what the 
Venezuelans most desired. Although the candidature 
of Senor Andrade was supported by General Crespo, no 
undue influence was brought to bear on the Federal 
Council to secure his election ; moreover, none of the 
other aspirants to presidential honours combining such 
substantial claims to the position. When the decision 
of the Council was made public, the general impression 
was favourable to the new president, and he assumed 
office with the good wishes of nearly the whole 
community. 

Senor Andrade did not prove a success as President, 
and his temporary popularity soon disappeared. His 
weak and vacillating policy in regard to internal politics 
created discontent, and afforded the opportunity that 
the Opposition had awaited to sow the seeds of sedition. 
Towards the end of 1898 the promoters of this revolu- 
tionary spirit decided that the time had arrived for 
armed insurrection against the Government, and the 
standard of revolt was raised in the western districts 
and in the State of Carabobo ; but it was not the wish 
of General Crespo to see President Andrade ousted 
from office, and he took the field in command of the 
Government troops to suppress the outbreak. The 
insurgents were scantily supplied with arms and 
ammunition, and could make little progress against the 
legal forces, the operations being confined chiefly to 
guerilla warfare. Gradually, therefore, order was restored 
under the direction of Crespo, and early in 1899 the 
movement was apparently nearing its end, but unfortun- 



630 VENEZUELA 

ately for the Government a disaster occurred at this 
stage to change the current of events. In a skirmish 
between a small body of troops and a band of rebels a 
stray bullet struck General Crespo in the head, killing 
him instantly, and his death at once brought about a 
revival of the insurrection. In a few months the 
insurgents were in control of the greater portion of the 
country, and prepared to march on Caracas, and it was 
evident that the Government cause was lost. On the 
approach of the rebel army President Andrade, with his 
ministers, abandoned the capital and sought refuge inl 
the Dutch colony of Curac^oa. 

A period of anarchy ensued, but at length order was 
re-established by the revolutionary leaders, and a Pro- 
visional Government formed. General Castro, who had 
been prominent in the revolt against Andrade, was 
elected President, and although various conspiracies 
were hatched against his authority, they were suppressed 
without difficulty. The disturbances in 1899 had 
brought many financial and economic afflictions in their 
train, notably widespread distress after the restoration 
of peace, and the fall in the price of coffee, the staple 
export from Venezuela, tended to accentuate the 
general distress. Under these circumstances it was not 
surprising that the exchequer was without funds to » 
meet the public obligations, the expenditure in 1898 and I 
1899 having been abnormally heavy in consequence of I 
internal disturbances, and the end of the nineteenth i 
century found Venezuela in the position of a defaulting! 
Government on the internal and external public debts, 
and in such economic distress that discontent was- 
apparent amongst all sections of the population. 

In February, 1902, General Castro was again elected 
to the Presidency, and during his second term of office 
some interesting events occurred. Damage to the 
property of foreign residents had been extensive in the 
various revolutionary outbreaks during recent years, and 
claims for compensation were preferred against thei 
Government. No consideration being accorded to these i 



1902] BLOCKADE OF LA GUAYRA 631 

demands, the matter passed into the hands of the 
foreign diplomatic representatives, and to them, also, 
no satisfaction was given. When diplomacy failed, 
Great Britain, Germany, and Italy determined to use 
force as the only means of securing a just settlement for 
their subjects. Towards the end of 1902 the three 
powers established a blockade of La Guayra and seized 
the Custom-house, announcing that they would remain 
in possession until sufficient funds had been collected to 
satisfy their demands. Through the mediation of the 
United States a protocol was signed on February 13, 
1903, agreeing to refer the dispute to the Hague 
Tribunal, and the conditions were set forth in a treaty 
on May 7 of the same year. Under this agreement not 
only the blockading powers, but all other nationalities 
were entitled to claim for damages suffered. On 
February 22, 1904, the award of the Hague Tribunal 
was given, and while admitting claims of all nationalities, 
it established a precedent in International Law in that a 
preferential right to the 30 per cent, of the Customs dues 
set aside was allowed to the three powers which had 
taken active steps to enforce payment, and that only 
after their claims were satisfied could other nations 
participate. The United States Government was 
requested to execute the award. 

The Venezuelan Law of Constitution differs from 
that of other South American States, and requires some 
explanation for the political situation to be understood. 
Congress appoints a Federal Council consisting of 19 
members for two years, and this Council elects a President 
from its own members, who is also President of the 
Republic for a term of four years under the modification 
introduced in 1893, and since extended to six years. 
Congress comprises the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives, three Senators being elected for each State 
for four years by the local Legislatures, and representa- 
tives in the proportion of one to every 35,000 inhabitants 
are chosen by popular, direct and public election. Until 
1881 the political division of Venezuela was twenty-one 



632 VENEZUELA 

States and their territories, but in that year the country 
was rearranged into eight States, the Federal District, 
two national settlements, and eight territories. These 
States are :— Miranda, Carabobo, Bermudez, Zamora, 
Lara, Los Andes, Falcon and Zulia, and Bolivar. The 
territories were : — Goajira, Alto Orinoco, Amazonas, 
Colon, Yurnari, Caura, Delta and Armisticio ; but in 
1891 the territory of Yuruari was reincorporated into 
the State of Bolivar, so that only seven of the eight 
territories created in 1881 now exist. In 1899 a 
measure was sanctioned for the re-creation of the twenty 
States under the Act of 1864, and this was again 
modified by a decree dated August 4, 1900, by which 
the Republic was apportioned into the fifteen political 
divisions already described. 

Before leaving the subject of politics in Venezuela, 
attention must be called to one clause in the Law of 
Constitution which offers a premium on revolutionary 
practices and explains why the country is a constant 
prey to internal disturbance. It is specially enacted 
that insurgents taking up arms from political motives 
shall be accorded belligerent rights, and that all property 
of persons participating in political risings is exempt 
from confiscation. In other words, any ambitious 
citizen can join a rebellion with a light heart, knowing 
that he cannot be punished for treasonable acts, and that 
his vested interests in land or other property are safe 
whether the cause he supports emerges victorious or 
defeated from the struggle. So long as these conditions 
continue there can be small hope for peace in this 
insurrection-ridden community. 

With half a hundred revolutionary outbreaks in a 
period of seventy years, the economic development of 
Venezuela has necessarily been slow. Presidents and 
Administrations disappeared with such startling rapidity 
in the first forty years of Venezuelan Independence, that 
little opportunity occurred for careful consideration of 
the means best fitted to promote the general welfare. 
Even when measures of improvement were initiated, 



1904] CLIMATE AND TOPOGEAPHY 633 

political disturbances invariably arose to obstruct con- 
tinuity of policy in the proposed reforms. 

It was not until General Guzman Blanco acceded to 
power in 1870 that any practical effort was made to 
inaugurate a system permitting mental and material 
development, to assume definite shape, the first by the 
institution of elementary education, and the second by 
the advent of an epoch of comparative peace which gave 
breathing space for industrial enterprise to expand ; 
but after his overthrow backsliding took place as a 
consequence of constant internal unrest. A prospect of 
a more happy state of affairs opened under General 
Crespo between 1894 and 1898, but his successor was 
unable to maintain this improvement. For the last 
seven years, therefore, Venezuela had been a prey to the 
intrigues of unscrupulous politicians, and the attendant 
evils of ever-recurring conspiracies against the authorities, 
and, as a consequence, the economic situation has been 
confronted by innumerable difficulties. 

The climate and topography of Venezuela are factors 
of such variable quantities as to require description. 
The coast line on the northern and eastern boundary is 
swampy and unhealthy at all seasons in consequence of 
malaria ; but this low-lying land only extends for a very 
short distance into the interior, precipitous mountain 
ranges then rising abruptly to 5000 feet above sea level, 
and at the back of these lofty chains are great valleys 
where a fertile soil and abundance of water offer many 
facilities for coffee plantations and other branches of 
agricultural industry. In one of these valleys is the 
city of Caracas, at an elevation of 3000 feet above the 
sea, and endowed with the climatic attributes of per- 
petual springtime. There is little variation in tempera- 
ture the year round, the thermometer in the shade 
seldom marking higher than 76° F. during the daytime 
or falling below 65° at night. These conditions are 
repeated in more or less degree in the succession of 
valleys in the mountain area, the greater or lower 
altitude modifying heat or cold. Where districts are 



634 VENEZUELA 

above an altitude of 2000 feet the climate is not injurious 
to immigrants from northern countries ; malarious fevers 
are few, and epidemic disease rarely encountered. 
Towards the south-west the character of the country 
changes, the mountain ranges disappearing and giving 
place to great open plains stretching away to the banks 
of the river Orinoco, at which point heavy forest 
replaces the grass lands of the more central districts. 
These open plains are the llanos, and here the climate is 
hot and humid, malaria playing havoc with residents 
accustomed to live in temperate regions. With the 
exception of the llanos the greater portion of Venezuela 
is heavily wooded with excellent timber trees of many 
different kinds. 

In regard to population, no accurate statistics are 
available, the census returns being unreliable. In 1873 
official figures showed a total population of 2,032,476 ; 
in 1891 this estimate was increased to 2,323,527, com- 
prising 1,137,139 males and 1,186,388 females. In 1890 
the Indian population was given as 326,000 ; of these, 
66,000 were classified as independent, 20,000 as under 
control, and 240,000 as civilised. In 1894 another esti- 
mate gave 2,444,816, including 44,129 foreigners of the 
following nationalities : — Spanish, 13,558 ; Colombians, 
11,081; British, 6154; Dutch, 3729; Italians, 3179; 
French, 2545 ; Germans, 962. The area of Venezuela, 
after deducting the 60,000 square miles awarded to 
Great Britain by the arbitration proceedings in 1899, is 
placed at 533,943 square miles. The distribution of the 
population in 1891 is shown by the following table. 
Information regarding the movement of population is 
seldom published, the latest returns being for 1889. 
These show 6705 marriages, 76,187 births, and 55,218 
deaths, as taking place during the twelve months. Of 
immigration there is little ; in 1890 the arrivals were 
1555, but these were offset by an equal number of 
departures. During the last few years there have been 
occasional endeavours to induce foreigners to settle, and 
contracts were made subsequent to 1896 for the intro- 



1904] 



POPULATION 



635 



duction of immigrants to form colonies on national lands, 
but nothing has really been done. 



State. 


Area, 
sq. miles. 


Population 

1891. 


Population 

per 

sq. mile. 


Federal District . 


45 


89,133 


1,980-7 


Miranda 




33,969 


484,509 


14-2 


Carabobo 






2,984 


198,021 


60-6 


Bermudez . 






32,243 


300,597 


9-3 


Zamora 






25,212 


246,676 


9-6 


Lara . 






9,296 


246,760 


26-5 


Los Andes . 






14,719 


336,146 


22-8 


Falcon and Zulia 






36,212 


224,566 


6-2 


Bolivar 






88,701 


50,289 


0-5 


Various Territories 




290,562 


146,830 


0-5 


Total . 






533,943 


2,323,527 


4-3 



Of Venezuelan cities the most important are Caracas, 
with a population of 72,429; Valencia, with 38,654; 
Maracaibo, with 34,284 ; Barquisimeto, witli 31,476 ; 
Ciudad de Cura, with 12,198; Barcelona, with 12,785; 
Ciudad Bolivar, with 11,686 ; and Guanara, with 
10,880. Little has been accomplished in the matter of 
improvements by the municipal authorities of these 
towns. Caracas, the National Capital, is without 
drainage, and has a deficient water supply, is ill-paved 
and dirty, and the enforcement of ordinary hygienic 
regulations are entirely neglected. Of other Venezuelan 
cities Valencia is the most attractive, broad streets 
shaded by well-grown trees lending a picturesque 
appearance to the thoroughfares. 

In regard to public education, Venezuela is one of 
the most backward of the South American States, and 
previous to 1870 no system existed for public instruc- 
tion. It was due to General Guzman Blanco that free 
elementary schools were established, and the attendance 
of children between the ages of six and fourteen made 



636 VENEZUELA 

obligatory ; but the law of compulsory attendance has 
never been enforced, and children who should be 
receiving instruction are sent by their parents to work 
on the coffee plantations, or occupied in other employ- 
ments. There are 1415 Federal elementary schools, 
and 150 maintained under the different State Govern- 
ments, and the number of pupils on the rolls is returned 
as 100,026, but the attendance is not regular. For the 
Federal institutions the sum annually expended is 
2,500,000 francs, or about 20 francs for each child 
enrolled. Away from the towns no effort is made to 
furnish primary instruction for the children of the 
labouring classes, the employers of thousands of workers 
on the principal coffee estates finding neither school 
houses nor teachers. Occasionally, rudiments of educa- 
tion are imparted by the parish priests, but such 
innovations receive small encouragement from the 
plantation owners, and seldom lead to substantial result. 
For secondary education there are twenty-two colleges 
for boys and eleven establishments for girls, and also 
twenty-six private institutions, while for higher educa- 
tion two Universities exist. On the Federal colleges 
and universities the National Government spends 
annually 850,000 francs, an amount totally inadequate 
for the purpose. Among the lower social classes in 
Venezuela, the question of public instruction is regarded 
with apathetic indifference, and parents consider them- 
selves hardly used when some unusually zealous official 
insists on the attendance of children at the public 
schools. 

The administration of justice is based on a very low 
standard, and corruption is deep-rooted in both higher 
and lower branches of the judiciary. The laws are 
codified, but the procedure is tedious and costly, and 
all litigation is avoided as much as possible, no matter 
how just may be the cause in dispute. The necessity 
of purifying the judicial system is not appreciated by the 
Venezuelans, even the more highly educated section of 
the population being content to allow matters to rest 






1904] CHURCH INFLUENCE 637 

in the existing unsatisfactory condition rather than exert 
their influence to eradicate the scandal which present cir- 
cumstances constantly provoke. In the various munici- 
palities detachments of police are maintained, but they are 
more often utilised as armed troops to suppress seditious 
outbreaks than as constables. Murder, robbery, and 
other serious crimes are of common occurrence, and are 
regarded with indifference. 

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Venezuela is of a negative character. So far as the 
educated men are concerned, the tendency towards free 
thought in matters religious is strongly developed ; but 
whether this attitude arises from the restraint imposed 
by Church ritual on their methods of life, or is the 
result of a careful consideration of religious belief, is not 
clearly defined. With the women of the higher social 
classes the Catholic doctrines are predominant, and the 
rites and ceremonies of the church sincerely venerated ; 
but it is with the lower grades of the community that 
the Venezuelan clergy have most power. The ignorance 
of the peasantry is so dense that superstition plays a 
great part in their lives, and the priesthood can instill 
into their minds an outward respect for religious forms 
and dread of direful consequences to follow disobedience 
to priestly injunctions. In one respect, however, the 
clergy have failed to impress on the peasant classes a 
standard of morality similar to that appertaining to most 
other countries. In so far as the ceremony of marriage 
is concerned, the lower grades of the community do not 
conform to modern ideas, and more often than not the 
man and woman living together and bringing up a family 
of half a dozen children are not married. Frequently it 
is the woman who objects to being legally bound, aver- 
ring that she has a stronger position when simply 
cohabiting with the man than if he could claim any 
legal rights as a wife. Nor is any social degradation 
attached to this form of concubinage, which probably 
originated in the fact that the fees charged by the 
priests for a marriage ceremony are unduly heavy, often 



638 VENEZUELA 

prohibitive. Hence the "free love" habits, and no 
arguments on the part of the clergy of to-day have been 
successful in changing the practice of past generations. 
An example of the attitude of the peasants towards 
marriage is related by a French priest in one of the 
country districts. A woman brought her child to him 
to be baptised, and was asked the name of the father. 
"No se, Senor Padre," was the reply, in a tone per- 
fectly unconscious of any uncommon occurrence. The 
priesthood in Venezuela is recruited from men of low 
intellectual ability, and no endeavour is made by its 
members to formulate a means by which the people's 
morals may in this respect be improved. The clergy 
are content to find their limited authority respected, 
and show small desire for any expansion of the narrow- 
minded train of reasoning that now controls their 
action. 

There is a tale concerning the present Archbishop 
of Caracas which endears him to the Venezuelans. One 
day his carriage mules jibbed when ascending a steep 
hill, and the language of the driver became more forcible 
as his efforts to make the animals move proved unavail- 
ing. The Archbishop put his head out of the window 
and called, " No tanto liomhre, no tanto " in reproof, and 
alighted to try his powers of persuasion. He had driven 
mules in his youth, and warmed to his work with a will, 
forgetting his episcopal dignity until reminded of his 
position by a voice behind him remarking, "No tanto 
liombre, no tanto." Thereafter that exjjression came into 
general use whenever bad language overstepped con- 
ventional limits. 

The national character has hardly reached a stage of 
development to permit an accurate diagnosis. Among 
the upper social grades Spanish traits are toned down 
by local surroundings, but are always present. The 
white Venezuelans are impulsive in all political affairs, 
and impatient of control, the insubordinate spirit showing 
as plainly now as in former days in Spain when it led 
to pronunciamientos on the part of influential men at 



1904] VENEZUELAN CHARACTER 639 

variance with the authorities. These features are to-day 
characteristic of the educated classes, and account in large 
measure for the political turmoil in which the country 
is so often involved. The uneducated masses have a 
greater proportion of Indian than Spanish blood ; they 
preserve the national traits of their Indian forefathers, 
and although the level of their intelligence is low, yet 
they are crafty and cunning in their dealings to an extent 
not suspected at first by the casual observer. Simple in 
their habits of life, these people care little for modern 
civilisation, nor have they at present any ambition to better 
their social condition ; content with a hand-to-mouth 
existence, they rarely make any provision for the future. 
They are clay awaiting the hand of the potter to mould 
them into shape, and years must elapse before their 
animal and half savage existence is sufficiently expanded 
to allow of mental development. 

Industries and occupations in Venezuela may be 
divided into three groups : — The cultivation of coffee, 
cacao and sugar-cane ; the raising of cattle ; and gold 
mining. The principal wealth is derived from coffee, the 
exportation in recent years averaging 50,000 tons annually, 
worth, approximately, £2,000,000. There are now 33,000 
coffee plantations in the country, and the cultivated area is 
200,000 acres. As a rule, the bushes are protected from 
the sun by shade trees planted when the estate is first 
opened. It is seldom that any great care is shown in 
the methods of cultivation. Two or three times each 
year the grass and weeds are cleared away, and after 
the crop is gathered the bushes are pruned, nature then 
doing all else that is needed to bring abundant crops 
for the ensuing season, and it says much for soil and 
climate that with this minimum of labour the plantations 
in most districts have yielded heavily. In a few instances 
coffee plantations are owned by foreigners, but the 
industry is controlled by Venezuelans. 

The cacao plantations are conducted on similar 
lines, and there are 5000 estates devoted to the pro- 
duction of this article, the amount shipped abroad in 



040 VENEZUELA 

1897 being 4000 tons, chiefly from La Guayra, and 
worth £200,000. In addition to the crude cacao ex- 
ported, a certain quantity annually finds its way into 
foreign markets in the form of manufactured chocolate, 
that from Caracas being especially esteemed for its 
purity and flavour. 

For the cultivation of sugar-cane the conditions in 
Venezuela are not particularly favourable, but there are 
1100 estates devoted to it, although as a rule the 
output has been limited, and in some cases not more 
than a few tons of sugar were manufactured. Often 
the machinery employed is of most primitive descrip- 
tion, and wooden rollers for crushing the cane turned 
by horses or mules are frequently seen in operation. 
The inducement to cultivate cane and manufacture 
sugar has been the prohibitive duty imposed upon 
foreign sugars, this charge amounting to one franc the 
kilo, but recently this high tariff has been modified, 
and the industry may be expected to diminish rapidly, 
if not to disappear altogether in the course of a few 
years. 

To the growth of cereals little attention is paid. A 
small amount of maize is produced for home use, but 
the cultivation of wheat is rarely attempted, flour being 
imported to supply the needs of the population. Yams, 
beans, and other vegetables are grown to meet local 
demand, but agricultural farming is everywhere neglected, 
in spite of the favourable conditions prevailing in various 
districts. 

The principal centre of pastoral industry is in the 
llanos, the great plains stretching away to the river 
Orinoco. No accurate information as to the number of 
horned cattle in Venezuela is available, the calculation 
made in 1888 of 8,476,300 head being obviously at fault, 
and a revised estimate in 1896 of from 4,000,000 to 
5,000,000 being hardly more definite. This section 
where cattle breeding establishments are situated is 
difficult of access, and details in regard to the industry 
are scanty. The herds consist of long-horned, small- 



1904] 



MINERAL RESOURCES 



641 



bodied animals, descended from the cattle introduced 
by the Spaniards when this country was first colonised, 
and at present there is no market to which they can 
be shipped, so that they are only of value for their 
hides. Other branches of pastoral industry are the 
breeding of goats and sheep, the total number being 
estimated at 6,000,000. Of horses and mules Venezuela 
contains 600,000; of donkeys, 850,000; and of swine, 
2,000,000. In 1898 the total amount of hides and 
skins shipped abroad was 3440 tons. 

The mining industry is chiefly confined to the 
neighbourhood of the Cuyuni River and the Yuruari 
Territory, the once famous Callao mine, from which 
fabulous profits were obtained, being in this latter locality. 
The quantity of gold exported from these districts between 
1884 and 1897 was :— 





Ounces. 




Ounces. 


1884 


233,935 


1891 


49,050 


1885 


172,037 


1892 


46,560 


1886 


217,135 


1893 


47,950 


1887 


95,352 


1894 


52,925 


1888 


71,594 


1895 


47,588 


1889 


88,834 


1896 


60,674 


1890 


85,931 


1897 


43,500 



The falling-off in the amount of gold is due to the 
rich placer mining having become exhausted, and the 
difficulty of transport for heavy machinery to work the 
quartz reefs near the Callao property. Projects have 
been made during the past decade to build a railway 
into this district, but none of the suggestions put forward 
have materialised. Gold is also found in other districts, 
but no important undertakings have been attempted. 
On the right bank of the river Orinoco is an immense 
deposit of hematite ore, from which trail shipments have 
been made to Philadelphia with encouraging results, but 

2s 



642 VENEZUELA 

the property has been the subject of lengthy litigation and 
development has been retarded. Silver mines exist in 
the States of Bermudez, Lara, and Los Andes. Other 
minerals, such as asphalt, sulphur, lead, copper, and tin 
are also found. Coal is mined, but is of poor quality 
and seldom used. The salt deposits, a Government 
monopoly, constitute a valuable resource, and the income 
derived from them in 1894 reached 1,727,490 francs. 
Under more settled conditions there is little doubt that 
mining enterprise is capable of rapid development and 
extension. 

Of manufacturing industry there is none in Venezuela 
except a few concerns for preparing chocolate, some 
distilleries and breweries, and a few cigar and cigarette 
factories. Practically all manufactured articles in use 
are imported from abroad. There is no reason why this 
should be the case, the rivers and streams providing 
abundant water for motive power to drive machinery, 
and raw material being available for the manufacture of 
most goods in common use. 

Additional facilities of transport are urgently needed 
for the economic development of Venezuela. At present 
only 529 miles of railway are open to the public service, 
and these lines are built only to give access to the high- 
lands from the sea coast, none existing for transit to the 
central districts. Roads for wheeled traffic have been 
constructed in some districts, but so little attention has 
been paid to their maintenance that they are frequently 
impassible, and resort is necessary to mules and donkeys 
for the conveyance of merchandise, a method at once 
costly, inconvenient, and tardy. In a matter which is 
of vital importance to industrial progress, the authorities 
maintain a most apathetic attitude. Under Blanco an 
effort was made to encourage railway enterprise, but the 
bad faith of subsequent Administrations in regard to the 
obligations contracted with the various companies has 
deterred the investment of fresh capital for extending 
the railway system. Until, therefore, the present 
impediments are mitigated or removed, it is impossible 



1904] PUBLIC DEBT 643 

that the great natural resources can be thoroughly 
recognised or adequately developed. No practical effort 
is made to utilise the river Orinoco and its tributaries 
for the development of the rich territories near this 
magnificent waterway, although in the neighbourhood 
are forests of valuable timber, large areas where india- 
rubber exists, and districts where many medicinal barks 
and herbs can be obtained. These riches remain 
untouched for lack of transport. 

The financial situation of Venezuela is unsatisfactory, 
although the public indebtedness is not inordinately 
large. This is due more to the circumstance that the 
credit of the country has not been sound enough to 
allow large borrowings, rather than to any unwillingness 
of successive Administrations to contract loans. The 
foreign debt originated in the share of the old Colombian 
debt assumed by Venezuela when the two States separ- 
ated, and in 1834 the amount allotted to Venezuela was 
£1,888,396, and there is £906,400 for arrears of interest. 
In 1881 bonds for the conversion of this debt were 
issued for £2,750,000, the amount in circulation in 1897 
being £2,638,400, and since then the service has been 
in default. In 1896 a further external obligation was 
contracted to settle claims made by the railway com- 
panies for a sum of 50,000,000 bols., representing 
£1,949,742, but no interest on this loan has been paid 
since July, 1898. The internal bonds in circulation 
amount to 79,783,511 francs, and, in addition, there 
is a floating debt of 30,000,000 francs. The total of 
the public obligations outstanding at the present time 
may be placed at £10,000,000, including arrears of 
interest. 

The financial difficulties have arisen through an 
excess of expenditure over revenue, a product of revolu- 
tionary outbreaks, and a lax administration of the 
exchequer. For the year 1899-1900 the revenue and 
expenditure were estimated to balance, but a heavy 
deficit occurred in consequence of further insurrectionary 
troubles. The estimates for that year are a fair inclica- 



644 



VENEZUELA 



tion of the normal resources and expenses. They 
were : — 



Revenue. 


Bolivars. 


Expenditure. 


Bolivars. 


Customs Duties . 
Stamps 

Internal Taxes . 
Transit Dues 
Salt Taxes . 

„ (additional) 
Mining and Lands 

Total 


26,000,000 
2,669,680 
2,593,300 
4,722,500 
900,000 
1,960,000 
32,000 


Public Services . 
Internal Debt 
External Debt 

„ (loan of 1S90) 

Foreign Claims 
Public Works 
State Subventions 

Total 


19,893,456 
4,967,000 
2,155,203 
3,000,000 
887,321 
2,340,000 
5,654,500 


38,877,480 


38,877,480 



The transit dues consist of the additional duties on 
imported merchandise levied by the National Govern- 
ment in place of the interstate charges formerly made by 
the several States, and nominally are returned to the 
different States, or expended for their benefit in the 
construction of public works. Customs duties form the 
principal source of revenue, the duties on imported goods 
being 40 per cent, of the invoice value. There is little 
possibility in the near future of any substantial expansion 
of the national income, the poverty of the population 
being so pronounced that any large increase of internal 
taxation is impossible. 

Commercially the country has been embarrassed 
during the last few years by the low price for coffee. It 
is the practice of merchants to make advances against 
the coffee crop and recoup themselves from the proceeds 
of the sales, and the drop of 50 per cent, in value in the 
course of four or five years restricted all transactions of 
this kind. This, combined with the effect of internal 
political disturbances, hurt all trade. Although the 
Venezuelans are numerically in the majority, Germans, 
British, French, Italians, Dutch and Spaniards, are all 
interested in the general business of the country. During 



' 



1904] COMMERCE 645 

the past seven years the value of imported merchandise 
has averaged 100,000,000 francs, exports being worth 
slightly more. In 1898 Venezuela purchased British 
goods for £468,822, and sold to England produce worth 
£45,599, and during the same year the imports from the 
United States were $2,704,908, while Venezuelan articles, 
chiefly coffee, to the value of $7,722,564 were sent to 
New York. These figures show that the United States 
purchases 40 per cent, of the total exports of Venezuela, 
and sells to her only 12 per cent, of her imports. Great 
Britain, on the other hand, in 1898 sold to Venezuela 
12 per cent, of her total imported merchandise and 
bought 1J per cent, of her surplus produce, and this 
proportion was approximately maintained in the four 
years from 1895 to 1898. The balance of Venezuelan 
trade goes to Germany, France, Holland, Italy and 
Spain. For imported merchandise the position of 
Germany in comparison with other countries is steadily 
improving, German manufacturers taking more pains to 
study the wants and peculiarities of the Venezuelan 
trade, and the system on which German trading is 
conducted being more convenient for the buyer on 
account of longer credits and other concessions accorded. 
The country is rich in resources, and has a soil and 
climate unrivalled for many valuable products for which 
the world has need. Mineral wealth exists and virgin 
forests remain untouched. The geographical position 
also offers many advantages, the journey from New York 
to Caracas taking only five days now, and capable of 
being greatly expedited if any inducement arose. It 
is unlikely that Venezuela can remain many years longer 
an unknown land, only occasionally coming before the 
eyes of the world in connection with some such incident 
as the controversy between the United States and Great 
Britain in 1895, or when exceptionally bloodthirsty 
revolutionary outbreaks occur. As yet there are no 
indications of the dawning of peaceful times, and at the 
opening of the twentieth century insurgents were every- 
where up in arms. It would seem that nothing short of 



646 VENEZUELA 

iron despotism can give breathing space to the unfortu- 
nate people, and there is no present sign of deliverance 
either through a prolonged dictatorship or of the advent 
among the ruling classes of a higher conception of 
patriotic duty. 






CHAPTER XXXIV 

CONCLUSION 

The Republics and Internal Dissensions. Spanish and Portuguese 
Influence on the Inhabitants. South America and Cuba. 
Spanish Traits modified. More Peaceful Future Conditions. 
Measures for Consolidation. Necessity of Closer Relations 
between South American Republics. Free Interchange of 
Commodities. Europe and South America. Reasons why 
Progress watched. Outlet for Emigration from Latin Countries. 
Wheat, Maize, Beef, Mutton and Coffee. Simon Bolivar and the 
Spanish Colonies. The Ideals of Sucre and San Martin. The 
Development of South America. United States Influence. The 
Panama Canal. Chilian Influence on the Pacific Coast. The 
United States and Chile. Bolivian Mineral Wealth and Foreign 
Immigration. 

A witty diplomatist in one of the South American 
republics not long since remarked to a deputation of 
merchants coming to him with claims against the Govern- 
ment to which he was accredited, "Gentlemen, you 
appear to think that this is a country equipped with a 
Government with which I can deal. It is nothing of 
the sort. It is a hunting ground." 

Hitherto there has been only too much cause to 
justify the sarcasm underlying this diplomatic jest. 
Glancing back over the period which this history covers, 
there is everywhere the sense of human sacrifice, the all- 
pervading smell of bloodshed, no matter whether the 
country under review is Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, or 
Paraguay ; the first three are torn and bleeding from 
internal dissensions, and Paraguay still mourns for her 

647 



648 CONCLUSION 

victims in the unequal struggle against an invading army 
of vastly superior numbers and resources. Is it possible 
to think that this section of South America has yet 
emerged from a condition of affairs that in the course of 
the last forty years outrivalled the worst epoch of the 
Middle Ages in the Old World? From the troublous 
times in Europe before and after the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, sprung nations hardened by the 
lessons of adversity taught by experience in the severe 
school of civil wars when men fought for a principle 
rather than suffer unjust oppression. Spain with her 
grasping policy of obtaining all possible tribute from her 
colonies and her methods of bringing pressure to bear 
on individuals under the doctrines of the Inquisition, 
drove her subjects across the seas into a revolt that only 
ended with freedom from the Spanish yoke. In that 
struggle the South American colonists were deserving of 
all sympathy. It was an uprising against the worst form 
of tyranny. The unanimity of this feeling was irresistible, 
victory a natural consequence, but Spain learnt nothing 
from the disasters she suffered. The history of the 
South American revolt was repeated in Cuba, under not 
dissimilar circumstances, until the intervention of the 
United States Government in 1898. The question 
raised by investigation into affairs of these South 
American republics is whether they have profited as 
they should have done after their hard-fought battle for 
their independence. The feeling against a continuance 
of Spanish dominion had many sound reasons to justify 
its existence ; but the colonists were Spaniards after 
they gained their freedom, and Spanish character was 
then, and is now, the prominent influence amongst the 
inhabitants. The strain is inherited. It is to this fact 
that revolution, civil war, political turmoil and other 
calamities can be traced ; for this reason the river Plate 
has made such tardy economic progress, in spite of 
magnificent natural advantages. Yet there are signs 
that the influence of Spanish character is slowly losing 
its baneful grip over this continent. After a century of 



1904] CONCLUSION 649 

unrest the truth is coming home by degrees to the 
people that there is something more satisfactory than a 
condition of affairs where the hand of every man is 
against his neighbour. The old spirit is not yet 
eliminated ; but it is nearing its end, and to Argentina 
belongs the credit for having prepared its funeral dirge. 
The lesson that freedom does not mean anarchy has 
taken long to learn, but every year it is better under- 
stood. 

The new century opens with the dawn of peace in 
this quarter of the globe. Possibly it may be the false 
light seen in eastern countries before the real daylight is 
at hand, but it is none the less a signal that darkness 
cannot endure much longer. Seditious movements in 
Argentina are out of fashion to-day. Small tendency is 
shown towards a revival of practices that brought little 
else than misery. In Uruguay evolutionary progress has 
been slower than in Argentina. Political conditions are 
such that the demon of armed strife is harder to kill in 
consequence of the bitter feud between Colorados and 
Blancos. Yet it is nearing its end, although the two 
factions have again met on the field of battle. Even 
Paraguay, with the disjointed elements which constitute 
its Government, is drifting away from insurrectionary 
methods, and slowly adopting the theory and practice of 
conducting public affairs without recourse to the throat- 
cutting policy of a few years ago. 

If these republics would suppress their military 
establishments and rid themselves of the armaments they 
have collected, tranquillity would be ensured. They are 
fond of posing as large nations while still in their 
swaddling clothes. The possession of great stores of 
war material is a temptation to try conclusions with their 
neighbours. Even in this respect, however, improvement 
is noticeable. There is less disposition nowadays to rush 
into a quarrel, and the growing desire for internal and 
external peace is a most hopeful sign. 

What is necessary to consolidate peace is the adequate 
administration of justice throughout these republics, 



650 CONCLUSION 

protection for civil rights, and a more liberal system of 
public education. No great ability, no extraordinary 
effort, no costly expenditure of money, is necessary to 
achieve these results. Honest administration, supported 
by the goodwill of the inhabitants, is all that is required 
to place these countries on a sound basis. The present 
position of the River Plate Republics and Brazil is an 
anomaly. Relations between Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, and Brazil should be drawn closer. For these 
countries to maintain impassible trade barriers in the 
shape of tariff restrictions is folly. A zolherein estab- 
lishing free interchange for all merchandise could only 
prove beneficial. Buenos Aires in such circumstances 
would become the acknowledged metropolis of this 
section of the Continent. With extended intercourse, an 
expansion of mental perspective would follow. This 
would lead to the Governments taking joint action in 
all matters of general interest in this part of the world. 

It is often asserted that the European has small reason 
to pay close attention to River Plate affairs, on account 
of the isolated position of Brazil and Argentina. This 
may have been true in the past, but is so no longer. 
There are two substantial reasons for watching develop- 
ments in these republics. The first is that the temperate 
regions of South America provide an outlet for the 
surplus population of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France. 
The Anglo-Saxon has a choice of British Colonies to 
which to emigrate, and the Teuton there finds also con- 
ditions to his taste. The United States provides a 
further field for both these nationalities. In the case of 
the people of Latin countries the situation is different. 
In South America the surroundings are in accordance 
with their traditional customs. For the Spaniard and 
Portuguese there is the inducement of a like language, 
while for the Italian the difference is easily overcome. 
The River Plate Republics are so essentially Latin in 
character that they form the natural resting place for the 
people of European Latin countries, who may be forced 
to leave their homes in consequence of increasing com- 



1904] CONCLUSION 651 

petition in the struggle for existence. To these people 
the River Plate or Brazil is a haven of refuge. Under 
improved economic conditions it will become infinitely 
more attractive for the inhabitants of over-crowded 
European centres. 

The second reason why Europe cannot afford to 
neglect progress in the River Plate and Brazil is because 
South America is rapidly taking rank as one of the 
principal purveyors of food for European markets. 
Wheat, maize, coffee, beef and mutton are received in 
constantly increasing quantities from this quarter, and a 
sudden cessation of supplies would entail serious conse- 
quences to those countries which are accustomed to 
depend upon shipments of cereals, coffee, and meat from 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. It is not, however, 
with the possibility of decrease, but with the probability 
of a substantial increase, of the supply of food stuffs that 
Europe is most concerned. Argentina and Uruguay at 
present export to Europe 100,000,000 bushels of wheat 
and 50,000,000 bushels of maize annually. This amount 
will be trebled in the next decade, and that means cheap 
bread stuffs for Europe. It has another bearing also 
upon the European situation. So long as production in 
cereal crops steadily augments in the River Plate, the 
agricultural industry in Europe must be confronted with 
prices leaving small margin of profit to the farmer. 

In regard to the meat trade with Europe, the River 
Plate has no cause to fear competition by the United 
States or the British colonies. The United States will 
soon have no surplus to send abroad, the rapidly increas- 
ing home population annually requiring additional 
supplies. The conditions of the River Plate trade are so 
much more favourable than those for Australia or New 
Zealand that the latter countries cannot compete success- 
fully in beef, and only to a moderate extent in mutton. 
When it is remembered that Argentina and Uruguay 
possess more than 30,000,000 head of horned cattle and 
130,000,000 sheep, it will be recognised they must be a 
factor of special interest to Europe, the more so as there 



652 CONCLUSION 

is ample room to double these numbers. Nor is the 
River Plate unknown in smaller matters. The British 
Government recently purchased in Argentina 35,000 
horses and mules for military service in South Africa, 
and relies on further supplies whenever necessity arises. 
It is therefore evident that the progress of these countries 
will be closely watched. 

The prosperity of these River Plate Republics rests 
entirely in the hands of their people. If they are 
desirous of better administration they must look to 
themselves to obtain it. They cannot regard corrupt 
practices with apathy until stirred into action by some 
political leader who sees in the conditions of the moment 
an opportunity to further his own ambitious designs. 
The people must look to the education of their children. 
It is from the residents, whether natives or foreigners, 
that a movement for reform in the judicial system must 
come. They must cut themselves adrift from the 
lethargy prevailing hitherto in regard to economic pro- 
gress. They must break away from the idea that all 
efforts for improvement should be initiated by the 
authorities. The system of paternal government so 
long in vogue has proved a failure. It is a relic of 
Spanish and Portuguese Administration. The time has 
come to discard it. The Press is free. The right of 
public meeting is not denied. Through these two 
agencies much good can be effected if the people are 
determined to help themselves towards better things. 
Plato says that the people of a country obtain the 
government they deserve. That maxim should be driven 
into the brains of the population of the River Plate 
Republics and Brazil. 

So much may be said for the present conditions 
in the principal countries on the east coast of South 
America ; on the west coast of the continent and in the 
northern sections the developments of the last century 
have brought about many characteristics of a different 
complexion. 

When Simon Bolivar, abandoned by his former 



1904] CONCLUSION 653 

friends, was dying, he wrote his political testament, 
reviewing the tragedy of his life in connection with the 
struggle of the Spanish colonies for independence, and 
their conduct after they became sovereign States. He 
tells nothing of his bitterness of heart at the ingratitude 
of a people who had conferred on him the title of 
Liberator, and then accused him of seeking self- 
aggrandisement ; but he comments on the deathblow to 
his hopes of establishing a New Spain across the seas, 
and the inability of his fellow-countrymen to appreciate 
the sacred boon of liberty that his hand had won for 
them. This historical document concludes sadly with 
the words, " I have ploughed in the sea." 

It is impossible not to sympathise with Bolivar in his 
disappointment over the failure to realise his ideals in 
connection with the great heritage of the Spanish 
Colonists. If we turn to San Martin and Sucre we find 
that they underwent experiences similar to those of 
Bolivar, for the people they had served so faithfully 
requited their patriotism with abuse and ingratitude. 
Like Bolivar, they reached the conclusion that they had 
laboured in vain for the happiness and welfare of their 
compatriots and country. The idea of those three great 
leaders was the establishment of a Confederation of 
Spanish America, embracing the whole southern continent ; 
they appreciated the vast natural resources of this section 
of the world, and they saw that with unity of interests 
amongst the different groups of colonists one great com- 
munity would combine such elements of strength as to 
be practically unassailable by outside influence. They 
realised before they died that internal dissensions made 
the fulfilment of their dream impossible, and they resigned 
all hope that even at a later period a fusion of interests 
might be effected. A feeling of despondency in the 
present gave a gloomy colouring to future prospects, and 
Bolivar, Sucre, and San Martin all expressed doubts of 
the outcome of the change they had wrought when they 
helped to wrest the colonies from Spain. From the 
ashes of the shattered hopes formed when independence 



654 CONCLUSION 

was first won, have now risen communities widely differ- 
ing in national character and material interests. 

That the development of South America can long 
continue at the present tardy pace is not possible, for 
all the elements for great commercial prosperity are 
there, save one. Population only is lacking to create 
the necessity for the exploitation of the vast natural 
resources lying almost untouched at the present time, 
and it cannot be many years before the overcrowded 
centres of Europe must disgorge millions of their inhabi- 
tants to these sparsely inhabited regions. When that 
stage arrives the transformation will be rapid, and with 
increased population life in South America will radically 
alter. Where a livelihood is possible to-day with a 
minimum of labour, competition will banish the indolent 
habits which now check producing power at every turn. 
With coal and iron, immense mineral deposits of all 
kinds, extraordinary facilities for every branch of 
agricultural and pastoral industry, and with easy access 
to districts where all tropical products are found, there 
is the practical certainty of substantial progress in the 
future. It will be a natural development when it comes, 
and it will crush the existing incapacity for public 
administration which has throttled advancement in all 
South American States. 

For some years past it has seemed that the influence 
of the United States might enter so far into South 
American politics as to form the starting-point of a new 
era for Latin America. Strong efforts have been made 
by the North Americans to cement a warmer friendship 
with the South American Republics by the promotion 
of the Pan-American Congress in Washington in 1888 
and a similar conference in Mexico in 1901. The 
championship of the Venezuelan cause against Great 
Britain in 1895 was another proof of the anxiety at 
Washington to extend American influence in South 
America, but unexpected incidents have counteracted 
these endeavours to create closer ties between the two 
continents. The misunderstanding with Chile in con- 



1904] CONCLUSION 655 

nection with the " Baltimore " dispute in 1891 engendered 
ill-feeling in that quarter, and is not yet forgotten, and 
the recent action of Mr Roosevelt's Government in 
regard to Panama has roused distrust all over South 
America. There has been for many years a lack of 
confidence on the part of Spanish-speaking Americans 
in regard to the policy of the United States, and in view 
of the Panama affair a long time must elapse before this 
is removed. Under such conditions it is probable that 
European rather than North American influence will 
play the more important part in the immediate future 
development of the States which have inherited the old 
Spanish dominions. 

Of course, the proximity of the United States to 
Venezuela and Colombia must not be forgotten, nor the 
fact that the construction of the Panama canal will bring 
United States interests into closer touch with the 
northern section of the southern continent. No matter 
how great the hostility of Colombians and Venezuelans 
may be, they cannot ignore the influence of their northern 
neighbour, and it must be weighed carefully in any 
consideration of future developments in these two 
countries. United States capital is invested already in 
a few undertakings in both Colombia and Venezuela, 
and will extend in other directions, and any attempt to 
obstruct legitimate business enterprise will involve a 
conflict with Washington which can only result to their 
detriment. With Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Para- 
guay circumstances are different, for those countries are 
in closer communication with Europe than with New 
York, and a constant stream of European immigration 
helps to foster commercial relationship and friendly 
feeling. 

It is not to be expected that the opening of the 
Panama canal will exercise any very great influence on 
the trade of South America in the immediate future. 
For several years past the railway across the isthmus 
has worked in harmony with the steamship lines having 
business relations with Colon and Panama, and through 



656 CONCLUSION 

freight rates have been established at prices which have 
permitted cargo from the Pacific coast to be sent direct 
from Peru and Ecuador to the United States and 
Europe. No doubt the canal will lead to cheaper 
transport, and this will encourage increased production 
on the southern coast, but the reduction in cost will not 
be sufficient at first to swell the volume of trade to any 
great extent. As regards passenger traffic, the canal 
will be a distinct gain, avoiding the tedious and expensive 
transhipment now incidental to a journey to South 
America via Panama, and it will make intercourse 
between the Pacific coast and New York and Europe 
more frequent, thus improving future economic condi- 
tions ; but this influence can only extend gradually, and 
will not show substantial results for another generation. 

At present Chilian influence is dominant on the 
Pacific Coast of South America. Since the war with 
Peru and Bolivia, the political position of the Adminis- 
tration in Santiago has been strengthened and extended 
whenever opportunity offered, and it has now an important 
bearing on the conditions existing from the isthmus of 
Panama to the Straits of Magellan. In Bolivia, the 
attempt of Argentina to oppose the Chilian policy has 
not been successful, but it may enter into the situation 
at a later date when communication between Buenos 
Aires and Sucre becomes less difficult by the extension 
of the Argentine railway system to join the lines now 
projected by the Bolivian Government. The over- 
powering military and naval strength of Chile has given 
her a free hand to pursue any policy she has wished for 
the past twenty years in regard to Peru, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia, but no effort has been made to establish such 
commercial relations with those countries as to bind 
them to her by strong commercial ties. Indeed, rather 
the reverse has been the case, and the arrogant attitude 
of Santiago in recent dealings with her neighbours has 
created deep-rooted hostility both in Bolivia and Peru. 

The extension of United States influence to Panama 
brings an important factor into play. It is questionable 



1904] CONCLUSION 657 

whether distrust of United States intentions or dislike 
of Chilian pretensions will be the stronger, but in any 
case it may be taken for granted that one will be used 
against the other when opportunity offers. It is not 
unlikely that Chile may now bestir herself to establish 
more friendly relations with Bolivia and Peru, for she 
has much to lose and nothing to gain by allowing United 
States influence to undermine her position on the 
Pacific seaboard. She can consolidate her interests by 
agreeing to generous terms for the settlement of the 
Tacna and Arica question with Peru, and by certain 
concessions to Bolivia. On the other hand, if she does 
not adopt some such policy she must become more and 
more isolated as time passes, and as the great natural 
resources of Argentina develop, Chile's political import- 
ance in South America will become dwarfed. 

It is from Bolivia that a great and sudden economic 
upheaval is likely to come and prove the beginning of a 
new era of development in South America. The vast 
mineral wealth of that country cannot fail to attract 
immigration from all quarters when once the difficulty 
of transport is solved, and the solution of the problem is 
within reasonable distance now that the extension of the 
Argentine railway system to the Bolivian frontier has 
been arranged. The deposits of gold, silver, tin and 
copper in Bolivia offer inducements unequalled in South 
America for profitable mining enterprise, and their 
existence is becoming known gradually to the outside 
world. 



THE END 



2t 



mam 



INDEX 



Abtao, Chilian Warship, 354, 442, 454 

Aceval, Emilio, President of Paraguay, 
191 

Acha, Gen. , President of Bolivia, 3 1 

Aconcagua, Chile, 324, 421 

Aconcagua River, 370 

Aconcagua, Chilian Warship, 354 

Acre Territory, Dispute between Brazil 
and Bolivia, settled 1903, 308, 561- 
562 

Acuerdo Party in Argentina, see under 
Argentina 

Adams, Mr, U.S. Minister in Bolivia, 
480 

African Negroes in South America, 10 

Agriculture: in South America, 17; in 
the River Plate Republics, 651-652 ; 
in Argentina, 127 ; in Paraguay, 
192 ; in Uruguay, 228-230 ; in Chile, 
426-429; in Peru, 545; in Bolivia, 
573 ; in Ecuador, 588 ; in Colombia, 
611-613 ; in Venezuela, 640-641 

Agua Santa, Peru, 461-462 

Aguas Blancas, Chile, 423 

Aguero, Jose de la Riva, President of 
Peril, 29 

Aguirre, Anastasio, President of Uru- 
guay, 32, 131-135 

Aguirre, Capt. Elias, Peruvian Naval 
Commander, 456 

Aguirre, J. J., of Chile, 387 

Alagoa, Warship, 166 

Alamos, Lieut.-Col. Gabriel, of Chile, 
348 

Alban, Gen., Governor of Panama, 600 

Albano, Anicleto Vergara, of Chile, 501 

Albarracain, Col., Peruvian Commander, 

470 
Albuquerque, Brazil, 136 
Alcalde, Manuel, of Chile, 434 
Alcerrica, Gen., of Chile, 371-380 
Alcoholism: in Chile, 413-414; in 
Colombia, 611 ; in Peru, 533 
059 



Alcorta, Senor, Argentine Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, 119-120 
Aldea, Serjeant, 452 
Alegre, Gen. Porto, in the Paraguayan 

War, 156-163 
Alegrete, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 

255 
Alem, Dr Leandro, 

Candidate for the Presidency of 

Argentina, 66, 67 
Organiser of the Union Civica in 

Argentina, 75, 79 
Dr Alem and the Union Civica Radical 
in Argentina, 93-96, 102-103 
Alen, Col., 173 
Alencar, Capt. Alexandrino de, of 

Brazil, 278 
Alfaro, Gen. Aloy, President of Ecuador, 

582, 586 
Alfonso XII. of Spain, 595 
Alfonso Alberquerque, Portuguese War- 
ship, 280 
Almagro at Cuzco, 8 
Almirante Blanco Encalada, Chilian 

Warship, 328 ; in the Chilian Peru- 
• vian War, 442-443, 449-458, 476, 

488; in the Chilian Civil War, 

1890-1, 346, 352, 355-357 ; destroyed, 

1891, 357 
Almirante Blanco Encalada, New 

Chilian Warship, 399 
Almirante Cochrane, Chilian Warship, 

328 ; in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 

442-460, 472; in the Chilian Civil 

War, 1891, 346, 349, 354, 374 
Almirante Tamandari, Brazilian Cruiser, 

166, 263 
Almonacid, Dr, of La Rioja, 49 
Alonzo, Severo Fernandez, President 

of Bolivia, 1896, 559-560 
Altamirano, Eulogio, of Chile, 360, 362, 

480-481 
Alto del Puerto, Chile, 377-379 



660 



INDEX 



Alves, Dr Rodriguez, President of 

Brazil, 1902, 308 
Amambahy, Paraguayan Ship, 135 
Araapa Dispute between Brazil and 

French Guiana, 306 
Amazonas, Brazil, 258 
Amazonas, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Amazonas, Chilian Transport, 349, 477 
Ambato, Ecuador, 585 
Amengual, Col, Chilian Commander, 

470 
America, Peruvian Corvette, 508 
Amethyst, British Warship, 518 
Amunategui, Miguel Luis, of Chile, 329, 

339 
Amunategui, Col., Chilian Commander, 

470 
Ancon, Peru, 478-479 
Ancon, Treaty of, Oct. 20, 1883, 497- 
500 ; ratified, May 8, 1884, 332, 403, 
407, 500, 523, 529 
Ancdn, German Cruiser, 286 
Andes Mts., 567, 585 
Andrade, Seiior, 

President of Venezuela, 629-630 
Other References, 623, 627 
Angamos, Chilian Transport, 347, 357, 

476, 483 
Angostura, Paraguay, 173-180 
Antelo, Dr, of Entre Rios, 49 
Antioquia, Colombia, 594, 600, 613 
Antofagasta, Chile : 

Antofagasta in the Chilian Civil War, 

1891, 355-356 
Antofagasta in the Chilian-Peruvian 

War, 439, 446-448, 454, 458 
Antofagasta Province, 420, 565-566 
Bolivian Province and Town, 437-438 
The Port of Antofagasta, 422-423, 425, 
517,571, 574 
Antunez, Carlos, of Chile, 338, 339 
Aparicio, Col. Timoteo, 

Uruguayan Commander, 134 
Leader of Blanco Revolution in Uru- 
guay, 1870-72, 199-203, 206, 208 
Aparicio, Gen., of Ecuador, 1876, 579 
Apostolo, Brazilian Newspaper, 299 
Apurimac, Peruvian Schoolship, 493 
Aquidaban River, 185-1S6 
Aquidaban, Brazilian Warship, in the 

Revolt in Brazil, 1893-94, 260-286 
Aquila, Chilian Transport, 363, 365 
Araffitary, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Arana, Barros, of Chile, 328 
Araucanian Indians, 15, 412 
Arauco, Chile, 421, 425 
Arbolito, Uruguay, 218-219 
Arce, Senor, President of Bolivia, 1884, 

557 
Arenas, Antonio, of Peru, 480-481, 523 



Arequipa, Peru : 

A Clerical Stronghold, 537, 541 
Other References, 16, 354, 495-496, 

508, 510, 511, 536, 539, 540 
Argentine Republic : 
Custom-house at Cordoba, 1602, 11 
British Aggression, 19 
Revolution at Buenos Aires, 1810, 21 
Struggle for Independence, 23 
Viceroy Baltasar de Cisneros deposed, 

1810, 24 
Puyredon, Dictator, 1816, 24, 32 
Act of Independence of the United 

Provinces of the Rio de la Plata 

ratified, 1816, 24 
Treaty between Argentina and Great 

Britain, 1825, 24 
President Rivadavia, 1825, 32 
Federal or Unitarian Form of Govern- 
ment, 32, 33, 42 
Buenos Aires as the centre of Govern- 
ment, 32 
Vicente Lopez, President, 32 
Centre of Government moved to Santa 

Fe, 32 
Conflict between Federalists and 

Unitarians, 33 
Defeat of Gen. Lavalle by Rosas, 

1829, 33 
Rosas, Governor and Captain-General 

of Buenos Aires, 33-37 
River Parana as a Waterway, 33 
French Expedition, 1851, 34 
Tyranny of Rosas, 34 
Revolution under Gen. Urquiza and 

Flight of Rosas, 1852, 36-37 
The Portefios of Buenos Aires, 37 

et seq. 
Tension between Buenos Aires and the 

Provinces, 38 
Revolution in Buenos Aires against 

Gen. Mitre, 1860, 38 
Victory by Gen. Mitre at Pavon, 1861, 

38, 40 
Gen. Mitre, President, 1861, 38-40, 42 
The National Capital, 38 
Strained Relations between Argentina 

and Uruguay, 1864, 131, 134 
Aggressive Policy of Gen. Lopez of 

Paraguay towards Argentina, 39. 
The Paraguayan War — Argentina, 

Uruguay, and Brazil against 

Paraguay, 1865-1870, 39, 130-195, 

210 
Paraguayan Occupation of Cor- 
rientes, Apr. 1865, 138-139, 141- 
142. 
The Alliance between Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay, against 
Paraguay, May 1, 1865, 139, 210 



INDEX 



661 



Argentine Republic — continued 
The Paraguayan War — continued 
Recapture of Corrientes by the 

Argentines, May 25, 1865, 142 
Defection of Gen. Urquiza in Entre 

Rios, 144 
Evacuation of Corrientes by Para- 
guayan Troops, 1865, 148 
Corrientes the Base of Operations of 
the Allied Troops, 1865, 151- 
152 
The Parana River, 151-154 
The Argentine National Guard, 152 
Engagements at Paso de la Patria, 

etc., 1866, 152, 153 
Engagement at Tuyuti, Nov. 1867, 

164-165 
Peace, July 1870, 186 
Other References to the Paraguayan 
War, see under Paraguay 
Revolution in Mendoza, etc., 1867, 

161 
Cholera in Buenos Aires, 1868, 40 
Ur Sarmiento, President, 1868, 40-41, 

43, 123 
Yellow Fever in Buenos Aires. 1871, 

41 
Political Status of Argentina in 1874, 

42 
Cordoba and the Presidential Election 

of 1874, 43 
Dr Nicolas Avellaneda, President, 43- 

47,52 
Corrientes and the Portenos, 44 
The Tiro Nacional (Volunteers) of 

Buenos Aires, 45-46 
The Cordoba League, 46, 70 
Buenos Aires and the Provinces, 47 
Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1878-79, 

330, 335 
Gen. Roca and Dr Tejedor, Candidates 

for the Presidency in 1880, 47 
Carlos Pellegrini, Minister of War, 

1880, 48, 54, 55 
The Portenos and the Cordoba Pro- 
gramme, 49 
Military Preparations of Buenos Aires, 

50 
Conspiracy against Cordoba, 51-53 
Rioting in Buenos Aires, 53 
Commencement of Civil War, 53 
Defence of Buenos Aires, 54 
Col. Arias and the Volunteers, 55 
Engagement at Olivera, 56 
Assault on Buenos Aires, 56-59 
Armistice and Peace Negotiations, 59 
Terms of Surrender of Buenos Aires, 

59. 
Dr Jose M. Moreno, Governor of 
Buenos Aires, 60 



Argentine Republic — continued 

Buenos Aires Federal Capital, 1880, 

60, 62 
Roca, President, 1880, 60-68, 71 
Conciliation of Portenos, 62 
Absolute Power of Roca, 62 
Railway Extension, 63 
Industrial Prosperity, 64 
Foreign Loans, 1884, 64 
Pellegrini Minister of War, 1885, 65 
Revolutionary Outbreaks, 65 
Discontent in Buenos Aires, 65 
La Plata, Provincial Capital of Buenos 

Aires, 65 
New Docks at Ensenada, 65 
Candidates for the Presidency, 1885, 

66-68 
Financial Policy of Roca, 67 
Suspension of Specie Payments, 68 
Dr Victorino de la Plaza, Finance 

Minister, 68 
Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, President, 

. 1886, 69-86 
Mode of electing a President, 69-70. 
Roca and Celman, 71-72 
Currency Conversion and Paper Issues, 

72 
Administrative Corruption, 72-73 
Pellegrini as Vice-President, 73 
Financial Necessities, 73-74 
General Discontent, 74 
The Union Civica, 75-86 
The Mortgage Banks under Celman, 77 
Foreign Residents and the National 

Government, 78 
Open Hostility to the Government, 79 
General Revolt, July 1890, 80-85 
The Navy and the Rebel Cause, 82 
National Reinforcements, 83 
Armistice and Peace Proposals, 83-84 
Argentina, and the Bolivian Question 

with Chile, 1888, 557-558. 
Resignation of President Celman, 

1890, 84-86 

Pellegrini, President, 1890, 85-98 
Gen. Roca, Minister of the Interior, 

88, 97 
Dr Vicente Lopez, Minister of Finance, 

88 
The Financial Situation in 1890, 88-91 
Argentina and Baring Brothers, 90 
Patriotic Loan, 92 
Attempt to assassinate Roca in 1891, 

92 
Treaty with Bolivia, 1891, 558 
Col. Camus of Chile in Argentina, 

1891, 356 

The Argentine Legation in Chile and 
Ex-President Balmaceda of Chile, 
1891, 385-387 



662 



INDEX 



Argentine Republic — continued 
Pellegrini's Administration, 92 
Gen. Bartolome Mitre and the Presi- 
dency, 92 
Agreement between Mitre and Roca, 

93, 94 
Dr Leandro Alem and the Union 

Civica Radical, 93-96, 102-103 
A New State Bank, 94 
Dr Luis Saenz Pena, Acuerdo Candi- 
date for the Presidency, 94 
Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, Union Civica 
Radical Candidate for the Presi- 
dency, 95 
Political Parties in 1892, 95 
Dr Pena, President, 1892, 96-108 
Dr Jose Uriburu, Vice-President, 96 
Wreck of the Bosales, 98, 107 
President Pena's Policy, 99-108 
Cabinet of Dr Aristobulo del Valle, 

100-101 
Return of Dr Alem, 100, 103 
Revolt in San Luis, 101- 
Governor Julio Costa of Buenos Aires, 

101-102, 105 
Dr Lucio V. Lopez, Governor of 

Buenos Aires, 102, 105-106 
Revolution in Buenos Aires and Santa 

Fe, 101-103 
Political Conditions in 1893, 105 
President Pena's Financial Policy, 105 
The Executive and the Chambers, 106 
Hostility to President Pena and Minis- 
terial Crisis, 107 
Resignation of President Pena, 1895, 

107-108 
Dr Uriburu, President, 1895, 108-113 
The Chilian Boundary Dispute, 1895, 

108-109 
The Misiones Dispute with Brazil, 137, 

245 ; settled, 1895, 109, 112, 116, 

289 
Chile and the Negotiations between 

Bolivia and Argentina, 1893-96, 

559 
Congress and Railway Guarantees, 

109-110 
The Financial Position in 1897, 110 
Gen. Roca, President, 1897, 110-120 
Dr Quirno Costa, Vice-President, 111 
The Chilian Boundary Dispute, 1898, 

406-407 
The Puno de Atacama Dispute with 

Chile and Bolivia: in 1898, 111- 

112; in 1899, 113-114 
Conference between President Roca 

and President Erraguriz of Chile, 

1899, 114 
Reform of the Federal Courts, 1899, 

115, 125 



Argentine Republic — continued 

Dr B. Irigoyen, Governor of Buenos 

Aires, 1898-99, 116-117 
Unrest in La Rioja and Catamarca, 117 
The Currency Question, 118 
Public Works, 118 
Sefior Alcorta, Minister of Foreign 

Affairs, 119-120 
Visit of President Roca to Brazil, 1899, 

116, 307 
Commercial Treaty between Argentina 

and Brazil, 307 
Visit of President Salles of Brazil to 

Buenos Aires, 1900, 118-119 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
with Chile: in 1888,557-558; in 
1891, 558; in 1893-96, 559 
The Puno de Atacama Dispute be- 
tween Argentina, Chile, and 
Bolivia: in 1898, 111-112; in 
1899, 113-114; in 1900, 407 
Argentine Boundary Disputes with 
Chile : in 1878-79, 330, 335 ; in 1895, 
108-109 ; in 1898, 406-407 ; in 
1901-2, 119-120 
Treaty between Argentina and Chile, 

June 1902, 120 
Increase of the Navy, 1895-1901, 402 
Candidates for the Presidency, 1904, 

120 
Argentina To-day, 049-652 
Population, 64, 121-12J 
Education, 41, 123-1^5 
Administration of Justice, 125 
Religion, 125-126 
National Character, 126 
Railways, 63, 109-110 
Finance and Industries, 64, 67-68, 72- 
74, 77, 88-92, 94, 105, 110, 118, 
122, 127 
The Welsh Settlement on the Chubut, 

114-115 
Patagonia, 9, 15, 114-115, 118, 430 
Tierra del Fuego, 420, 421, 425, 430 
Argollo, Gen. , in the Paraguayan War, 

166, 168, 175-177, 187 
Argollo, Gen., of Brazil, 285 
Arguedas, Col., of Peril, 521 
Arias, Col., of Corrientes : 
His Campaign in Buenos Aires, 54-59 
Other Reference, 45 
Arica : 
Chilian Invasion and Capture of Arica 

from Peru, 1880, 468-473, 481 
Bolivia and Perii and the Chilian 
Occupation of Arica, 403-404, 407, 
473, 498, 502, 529, 556 
Other References, 354, 420, 450, 575 
Armacao, near Nictheroy, Brazil, 263, 
274, 275-277 



INDEX 



663 



Arrate, Col., of Chile, 354 

Arredondo, Avelino, Assassin, 220-221, 

226 
Arredondo, Gen. Jose Miguel, in 

Uruguay, 211 
Arrieta, J., of Uruguay, 387 
Arrue, Col. Julio, in Uruguay, 207 
Arteaga, Col. Luis, Chilian Commander, 

465-467 
Arteaga Alemparte Brothers, 334 
Artigas, Gen., Dictator of Uruguay, 24 
Asiatics in Peru, 532-534, 546 
Astecs of Mexico and South America, 

7,8 
Astrogildo, Gen. , of Brazil, 255 
Asumpcao, Col. , in the Paraguayan War, 

143 
Asuncion, Paraguay, 135, 162, 166 
Atacama District : 

The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate 
Industry and the Disputes between 
Bolivia and Chile, Peruvian In- 
trigues in Bolivia, and the Chilian 
War with Peru and Bolivia, 1879- 
84, 433-504, 517, 555-556 
Other References, 324, 356, 420, 421 
Atahualpa, 7, 584, 587 
Atahualpa, Peruvian Monitor, 443, 476 ; 

destroyed, 1881, 493 
Athas, Major, of Chile, 369 
Australians in Paraguay, 194 
Avellaneda, Dr Nicolas, 

President of Argentina, 43-47, 52, 63 
His Attitude to the Tiro Nacional, 45- 
47 
Ayacucho, Peru, 23, 495 
Ayahueca Indians, 16 
Aymara Indians and Aymara Language, 
16, 534, 538, 567-569 

Bage, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 216, 

255 
Bahia, Brazil: 
Early History, 12-13 
Bahia and the Jaguncos, 297-303 
Bahia, Warship, 166 
Baker, Inspector, and the Uruan Incident 

in British Guiana, 1895, 622-628 
Ballivian, Gen., President of Bolivia, 31 
Balmaceda, Jose Manuel, 
Biographical, 333 

His Political Ideals, and His Participa- 
tion in Chilian Politics, 1851-86, 
334-337 
President of Chile, 1886, 332-385 
His Administration, 338-340 
Conflict between the President and 
Congress and Revolution in Chile, 
1891, 341-382 
His Dictatorial Attitude, 347 



Balmaceda — continued 
Attempted Assassination of President 

Balmaceda, 362, 364, 367 
Abdication of President Balmaceda, 

1891, 380-382 
Suicide of Balmaceda, 1891, 385-387, 

389 
His Political Testament, 387-388 
Balta, Col. Jose, 

President of Peru, 1862, 30 
Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1867, 511 
President of Peril, 1868, 511-513 
Assassination of Balta, 1872, 513-514 
Baltimore, U.S. Cruiser in Chilian 
Waters, 1891-92, 380, 391-396, 400, 
655 
Banados, Senor, of Chile, 380 
Baptista, Mariano, 
President of Bolivia, 1892, 559 
Other References, 480-481, 558 
Baquedano, Gen. Manuel, 
Chilian Commander in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 468-473, 482, 485, 
486, 488, 493 
Acting President in Chile, 380-384 
Other Reference, 365 
Barbosa, Col. Orozimbo, Chilian Com- 
mander, 469, 470, 482, 485 
Barbosa, Gen. Ruy, 303, 348, 371-380 
Barbot, Conspirator in Uruguay, 199 
Barcelo, Col., Chilian Commander, 470 
Barcelo, Jose, of Chile, 387 
Barcelona, Venezuela, 635 
Baredo, President, of Paraguay, 189 
Baring Brothers and Argentina, 90 
Barnes, Sub-Inspector, and the Uruan 
Incident in British Guiana, 1895, 
622-628 
Barquisimeto, Venezuela, 635 
Barracouta, British Ship, at Trinidade, 

Brazil, 292 
Barreto, Gen. Menna, Brazilian Com- 
mander, 132-133, 164, 179, 183, 184, 
187 
Barrios, Gen. , Paraguayan Commander, 

135, 142, 148, 164 
Barros, Dr Prudente de Moraes, see 

Moraes (Dr) 
Basques in Argentina, 121 
Batlle, Gen. Lorenzo, President of 

Uruguay, 1868, 199-203 
Batlle, Jose, y Ordonez, President of 

Uruguay, 223 
Bedoya, Jose Diaz, 181 
Belgrano, Gen., Revolutionary Leader 

in Argentina and Paraguay, 24 
Bello Horizonte, Brazil, 314 
Belzu, Gen., President of Bolivia, 31 
Benham, Adm., in Brazilian Waters, 
276-277 



664 



INDEX 



Berenguela, Spanish Warship, 509 
Berges, Senor, of Paraguay, 166, 173 
Bermudez, Col . Morales, President of 

Peru, 1890,524-525 
Bermudez, Venezuela, 642 
Berro, President of Uruguay, 31 
Berro, Dr, of Uruguay, 221 
Berro, Bernardo P., Conspirator in 

Uruguay, 198-199 
Bettancourt, Gen. de, in the Paraguayan 

War, 172 
Billinghurst, Latorre Protocol, Apr. 1898, 

407 
Bittencourt, Gen., Minister of War in 

Brazil, 300, 303 
Bio-Bio, Chile, 421 
Bio-Bio, Chilian Transport, 368-369 
Blanca, Spanish Warships, 509 
Blanco, Guzman, President of Venezuela, 

28, 618-621, 633, 635 
Blanco, Dr Juan Carlos, of Uruguay, 

212 
Blanco Encalada, see Alniirante Blanco 

Encalada 
Blancos of Uruguay, 131, 144, 147, 151, 

165, 197-207, 216-224, 649 
Blanes, J. M. , Artist, 41 
" Blues " of Venezuela, 618 
Blumenau, Santa Catharina, Brazil, 236 
Bocayuva, Minister, of Brazil, 245 
Boeto, Belisario, of Bolivia, 501 
Bogota, Colombia, 21, 597 
Bolivar, Simon : 
Liberator, 652-653 

Leader of Rebellion in Venezuela, 21 
Dictator of Venezuela, 21 
President of Colombia, 22, 27 
Emancipator of Ecuador, 22 
His Part in the Emancipation of Peru, 

23 
His Failure to federate South American 
Republics, 27 
Bolivia : 

Insurrection in 1809, 21 
Emancipation from Spain, 1825, 23 
Gen. Sucre, President, 1826, 23, 30 
Gen. Santa Cruz, President, 1827, 30 
Gen. Velasco, President, 1839, 30 
Gen. Ballivian, President, 1841, 31 
Gen. Velasco, re-elected President, 31 
Gen. Belzu, President, 31 
Gen. Cordoba, President, 1855, 31 
Dr Linares, President, 1858, 31 
Gen. Acha, President, 1861, 31 
Boundary Dispute between Bolivia and 

Brazil, about 1864, 136 
Gen. Belzii re-elected President, 1865, 

31 
Col. Melgarejo, President till 1869, 31, 
137 



Bolivia — continued 

Bolivia and the Paraguayan War, 

1865, 136 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru, and 
the War with Spain, 1865-66, 
326 
The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate 
Industry of Atacama and the Dis- 
putes between Bolivia and Chile, 
Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, the 
Chilian Warwith Peru and Bolivia, 
1879-84, and the Chilian Occu- 
pation of Atacama, Tacna, Arica, 
etc., 433-504 
Chile and Bolivia and the Atacama 

Guano District, 433-436 
Bolivian Claims, 1843-64, 434-435 
Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 

1866, 435-436 
Bad Faith of Bolivia, 1871, 436 
Secret Compact between Peru and 

Bolivia, 1873, 436, 441, 517 
Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 

1874, 436-437, 440 
Peruvian Intrigues, 437-438, 555 
Export Duty on Nitrate of Soda, 

1878, 438 
Chilian Ultimatum, Jan. 3, 1879, 

438 
Occupation of Antofagasta, etc. , by 
Chilians, Feb. 1879, 439, 446- 
447, 519 
Bolivian Declaration of War against 
Chile, Mar. 1, 1879, 439, 440, 
441 
Peruvian Proposal of Arbitration, 

439-440 
The Bolivian Army, 445 
Calama captured by Chilians, Mar. 

23, 1879, 447-448 
Battle of Tacna, May 26, 1879, 468- 

471 
Battle of Arica, June 7, 1879, 472- 

473 
Bolivia and the Chilian Demands, 

1880, 480-481 
Truce (Pacto de Tregua) between 
Chile and Bolivia, Apr. 4, 1884, 
332, 500-503 ; ratified, Nov. 29, 
1884, 503-504, 557 
Bolivia and Peru, and the Chilian 
Occupation of Tacna and Arica, 
403-404, 407, 468-473, 481, 498, 
502, 529, 556 
Peruvian Intrigues and Bolivian 
Export Duties in Atacama, 
436-439 
The Chilian Occupation of Atacama 
and the Nitrate Industry lost to 
Bolivia, 437, 517, 555-556 



INDEX 



665 



Bolivia — continued 
The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
Bolivia, Chile, and Peril, and the 
Chilian Occupation of Tarapaca, 
421-422, 516 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
with Chile : in 1888, 557-558 ; in 
1891, 558 ; in 1893-96, 559 
Dispute with Chile as to Seaport, 

1900, 562 
Other References to the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, etc., see under 
Chile, Peru 
Political Conditions before 1879, 555 
Conservatives and Liberals, 555 
Hilarion Daza, President, 438, 459-460, 

462, 555 
President Daza deposed, 1879, 556 
Temporary Administration, 556 
Gen. Narcisco Campero, President, 

1880, 556-557 
Law of Constitution, Oct. 28, 1880, 

556-557 
Negotiations with Chile, 1884, 557 
Senor Pacheco, President, 1884, 557 
Senor Arce, President, 1888, 557 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 

with Chile, 1888, 557-558 
Treaty between Bolivia and Argentina, 

1891, 558 
Indian Outbreak, 1891, 558 
Col. Camus of Chile in Bolivia, Mar. 

1891, 356 
Bolivia and the Revolution in Chile, 

May 1891, 363 
Senor Baptista, President, 1892, 559 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 

with Chile, 1893-1896, 559 
Severo Fernandez Alonzo, President, 

1896, 559-560 
Insurrection of the Liberal Party under 

Col. Pando, 1898-99, 560-561 
Provisional Government under Col. 

Pando, 1899, 560 
Col. Pando, Chief Magistrate, 561 
The Puno de Atacama Dispute between 

Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile : in 

1898,111-112; in 1899, 113-114; in 

1900, 407 
Dispute with Chile as to Seaport, 1900, 

562 
The Acre Territory Dispute between 

Brazil and Bolivia settled, 1903, 

308, 561-562 
The Constitution, 556-557 
National Capital, 562-563 
Political Situation, 563-564 
Cities of Bolivia, 566 
Topographical Features, 567 
Population, 564-566 



Bolivia — continued 
Stories of Indian Atrocities, 564-565 
Indian Traits, 568-569, 571 
Language, 567 
Education, 569-570 
Administration of Justice, 570 
National Character, 570-571 
Railways and Transport, 571-572 
Agriculture and Industries, 573-575 
Mineral Wealth, 574-575, 657 
Financial Situation, 575-576 
Future Prospects, 576 
Bolivia To-day, 656-657 
Bolognesi, Col. Francisco, Peruvian 

Commander, 471 
Bonaparte, Joseph, and the Spanish 

Crown, 19, 20 
Borax : in Chile, 424-425 ; in Peru, 550 
Borax Consolidated (Syndicate), 550 
Borda, Juan Idiarte, 

President of Uruguay, 215-221 
Assassination of Borda, 220-221, 226 
Borgado, Priest, 173 
Borgono, Col., Vice-President of Peru, 

1890, 525-526 
Borrero, President, of Ecuador, 578-579 
Bover, Gen., in Venezuela, 21 
Boyaca, Colombia, 595 
Brazil : 
Early History, 12-15 
A Spanish Colony, 12 
Portugese Action, 12 
Bahia, &c, under Spanish Rule, 12 
Holland in possession of Bahia, &c. , 1 3 
Portuguese Authority re-established, 

1649, 13 
French Attacks on Rio de Janeiro, 

1710 and 1711, 13 
Joao VI. of Portugal and the 
Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and 
Alagarres, 1808-15, 14-15 
Pedro I., 1822, 14 
Independence recognised, 1825, 14 
Boundary Dispute between Bolivia 

and Brazil, 1864, 136 
The Paraguayan War, 1865-1870, 130- 
195: 
Strained Relations between Uru- 
guay and Brazil and the 
Mission of Conselheiro Saraiva 
to Uruguay, 131-132 
Adm. Tamandare and the Uru- 
guayan Warship Villa del Salto 
on the River Uruguay, 132 
Brazil and the Revolt in Uruguay 

under Gen. Flores, 132 
Paraguayan Declaration of War 

against Brazil, 1864, 135 
Invasion of Matto Grosso by Para- 
guayans, 1864, 135-137, 148 



666 



INDEX 



Brazil — continued 
The Paraguayan War — continued 
Capture of Paysandii by Brazilians, 

Jan. 2, 1865, 133 
Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay against Paraguay, 
May 1, 1865, 139 
Naval Battle on the Riachuelo River 
and defeat of Paraguayans, 
June 11, 1865, 143 
Invasion of Rio Grande by Para- 
guayans, 144 
Paraguayan Occupation of Uru- 
guayana, Sept. 18, 1865, 146- 
147 
The Lopez Administration in Matto 

Grosso, 148 
Decision of Brazil and Allied Forces 

to invade Paraguay, 151 
Disaster to the Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 

1866, 157-158 
Brazilian Victory at Curuzii, Aug. 

1866, 157-158 
The Situation in Matto Grosso, 162 
Other References to the War in 
Paraguay, see under Para- 
guay. 
Brazil after the Paraguayan War, 

231-232 
Pedro II., Emperor, 1840-89, 14-15, 

232-244 
Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu, 

234-240 
Positivism and Republican Principles, 

235 
Sao Paulo and the Republican Move- 
ment, 235-239, 243, 244, 246, 251, 
254 
Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul, 1878, 

235-236 
Development of Brazil, 236 
Pedro's Visits to Europe, 232, 236 
Princess Isabel, Regent, 236-240 
Emancipation of Slaves, 237-238 
Sao Paulo and the Slavery Question, 

237-240 
Sedition, 239-240 
Return of Pedro, 1888, 240 
Vizconde de Ouro Preto's Administra- 
tion, 241 
Military Conspiracy under Gen. 
Deodoro da Fonseca and Gen. 
Floriano Peixoto, 242-243 
Deposition of Pedro and Republican 
Form of Government established, 
1889, 243-244 
Separation of Church and State, 1890, 

245 
Law of New Constitution passed 
1891, 245-249 



Brazil — continued 
Gen. Deodoro da Fonseca, President, 

1891, 246-256 
Gen. Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President, 

246-256 
The United States of Brazil, 246 
Praetorian Administration, 244, 251 
Manifestoes condemning Federal 

Authorities and accusing Presi- 
dent da Fonseca, 251 
The Chambers dissolved, and Martial 

Law established, Nov. 3, 1891, 

252-254 
Rising in Rio Grande do Sul against 

the Government, 255-256 
Naval Revolt in Rio de Janeiro, 255- 

256 
Resignation of President da Fonseca, 

1891, 256 
Gen. Floriano Peixoto, President, 

1891, 256-288 
Abrogation of the Decree of Nov. 3, 

257 
Article 42 of the Constitution, 257, 

258 
Deposition of the Governors of Matto 

Grosso, Amazonas, and Ceara, 

258 
Military Despotism, 258 
Dr Julho de Castilhos in Rio Grande 

do Sul, 259 
Resignation of Adm. C. de Mello and 

Dr S. Correa, 259 
Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul under 

Gumercindo Saraiva, 259 
Adm. Wandenkolk, Leader of Insur- 
rection, 259 
Naval Revolt under Adm. C. de 

Mello, 1893, 260-266 
Adm. Mello's Manifesto, 260 
Martial Law, 262 
Warships of the Insurgents, 263 
Bombardment of Rio de Janeiro, 264 
Expedition to the South, 264 
Provisional Government at Desterro 

with Capt. Lorena as President, 

1893, 265-286 
Fort Villegaignon in revolt, 265 
Explosion at Gouvernador, 266 
Adm. de Mello at Desterro, 265, 266 
Adm. S. da Gama in Command of 

Rebel Forces, 265, 266-283 
Civil War, Dec. 1893, 267 
The Government Flotilla, 268 
Firing against the Rebel Squadron, 

269, 279 
Fighting at Gouvernador and Mo- 

cangue, 269 
The Insurgents as Belligerents, 271 
Adm. de Mello at Desterro, 1894, 271 



INDEX 



667 



Brazil — continued 

Gumercindo Saraiva in the North, 271 

Adm. de Mello's Expedition with the 

Republica and seizure of Para- 

nagua, 273 

Occupation of Curityba and Lapa by 

Rebels, 273 
Peixoto's Plan of Campaign, 274 
Attempt of Rebels to capture the 

Armacao, 275-276 
U.S. Adm. Staunton and Adm. de 

Mello, 276 
U.S. Adm. Benham and the Revolt, 

277 
Situation of Rebels, 277-278 
Adm. de Mello and the Republica and 

the Aquidaban, 278-280 
Loss of the Venus, 279 
Rebel Council of War, 279-280 
Adm. da Gama and Insurgents con- 
veyed by Portuguese Warships 
to Neutral Territory, 2S0-281 
Diplomatic Relations between Portugal 

and Brazil broken off, 281 
End of the Revolt in Rio de Janeiro, 

280-281, 283-284 
Incident of the Sirius, 281 
Adm. de Mello at Curityba, 283 
Council of War of Insurgent Leaders, 

283 
Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros, 

President, 1894, 283-304, 306 
Rebel Attack on Rio Grande do Sul, 

284-286 
Insurgent Troops landed in Uruguay 
and Rebel Ships delivered to 
Argentine Authorities, 285-286 
Naval Expedition against Desterro, 

286 
Capt. Lorena and Insurgents shot, 

286-287 
French Victims and Indemnity to 

France, 287 
Death of Gumercindo Saraiva, 287 
Revolution crushed, 288 
Amnesty to Rebels, 1895, 289 
Outbreak at Military School, 290 
Diplomatic Relations resumed with 

Portugal, 290 
Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul against 
Governor Castilhos led by Aparicio 
Saraiva and Adm. da Gama, 290- 
293 
Peace in Rio Grande do Sul, 292-293 
England and Trinidade, 292 
Claims of Italian Residents, 293 
Financial Legislation, 293 
Temporary Retirement of President 
Moraes and Dr Victorino Pereira, 
Acting-President, 1896, 294 



Brazil — continued 

Return of President Moraes, 1897, 296 
Antonio Maciel or Antonio Conselheiro 

and the Jagunco Settlement at 

Canudos, 296 
Expedition under Col. Moreira against 

Canudos, 1897, 298 
Repulse of Col. Moreira, 298 
Riots in Rio de Janeiro, 299 
Second Expedition under Gen. Oscar 

against Canudos, 299-302 
Jacobino Riot in Rio de Janeiro, 302 
Murder of Gen. Bittencourt, Minister 

of War, 303 
Conspiracy against President Moraes, 

303-304 
Dr Manuel Campos Salles, President, 

1898, 304-308 
Dr Rosa E. Silva, Vice-President, 304 
Critical Financial Situation, 305 
Condition of Brazil, 1894 and 1898, 

306 
Brazil and the Chilian Revolution, 

1891, 361-362 
Boundary Dispute between Bolivia 

and Uruguay, 1894, 191 
The Misiones Dispute with Argentina, 

137, 245, settled in favour of 

Brazil, 1895, 109, 112, 116, 289 
The Amapa Question with French 

Guiana, 1899, 307 
Visit of President Roca of Argentina 

to Brazil, 1899, 116, 307 
Commercial Treaty between Argen- 
tina and Brazil, 307 
Visit of President Salles to Buenos 

Aires in 1900, 118-119 
Fiscal Legislation, 307 
Bubonic Plague, 308 
Dr Rodriguez Alves, President, 1902, 

308 
The Acre Territory Dispute between 

Brazil and Bolivia settled, 1903, 

308, 561-562 

Economic Conditions, 305-307, 308- 

309, 651 
Population, 309-310 

German Settlements, 235-236, 310 

Portuguese in Brazil, 311 

National Character of Brazilians, 311 

Education, 312-313 

Administration of Justice, 313 

Bello Horizonte, 314 

Railways and Transport, 236, 315- 
317 

Telegraph Service, 316 
Brazil, Dr Assis, of Brazil, 255 
Brown, Adm., U.S. Commander, 391- 

392 
Bubonic Plague in Brazil, 308 



668 



INDEX 



Buchanan, Minister, and the Chilian 
Boundary Dispute in 1899, 113 

Buendia, Gen. Juan, Peruvian Com- 
mander in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 
459-467, 486, 489 

Buenos Aires, see under Argentina 

Bulnes, Gen., President of Chile, 30, 
323 

Bulwer-Clayton Treaty, 1850, 601 

Bustamante, Jose Candido, Candidate 
for the Presidency in Uruguay, 
199 

Bustamante, Senor, of Salazar, of Peru, 
527 

Bustos in Argentina, 32 

Caacupi, Paraguay, 184 

Caamafio, Dr Placido, President of 

Ecuador, 1884, 580 
Caballero, Gen. , President of Paraguay, 

189 
Cabral, Pedro, and Brazil, 12 
Cabrita, Lieut.-Col., Brazilian Com- 
mander, 153 
Cacao-Growing : in Peru, 547 ; in 
Ecuador, 588 ; in Venezuela, 639- 
640 
Cacapava, Brazil, 255 
Caceres, Col. Andres Avelino, 

Peruvian Commander, 459, 465, 484, 

486, 487, 495-497 
Leader of Revolt against President 

Iglesias, 1884-85, 523-524 
President of Peru, 1886, 524-525 
President of Peru, 1894, 526-527, 531, 

538 
Other Reference, 522-523 
Gachapoal, Chilian Warship, 349 
Caciques of Bolivia, 565 
Calama, Atacama District, 355, 356, 446- 

448 
Caldera, Chile, 356-357, 366, 454 
Calderon, Dr Francisco Garcia, President 

of Peru, 494-495 
Caleta Buena, Chile, 422 
Callao, Fortress in Chile, 374 
Callao, Peru : 

Spanish Bombardment, May 1866, 

509-510, 517, 520 
The Gutierrez Conspiracy, 1872, 513- 

514 
Revolt under Pierola, 1878, 518 
Blockade by Chilians, 1880-81, 475-479, 

483, 493 
Other References, 23, 443, 515, 539, 
540 
Camacho, Col. Eleodoro, Bolivian Com- 
mander, 468, 470-471 
Camalotes or Floating Islands, 167-168 
Caminos, Senor, of Paraguay, 186 



Campero, Gen. Narcisco, 

Bolivian Commander, 468, 470-471, 475 
President of Bolivia, 1880, 556-557 
Campo Grande, Paraguay, 185 
Campo Osorio, Rio Grande do Sul, 291 
Campos, Col. Julio, in Buenos Aires, 45, 

50, 54, 58 
Camus, Col. Hermogenes, of Chile, 355- 

356, 373 
Cana Indians, 16 
Canabe River, 174, 175, 177 
Candamo, Manuel, 

President of Peru, 1903, 5'^9 
Other Reference, 527 
Candelaria, 137 
Canelones, Uruguay, 203 
Cannevaro, Gen., 141, 147 
Canning, George, referred to, 24, 26 
Canseco, Gen., 

Leader of Revolts in Peru, 506, 508, 

510-511 
Provisional President of Peru, 511 
Canseco, Lieut. Diaz, Peruvian Naval 

Commander, 1879, 454 
Canterac, Gen., in Peru, 23 
Canto, Gen. Estanislao, of Chile, 358, 

368, 370-379 
Cantuaria, Gen. , of Brazil, 299 
Canudos, Brazil, and the Jaguncos, 296- 

302 
Carabaya, Peru, 549-550 
Caraballo, Gen. Francisco, 
Commander in the Paraguayan War, 

177 
Leader of Revolt in Uruguay, 199 
Commander of Troops against Blanco 
Revolution in Uruguay, 200-201 
Carabobo, Venezuela, 22, 629 
Caracas, Venezuela, 20, 619, 620, 624, 

633, 635 
Caracoles, Atacama District, Chile, 447 
Carbajal, Capt. Manuel, Peruvian Naval 

Commander, 456 
Carelmapii, Chile, 334 
Carillo, Juan, of Bolivia, 480 
Carlos IV. of Spain, 19 
Carlos V, 536 
Caro, Miguel, President of Colombia, 

1894, 599 
Carreros, Senor, 173 
Carrillo, Capt. Camilo, of Peru, 495 
Carrillo, Major Lucas, in the Paraguayan 

War, 180 
Carrizal, Chile, 454 
Cartagena, Colombia, 22, 597 
Casal, Dr Barros, of Brazil, 255 
Casas, Padre, quoted, 6 
Castelli in Argentina, 24 
Castilhos, Capt., Portuguese Naval Com- 
mander, 280-281 



INDEX 



669 



Castilhos, Julho de, Governor of Rio 

Grande do Sul, 255, 259, 290-291 
Castilla, Gen. , 
Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1866, 510 
President of Peru, 29, 30, 506 
Castillo, Col. Romualdo, assassinated, 

205 
Castro, President, of Venezuela, 1899 

and 1902, 630-631 
Castro, Gen. Enrique, in Uruguay, 203, 

211 
Castro, Col. Gentil de, of Brazil, 299 
Catamarca, Argentina, 117 
Catholic Church : 

The Inquisition, 4, 540 
Catholicism in South America, 7, 9 ; 
in Argentina, 125-126 ; in Uruguay, 
227 ; in Brazil, 236, 245 ; in Chile, 
417 ; in Peru, 537 ; in Bolivia, 
571 ; in Ecuador, 587 ; in Colom- 
bia, 609-610 ; in Venezuela, 637- 
638 
Question of Separation of Church and 
State in Chile, 1884, 336, 337 
Cattle-Farming, etc. : in Argentina, 
128; in Uruguay, 228; in Chile, 
430 ; in Peru, 547-548 ; in Columbia, 
612-613 ; in Venezuela, 640-641 ; in 
the River Plate Republics, 651-652 
Cauca, Colombia, 594, 600, 613 
Cauta, Peru, 489 
Cautin, Chile, 424 
Cavalcanti, E. de B. de Lacerda, of 

Brazil, 362, 387 
Caxias, Marshal, of Brazil, in the Para- 
guayan War, 160-188 
Cayambi, Ecuador, 585 
Caypam, Brazil, 302 
Ceara, Brazil, 258 
Celman, Dr Marcos Juarez, 49, 83 
Celman, Dr Miguel Juarez, 

Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
tina, 66 
President of Argentina, 69-86 
Roca and Celman, 71-72 
Celman's Mai-Administration, 72-86 
The Union Civica and Revolt against 

Celman, 75-86 
Other References, 49, 52 
Celosa, Chile, 355 
Celso, Affonso, of Brazil, 299 
Cemeteries freed in Chile, 332, 336 
Cerda, Seiior, y Ossa, of Santiago, 

Chile, 385 
Cerro Colorado, Uruguay, 219 
Cerro Largo, Uruguay, 203 
Cerro Leon, Paraguay, 135-141 
Cerro de Pasco, Peru, 548-549, 550, 552 
Cerros Blancos, Uruguay, 219 
Chacabuco, Chile, 25 



Chacabuco, Chilian Corvette, 327, 442 
Chalaca, Peruvian Transport, 493 
Chaharal, Chile, 364, 454 
Chanca Indians, 16 
Chancay, Peru, 478-479 
Chanchamayo, Peni, 547 
Charleston, U.S. Cruiser, 277, 360 
Charras, Col., 55 
Chiclayo, Peru, 479 
Chile : 

Revolution, 1809, 21 
The Separatist Movement, 1810, 25 
Spanish Rule re-established, 1813, 25 
Royalists defeated at Chacabuco, 1817, 

25 
Government under Gen. O'Higgins, 

1818, 25, 30 
Royalist Victory at Concha Rayada, 

1818, 25 
Defeat of Royalists at Maypii, Apr. 5, 

1818, 25 
Independence secured, 1818, 25 
Gen. Freire, President, 1823, 30 
Federal v. Unitarian Form of Govern- 
ment, 30 
Gen. Pinto, President, 1827, 30 
Gen. Lastera, President, 1829, 30 
Gen. Pinto again President, Dec. 1829, 

30 
Gen. Prieto, President, 1831, 30, 321- 

323 
Gen. Prieto again President, 1835, 30, 

323 
Gen. Bulnes, President, 1841, 30, 323 
Independence of Chile recognised by 

Spain, 30 
Manuel Montt, President, 1851, 30, 

323-324 
The Law of Constitution, 321-322 
The Presidential Term, 322, 327 
Administration, 1833-61, 323-324 
Jose Joaquin Perez, President, 1861, 

324-327 
Fire at the Compania Church, Santiago, 

1863, 325 
Chile and the Paraguayan War, 1865, 

137, 151 
War with Spain of Chile and Peru, 
1865-66, 326-327, 508-510 
Spanish Bombardment of Valpa- 
raiso, Mar. 31, 1866, 326, 509 
Capture of the Coradonga from 

Spain, Jan. 1866, 326, 509 
Truce with Spain, 1867, 327; and 

Treaty with Spain, 1879, 327 
Other references to the War, see 
under Peril 
Foundation of the Chilian Navy, 327 
Re-election of President Perez, 1866, 
327-328 



670 



INDEX 



Chile — continued 

Federico Errazuriz, President, 1871, 

328-329 
New Warships, 328 
Public Works, 329 
Candidates for the Presidency, 1876, 

329 
Anibal Pinto, President, 1876, 329- 

331 
Economic Crisis, 330 
Boundary Dispute with Argentina, 

1878-79, 330, 335 
Treaty with Spain, 1879, 327 
The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate In- 
dustry of Atacaraa and the Dis- 
putes between Bolivia and Chile, 
Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, the 
Chilian War with Peru and Bolivia, 
1879-84, and the Chilian Occupa- 
tion of Atacama, Tarapaca, Tacna 
and Arica, 433-504 
Atacama and Its Guano, 433 
Chilian Vice-Royalty, 434 
The Chilian Exportation Law, 1842, 

434 
Bolivian Claim, 1843, 434, 435 
Revision of Chilian Titles, 1845, 

434 
Bolivian Demands, 1847, 434 
Bolivian Demands, 1858, 434 
Further Discussion,1859-61, 434-435 
War threatened between Bolivia and 

Chile, 1863-64, 435 
Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 

1866, 435-436 
Bad Faith of Bolivia, 1871, 436 
Secret Compact between Perii and 

Bolivia, 1873, 436, 441, 517 
Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 

1874, 436-437, 440 
Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, 437- 

438 
Bolivian Export Duty on Nitrate of 

Soda, 1878, 438 
Chilian Ultimatum to Bolivia, Jan. 

3, 1879, 438-439 
Occupation of Antofagasta, etc. , by 
Chilians, Feb. 1879, 439, 446- 
447, 519 
Bolivian Declaration of War against 
Chile, Mar. 1, 1879, 439, 440, 
441 
Peruvian Proposal for Arbitration, 

439-440 
Chilian Declaration of War against 
Perii, Apr. 5, 1879, 440-441, 520 
The Chilian Fleet, 442-444 
Military Forces, 444-446 
Capture of Calama, Mar. 23, 447- 
448 



Chile — continued 

The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
Occupation of Tocopilla and Cobija, 

448 
Blockade of Iquique, 448 
Bombardment of Pisagua, 449 
Naval Action off Iquique, May 20 ; 
and Loss of the Esmeralda, 450- 
453 
Peruvian Reprisals, 453-454 
Capture of the Huascar, Peruvian 

Warship, Oct. 8, 454, 457 
Capture of the Pilcomayo from Peru- 
vians, Nov. 17, 457 
Invasion of Tarapaca, Oct., 458-460 
Battle of Pisagua, Nov. 2, 460-461 
Occupation of Junin, 461 
Skirmish near Agua Santa, Nov. 6, 

461-462 
Battle at San Francisco, Dolores, 

Nov. 16, 462-464 
Occupation of Iquique, Nov. 20, 464 
Battle of Tarapaca, Nov. 27, 465- 

467 
Invasion of Tacna and Arica, Feb. 

1880, 468-470 
Battle of Tacna, May 26, 470-471 
Battle of Arica, June 7, 472-473 
Blockade of Callao, 1880, 475-479, 

483 
Loss of the Janequeo, May 25, 477 
Loss of the Loa, July 3, 478 
Loss of the Covadonga, 478-479 
Bombardment of Chorillos, etc., 

479-480 
Efforts of the United States for 

Peace, Oct. 1880, and Confer- 
ence on the Lackaioana, 480- 

481 
Chilian Demands rejected, 481 
Preparations for Advance to Lima, 

481-485 
Occupation of Pisco and Yea. Nov. 

1880, 482 
Naval Action at Callao, Dec. 6, 483 
Battle of Chorillos, Jan. 13, 1881, 

485-487 
Fighting on Moro Solar, Jan. 13, 

487 
Armistice, Jan. 15, 488 
Battle of Miraflores, Jan. 15, 488- 

489, 522 
Occupation of Lima, Jan. 16, 489- 

500 
Vandalism of Chilians in Lima, 490- 

493 
Adm. Patricio Lynch, Commander 

in Peru, 493-497 
Capture of Arequipa, Aug. 1883, 

496 



INDEX 



671 



Chile — continued 

The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Ancon) 
between Chile and Peru, Oct. 
20, 1883, 497-500 ; ratified, May 
8, 1884, 332, 403, 407, 500, 523, 
529 
Evacuation of Lima, Oct. 22, 1883, 

500 
Truce (Pacto de Tregua), Apr. 4, 
1884, between Chile and Bolivia, 
500-503 ; ratified, Nov. 29, 1884, 
332, 503-504 
Bolivia and Peru and the Chilian 
Occupation of Tacna and Arica, 
403-404, 407, 468-473, 481, 498, 
502, 529, 556 
Chilian Occupation of Atacama, 437, 

517, 555-556 
Chilian Occupation of Tarapaca, 414, 
420-423, 437, 480, 498, 516-517, 
520 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
with Chile : in 1888, 557-558 ; in 
1891, 558 ; in 1893-96, 559 
Bolivian Dispute with Chile as to 

Seaport, 1900, 562 
Other References to the War, see 
under Bolivia, Peru 
Domingo Santa Maria, President, 1881, 

331-333, 335, 336 
Congressional Elections, 1882, 1885, 

332-333, 336 
Jose Manuel Balmaceda in Chilian 

Politics, 1851-86, 333-337 
The Reform Party and La Libertad, 

334 
Programme of the Reform Party, 1875, 

334, 336 
Civil Registry, 332, 336 
The Civil Marriage Law, 332, 336 
The Freeing of Cemeteries, 332, 336 
Question of Separation of Church and 

State, 1884, 336, 337 
Jose Manuel Balmaceda, President, 

1886, 332-382, 387-389 
The Cabinet, Oct. 1886, 338 
The Cabinet, Nov. 1886, 338 
The Cabinet, June 1887-Apr. 1888, 339 
Congressional Elections, Mar. 1888, 

339 
Ten Cabinets, Apr. 1888-Oct. 1890, 340 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 

with Chile, 1888, 557-558 
Conflict between President and Con- 
gress, 1889-90, 341-344 
The Comision Conservadora, 1890, 342- 

344, 398 
Treaty between Bolivia and Argentina, 
1891, 558 



Chile — continued 

Pretext for Revolt, Jan. 1891, 343 
Preparations for Rebellion, 345 
Naval Revolt, 345 
Occupation of Coquimbo and Serena, 

347 
Fighting at Pisagua, 347 
Attitude of the President, 347 
Serena and Coquimbo reoccupied by 

Government Troops, 348 
The Act of Deposition published in the 

Heraldo, Jan. 7, 349 
Surrender of Pisagua to Congres- 

sionalists, Feb. 6, 349-350 
Fight near Dolores and Defeat of Gen. 

Robles, Feb. 15, 350-351 
Congressionalist Defeat at Huara, Feb. 

16, 351 
Occupation of Iquique, Feb. 16, 351- 

352 
Attempt to recapture Iquique and 

Intervention of Adm. Hotham, 

Feb. 19, 352 
Gen. Robles defeated at Pozo Almonte, 

Mar. 7, 353-354 
Arica, Tacna, and Tarapaca in posses- 
sion of Revolutionists, 354 
Occupation of Antofagasta, Mar. 20, 

355 
Occupation of Calama, Mar. 29, 356 
Occupation of Caldera, Apr. 22, 356 
The Blanco Encalada torpedoed, Apr. 

23, 357 
Treatment of Suspected Persons, 358 
Financial Difficulties, 358 
Provisional Government on Junta de 

Gobierno under Capt. Jorge Montt, 

358 
The ltata Incident, June, 359-360, 391 
Peace Conference at Santiago, May 

5, 360-362 
Attempted Assassination of the Presi- 
dent, 362 
The Condell and the Lynch and the 

Case of Richard dimming, 363- 

364 
Sympathy with Revolution abroad, 

364-365 
The Congressionalist Army, 365-366 
The President's Attitude to the Revolu- 
tionists, 366-368 
Massacre of Lo Canas, Aug. 19, 367 
Landing of Congressionalists at Quin- 

teros, Aug. 18, 368-370 
Strength of the Revolutionary Army 

and of the Balmacedists, 370 
Battle of Concon, Aug. 21, 371-373 
Advance on Vina del Mar, 373-374 
Concentration of Congressionalist 

Troops at Quilpue, 375 



672 



INDEX 



Chile — continued 

Battle of Placilla, Aug. 28, 376-380 
Occupation of Valparaiso, Aug. 28, 

379 
Resignation of President Balmaceda, 

Aug. 29, 380-382 
Gen. Baquedano, Acting President, 

Aug. 29, 1891, 380 
The Junta de Gobierno at Santiago, 

382, 383, 389 
Resignation of Gen. Baquedano, Aug. 

31, 1891, 383-384 
Proclamation of Adm. Jorje Montt, 

Sept. 1891, 384 
Work of Reconstruction, 384-385 
Suicide of Balmaceda, 385-387 
Political Testament of Balmaceda, 387- 

389 
New Congress, Nov. 1891, and Resig- 
nation of the Junta de Gobierno, 

389 
The Tesoreria General de la Escuadra 

abolished, 389 
Cost of the Revolution, 389-390 
Adm. Montt, President, 1891, 390- 

405 
Promotion for Services, 390-391 
Law of Amnesty, 391 
Strained Relations between Chile and 

the United States, 1891-2, 391-396 
The Baltimore Incident, 380, 392-396, 

400, 655 
Message of President Harrison to the 

U.S. Congress, Dec. 9, 1891, 393 
Telegram from Santiago to Chilian 

Representative in Washington, 

Dec. 11, 1891, 394-395 
United States Ultimatum to Chile, 

Jan. 22, 1892, 395 
Apology to U.S. Government, 395- 

396 
Real Issues of the Civil War, 397 
Political Situation in 1892, 398 
Increase of the Army and Navy, 398- 

399, 402 
The Irarrazaval Ministry, 1892, 400 
The Barros Luco Ministries, 400 
The Eduardo Matte Ministry, 400 
The Political Situation in 1894, 399-400 
The Pedro Montt Ministry, 1894, 400 
New Municipal Law, 400 
Conversion of the Currency, 401 
Political Parties in Congress, 401-402 
Complications with Argentina, 402 
Argentina and the Bolivian Question 

with Chile, 1893-96, 559 
Sale of the Esmeralda to Japan, 1894, 

402, 581 
Understanding with Peru re Tacnaand 

Arica, 1895, 403-404 



Chile — continued 

Candidates for the Presidency, 404 
Federico Errazuriz, President, 1896, 

404-409 
Congressional Elections, 1897, 405-406 
Conference between President Roca of 

Argentinaand President Errazuriz, 

1899, 114 
Jerman Riesco, President, 1901, 408- 

409 
Boundary Disputes with Argentina : 

in 1878-79, 330, 335 ; in 1895, 108- 

109; in 1898, 406-407; in 1901- 

1902, 119-120 
The Puno de Atacama Dispute between 

Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia : in 

1898, 111-112; in 1899, 113-114; in 

1900, 407 
Final Settlement of Dispute with 

Argentina, 1902, 409 
Treaty between Argentina and Chile, 

June 1902, 120 
Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal 

Disturbances, 410-411 
Movement of Population, 411-412 
Araucanian Indians, 412 
Alcoholism in Chile, 413-414 
Chilians and the Government, 414- 

415 
Education, 328, 415-417 
Religion, 417-418 
Administration of Justice, 418 
National Character, 418-419 
Finance, Economic Development, 330, 

419-432 
Railways, Roads, etc., 328, 419-420 
Mineral Wealth, 421-426 
Nitrate Industry, 421-423 
Copper, 423-424 
Silver, 424 
Coal, 425 
Borax, 425-426 
Agriculture, etc. , 426-431 
Vine-Growing, 429-430 
Cattle and Sheep-Farming, 420, 430 
Fisheries, 431 
Manufactures, 431-432 
Chilian Influence on the Pacific Coast, 

656-657 
Chile, Chilian Warship, 435 
Chiloe Id., 421 
Chimboraso, Ecuador, 585 
Chimbote, Peru, 479 
Chincha Ids. , Peru : Dispute with Spain, 

1864, 326, 333, 507-508 
Chinese in Perii, 546 
Cholera : in Buenos Aires, 40 ; in 

Uruguay, 199 
Cholo People in Peru, 532; in Bolivia, 
564 



INDEX 



673 



Chorillos, Peru : 

Battle, Jan. 13, 1881, 486-487 
Other References, 479, 484 
Christiancy, Mr, U.S. Minister in Peru, 

480 
Christianity in South America, see 

Catholic Church 
Chubut River, Argentina, 114-115 
Chuno, 573 

Cisneros, Viceroy Baltasar de, of Argen- 
tina, deposed, 24 
Ciudad Bolivar, Venezuela, 635 
Ciudad de Cura, Venezuela, 635 
Civil Registry in Chile, 332, 336 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850, 601 
Cleopatra, German Steamer, 346 
Cleveland, President, 

His Verdict in the Misiones Dispute, 

1895, 109, 112, 116, 289 
The President and the Boundary 
Dispute between Venezuela 
and British Guiana, 1895, 622- 
628 
Coal in Chile, 425 
Cobija, Chile, 446, 448 
Cobras Island, Brazil, 263, 280 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, 562, 567 
Cochrane, Lord, in Peru, 23 
Cochrane, see Almirante Cochrane 
Cocorobo, Brazil, 300 
Coffee-Growing : in Peru, 547 ; in 
Ecuador, 588 ; in Colombia, 611-612 ; 
in Venezuela, 539, 644 
Colchagua, Chile, 421 
Colla Indians, 16 
Colmo, Chile, 370-372 
Colo-Calo, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 477 
Colombia : 

Spanish Rule, 10 
Revolution at Bogota, 1810, 21 
Bolivar in New Granada, 1813, 21 
Gen. Morilla at Cartagena, 1815, 22 
New Granada and Venezuela under 
the Republic of Colombia, 22, 
591-592 
Bolivar, President, 1821, 22 
Secession of Venezuela and Ecuador, 

(9. v.), 27, 591-592 
Gen. Santander, Chief Magistrate, 

1831, 27 
Panama and Colon Free Ports, 28 
Panama Treaty between the United 
States and Colombia, 28 ; renewed, 
1865, 28 
Dr Marquez, President, 1836, 28 
Gen. Harran, President, 28 
Gen. Mosquera, President, 28 
Mariana Ospina, President, 28 
Federal v. Unitarian Form of Govern- 
ment, 28 



Colombia — continued 
The United States of Colombia, 1819, 

591-592 
The Confederacion Granadina, 1858, 

592 
The United States of New Granada, 

1861, 592 
The United States of Colombia, 1863, 

592 
The Republic of Colombia, 1866, 592 
Internal Political Troubles, 592 
Political Parties, 592-593 
President Trujillo, 593 
Rafael Nunez, President, 1880, 593- 

594 
Revolution in 1881, 594 
Settlement of Boundary Dispute with 

Costa Rica, 594 
President Laldua, 1883, 594 
General Otalora, President, 1883, 594 
Boundary Question with Venezuela, 

595 
Rafael Nunez, President, 1884, 595 
President Nunez and the Conservatives, 

595 
Rebellion in 1885, 595-596 
Occupation of Panama and Colon by 

United States Forces, 596-597 
Revision of the Law of Constitution, 

1886, 598 
President Nunez re-elected 1886, 598 
President Nunez re-elected 1892, 598 
Miguel Caro, Vice-President, 599 
Death of President Nunez, 1894, 599 
Miguel Caro, President, 1894, 599 
Revolt in 1895, 599 
Boundary Dispute with Peru, 1895, 

529 
M. A. Sanclemente, President, 1898, 

599 
J. M. Marroquin, Vice-President, 599- 

600 
Revolution in 1898, 600 
J. M. Marroquin, President, 1900, 600 
The Panama Canal and the Secession 

of Panama, 1903, 601, 614, 655- 

656 
Topography and Revolutionary 

Practices, 602 
Political Situation, 1904, 603-604 
Economic Conditions, 604-605 
Topographical Features and Climate, 

605-606 
Area and Population, 606-607 
Hygienic Conditions, 607 
Education, 607-609 
Administration of Justice, 609 
The Roman Catholic Church, 609-610 
National Character, 610-611 
Effects of Alcoholism, 611 

2 U 



674 



INDEX 



Colombia — continued 
Agriculture and Industries, 611-614 
Financial Situation, 614-615 
Future Prospects, 615-616 
Colon, Colombia : 
The Port, 28, 655 
Occupation by United States Forces, 

1885, 596-597 
Capture of Colon by Insurgents, 1900, 
600 
Colonia, Uruguay, 207 
Colorados of Uruguay, 131, 137, 197-204, 

216-224, 649 
Colorados Netos of Uruguay, 204-207 
Colorados Principistas of Uruguay, 204- 

207 
Colquechaca, Bolivia, 574 
Columbus referred to, 5 
Comisario Regio in Peru, 507 
Comision Conservadora in Chili, 342-344, 

398 
Commercio, Brazilian Newspaper, 299 
Comte, Auguste, and His Theories in 

Brazil, 235 
Concecao Id. , Brazil, 276 
Concepcion, Chile, 324, 421, 425, 431 
Concha, Sefior, y Toro, of Chile, 360, 

362, 386, 387 
Concha Rayada, Chile, 25 
Conchuco Indians, 16 
Concon, Chile, 367, 370-375 
Concordia, Argentina, 132, 143-145 
Condell, Capt., Chilian Naval Com- 
mander, 450, 452-453 
Condell, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 357, 363, 

364 
Condor, Chilian Warship, 368 
Conessa, Col., 156 
Conselheiro or Maciel, Antonio, and the 

Jaguncos of Canudos, 296-302 
Constant, Benjamin, Positivist, 235 
Copper : in Chile, 423-424 ; in Peru, 

548 
Coquimbo, Chile, 326, 347, 348, 364, 

382, 421 
Cordero, Luis, President of Ecuador, 

1892, 581-582 
Cordoba, Gen., President of Bolivia, 

30 
Cordoba, Argentina, see under Argen- 
tina 
Coronel, Chile, 425 
Corralito, Uruguay, 200 
Correa, Pedro, y Santiago, of Peru, 

523 
Correa, Dr Serzedello, of Brazil, 259 
Corrientes, Argentina, in the Para- 
guayan War, 138, 140-143, 151-152 
Cortes, Fernando, Conqueror of Mexico, 
7 



Corumba, Brazil, 136 

Costa, Dr Julio, Governor of Buenos 

Aires, 101-102, 105 
Costa, Dr Quirno, Vice-President of 

Argentina, 111 
Costa Rica : 

Boundary Dispute with Colombia, 

594 
Costa Rica and the Panama Canal, 
601 
Cotton Industry in Peru, 546-547, 552 
Covadonga, Spanish Gunboat, 326, 507 ; 
captured by Chilians, Jan. 1866, 
326, 509; in the Chilian-Peruvian 
War, 442, 450-454, 472 ; destroyed, 
1880, 478-479 
Cragosta, Brazil, 269 
Crespo, Gen. Joaquin 

Leader of Revolution in Venezuela, 

1892, 621 
President of Venezuela, 1894, 621- 

628, 633 
President Crespo and the Boundary 
Dispute between Venezuela and 
British Guiana, 622-628 
Death of Gen. Crespo, 630 
Cuadra, Pedro Lucio, of Chile, 339, 

340 
Cuba under Spanish Rule, 5, 7, 648 
Cuenca, Ecuador, 585, 586, 587 
Cuestas, Juan Lindolfo, President of 
Uruguay in 1897, 221-223; in 1899, 
223 
Cullen, Gen., of Argentina, 33 
Gumming, Richard, in Chile, 364 
Cundinamarca, Colombia, 595 
Curayaco, Peril, 482 
Curico, Chile, 421 
Curityba, Paranagua, Brazil, 236, 273, 

283, 284, 287, 288 
Curupaitf, Paraguay, 157-160, 168 
Curuzii, Paraguay, 157-160 
Cuzco, Peru, 8, 536, 547 

Daule River, 588 

Davila, Col. Justo Pastor, Peruvian 
Commander, 459, 484-486 

Daza, Gen. Hilarion, President of 
Bolivia, 438, 459-460, 462, 555-556 

Defrance, A. , in Chile, 362 

Desterro, Santa Catharina, Brazil, 265, 
266, 271, 272, 280, 284 

Detroit, U.S. Warship, 277 

Diario de Commercio, Brazilian News- 
paper, 256 

Dios Leon, Col. Juan de, of Chile, 376 

Dolores, Tarapaca, 350, 351, 462 

Donoso, Gregorio, of Chile, 360 

Dorrego of Argentina, 33 

Dourado, Brazil, 136 



INDEX 



675 



Dreyfus & Co., of Paris, 511-512 

Drink Traffic, see Alcoholism 

Duarte, Major, in the Paraguayan War, 

143-148 
Duclerc and Brazil, 13 
Durand, Senor, of Peru, 528 
Dutch in Brazil, see under Brazil 

Echeniqtte, Gen., President of Perti, 

29 
Ecuador : 
Defeat of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, 

1546, 11 
Revolution at Quito, 1809, 20, 21 
Battle of Pichincha, 1822, and 

Emancipation of Ecuador by 

Bolivar, 22 
Separation from Colombia, 1830, 27, 

577, 591-592 
Gen. Flores President, 1830, 28-29 
Vicente Rocafuerte, President, 29 
Gen. Flores re-elected President, 

1839 and 1843, 29 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and 

the War with Spain, 1865-66, 326- 

327 
Acts of Constitution, 1830-96, 577- 

578 
Administration of President Moreno, 

1875, 27, 578 
Assassination of President Moreno, 

1875, 578 
Dr Borrero, President, 1875, 578-579 
Revolt under Gen. Veintemilla, 1876, 

578-579 
Defeat of the Government, 579 
Gen. Veintemilla, President, 1878, 

579 
Gen. Veintemilla, Dictator, 579 
Revolt against Gen. Veintemilla, 1883, 

579 
Dr Placido Caamafio, President, 1884, 

580 
Dr Antonio Flores, President, 1888, 

580, 583, 586 
Dr Luis Cordero, President, 1892, 581 
The Esmeralda Incident, 1894, 402, 

581 
Revolution against Dr Cordero, 1894, 

582 
Provisional Government under Gen. 

Alfaro, 1895, 582 
Boundary Disputes, 1895, 529 
Gen. Alfaro, President, 1897, 582 
Gen. Alfaro and the Clergy, 582 
Conspiracies against Gen. Alfaro, 582 
Gen. Leonidas Plaza, President, 1901, 

583 
Laws regarding Sedition, 583 
Political Conditions, 583 



Ecuador — continued 

Economic Conditions, 583 
Area and Population, 584 
Cities of Ecuador, 584 
Topographical Features, 585 
Education, 586 

Administration of Justice, 586 
National Character, 587 
Railways, 587-588 
Industry and Production, 588-589 
Financial Situation, 589-590 
Future Prospects, 590 
Education : in Argentina, 41, 123-125 ; 
in Paraguay, 194 ; in Uruguay, 208, 
225-226; in Brazil, 312; in Chile, 
328, 415-417 ; in Peru, 515, 534-536 ; 
in Bolivia, 569-570 ; in Ecuador, 
585-586; in Colombia, 607-609; in 
Venezuela, 635-636 
Edwards, Augustin, of Chile, 338, 339 
Egan, Patrick, U.S. Minister in Chile, 

1891, 361-362, 392-396 
Egusquiza, E. D., 181 
Egusquiza, J. B. , President of Paraguay, 

1894, 190-191 
Ejercito Restaurador de la Honra 

Nacional in Peru, 508 
Ellauri, Dr Jose, President of Uruguay, 

1873, 204-206 
England and South America : 
British Action in Brazil, 13 
British Aggression in Argentina, 19 
Treaty between Argentina and 

England, 1825, 24 
British Action in Uruguay, 1828, 24 
English Recognition of the Independ- 
ence of South America, 26 
Conflict with Uruguay, 31 
England and the Paraguayan War, 

1865, 151 
Adm. Hotham and the Chilian Revolu- 
tion, 1891, 352, 360 
The Siriusin Brazilian Waters, 1893-94, 

265-266, 281 
The Racer in Brazilian Waters, 1893, 

265-266 
Occupation of Trinidade, Brazil, 1895, 

292 
Boundary Dispute between Venezuela 
and British Guiana, 1887, 620-621 
Boundary Dispute between Venezuela 
and British Guiana, 1895-99, 
622-628, 654 
England and the Chilian Boundary 
Disputes, in 1895, 108-109; in 
1899, 111-112, 113-114; in 1901, 
119-120 
Blockade of La Guayra, Venezuela, 
by England, Germany, and Italy, 
1902, 631 



676 



INDEX 



Ensenada, Argentina, 65, 285 

Entre Rios, Argentina, 138, 140-144 

Enxadas Id., Brazil, 263, 275, 280, 281 

Errazuriz, Federieo, President of Chile, 
1871, 114, 328-329, 388, 404-409 

Escala, Gen., Chilian Commander, 458, 
461, 465 

Escobar, President, of Paraguay, 190 

Escurra, Juan B., President of Paraguay, 
191 

Esmeralda, Ecuador, 589 

Esmeralda, Chilian Warship : in Ata- 
cama, 1863, 435 ; in the War with 
Spain, 1866, 326; in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 1879, 443, 450-452 
destroyed by Peruvians, 1879, 452 

Esmeralda, New Chilian Warship, 399 
in the Civil War in Chile, 1891, 346 
366, 368, 374 ; sold to Japan, 1894 
402, 581 

Esperanra, Brazilian Ship, 266 

Espina, Col., 102 

Espinar, Col., Peruvian Commander, 463 

Espinosa, Senor, of Peru, 527 

Espinosa, Col. Julio Banados, of Chile, 
348, 386-387, 392 

Esperito-Santo, Ship, 303 

Estanislas, Gen., del Canto, of Chile, 
390 

Estero Vellaco, 153 

Estigarribia, Col., Paraguayan Com- 
mander, 143-148 

Eten, Peru, 479 

d'Eu, Conde, 

Commander in the Paraguayan War, 

147, 181-187 
Other References, 234, 240 

Favella Hill, Canudos, 301 
Febronio, Major, of Brazil, 298 
Federal v. Unitarian Form of Govern- 
ment : in Colombia, 28 ; in Chile, 30 ; 
in Argentina, 32, 33, 42 ; in Brazil, 
249 
Felix, Jose, of Rio de Janeiro, 256 
Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, 4 
Ferdinand VII. of Spain, 19, 20, 21 
Ferrari, Pablo, Chilian Commander, 478 
Fidanza, Capt., 173 

Fidelis, Col., Brazilian Commander, 134 
Figueira, Andrade, of Brazil, 238, 239 
Fisheries of Chile, 431 
Flores, Antonio, President of Ecuador, 

1888, 580, 583, 586 
Flores, Col. Fortunato, in Uruguay, 197 
Flores, Gen. Venancio, 

President of Ecuador, 1830, 1839, and 

1843, 28-29 
Leader of Revolt in Uruguay, 1863-65, 
131-135 



Flores, Gen. V. — continued 
President of Uruguay, 1865, 135, 197- 

198 
President Flores in the Paraguayan 

War, 139-160, 187 
Assassination of Gen. Flores, 1868, 
198 
Flores, Buenos Aires, 56 
Florida, U.S., 207 
Florida, Uruguay, 203, 206 
Fonseca, Gen. Deodoro da, of Brazil : 
Leader of Military Conspiracy, 242- 

243 
Provisional President of Brazil, 243- 

245 
President of Brazil, 246-256 
Fontecilla, Manuel Sanchez, of Chile, 

340 
France and South America : 

French Action in Brazil, 1711, 13 
Portugal and French Guiana, 1807- 

15, 13-14 
Conflict with Uruguay, 1851, 31 
Conflict with Rosas in Argentina, 1894, 

33-34 
France and the Paraguayan War, 1865, 

151 
France and the Revolution in Chile, 

1891, 361-362 
French Victims in Brazilian Revolt, 
and Brazilian Indemnity to France, 
1894, 287 
French in Argentina, 122 
Francia, Dr Rodriguez de, First Consul 

in Paraguay, 25 
Francisco, Col. Joao, of Brazil, 291 
Franklin, Benjamin, referred to, 26 
Freire, Col., in Uruguay, 1868, 198 
Freire, Gen. , President of Chile, 1823, 30 
Freire, Francisco, of Chile, 1886, 338 
Fresia, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 476, 483 
Frias, Col. Anibal, of Chile, 370 
Frias, Felix, 46 

Fruit-Growing : in Paraguay, 192 ; in 
Uruguay, 229-230 ; in Chile, 429 ; in 
Bolivia, 573 
Fuenzalida, Ensign, of Chile, 379 
Funes, Naval Commander, 98-99, 107 

Gainza, Gen. Martin, 45 
Galenga, Mr, of the Times, 540 
Galvez, Lieut., Peruvian Commander, 

477 
Gama, Adm. Saldanha da, 

Personality of Adm. da Gama, 270 
Commander of Rebel Forces in Brazil, 

1893, 265-283 
Leader of Revolt in Rio Grande do 

Sul, 1895, 290-293 
Other References, 263, 311 



INDEX 



677 



Gamarra, Col., Peruvian Commander, 

1880, 469 
Gamarra, Gen., 

President of Peru, 1829, 29 
Peruvian Leader in Bolivia, 1839, 30 
Gana, Gen., Jose Francisco, of Chile, 

348 
Garcia, Capt. Aureteo, y Garcia, 

Peruvian Commander, 480-481, 486, 

489 
Garezon, Lieut. Pedro, Peruvian Naval 

Commander, 456-457 
Garibaldi, Gen. , in Uruguay, 31 
Gatica, Major, of Chile, 348 
Gazeta da Tarde, Brazilian Newspaper, 

299 
Gelly, Gen., y Obes, Argentine Com- 
mander, 165, 176, 179, 187 
Germany and South America : 

Blockade of La Guayra, Venezuela, 
by England, Germany, and Italy, 
1902, 631 
Germans in Argentina, 122 ; in Brazil, 
235, 310 ; in Chile, 416 
Gill, President, of Paraguay, 189 
Glycerio, Francisco, of Brazil, 251, 302 
Godoy, Domingo, Minister in Chile, 

1891, 362, 392 
Godoy, Joaquin, Minister in Chile, 1886, 

338 
Gold : in Peru, 549 ; in Colombia, 613 ; 

in Venezuela, 641 
Gomensoro, Tomas, President of 

Uruguay, 203, 205 
Gomez, Col. Leandro, in the Paraguayan 

War, 132-133 
Gonzalez, President, of Paraguay, 1890, 

190 
Gonzalez, Col. Genuardo, of Paysandii, 

1875, 207 
Gorostiaga, Dr Benjamin, Candidate for 

the Presidency of Argentina, 66, 67 
Gouvernador Id. , Brazil, 266, 269 
Gragoata, Brazil, 274 
Grammer, Juan, of Chile, 358 
Grande, Ilha, Brazil, 271 
Grau, Adm. Miguel, Peruvian Naval 

Commander, in the Chilian-Peruvian 

War, 450-457 
Great Britain, see England 
Guacoldo, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 477, 

483 
Guadaloupe, Bolivia, 574 
Guaitecas Id., 421 
Guale, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 358 
Gualeguay, Argentine Warship, 138 
Guanabara, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Guanara, Venezuela, 635 
Guano : 
Exports from Peru, 1869, 511-512 



Guano — continued 
The Guano Deposits of Atacama and 
the Disputes between Bolivia and 
Chile, the Chilian-Peruvian War, 
1879-84, and the Chilian Occupa- 
tion of Atacama, 433-504 
Guano in the Lobos Ids., 498 
Guaviyii, Uruguay, 211 
Guayaneco Id., 421 
Guayaquil, Ecuador, 578, 582, 584, 586, 

587 
Guayas River, 588 
Guerrero, Adolfo, 365 
Guiana, British, and the Venezuelan 
Boundary Dispute : in 1887, 620- 
621 ; in 1895-99, 622-628, 654 
Guiana, French, 

Portugal and French Guiana, 1807- 

15, 13-14 
Amapa Dispute with Brazil, 1897-99, 
306 
Guimaraes, Adm., of Brazil, 255 
Gustavo Sampaio, Brazilian Torpedo- 
Catcher, 269, 286 
Gutierrez, Cols. Marcelino, Silvestre, 
and Tomas, Peruvian Conspirators, 
513-514 
Gutschmid, Baron, in Chile, 360, 387 

Haggard, Mr, referred to, 628 
Hague Tribunal, 631 
Hamilton, Alexander, referred to, 26 
Harrison, Benjamin, and the Relations 

between Chile and the United 

States, 1891, 393-395 
Heraldo, Chilian Newspaper, 349 
Heredia, Gen. , of Argentina, 33 
Herran, Gen., President of Colombia, 28 
Herrera, Emilia Toro, Wife of President 

Balmaceda, 334 
Holdich, Sir Thomas, and the Chilian 

Boundary Question, 119 
Holguin, Carlos, of Colombia, 598 
Holleben, Baron von, 59 
Holland : Dutch Action in Brazil, 13 
Holley, Gen. Adolfo, of Chile, 353, 355- 

356, 368, 390 
Homos, Gen., in the Paraguayan War, 

164 
Hotham, Adm. , of the Warspite, in Chile, 

1891, 352, 360 
Hotham, Lieut., of the Sirius, in Brazil, 

1894, 281 
Huacho, Peru, 479 
Huaita Ford, Atacama, Chile, 447 
Hualgayoc, Peru, 550 
Huamachuco, Peru, 496 
Huamachuco Indians, 16 
Huanca Indians, 16 
Huanchaca, Bolivia, 356 



678 



INDEX 



Huanchaca Mining Company, Bolivia, 
571, 574 

Huara, Chile, 351 

lluascar, Peruvian Monitor : built 1866, 
443 ; in the Peruvian War with 
Spain, 1866, 510; in the Peruvian 
Revolution, 1878, 518 ; in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 1879, 443, 450-454; 
captured by Chilians, 1879, 455-458 ; 
Chilian Monitor in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 1880-81, 476-477, 488 ; 
in Chilian Civil War, 1891, 346 

Huasco, Chile, 366, 454 

Huemel, Chilian Warship, 368 

Huerta, Manuel Garcia de la, of Chile, 
339 

Humaita, Paraguay, in the Paraguayan 
War, 1865-68, 139, 141, 148, 157, 162- 
171 ; bombarded by Allies, Apr.- 
July 1868, 168-171 

Humboldt, Alexander von, referred to, 9 

Husares Constitutionales of Chile, 376 

Ibanez, Adolfo, of Chile, 340 
Iglesias, Gen. Miguel, 
Peruvian Commander in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 1881, 484, 486, 
487 
President of Peru, 1883, 496-497, 522- 
524, 531, 538 
Ignacio, Adm., Brazilian Commander 
in the Paraguayan War, 160, 161, 
181 
Iguatemy, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Imperial, Chilian Transport, 363 
Incas of Peru, 7, 8, 16 
Independencia, Peruvian Ironclad : built 
1865, 443 ; in the Peruvian War with 
Spain, 1866, 510; in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 1879, 443, 450-453; 
destroyed, 1879, 453, 479; Other 
Reference, 513 
Independencia, Peruvian Armed Steam 

Launch, 477 
Indians: of South America, 15, 412; of 
Peru, 532-533, 538, 546 ; of Bolivia, 
558-559, 565, 568-571 ; of Ecuador, 
587 
Inquisition, 4, 540 
Intemperance, see Alcoholism 
Iquique, Tarapaca : 
Peruvian Port, 448 
Naval Battle between Chile and Peru, 

1879, 450-452 
Chilian Port in the Chilian Civil War, 
1891, 346, 348, 351-353, 360, 364- 
366 
Other References, 412, 422 
Iquitos, Peru, 527, 551, 553 
Irarrazaval, Seflor, of Chile, 400 



Irigoyen, Dr Bernardo, 
Candidate for the Presidency of 

Argentina, 66, 67 
Partisan of the Union Civica, 73 
Partisan of the Union Civica Radical, 

93 
Governor of Buenos Aires, 116-117 
Iriondo, Dr, of Santa Fe, 49 
Isabel, Princess, 

Regent of Brazil, 234-240 
Her Emancipation of the Slaves, 237- 
240 
Italy and South America : 
Conflict with Uruguay, 1851, 31 
Uruguayan Question with Italy, 1882, 

210 
Brazilian Question with Italy, 1896, 293 
Blockade of La Guayra, Venezuela, 
by England, Germany, and Italy, 
1902, 631 
Italians in Argentina, 121 ; in Brazil, 
237, 309 
Itapirii, Fort, Paraguay, 153 
Itaroro River, Paraguay, 176 
Itata, Chilian Transport, 359, 391, 395 
Itati, Argentina, 152 

Jacobinos of Brazil, 302-304 

Jacques, Gen., of Brazil, 290 

Jaguarao, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 
255 

Jaguncos of Canudos, 296-302 

Janequeo, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 476- 
477 

Japan : 
Japanese Purchase of the Chilian 
Warship Esmeralda, 402, 581 

Japanese in Peru, 532, 546 

Jauja, Peru, 523 

Javary, Brazilian Warship, 263, 269 

Jews in Spain, 4, 6 

Joao VI. of Portugal in Brazil, 13 

Jornal de Brazil, 299 

Jornal de Comercio, Brazilian News- 
paper, 258 

Jovellanos, Salvador, President of Para- 
guay, 1872, 188 

Juan Fernandez, 431 

Jueces de Paz in Colombia, 609 

Junin : 

Battle, Aug. 6, 1824, 23 
Other References, 422, 460, 461 

Junta de Gobierno in Chile, 358-382, 
383, 389 

Jupiter, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 259, 
263 

Kennedy, John Gordon, in Chile, 360 
Konig, Senor, Chilian Minister in 
Bolivia, 1900, 408, 562 



INDEX 



679 



Korner, Gen. Emilio, in Chile, 357, 359, 
370, 382, 390, 399 

Lackawana, U.S. Corvette, at Arica, 
Oct. 1880, 480, 483, 497 

La Cotera, Gen. Manuel Gonzalez de, 
of Peru, 521 

Ladario, Baron de, of Brazil, 243 

Lage, Brazil, 263, 264 

Lagomarsino, Capt., Chilian Naval 
Commander, 472 

Lagos, Col. Hilario, in Argentina, 1880, 
45, 50, 54, 57 

Lagos, Col., Chilian Commander, 1880- 
81, 471-472, 481, 486, 488 

La Guayra, Venezuela : 

Blockade by England, Germany, and 

Italy, 1902, 631 
Other References, 625, 640 

Laldua, President, of Colombia, 594 

Lamar, Gen., President of Peru, 29 

Lamas, Col. Diego, Leader of Rising 
against President Borda of Uru- 
guay, 217 ; assassinated, 222 

Lambayeque, Peru, 479 

Lambton, Capt., in Chile, 352 

Lapa, Brazil, 273 

La Paz, Bolivia, 561, 562, 563, 566 

La Plata, see under Argentina 

La Puerta, Gen. Luis de, Vice-President 
of Peru, 474-475, 511, 520-521 

Lara, Venezuela, 642 

La Rioja, Argentina, 117, 161 

Larreta, Dr Aureliano Rodriguez, of 
Uruguay, 212, 221 

Las Cadenas, Chile, 376-377 

Las Cruces, Chile, 375 

Lastera, Gen., in Chile, 30 

Las Zorras, Chile, 376-377 

Latacunga, Ecuador, 585 

Latin America and Pan-American Con- 
gresses, 654 

Latorre, Capt., Chilian Naval Com- 
mander, 454-455 

Latorre, Major Lorenzo, 

Commander in Uruguay, 205, 208 
Dictator of Uruguay, 208-209 
President of Uruguay, 209 

Lautaro, Steamer sunk off Panama, 1902, 
600 

Lavadenz, Gen., Peruvian Commander, 
463 

Lavalle, Gen., in Argentina, 33, 58 

Lavalle, Jose Antonio, of Peru, 439-440, 
498 

Lavalle, Lopez, of Iquique, 464 

Law : Administration of Justice ; in 
Argentina, 115, 125 ; in Uruguay, 
226; in Brazil, 313; in Chile, 418; 
in Peru, 536-537 ; in Bolivia, 570 ; in 



Law — continued 

Ecuador, 586-587 ; in Colombia, 609 ; 
in Venezuela, 636-637 
Lebu, Chile, 346 
Leipzig, German Warship, 379 
Letelier, Col., Chilian Commander, 482 
Liberdade, Brazilian Cruiser, 276 
Liberdade, Brazilian Newspaper, 299 
Libertacao do Ventre, 237 
Libertad,, Chilian Newspaper, 334 
Liliedale, Dr Oscar, of Argentina, 75-76, 

93* 
Lillo, Eusebio, of Chile, 338, 339, 480 
Lima, Viana de, of Brazil, 135 
Lima, Peru : 

The Gutierrez Conspiracy, 1872, 513- 
514 

Insurrection, 1879, 475 

Chilian Occupation, Jan. 16, 1881, 489 

Attack of Lima by Rebel Armies, 
1884-85, 523 ; 1895, 526-527 

San Marcos University, 536 

The Plaza de la Inquisicion, 540 

Other References, 483, 536, 537, 539, 
551, 552 
Lima, Cruiser, 167-168 
Limache, Chile, 380, 431 
Limefia, Peruvian Steamer, 473 
Linares, Dr, President of Bolivia, 31 
Linnares, Chile, 421 
Liquor Traffic, see Alcoholism 
Lira, Carlos, of Chile, 387 
Listarria, Senor, of Chile, 340 
Llamas, 568, 572 

Liana, Julian de la, in Uruguay, 207 
Llanos, 17, 605, 612, 634, 640 
Llanquihue, Chile, 416, 421, 430 
Loa, Chilian Armed Transport, 454-455 ; 

destroyed, 1880, 478-479 
Lobo, Aristides, of Brazil, 251 
Lobo, Dr Fernando, of Brazil, 304 
Lobos, Ids., 499 
Lo Cafias, Chile, 367 
Locumba River, 469 
Loja, Ecuador, 585 
Lomas Valentinas (Hills), 174, 179 
London Pacific Company, 550 
Lopez, Gen., of Venezuela, 1887, 619 
Lopez, Benigno, 173 
Lopez, Don Carlos, First Consul in Para- 
guay, 25 
Lopez, Gen. Francisco Solano, 

Biographical, 140 

First Consul in Paraguay, 25 

Dictator of Paraguay, 39 

Gen. Lopez and Uruguay, 131, 134 

His War against Brazil, 135 

Gen. Lopez in the Paraguayan War, 
39, 135-186 

Marshal of the Army, 137 



680 



INDEX 



Lopez, Gen. Francisco Solano — cont. 

Death of Gen. Lopez, 1870, 186 
Lopez, Dr Lucio V. , 

Governor of Buenos Aires, 1893, 102, 

105-106 
Dr Lopez and Col. Sarmiento, 105-106 
Lopez, Dr Luzio, and the Union Civica 

in Argentina, 1887, 75, 76 
Lopez, Dr Vicente, 
President of Argentina, 32, 33 
Partisan of the Union Civica, 75, 76, 79 
Minister of Finance in Argentina," 88 
Lorena, Capt., Provisional President of 

Brazil, 265-286 
Los Andes, Venezuela, 642 
Los Angeles, Peru, 516 
Lota, Chile, 425 

Lubiaga, Lieut. Col., Peruvian Com- 
mander, 459 
Lucena, Baron, of Brazil, 252 
Luco, Ramon Barros, of Chile, 340, 346, 

_ 389-391, 400 
Lujan, Buenos Aires, 56 
Lynch, Capt. Patricio, Chilian Com- 
mander in the Chilian- Peruvian War, 
479-480, 481-487, 493-495 
Lynch, Madame, referred to, 140, 185, 

186 
Lynch, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 357, 363, 
364, 379 

MacCann, Adm., of the United States, 

and the Revolution in Chile, 1891, 

360, 363 
Maciel or Conselheiro, Antonio, and the 

Jaguncos of Canudos, 296-302 
Mackenna, Benjamen Vicuna, of Chile, 

329 
Madeira, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Madeiros, Col. , of Brazil, 300 
Magalhaes, Coelho, 162 
Magalhaes, Col. Marciano de, of Brazil, 

251 
Magallanes, Chile, 421 
Ma/jallanes, Chilian Gunboat, 328, 346, 

347, 349, 442, 454 
Magdalena, Colombia, 21, 595 
Magdalena, near Lima, Peru, 494 
Magellan, Straits of, 420, 425 
Magnasco, Dr, of Argentina, 115, 124, 

125 
Maipo, Chilian Transport, 365, 366 
Maipu, Chilian Warship, 354 
Maypii, Chile : Battle Apr. 5, 1818, 25 
Maldonado, Uruguay, 207 
Malleco, Chile, 421 
Malpartida, Seiior, of Peru, 527 
Manantiales de San Juan, Uruguay, 203 
Manco Gapac, Peruvian Monitor, 443, 

468, 472 



Manduvira River, 182 

Manuelita, Daughter of Dictator Rosas, 

36-37 
Mapocho, Chilian Steamer, 365 
Maracaibo, Venezuela, 612, 635 
Marajd, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Maranon, Peruvian Schoolship, 493 
Marcilio Lias, Brazilian Warship, 263, 

264 
Maria of Portugal, 14 
Maronas, Uruguay, 200 
Marquez, Dr, President of Colombia, 28 
Marquis d'Olinda, Brazilian Ship, 135 
Marriage Laws, etc. : in Uruguay, 210 ; 

in Chile, 332, 336 ; in Peru, 528 ; in 

Venezuela, 637 
Marroquin, J. M., 
Vice-President of Colombia, 599-600 
President of Colombia, 600 
Marte, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 263 
Martens, Dr, referred to, 628 
Martinez, Col. , of Chile, 486 
Martinez, Carlos Walker, of Chile, 360, 

386-387 
Martyr, Major Diocletiano, Brazilian 

Conspirator, 304 
Matias Cousino, Chilian Transport, 454, 

476 
Matta, Juan Gonzalo, 365 
Matte, Augusto, of Chile, 339, 364 
Matte, Eduardo, of Chile, 360, 392-395, 

400 
Mattera, Mgr. Gigi, 59 
Matto Grosso, Brazil, 135-136, 140-142, 

149, 151, 153, 162 
Maturana, Gen., Chilian Commander, 

482 
Maule, Chile, 421 
Mejillones, 435-436, 454, 457 
Melgarejo, Col., President of Bolivia, 31, 

137 
Mello, Adm. Custodio de, of Brazil : 
Leader of Risings in Rio de Janeiro, 

255-256, 259, 286 
His Manifesto, Sepr. 1893, 260 
Other References, 251, 311 
Mello, Marcellino Bispo de, Assassin, 303 
Mendez, Lopez, in Venezuela, 22 
Mendoza, Don Andres Hurtado de, 11 
Mendoza, Major, in Uruguay, 198 
Mendoza, Argentina, 161 
Mercedes, Uruguay, 207 
Meteoro, Peruvian Schoolship, 493 
Mexico : 
Spanish Conquest of Mexico, 7, 8 
Montezuma and the Astecs, 7 
Meza, Pedro Tablo, of Chile, 358 
Minas, Uruguay, 208 
Minas Geraes, Brazil, 309, 314 
Mindello, Portuguese Warship, 280 



INDEX 



681 



Mines and Mineral Wealth : of South 
America, 17, 654 ; of Chile, 421-425 ; 
of Peru, 548-551 ; of Bolivia, 573- 
574 ; of Ecuador, 589 ; of Colombia, 
613-614 ; of Venezuela, 641-642 
Miraflores, Peru : 

Battle, Jan. 1881, 488-489, 522 
Other References, 484, 487 
Miranda, Brazil, 136 

Misiones Dispute between Brazil and 
Argentina, 137, 245 ; settled, 1895, 
109, 112, 116, 289 
Mitre, Gen. Bartolome, 

Leader of the Portefios, 38, 47 
President of Argentina, 1861, 38-40, 

42 
President Mitre in the Paraguayan 

War, 134-166, 187 
Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
tina, 1874, 43 
His Attitude to the Tiro National of 

Buenos Aires, 45 
Mitre and Roca, 92-93, 94 
Other References, 54, 161, 165 
Mitre, Gen. Emilio, 45 
Mocangue, Brazil, 269 
Molina, Rear-Adm. Francisco, of Chile, 

390 
Mollendo, Peru, 449, 469, 574 
Monagas, Gen., President of Venezuela, 

28 
Monroe Doctrine and South America, 25- 

26, 623 
Monte Santo, Brazil, 300 
Montero, Adm. Lizardo, 

Peruvian Commander, 468, 470, 474, 

486 
Candidate for the Presidency of Peru, 

1875, 517 
Vice-President of Peru, Mar. 1881, 494 
President of Peru, Aug. 1881, 495, 501, 
506 
Monteverde, Gen. , in Venezuela, 21 
Montezuma and the Astecs, 7 
Montoyo, Sergeant, Assassin, 519 
Montt, Ismael Perez, of Chile, 392 
Montt, Adm. Jorge, 

Chilian Naval Commander, 34f>, 379 
Provisional Government at Iquique 
(Apr. 1891) under Capt. Montt, 
358 
Proclamation of Adm. Montt, Sept. 

1891, 384, 389 
President of Chile, Dec. 1891-Sept. 

1896, 390-405 
His Administration, 397-405 
Montt, Manuel, President of Chile, 30, 

323-324 
Montt, Pedro, of Chile, 338, 339, 360, 
364, 394-395, 400, 408-409 



Moore, Capt, Peruvian Naval Com- 
mander, 450, 453 
Moors in Spain, 4, 6 
Moquegua, Peru, 469, 481, 518 
Moraes, Col. Mendes de, 303 
Moraes, Dr Prudente de, 
Republican, 239, 251 
President of Brazil, 1894, 283-304, 306 
The President and the Pacification of 
Rio Grande do Sul, 1895, 290-293 
Temporary Retirement of President 

Moraes, 1896, 294 
His Return to Rio de Janeiro, 1897, 

296 
The Canudos Campaigns, 296-302 
Conspiracy against President Moraes, 
303 
Morales, Col, in Buenos Aires, 56, 58 
Moreira, Col., 

Military Commandant at Desterro, 286 
Commander of Expedition against 
Canudos, 298-301 
Moreno of Argentina, 24, 32 
Moreno, President, of Ecuador, assassin- 
ated, 1875, 29, 578 
Moreno, Dr, and the Chilian Boundary 

Commission in 1899, 113-114 
Morilla, Gen. , at Cartagena, 22 
Morinigo, President, of Paraguay, 1894, 

190 
Morris, Rev. Mr, of Buenos Aires, 124- 

125 
Morro Hill, Arica, 471-473 
Morro Solar: Fighting, Jan. 13, 1881, 

484, 486-487 
Mosquera, Gen., President of Colombia, 

28 
Mowbray, Lieut. Beauchamp, 266 
Munecas, Dr, of Tucuman, 49 
Municipal Government, etc. : in Chile, 
400 ; in Peru, 539 ; in Venezuela, 
635 
Munis, Col. Angel, of Uruguay, 207 
Mufioz, Col., in Brazil, 134 
Munoz, Dr Jose Maria, Candidate for 
the Presidency of Uruguay, 204 

Nabuco, Joaquin, of Brazil, 238, 307 
Napoleon and the Peninsular War, 13 
Navarro, Dr, of Catamarca, 49 
Negroes : in South America, 10 ; in Peru, 

532 
Netto, Gen., Brazilian Commander, 133, 

141, 155 
New Granada, see Colombia 
New York, U.S. Warship, 277 
Newark, U.S. Warship, 277 
Nicaragua and the Panama Canal, 601 
Nictheroy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 253, 

262, 263, 265, 266 



682 



INDEX 



Nictheroy,. Brazilian Warship, 268 

Nitrate Industry of Atacama, Tarapaca, 
etc., the Dispute of Peru with Chile, 
and the Chilian Occupation of Ata- 
cama, Tarapaca, etc., 414, 420-423, 
437, 480, 498, 516-517, 520, 555-556 

Novidades, Brazilian Newspaper, 256 

Novo Friburgo, Brazil, 310 

Novoa Jovino, of Chile, 498 

Nuble, Chile, 421 

Nueva Coimbra, Brazil, 135 

Numancia, Spanish Warship, 326, 509 

Nunez, Capt. Castro Mendez, Spanish 
Naval Commander, 326, 509-510 

Nunez, Rafael, President of Colombia, 
1880, 593-594 ; 1884-94, 595-599 

Nunez, Velasco, de Vela, 11 

Obes, Dr Julio Herrera y, President of 

Uruguay, 213-215 
O'Connor, Capt., of Argentina, 82 
O'Higgins, Gen., in Chile, 25, 30 
O'Higgins, Chile, 421 
O'Higgins, Chilian Corvette, 327 ; in the 

Chilian-Peruvian War, 1879-81, 

442, 449-460, 488; in the Chilian 

Civil War, 1891, 346, 347, 349, 354 
O'Higgins, New Chilian Warship, 399 
Oil Industry in Peru, 550 
Olaiieto, Sefior, of Bolivia, 434 
Olave, Col., in Uruguay, 198 
Oliveira, Major, in the Paraguayan War, 

185 
Oliveira, Joao Alfredo Correa de, of 

Brazil, 238 
Olivera, Argentina, 56 
Olmos, Col. Lisandro, at Cordoba, 52, 

66 
Olney, Richard, and the Boundary 

Dispute between Venezuela and 

British Guiana, 623 
Oribe, Ignacio, President of Uruguay, 

31 
Oribe, Manuel, President of Uruguay, 

31 
Orinoco River, 643 
Orion, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Ortiz, Gregorio, Assassin, 212 
Oruro, Bolivia, 562, 567, 571, 574 
Osborn, Mr, U.S. Minister at Santiago, 

480 
Oscar, Gen. Arturo, Commander in 

Expedition against Canudos, 299- 

302 
Oscurra, Paraguay, 184 
Osorio, Gen., in Chile, 1818, 25 
Osorio, Gen., Brazilian Commander in 

the Paraguayan War, 133, 153-187 
Osorio, Gen. Rocha, of Brazil, 1891, 255 
Osomo, Chile, 416 



Ospina, Mariano, President of Colombia, 

28 
Otalora, Gen., President of Colombia, 

594-595 
Ouro Preto, Vizconde de, of Brazil, 241, 

299 
Ouro Preto, Brazil, 314 
Ovalle, Juan, of Chile, 358 
Ovalle, Chile, 347 
Ovando, Gen. , of Colombia, 28 
Oviedo, Dr, of Peru, 495 

Pacasmayo, Peru, 479 

Pacheco, Sefior, President of Bolivia, 

1884, 557 
Pacocha, Peru, 468, 515 
Pacto de Tregua, Apr. 4, 1884, 332, 501 ; 

ratified, Nov. 29, 1884, 503, 557 
Padilla, Major Julio, 376 
Paez, Gen., 

Hero in the War of Independence in 

Venezuela, 22 
President of Venezuela, 28 
Palacios, Bishop, referred to, 173 
Palacios, President, of Venezuela, 1 889, 

621 
Palacios, Lieut. Enrique, Peruvian 

Naval Commander, 1879, 456 
Pallas, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 264, 

273 
Palleja, Col., on the Battle of Yatay, 

145-146 
Palomas, Uruguay, 208 
Pampas, 17 

Panama, Isthmus and Canal : 
Treaty with the United States, 28 ; 

renewed 1865, 28 
Panama Canal, 28, 601, 614, 655-656 
Secession from Colombia, 1903, 601 
Other References, 595, 600 
Panama City : 
Free Port, 28 
United States Troops, at Panama, 

1885, 597 
Capture of Panama by Insurgents, 
1898, 600 
Panama Hats, 552 
Pando, Col., 
Leader of Insurrection in Bolivia, 1898- 

99, 560-561 
Chief Magistrate of Bolivia, 561 
Para, Brazil, 255, 575 
Parci, Warship, 166 
Paraguay : 
Early Catholic Missions, 9 
Defeat of Gen. Brengano, 1810, 24 
Emancipation from Spain, 1811, 25 
Dr R. de Francia and F. Yegros 
nominated First Consuls, 1811, 
25 



INDEX 



683 



Paraguay — continued 

Don Carlos Lopez, First Consul, 1841, 

25 
Gen. Francisco Solano Lopez, First 

Consul, 1862, 25 
Aggressive Attitude of Gen. Lopez 

towards Argentina, 39 
The Paraguayan War — Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Brazil against 
Paraguay, 1865-70, 39, 130-195, 
210 
Origin of the War, 131-135 
Extente between Uruguay and Para- 
guay, 131 
Alliance with Bolivia, 136 
Gen. Lopez and Uruguay, 134 
Declaration of War in Brazil, 1864, 

135 
Invasion of Matto Grosso, 1864, 135- 

136 
Capture of Nueva Coimbra, Dec, 

1864, 135 
Congress at Asuncion, 137 
The Army in 1865, 138 
Occupation of Corrientes, Apr., 1865, 

138-139, 141-142 
Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay against Paraguay, 
May 1, 1865, 139, 210 
Importance of the Parana and Para- 
guay Rivers, 137, 139, 140 
Plan of Campaign, 140, 141, 148 
Distribution of the Army, 141 
Recapture of Corrientes by the 
Argentines, May 25, 1865, 142 
Battle of the Riachuelo, June 11, 

1865, 143 

Advance towards Uruguay, 145 

Operations near San Borge, June 15, 
1865, 143 

Invasion of Rio Grande, 144 

Mutiny in Entre Rios, Argentina, 
144 

Gen. Flores appointed Commander 
of the Allied Vanguard, 144 

Conditions in Uruguay, 145 

Battle of Yatay, Aug. 17, 1865, 145 

Occupation of Uruguayana, Sept., 
1865, 146-147 

Surrender of Col. Estigarribia, Sept. 
18, 1865, 147 

Preparations for Defence of Para- 
guay, 148 

The Lopez Administration in Matto 
Grosso, 148 

Consultation of Argentine, Brazilian, 
and Paraguayan Representa- 
tives, 150 

Peace Proposals refused by Brazil, 
151 



Paraguay — continued 

The Paraguayan War — continued 
Corrientes as the Base of Operations, 

151 
Defences of the Parana, 151, 152 
Engagements at Paso de La Patria, 

152, 153 
Raid to Rati, Feb., 1866, 152 
Reconnaissance of Paraguayan Posi- 
tions, 153 
Engagements on the Parana, Apr., 

1866, 153 
Camp near Fort Itapiru, 153 
Surprise of Allies, 154 
Advance into Paraguay, 154 
Battle of May 20, 1866, 154 
Discontent in Allied Army, 156 
Engagements of July 15 and 18, 1866, 

156 
Expedition against Curupaite, 157 
Engagement at Curuzii, Sept. 2, 

1866, 157 
Garrison of Curuzu, 158 

Peace Proposals by Lopez, 158, 159 
Attack upon Curupaiti, Sept., 1866, 

159-160 
Military Changes, 160 
Marshal Caxias's Invasion, July, 

1867, 161-162 
Occupation of Rio Hondo, 162 
Situation in Matto Grosso, 162 
Operations at Humaita, 163, 164, 

165, 166 
Capture of Villa del Pilar, and Tayi, 

Sept. 1867, 164 
Engagement at Tuyutf, Nov., 1867, 

164-165 
Capture of Rqjas, 1868, 168 
Capitidation of Curupaiti, 1868, 168 
Bombardment of Humaita, Apr., 

1868, 168 

Attempt to seize the Monitor Rio 

Grande, 169 
Assault on Humaita, July, 1868, 

169 
Occupation of Humaita by the 

Allies, July, 1868, 170-171 
Conditions at Tibicuari, 172-173 
Fighting on the River Canabe, Sept. , 

1868, 175, 176, 177, 179 
Assault on Agostura, Dec. , 1868, 176, 

177 
Capture of Villeta, Dec, 1868, 177 
Hostilities resumed, Dec 20, 1868, 

179 
Action of Dec 20, 1868, 180 
Surrender of Agostura, Dec 30, 

1868, 180 
Occupation of Asuncion, 180 
Mission of Sefior Parunhos, 181 



684 



INDEX 



Paraguay — continued 

The Paraguayan War — continued 
Provisional Government at Asun- 
cion, 182 
Engagement at the River Manduvira, 

182 
Fight at Sapucay, July, 1869, 183 
Attack on Peribebuy, July 12, 1869, 

183-184 
Evacuation of Oscurra and Caacupi 

by Lopez, 184 
Engagement at Yagari, Aug., 1869, 

185 
Action at Campo Grande, 185 
Death of Lopez, Mar., 1870, 186 
Treaty of Peace, July, 1870, 186 
Uruguay and the War Indemnity, 
210 
Death of Gen. Lopez, Mar., 1870, 

186 
Cirilo Rivarola, President, 1870, 186- 

188 
Population of Paraguay, 1870, 187 
Political Situation, 188-189 
Resignation of President Rivarola, 

1872, 188 
Assassination of Ex-President Rivarola, 

1872, 188 
Salvador Jovellanos, President, 1872, 

188-189 
Senor Gill, President, 1874, 189 
President Gill assassinated, 1875, 189 
Senor Uriarte, President, 1875, 187, 

189 
Senor Baredo, President, 1875, 189 
Senor Saguier, President, 1875, 189 
Gen. Caballero, President, 1882, 189 
Senor Escobar, President, 1886, 190 
Senor Gonzalez, President, 1890, 190 
President Gonzalez deposed, 1894, 

190 
Senor Morinigo, President, 1894, 190 
J. B. Egusquiza, President, 1894, 190- 

191 
Boundary Dispute with Bolivia, 191 
Relations with Uruguay, 191 
Emilio Aceval, President, 1898, 191 
Juan B. Escurra, President, 1902, 191 
The Constitution of Paraguay, 188 
Agriculture, etc., 192 
Population, 187, 193 
Australians at San Cosme, 194 
Education, 194 
Paraguay River, 139-140 
Parana, Brazil, 283, 310 
Parana River : 

The Parana as a Waterway, 33 
The Parana in the Paraguayan War, 
137-148, 151-154 
Paranagua, Brazil, 273, 280, 284 



Pardo, Manuel, 

Candidate for the Presidency of Peru, 

512-513 
President of Peru, 1872, 515-517 
Assassination of Pardo, 1878, 518-519 
Pareja, Adm. Jose Manuel, Spanish 

Commander, 326, 507-509 
Parish, Sir Woodbine, in Argentina, 24 
Paroja, Gen. , in Chile, 25 
Parra, Aquites, President of Colombia, 

593 
Parunhos, Senhor, of Brazil, 181 
Paso de la Patria, 152, 153 
Patagonia : 
Catholic Missions, 9 
Patagonian Indians, 15 
Public Works, 118 
Sheep-Farming, 430 
President Roca in Patagonia in 1899, 
114-115 
Patillos, Chile, 348 

Paul, Dr Rqjas, of Venezuela, 620, 621 
Paunero, Gen., Argentine Commander 
in the Paraguayan War, 142-147, 
161, 187 
Pavon, Argentina : Battle, Oct., 1861, 38, 

40 
Paysandii, Uruguay, 132-133, 201, 202, 

205, 207, 208 
Payta, Peru, 479 
Paz, Dr Maximo, Governor of Buenos 

Aires, 84 
Pedro I., 14 
Pedro II. : 

His Personality, 232, 233 

Emperor of Brazil, 14-15, 232-244, 313 

Pedro and the Paraguayan War, 147, 

151, 160 
His Visits to Europe, 232, 236 
His Return to Brazil, 1888, 240 
Deposition of the Emperor, and His 

Return to Portugal, 1889, 243 
Death of Pedro, 1891, 257 
Peixoto, Gen. Floriano, of Brazil 
Republican, 239 

Leader of Military Conspiracy, 242 
Vice-President of Brazil, 245 
President of Brazil, 1891, 256-288 
Revolt against the President, 258-288 
Pellegrini, Carlos, 
Biographical, 48 
Argentine Minister of War in 1880, 54, 

55 
Argentine Minister of War in 1885, 65 
Vice-President of Argentina in 1886, 

73 
President of Argentina, 85-98 
Other Reference, 110 
Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 255 
Pena, Capt., Chilian Commander, 478 



INDEX 



685 



Pefia, Benigno, of Chile, 358 
Pena, Dr Luis Saenz, 

Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
tina, 94-96 
President of Argentina, 96-108 
His Financial Policy, 105 
His Resignation, 107-108 
Pena Blanca, Chile, 375 
Peninsular War and Brazil, 13 
Pereira, Leite, 173 
Pereira, Luis, of Chile, 396 
Pereira, Dr Victorino, Vice-President of 

Brazil, 294, 296 
Pereyra, Leonardo, of Argentina, 75-76, 

93 
Perez, Gen., Bolivian Commander, 470 
Perez, Jose Joaquin, 

President of Chile, 1861, 324-327 

His Policy in the War with Spain, 

1865-66, 326-327 
President of Chile, 1866, 327-328 
Perez, Col. Maximo, Leader of Revolt 

in Uruguay, 199, 205 
Perez, Dr Roque, of Buenos Aires, 41 
Peribebuy, Paraguay, 182, 183 
Pernambuco, Brazil, 274 
Peru : 

Inca Civilisation, 7, 8, 16 

Spanish Rule, 8, 10, 12 

Defeat of Almagro at Cuzco, 1538, 8 

Francisco and Gonzalo Pizarro, 8, 10- 

11, 539-540 
Viceroy Velasco Nunez de Vela de- 
feated near Quito, 1546, 11 
Don Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, 

Viceroy, 11 
Spanish Monopoly of Official Posts, 12 
The Aymara Indians, 16, 534, 538 
Struggle for Independence, 23 
Spanish defeated by Lord Cochrane, 

1820, 23 
Gen. San Martin at Lima, Callao, 

etc., 23 
Defeat of Spanish by Bolivar at Junin, 

Aug. 6, 1824, 23 
Spanish defeated by Gen. Sucre at 

Ayacucho, Dec. 9, 1824, 43 
Jose de la Riva Aguero, President, 

1823, 29 
Gen. Lamar, President, 1827, 29 
Gen. Gamarra, President, 1829, 29 
Gen. Santa Cruz and Gen. Salaverry, 

29 
Gen. Ramon Castilla, President, 1845, 

29, 30 

Gen. Echenique, President, 29 
President Echenique deposed, 1855, 

29 
Gen. Ramon Castilla, President, 1855, 

30, 506 



Peru — continued 

Constitution of, 1860, 505-506 
Col. Balta, President, 1862, 30 
Gen. San Roman, President, 1862, 506 
Gen. Pezet, Vice-President, 506-508 
Gen. Canseco, Second Vice-President, 

506 
Disputes with Spain, 1863, 506-508 
Spanish Squadron in Peruvian Waters, 

1863, 506-508 
Incident at Talambo, 1863, 506-507 
Revolt under Gen. Prado and Gen. 

Canseco, Feb.-Nov., 1865, 506-508 
Gen. Prado, President, 1865, 508-511 
Peru and the Paraguayan War, 1865, 

137, 151 
Alliances with Chile, Ecuador, and 

Bolivia, Dec, 1865, 326-327, 508 
The Chincha Ids., Dispute between 

Spain and Peru, 1864-65, 326, 333, 

507-508 
War with Spain of Chile and Peru, 

1865-66, 326-327, 508-510 
Naval Engagement near Abtao, 

Feb. 6, 1866, 509 
Spanish Bombardment of Val- 
paraiso, Mar. 31, 326-327, 509 
Spanish Bombardment of Callao, 

May 2, 509-510, 517-520 
Withdrawal of Spanish Squadron, 

May 12, 510 
Other References to the War, see 
under Chile 
Dictatorship of Gen. Prado, 510 
Revision of the Constitution, 1867, 

510 
Gen. Prado, Constitutional President, 

1867, 510 
Revolt against President Prado under 

Gen. Canseco and Col. Jose 

Balta, 1867, 510-511 
Gen. Luis de La Fuerta, Vice- 
President, 511 
Resignation of President Prado, Jan. 

6, 1868, 511 
Gen. Canseco, Acting President, 511 
Constitutional Reforms of 1867 re- 
voked, 511 
Col. Jose Balta, President, Aug. , 1868, 

511-513 
The Financial Situation, 511-512 
Public Works, 512 
The Gutierrez Conspiracy in Lima 

and Callao, 1872, 512-514 
Assassination of President Balta, 1872, 

513-514 
Mariano Herencia Zevallos, Vice- 
President, 514 
Manuel Pardo, President of Peru, 

1872, 512-513, 515-517 



686 



INDEX 



Peru — continued 
Reforms, 515 
Revolt under Nicolas de Pierola, 1874, 

515-516 
Pardo's Foreign Policy, 516-517 
Secret Alliance between Bolivia and 

Peru, 1873, 436, 441, 517, 555 
Gen. Prado re-elected President, 1875, 

450, 474-475, 517-520 
Gen. La Puerta, Vice-President, 474 
Conspiracies under Nicolas de Pierola, 

1876 and 1878, 518 
Treaty with Spain, 1878, 518 
Assassination of Ex-President Pardo, 

Sept. 22, 1878, 518-519 
The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate 
Industry of Atacama, and the 
Disputes between Bolivia and 
Chile, Peruvian Intrigues in 
Bolivia, the Chilian War with 
Perii and Bolivia, 1879-84, and 
the Chilian Occupation of Ata- 
cama, Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica. 
433-504 
Atacama and its Guano Deposits 
and Nitrate Industry, 433 et 
seq., 519-520 
Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, and 
Secret Treaty between Peru and 
Bolivia, 1873, 436, 441, 517, 
555 
Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, 1875- 

78, 437-438, 555 
Peruvian Proposal of Arbitration 
between Bolivia and Chile, 439- 
440 
Chilian Declaration of War against 
Peru, Apr. 5, 1879, 440-441, 520 
The Peruvian Navy, 443 
Military Forces, 444-445 
President Prado, Commander of the 

Peruvian Army, 474, 520 
Operations of the Chilian Squadron, 

448-449 
Pisagua bombarded by Chilians, 

449 
Naval Action off Iquique, May 20, 
and Loss of the lndependencia, 
450-453 
Peruvian Reprisals, 453-454 
The Huascar captured by Chilians, 

Oct. 8, 454-457 
The Pilconiayo captured by Chilians, 

Nov. 17, 457 
Chilian Invasion of Tarapaca, 458- 

460, 520 
Battle of Pisagua, Nov. 2, 460-461 
Chilian Occupation of Junin, 461 
Skirmish near Agua Santa, Nov. 
6, 461-462 



Perii — continued 
The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
Battle at San Francisco, Dolores, 

Nov. 16, 462-464 
Chilian Occupation of Iquique, Nov. 

20, 464 
Battle of Tarapaca, Nov. 27, 465- 

467 
Adm. Montero in Command of the 

Peruvian Army, Nov. 26, 1879, 

474 
Chilian Invasion of Tacna and Arica, 

Feb. 1880, 468-470 
Battle of Tacna, May 26, 470-471 
Battle of Arica, June 7, 472-473 
Blockade of Callao by Chilians, 

1880, 475-479, 483, 493 
Chorillos, etc., bombarded by 

Chilians, Sept. 1880, 479-480 
Efforts of the United States for 

Peace, Oct., 1880, and Confer- 
ence on the Lackaioana, 480- 

481 
Chilian Demands rejected, 481 
Pisco and Yea occupied by Chilians, 

Nov., 1880, 482 
Naval Action at Callao, Dec. 6, 

483 
Defences of Lima, 483-485 
Battle of Chorillos, Jan. 13, 1881, 

485-487 
Fighting on Morro Solar, Jan. 13, 

487 
Armistice, Jan. 15, 488 
Battle of Miraflores, Jan. 15, 488- 

489, 522 
Lima occupied by Chilians, Jan. 16, 

489-500 
Panic in Lima, 490-491 
The Urban Guard, 491 
Chilian Acts of Vandalism, 492-493 
Peruvian Guerilla Warfare against 

Chilians, 1882, 495-496 
Capture of Arequipa by Chilians, 

Aug., 1883, 496 
Gen. Iglesias and Peace, 496-497 
Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Ancon) 

between Chile and Peru, Oct. 

20, 1883, 497-500 ; ratified, May 

8, 1884, 332, 403, 407, 500-501, 

523, 529 
Lima evacuated by Chilians, Oct. 

22, 1883, 500 
Tarapaca ceded to Chile, 498 
Chilian Occupation of Tarapaca, 

414, 420-423, 437, 480, 498, 516- 

517, 520 
Chilian Occupation of Tacna and 

Arica, 403-404, 407, 468-473, 

481, 498, 502, 529, 556 



INDEX 



687 



Peru — continued 
The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
Chilian Occupation of Atacama, 437, 

517, 555-556 
Other References to the War, see 
under Bolivia, Chile 
President Prado's Flight to Europe, 

Dec, 1879, 474-475,520 
Conspiracy under Nicolas de Pierola, 

Dec, 1879, 475,520-521 
Resignation of Gen. de La Puerta, Vice- 
President, Dec, 1879, 520-521 
Nicolas de Pierola, President, 1879, 

475, 520-522 
Dr F. G. Calderon, President, Mar. 12, 

1881, 494-495 
Adm. Montero, Vice-President, 494 
Adm. Montero, President, Aug. 1881, 

495 
Ministry of Capt. Carailo Carrillo, 495 
Nicolas Pierola, Provisional President, 

1881, 495 
Gen. Miguel Iglesias, President, 1883, 

496-497, 522-524 
Revolt under Gen. Caceres, 1884-85, 

523-524 
Gen. Caceres, President, 1886, 524-525 
Col. Morales Bermudez, President, 

1890, 524-525 
Pedro A. del Solar and Col. Borgofto, 

Vice-Presidents, 525-526 
Col. Arrate of Chile in Peru, Apr., 1891, 

354 
Gen. Caceres, President, 1894, 526 
Revolt under Pierola, 1894-95, 526-527, 

538 
Provisional Government under Sefior 

Candarao, 1895, 527 
Pierola, President, 1895, 527-528, 542, 

544 
Insurrection in Iquitos, 527 
New Electoral Law, 527-528 
Civil Marriages, 528 
Boundary Dispute with Colombia, 

1895, 529 
Other Boundary Disputes, 529 
Sefior Romaiia, President, 1899, 528- 

529 
Revolution under Sefior Durand, 528 
Manuel Candamo, President, 1903, 529 
Population, 530-534 
Races of Peru, 531-534 
Alcoholism, 533 
Language, 533-534 
Topography, 534 
Education, 534-536 
Administration of Justice, 536-537 
The Catholic Church, 537-538, 540, 541 
National Character, 538-539 
Municipal Government, 539 



Peru — continued 
Finance, 541-544 
Industries, 545-552 
Sugar-Growing, 545-546 
Cotton Industry, 546-547, 552 
Coffee, etc., 547 
Cattle and Sheep, 547-548 
Mineral Wealth, 548-550 
Oil, 550 

Guano Exports, 1869, 511-512 
Borax, 550 

Rubber, Gum, etc. , 551-552 
Manufactures, 552 

Railways, Roads, etc., 549, 551, 552- 
553 
Peruvian Corporation, 542, 547 
Petroleum Industry in Peru, 550 
Petropolis, Brazil, 310 
Pezet, Gen., President of Peru, 506-508 
Pichincha, Ecuador, 22 
Pierola, Nicolas de, 

Peruvian Conspirator, 1874, 515-516 ; 

1876, etc., 518 
Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1879, 475, 

520-521 
President of Peru, 1879, 475, 520-522 
Commander in the Chilian-Peruvian 

War, 1880-81, 484-489, 494 
Provisional President of Peru, 1881, 495 
Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1894-95, 526, 

538 
President of Peru, 1895, 527-528, 542, 
544 
Pietri, Dr, referred to, 628 
Pilcomayo, Peruvian Sloop, 443 ; captured 
by Chilians, 1879, 457, 476, 479, 488 
Pincon, Vincent Yanez, and Brazil, 12 
Pinto, Gen., President of Chile : in 1827, 

30 ; in 1829, 30 
Pinto, Anibal, President of Chile, 1876, 

329-331 
Pinto, Col., Bolivian Commander, 470 
Pinto, Sefior, Salvador Minister in Peru, 

288 
Pinzon, Rear-Adm. , Spanish Com- 
mander, 506, 507 
Pipon, Capt., of the Sirius, 281 
Pirene, Peru, 547 
Pisagua : 
Pisagua in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 

1879, 449, 459-461 
Pisagua in the Chilian Civil War, 1891, 

347, 349-350, 364 
Other References, 422, 449 
Pisco, Peru, 482 
Piura, Peru, 546, 550 
Pizarro, Francisco, 
Pizarro and Atahualpa, 7, 584, 587 
Founder of Lima, 539-540 
Other References, 8, 10 



688 



INDEX 



Pizarro, Gonzalo, 8, 11 

Placilla, Chile, 376-380 

Plague in Brazil, 308 

Plate River Republics, 650-652 

Plaza, Gen. Leonidas, President of 

Ecuador, 1901, 583 
Plaza, Dr Victorino de la, Minister of 

War in Argentina, 68 
Polidoro, Gen., Brazilian Commander in 

the Paraguayan War, 158-160, 183 
Population : of South America, 9-11, 15- 
16, 650 ; of Paraguay, 193 ; of Brazil, 
309; of Chile, 411-412; of Peru, 
530-534 ; of Bolivia, 566 ; of Ecuador, 
584 ; of Colombia, 606-607 ; of 
Venezuela, 634-635 
Portales, Gen., in Chile, 30 
Portenos of Buenos Aires, see under 

Argentina 
Porto Alegre, Brazil, 235, 310 
Portugal and South America : 

Portuguese Dominion of Brazil, 1500- 

1578, and 1649, 12-14 
The Portuguese Seat of Government 

in Brazil, 1808, 13 
Invasion of French Guiana, 1808, 13 
Joao VI., 1807-21, 13 
Pedro I., 1822, 14 
Portuguese Aggression in Uruguay 

till 1828, 24 
Pedro II., 1840, 14, 232-244, 257, 313 
The Portuguese and Brazilian Insur- 
gents in 1894, 280-281 
Diplomatic Relations between Portugal 
and Brazil broken off, 281 ; and 
resumed, 1895, 290 
Portuguese in Brazil, 309, 311 
Positivism in Brazil, 235 
Potosi, Bolivia, 574 
Pozo Almonte, Battle, Mar. 7, 1891, 353- 

355 
Pradera Iron Works, Colombia, 613 
Prado, B. , of Chile, 360, 362 
Prado, Gen. Mariano Ignacio, 
Leader of Rebellion in Peru, 1865, 506- 

508 
President of Peru, 1865, 508-511 
Defender of Callao against Spain, 1866, 

517, 520 
President of Peru, 1875, 450, 474-475, 

517-520 
Commander of the Peruvian Army in 
the Chilian-Peruvian War, 1879, 
450, 474, 520 
His Flight to Europe, Dec, 1879, 474- 
475, 520 
Prado, Lieut, of Peru, 468 
Prat, Capt., Chilian Naval Commander 
in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 450- 
451 



Prats, Belisario, of Chile, 340 
Presidents Errazuriz, Chilian Cruiser, 

358, 363 

Presidente Pinto, Chilian Cruiser, 358, 363 
Prieto, Gen., President of Chile: in 

1831, 30, 321-323 ; in 1835, 30, 323 
Puerto del Ingles, Uruguay, 202 
Puiff, Ship, 207 
Pulucayo Mine, Bolivia, 574 
Puno de Atacama Dispute between 

Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia : in 

1898, 111-112; in 1899, 113-114; in 

1900, 407 
Punta Arenas, Chile, 420, 425, 430 
Punta Gruesa, Chile, 453 
Punto Grosso, Brazil, 283 
Puy, Gen., in Venezuela, 21 
Puyredon, Dictator, in Argentina, 24, 32 

Queimadas, Brazil, 298 

Queiros, Gen. Innocencio Galvao de, of 
Brazil, 292 

Quichua Indians and the Quichua Lan- 
guage, 16, 534, 538, 567-569 

Quilloga, Chile, 355 

Quillota, Chile, 347, 375 

Quilpue, Chile, 373-376 

Quintana, Dr, Candidate for the Presi- 
dency of Argentina, 120 

Quinteros, Chile, 131, 346, 368-369, 370, 
391-396 

Quiroga, Gen., in Argentina, 32, 33 

Quito, Ecuador, 21, 579, 584, 586, 587 

Raceoo, Col., in Buenos Aires, 55, 56, 

57 
Racer, British Ship, 265-266 
Railways: in Argentina, 64, 109-110; in 

Uruguay, 227 ; in Brazil, 236, 315 ; 

in Chile, 328, 419-420; in Peru, 512, 

515, 551-552; in Bolivia, 571-572; 

in Ecuador, 587-588 ; in Colombia, 

604 ; in Venezuela, 642 
Ramirez, Col. , Chilian Commander, 448, 

466 
Ramirez, Dr Jose Pedro, of Uruguay, 

212, 221 
Rasquim, Gen., of Paraguay, 186 
Raycraft, Mr, in Chile, 393 
Rebolledo, Rear-Adm. Juan Williams, 

Chilian Naval Commander, 326, 448- 

454 
Recarbarren, Col. Isaac, Peruvian Com- 
mander, 459-461, 487 
Registration Law in Chile, 332, 336 
Reinafe, Gen. , of Argentina, 33 
Religion in South America, see Catholic 

Church 
Republic, Brazilian Warship, in the 

Revolt in Brazil, 1893-94, 263-285 



INDEX 



689 



Resolution, Spanish Frigate, 507, 509 
Reyes, Gen., of Colombia, 596 
Reyes, Vicente, of Chile, 404 
Riachuelo River, 56, 143 
Riachuelo, Brazilian Cruiser, 255 
Ribera, Fructuoso, President of Uruguay, 

31 
Riesco, Jerman, President of Chile, 1901, 

388, 409 
Riggin, Quartermaster, of the Baltimore, 

393 
llimac, Chilian Transport : captured by 
Peru, 1879, 454 ; in the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, 1880, 481 ; destroyed, 
Jan. 1881, 493 
Rio Branco Law, 237 
Rio Grande, Brazil: 

Rio Grande in the Paraguayan War, 

134, 141, 144 
Revolt in 1878, 235-236 
Revolt in 1893, 259, 265 
Attack on Rio Grande by Rebels, 

Apr., 1894, 284-286 
Revolt, 1895, 290-293 
Rio Grande, Monitor, 169 
Rio Honda, 162 

Rio de Janeiro, see under Brazil 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian Warship, 157 
Riobamba, Ecuador, 585 
Rioja, Argentina, 117, 161 
Rios, Col., Peruvian Commander, 464, 

466 
Ptiquelme, Lieut. -Col., of Chile, 351 
Rivadavia, President of Argentina, 24, 32 
Rivarola, Cirilo, President of Paraguay, 

186, 188 
Rivas, Gen. Ignacio, in the Paraguayan 

War, 169, 170 
Riveros, Rear-Adm. Galvarino, Chilian 

Commander, 454-455, 475, 479 
Robles, Gen., Paraguayan Commander, 

137, 138, 148 
Robles, Gen. Eulojio, of Chile, 348-354 
Roca, Gen. Julio, 

Candidate for the Presidency of 

Argentina, 47, 54, 55 
President of Argentina, 60-68, 71 
His Administration, 61-68 
Roca and Celman, 71-72 
Argentine Minister of the Interior, 88, 

97 
Attempted assassination of Roca in 

1891, 92 
Mitre and Roca, 93, 94 
Commander in Santa Fe, 102 
Again President of Argentina, 110-120 
His Meeting with President Errazuriz 

of Chile, 114 
His Visit to Patagonia, 114-115 
His Visit to Brazil, 1899, 116, 307 



Rocafuerte, Vicente, President of 

Ecuador, 29 
Rocha, Dr Dardo, of Argentina, 49, 66- 

67 
Rocha, Uruguay, 207 
Rodriguez, Senor, of Uruguay, 181 
Rodriguez, Lieut. , Peruvian Naval Com- 
mander, 456 
Rogers, Lieut., Chilian Naval Com- 
mander, 456-457 
Rojas, Argentina, in the Paraguayan 

War, 154-161, 168 
Romaila, Senor, President of Peru, 1899, 

528-529 
Rome, Church of, see Catholic Church 
Rosa, Almeida, of Brazil, 139 
Rosales, Torpedo-Catcher, wrecked, 98, 

107 
Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina, 38, 56 
Rosas, Juan Manuel, 
His Action in Uruguay, 31 
Governor and Captain-General of 

Buenos Aires, 33 
His Attitude towards French Settlers, 

33-34 
Tyranny and Downfall of Rosas, 36- 
37 
Ross, Augustin, 365, 366 
Rubber Industry : of Peru, 551 ; of 
Bolivia, 575 ; of Ecuador, 588 ; of 
Colombia, 612 
Rucanas, 16 

Saa, Gen., Uruguayan Commander, 

133 
Saavedra, Gen. Cornelio, Chilian Com- 
mander, 489, 492 
Saguier, President, of Paraguay, 1875, 

189 
St John, Mr, in Venezuela, 1887, 

621 
St John, Alfred, British Consul in Peru, 

1895, 527 
St John, Sir Spencer, British Minister in 

Peru, 1881, 488, 491 
Salado River, 434-435 
Salaverry, Gen., in Peru, 29 
Salaverry, Peru, 479 
Salazar, Gen., of Venezuela, 619 
Salazar, Eusebio, y Mazarredo, of Spain, 

507 
Saldana, Col. Atanasildo, of Uruguay, 

207 
Salgado, Col., of Brazil, 272, 284-285 
Salinas, Belisario, of Bolivia, 501 
Salisbury, Marquis of, and the Boundary 

Dispute between Venezuela and 

Guiana, 623 
Salles, Bernardino de Campos, of Brazil, 

251 

2x 



690 



INDEX 



Salles, Dr Manoel F. Campos, 

Personality of Dr Campos Salles, 

305 
Republican, 239, 251 
President of Brazil, 1898, 304-308 
His Visit to Europe, 306 
His Visit to Argentina, 1900, 118- 
119 

Salt Mines : in Colombia, 613 ; in Vene- 
zuela, 642 

Salto, Uruguay, 131, 207 

Sama River, 469 

San Bartolome (Hill), Peru, 485, 489 

San Borge, Brazil, 143 

San Clemento, California, 359 

San Cosme, 152, 194 

San Cristoval (Hill), Peru, 489 

San Diego, California, 359, 360 

San Francisco, Dolores, Peru, Battle of, 
1879, 462-463 

San Francisco, U.S. Cruiser, in Chilian 
Waters, 277, 380, 391-392, 395 

San Juan, Argentina, 161 

San Juan (Hill), Peru, 484, 486-487 

San Lorenzo, Peru, 476, 509-510 

San Luis, Argentina, 101, 161 

San Martin, Gen., Argentine Com- 
mander, 23, 25, 653 

San Roman, Gen., President of Perii, 
1862, 506^ 

Sanchez, Evaristo, of Chile, 338 

Sanchez Jose, of Peru, 523 

Sanclemente, M. A., President of Colom- 
bia, 1898, 599 

Sandia, Peru, 549 

Sanfuentes, Sen or, of Chile, 340 

Santa Anna de Liviamento, Brazil, 255 

Santa Catharina, Brazil, 283, 310 

Santa Cruz, Gen., in Peru, 29; in 
Bolivia, 1827-39, 30 

Santa Cruz, Col., Chilian Commander, 
1879, 466 

Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 567, 575 

Santa Cruz, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 
257, 263, 264, 265, 269, 274, 279 

Santa Lucia Chico, River, 200 

Santa Maria, Domingo, President of 
Chile, 1881, 331-333, 335, 336 

Santa Teresa (Hill) Peru, 484, 486 

Santander, Gen. , President of Colombia, 
27, 28 

Santiago, Chile : 

Fire at the Compaflia Church, 1863, 

325 
Other References, to Town and Pro- 
vince, 348, 356, 365, 380-384, 411- 
412, 416, 421, 431 

Santibanez, Jose Maria, of Bolivia, 434 

Santibanez, Ramon, of Chile, 358 

Santo Domingo, Peru, 550 



Santos, Gen. Maximo, 

Chief Adviser to President Vidal of 

Uruguay, 209-210 
President of Uruguay, 1882, 210-211 
Commander-in-Chief, 211 
Revolt against Gen. Santos, 211 
Captain-General, 211 
President of Uruguay, 1886, 211-212 
Attempted Assassination of President 
Santos, 212 
Sao Francisco Xavier, Brazil, 299 
Sao Joao Baptista, Brazil, 263, 264, 265, 

269, 274, 279 
Sao Paulo, Brazil : 

Sao Paulo in the Republican Move- 
ment, 235-239, 243, 244, 246, 251, 
254 
Sao Paulo and the Slavery Question, 

237-240 
Other References, 264, 265, 284, 283, 
299, 309-310 
Sapucay, Paraguay, 183 
Saraiva, Aparicio, 
Leader of Risings in Uruguay, 217- 

222, 224 
Leader of Rising in Rio Grande do Sul, 
290 
Saraiva, Conselheiro, Brazilian Envoy to 

Uruguay, 132 
Saraiva, Gumercindo, Leader of Revolt 

in Brazil, 259, 271-287 
Sarmiento, Col., and Dr Lucio V. Lopez, 

1894, 106 
Sarmiento, Dr, President of Argentina, 

1868-74, 40-41, 43, 63, 123-125 
Saraget, Gen., of Brazil, 299-300 
Schley, Capt., of the Baltimore, 393 
Scruggs, Mr, referred to, 627 
Seguier, Vice-President, of Paraguay, 

189 
Senoret, Lieut., Chilian Commander, 

477 
Sepulveda, Capt., Chilian Commander, 

461 
Serena, Chile, 347, 348 
Sergipe, Brazil, 300 
Serpe, Dr Epifanio, of Peru, 495 
Serrano, Lieut. Ignacio, Chilian Naval 

Commander, 452 
Serzedello, Major, of Brazil, 251 
Sete de Seplembre, Brazilian Warship, 263 
Shah, British Warship, 518 
Shannon, British Warship, 464 
Sheep-Farming, etc. : in Argentina, 127- 
128 ; in Uruguay, 228-229 ; in Chile, 
420, 430; in Peru, 547-548; in 
Colombia, 612 ; in Venezuela, 641 
Silva, Gen. , Peruvian Commander, 486 
Silva, Gen. Jose da, in the Paraguayan 
War, 176, 184 



INDEX 



691 



Silva, Rodrigo Augusto da, of Brazil, 238 
Silva, Dr Rosa E., Vice-President of 

Brazil, 1898, 304 
Silva, Waldo, of Chile, 346, 389-391 
Silver: in Chile, 424; in Peru, 549; in 
Bolivia, 573-574; in Venezuela, 
642 
Simeao, Jose, of Brazil, 251 
Simpson, Lieut, Chilian Naval Com- 
mander, 456-457 
Sirius, British Ship, 265-266, 281 
Slavery: Emancipation of Slaves in 

Brazil, 237-240 
Sodre, Lauro, of Brazil, 304 
Solar, Javier Vial, 365 
Solar, Pedro A. del, Vice-President of 

Peru, 1890, 525-526 
Soriano, Uruguay, 207 
Soto, Col., of Chile, 1891, 351-352 
Soto, Seiior, of Chile, 1891, 379 
Sotomayor, Gen., Chilian Commander, 

446-448, 481, 486-487 
Sotomayor, Rafael, Chilian War Minister, 

458, 470 
South America (see also Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Patagonia, Peru, 
Uruguay) : 
Geographical Position, 17 
Mineral Wealth, 17, 654 
Agriculture, etc., 17, 651 
The Spanish Conquest of South 
America and Spanish Colonial 
Policy, 6-10 
Emancipation of South America from 

Spanish Rule, 12-34, 653 
Proposed Federation of Republics, 27, 

653 
The Republics and Internal Dissen- 
sions, 647 
Spanish and Portuguese Influence, 648- 

650 
The River Plate Republics, 650-652 
Pan-American Congresses, 654 
The United States and South America, 

651-657 
The Monroe Doctrine, 25-26 
The Panama Canal, 28, 601, 614, 655- 
656 
Souza, Gen. Guillermo, in the Para- 
guayan War, 156 
Souza, Gen. Juan da, in the Paraguayan 

War, 180-182 
Spain : 
Traits of Spanish Character, 3 
Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, 4 
Treatment of Moors and Jews, 4 
The Inquisition, 4, 540 
The People of Spain in the 15th 
Century, 6 



Spain — continued 
Early Spanish Colonists and their 
Treatment of Natives in South 
America, etc., 6 
Spanish Colonial Policy, 10 
Emancipation of Spanish Colonies, 

12-34, 653 
Peruvian Disputes with Spain, 506- 

507 
Spanish Squadron in Peruvian Waters, 

1863-64, 506-507 
The Talambo Incident in Peru, 1863, 

507 
Dispute with Peru re the Chinch a 

Ids., 1864, 326, 333, 507-508 
Chilian War with Spain, 1865-66, 326- 

327 
Peruvian War with Spain, Jan. 14, 

1866-May 12, 1866, 508-510 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and Perii, 
and the War with Spain, 1865-66, 
326-327, 508 
The Govadonga captured by Chilians, 

Jan. 1866, 326, 509 
Naval Engagement of Spain against 
Chile and Peru near Abtao, Feb. 
6, 1866, 509 
Spanish Bombardment of Valparaiso, 

Mar. 31, 1866, 326-327, 509 
Spanish Bombardment of Callao, May 

2, 1866, 509-510, 517, 520 
Chilian Truce with Spain, 1867, 327 ; 

and Treaty, 1879, 327 
Spanish Arbitration in the Boundary 
Dispute between Venezuela and 
Colombia, 1883-1891, 595 
Spain and Cuba, 5, 7, 648 
Spanish Influence in South America, 
648-650 
Staunton, Adm.,in Brazilian Waters, 276 
Stephan, Col., of Chile, 356 
Stewart, Duncan, of Uruguay, 215 
Storrow, Mr, 627 
Suarez, Col., in Peru, 1824, 23 
Suarez, Gen., in the Paraguayan War, 

1866, 152 
Suarez, Col. Belisario, Peruvian Com- 
mander, 1879-81, 459, 464, 467, 
470, 484, 486, 489 
Suarez, Gen. Jose Gregorio, 

Candidate for the Presidency in 

Uruguay, 1868, 199 
Commander of Troops against Blanco 
Revolutionists in Uruguay, 1870, 
200-202 
Suarez, Lieut. -Col. Manuel, Peruvian 

Commander, 1879, 466 
Sucre, Gen., of Bolivia : 

Commander at Pichincha, 1822, 22 
President of Bolivia, 1825, 23, 30, 653 



INDEX 



Sucre, Bolivia, 562, 563, 567 
Sugar-Cultivation : in Peru, 545-546 ; in 

Venezuela, 640 
Supe, Peru, 479 
Switzerland and the Amapa Dispute 

between Brazil and French Guiana, 

306-307 

Tacna : 

Chilian Invasion and Battle of Tacna, 

May 26, 1880, 468-471, 481 
Bolivia and Peru and the Chilian 
Occupation of Tacna, 403-404, 
407, 498, 502, 529, 556 
Other References, 354, 420 
Tacuarembo, Uruguay, 208 
'Page, Brazil, 136 
Tajes, Gen. Maximo, 

Commander in Uruguay, 211 
President of Uruguay, 212-213 
Talambo, Peru, 506-507 
Talara, Peru, 550 
Talca, Chile, 324 
Talcahuano, Chile, 346 
Talisman, Peruvian Transport, 493, 515 
Taltal, Chile, 364, 421, 423, 454 
Tamandare, Adm., Brazilian Com- 
mander, 132, 133, 139, 158-160, 187 
TamandarS, see Almirante Tamandard 
Tamarugal, Chile, 429, 462 
Tarapaca (see also Iquique) 

The Nitrate Industry, the Dispute of 
Peru with Chile, and the Chilian 
Occupation, 414, 420-423, 437, 
480, 498, 516-517, 520 
Borax in Tarapaca, 426 
Battle of Tarapaca, 1879, 464-467 
Other References, to Town and Pro- 
vince, 354, 459, 462 
Tarija, Bolivia, 567 

Tavares, Gen., Jose da Silva, of Brazil, 
255, 292-293, in the Paraguayan 
War, 185 
Tayi, Paraguay, 164, 172 
Tejeda, Capt. M., of Chile, 359-360 
Tejedor, Dr Carlos, 
Governor of Buenos Aires, 45, 47 
Candidate for the Presidency of 
Argentina, 47, 53 
Telegraph Service in Brazil, 316 
Telles, Gen., of Brazil, 269 
Tesoreria General de la Escuadra in 

Chile, 389 
Tibicuari, Paraguay, 173-174 
Tierra del Fuego, 420, 421, 425, 430 
Timbo, Argentina, 166 
Tiradentes of Brazil, 13 
Tiro Nacional (Volunteers) of Buenos 

Aires, 45-46 
Titicaca Region, 16 



Toco, Chile, 423 

Tocopilla, Chile, 359, 422, 446, 448, 454 
Tolima, Colombia, 613 
Topater Ford, Atacama, Chile, 447 
Torata, Peru, 469, 516 
Torico, Rufino, of Lima, Peru, 489 
Toro, Domingo, y Herrera, of Chile, 387 
Toro, Chilian Ship, 488 
Tovar, Manuel, Archbishop of Lima, 523 
Trajano, Brazilia.n Warship, 263, 277 
Transvaal referred to, 565 
Tres Arboles, Uruguay, 219 
Trinidade, Brazil ; British Occupation, 292 
Triunfo, Spanish Warship, 507 
Trouin, Adm. Duguay, and Brazil, 13 
Trujillo, President, of Colombia, 593 
Trujillo, Peru, 536, 550 
Trumbull, Senor, 364 
Truxillo, Peru, 479 

Tucapd, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 477, 483 
Tucuman, Argentina, 24 
Tupi-Guarani Indians, 15 
Tupper, Alvaro Bianchi, 365 
Tupper, Lieut. C. G. , 266 
Tuyuti, Argentina, in the Paraguayan 
War, 159-165 

Udaondo, Dr, 

Governor of Buenos Aires, 116 
Candidate for the Presidency of 
Argentina, 120 
Union, Peruvian Corvette : in the War 
with Spain, 1866, 508 ; in the 
Chilian - Peruvian War, 1879-81, 
443, 454-457, 476, 483; wrecked, 
1881, 493 
Union Civica in Argentina, see under 

Argentina 
Union Civica Radical in Argentina, see 

under Argentina 
Unitarian v. Federal Form of Govern- 
ment : in Colombia, 28 ; in Chile, 
30; in Argentina. 32, 33, 42; in 
Brazil, 249 
United States : 
The United States and South America, 

651-657 
The Monroe Doctrine, 25-26 
The United States and the Paraguayan 

War, 1865, 151 
The United States and the Chilian- 
Peruvian War, Oct., 1880, 480-481 
The United States Forces in Colon and 

Panama, 1885, 596-597 
The United States and the Boundary 
Dispute between British Guiana 
and Venezuela, 1S87, 620-621 _ 
The Chilian Transport Itata detained 
at San Diego, Cal., 1891, 859- 
360, 391, 395 



INDEX 



693 



United States — continued 

Patrick Egan and the Peace Conference 

in Chile, May, 1891, 361-363 
Strained Relations between the United 

States and Chile, 1891, 391-396 
The San Francisco at Quinteros, 1891, 

380, 391-392, 395 
The Baltimore Incident at Valparaiso, 

1891, 380, 392-396, 400, 655 
The U.S. Squadron in Brazilian Waters. 

1893, 276-277 
Arbitration in the Misiones Dispute 
between Brazil and Argentina in 
1895, 109, 112 
The United States and Spanish Misrule 

in Cuba, 5, 7, 648 
Minister Buchanan and the Chilian 
Boundary Question in 1899, 113- 
114 
The United States and the Venezuelan 
Boundary Question, 1895-99, 622- 
628, 654 
The Panama Canal, 28, 601, 614, 655- 
656 
Uranus, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 263, 

264, 273 
Uriarte, President, of Paraguay, 1875, 

187, 189 
Uribe, Lieut. , 452 
Uriburu, Dr Jose, 
Argentine Minister in Chile, 1891, 385- 

387 
Vice-President of Argentina, 1892, 97 
President of Argentina, 1895, 108-113 
Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
tina in 1904, 120 
Urmaneta, Geronimo, of Chile, 434 
Urguiza, Gen., 
Leader of Revolution in Buenos Aires, 

1852, 36-38 
Commander in the Paraguayan War, 

137-144, 151, 165 
Other Reference, 31 
Urriola, Col., 468 
Urrutia, Gen., of Chile, 351 
Uruan River Incident in the Venezuelan 

Boundary Dispute, 623-624 
Uruguay : 
Montevideo captured by Brazil, 1817 

and 1823, 14 
Revolution in Montevideo in 1809, 21 
Gen. Artigas, Dictator, 24 
Portuguese Aggression, 24 
Independence acknowledged, 1828, 24 
Fructuoso Ribera, President, 1830, 31 
Manuel Oribe and Ignacio Oribe, 

Presidents, 1835, 31 
Warfare of Ribera against Ignacio 
Oribe aided by Rosas of Buenos 
Aires, 1838-51, 31 



Uruguay — continued 
Conflict with England, France, and 

Italy, 31 
President Berro, 31 
Anastasio Aguirre, President, 1864, 32, 

131 
Civil War, 1863-65, 131, 197 
The Blancos, 131, 144-147, 151, 165, 

197-230 
The Colorados, 197-204, 230, 649 
Gen. Venancio Flores, Leader of 

Revolt, 1863-65, 131-135 
Strained Relations between Argentina 

and Uruguay, 131, 134 
Relations with Paraguay, 131, 191 
Strained Relations between Uruguay 

and Brazil, 131-132 
Brazilian Mission of Conselheiro Saraiva 

to Uruguay, 132 
Paysandu captured by Brazilians, Jan. 

1, 1865, 132 
Villa del Salto fired on, 132 
Uruguayan Expedition to Rio Grande 

do Sul, 134 
Peace Negotiations, Feb. 1865, 135 
Gen. Venancio Flores, President, 1865, 

135, 197-198 
Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay against Paraguay, 
May 1, 1865, 139 
War against Paraguay of Uruguay, 
Argentina, and Brazil, 1865-70, 
see under Paraguay 
President Flores in the Paraguayan 

War, 139-160, 187 
Revolt of Col. Fortunato Flores, 1867, 

197 
Dr Pedro Varela, President, 1868, 198 
Blanco Conspiracy and Assassination 

of Gen. Flores, 1868, 198 
Gen. Batlle, President, 1868, 199-204 
Cholera Epidemic, 1868, 199 
Outbreaks under Maximo Perez and 

Gen. Caraballo, 199 
Blanco Revolution under Col. Aparicio, 
1870-72, 199-203 
Fighting at Corralito, etc. , 200 
Siege of Montevideo, 201-202 
Defeat of Insurgents, 202, 203 
Peace, 1872, 203 
Tomas Gomensoro, President, 1872, 

203, 205 
Colorados Netos and Colorados Princi- 

pistas, 204 
Candidates for the Presidency, 1873, 204 
Dr Ellauri, President, 1873, 204-206 
Assassination of Col. Romualdo Cas- 
tillo, 1874, 205 
Revolt in Soriano, 1875, 205 
Municipal Election in Montevideo, 205 



694 



INDEX 



Uruguay — continued 
Pedro Varela, President, 1875, 206-208 
Political Exiles, 207 
La Revolucion Tricolor, 207-208 
Major Lorenzo Latorre, Dictator, 1876, 

208-209 
Mapr Latorre, President, 209 
Dr Francisco A. Vidal, President, 1880, 

209-210 
Gen. Maximo Santos, 209-210 
Gen. Santos, President, 1882, 210-211 
Dr Vidal re-elected President, 1886, 211 
Gen. Santos, Commander-in-Chief, 211 
Revolution against Gen. Santos, sup- 
pressed by Gen. Tajes, 211 
Gen. Santos re-elected President, 1886, 

211 
Attempted assassination of President 

Santos, 212 
The Ministerio de la Conciliacion of Dr 

Jose Pedro Ramirez, 212 
Gen. Tajes, President, 1886, 212-213 
Dr Julio Herrera y Obes, President, 

1890, 213-215 
Financial Crisis, 215 
Administration of Duncan Stewart, 215 
Juan Idiarte Borda, President, 1894, 

215-221 
Revival of Corruption, 216 
Boundary Dispute between Bolivia and 

Uruguay, 1894, 191 
Congressional Elections, 1896, 216 
Revolution under Aparicio Saraiva and 

Col. Diego Lamas, 1897, 216-220 
Fighting at Arbolito, Cerro Colorado, 

etc., 218-219 
The Venus Insurgent Expedition, 219- 

220 
Armistice and Peace Negotiations, 220 
Assassination of President Borda, 1897, 

220-221, 226 
Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President, 1897, 

221-223 
Peace, 221-222 

Policy of the New Administration, 222 
Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President, 1899, 

223 
Military Revolt, 1899, 223 
Jose Batlle y Ordonez, President, 

1903, 223 
Blanco Rebellion, 223-224 
Climate, 224 
Population, 224 
Education, 208, 225-226 
Administration of Justice, 226 
National Character, 226 
Religion, 227 

Railways, Waterways, etc., 227-228 
Agriculture, etc. , 228-230, 651 
Landed Proprietors, 230 



Uruguay River, 132, 137, 141, 144-146 
Uruguay, Warship, 132 
Uruguayana, Brazil, 146-147, 255 
Uspallata Pass, Argentina, 356 
Uyuni, Bolivia, 356 

Valderrama, Adolfo, of Chile, 338 
Valdivia, Chile, 416, 421, 431 
Valencia, Venezuela, 635 
Valentine Hills, Paraguay, 179 
Valenzuela, Major Marco Aurelio, of 

Chile, 347, 350 
Valenzuela, Paraguay, 183 
Valiente, Bernardo, 181 
Valle, Dr del, of Peru, 1881, 495 
Valle, Dr Aristobulo del, 

Partisan of the Union Civica in Argen- 
tina, 1887, 75, 76, 79 

Dr del Valle's Ministry, 1893, 100-101 

Other Reference, 46 
Valparaiso, Chile : 

Bombardment by Spanish, 1866, 326- 
327, 509 

Skirmish at Valparaiso, Jan. , 1891, 346 

Occupation by Congressional Troops, 
Aug., 1891, 379-380 

The Baltimore Incident, Aug., 1891, 
380, 392-396 

Other References to Town and Pro- 
vince, 364, 365-366, 368, 373-376, 
410-413, 418, 421, 431 
Varela, Senor, of Argentina, 1869, 181 
Varela, Dr Hector, of Buenos Aires, 

1871, 41 
Varela, Don Jose, 206, 209 
Varela, Dr Pedro, 

President of Uruguay, 1868, 198 

President of Uruguay, 1875, 206-208 
Varela, Rufina, 46 
Vargas, Col., of Chile, 380 
Veintemiila, Gen., of Ecuador, 578-580 
Vela, Velasco Nunez de, 11 
Velarde, Gen. Manuel, Peruvian Com- 
mander, 459, 470, 495, 523 
Velarde, Lieut., 452 
Velasco, Gen. , President of Bolivia, 30, 

31 
Velasquez, Gen. Jose, of Chile, 348, 482 
Velesco, Gen., of Bolivia, 562 
Velez, Gen., of Colombia, 596 
Venezuela : 

Caracas and Emancipation from 
Spanish Rule, 20 

Rebellion under Simon Bolivar, 21 

Bolivar, Dictator, 1813, 21 

Gen. Paez's Operations against the 
Spanish, 22 

Venezuela and New Granada under 
Colombia, 1819, 22 

Battle of Carabobo, 1821, 22 



INDEX 



695 



Venezuela — continued 
Separation from Colombia, 1830, 27 
Gen. Paez, President, 1830, 28 
Gen. Monagas, President, 1847, 28 
Internal Dissensions since 1830, 617- 

618 
Struggle between the Yellows and the 

Blues, 618 
Gen. Guzman Blanco, Dictator, 1870- 

89, 28, 618-621, 633, 635, 642 
Revolt under Gen. Salazar crushed 

1872, 619 
Boundary Dispute with British Guiana, 

1887, 620-621 
Gen. Lopez and Dr Rojas Paul, 1887- 

89, 619-620 
Conspiracy in 1889, 620 
Gen. Blanco deposed, 1889, 620 
Gen. Palacios, President, 1889, 621 
Settlement of Boundary Dispute with 

Colombia, 1891, 595 
Revolt under Gen. Joaquin Crespo, 

1892, 621 
Provisional Government, 621 
Gen. Crespo, President, 1894, 621-628, 

633 
Revolt under Dr Rojas Paul, 621 
Boundary Dispute with British Guiana, 

1895-99, 622-628, 654 
The Uruan Incident, 622-623 
Venezuela and the United States, 623 
United States and Great Britain, 623 
President Cleveland's Message to 

Congress, Dec. 1895, 623-624 
The Cleveland Commission, 1896, 627 
The Arbitration Tribunal in Paris, 

1897, 628 
The Award of the Tribunal, Oct. 1899, 

628 
Sehor Andrade, President, 1898, 629 
Revolt, 1898, 629 
Death of Gen. Crespo, 1899, 630 
Victory of the Revolution, 630 
Gen. Castro, President, 1899, 630 
Gen. Castro, President, 1902, 630-631 
Question of Compensation for Damage 

to Foreign Residents, 1902, 630- 

631 
La Guayra blockaded by England, 

Germany, and Italy, 1902, 631 
Award of the Hague Tribunal, Feb. 22, 

1904, 631 
Law of Constitution, 621, 631-632 
Political Divisions, 831-632 
Seditious Practices, 632 
Revolutionary Tendencies, 632 
Climate and Topography, 633-634 
Population, 634-635 
Municipalities, 635 
Education, 635-636 



Venezuela — continued 

Administration of Justice, 636 
Religion, 637-638 
Marriage, 637-638 
National Character, 638-639 
Agriculture and Industries, 639-640 
Mineral Resources, 641-642 
Transport, 642 
Financial Situation, 643-645 
Future Prospects, 645-646 
Venus, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 1879, 
263 ; Brazilian Armed Transport, 
destroyed, 1894, 279 
Venus, Insurgent Expedition to Uru- 
guay, 1897, 219-220 
Vera, Gregorio, of Chile, 358 
Vergara, Col., Chilian Minister of War, 

1880, 480 
Vergara, Col. Jose, Chilian Commander, 

1879-80, 461, 469-470 
Vergara, Jose Francisco, of Chile, 336, 

337 
Vergara, Luis, of Chile, 385 
Vergara, Ramon Donoso, of Chile, 340 
Vespucci, Amerigo, and Bahia, 12 
Victorica, Naval Commander, 98-99, 107 
Vicuna, Claudio, of Chile, 340, 341, 342, 

364, 380, 387, 391, 409 
Vicuna, Nicolas Pefia, of Chile, 338 
Vidal, Dr Francisco A., President of 
Uruguay: 1880,209-210; 1886,211 
Vieyra, and Brazil, 13 
Villa de Madrid, Spanish Warship, 326, 

509 
Villa del Pilar, Paraguay, 164, 172 
Villa del Salto, Uruguayan Warship, 132 
Villagran, Col. , Chilian Commander, 466 
Villagras, Col., of Chile, 351 
Villalba, Dr, of Uruguay, 135 
Villamil, Col., 459-461 
Villar, Gen., Commander in Uruguay, 219 
Villaran, Sefior, of Peru, 527 
Villegaignon, Fort, Brazil, 263, 265, 268, 

269, 279, 280 
Villegas, Col., of Chile, 1891, 355 
Villegas, Gen., Peruvian Commander, 

1879, 463 
Villeta, Paraguay, 174, 177 
Vina del Mar, Chile, 371-376 
Vinces River, 588 
Vine-Growing in Chile, 429 
Viso, Dr, of Cordoba, 49, 52 
Vivanco, Gen., of Peru, 507 
Vosges, M. de, French Minister in Peru, 

488 
Vulcarel in Argentina, 24 

Wandenkolk, Adm. , of Brazil, Leader 
of Insurgents in Rio de Janeiro, 255- 
256, 259 



696 



INDEX 



Warspite, British Warship, 352, 360 

Washington, George, referred to, 26 

Wauclle, Steamer, 366 

Welsh Settlement on the Chubut River, 
114-115 

West Indies : 

Spanish Expeditions, 6 
Spanish Rule in Cuba, 5,7, 648 

Yacango, Peru, 518 
Yagari River, Paraguay, 184 
Yaguaron, Brazil, 134 
Yarza, Enrique and Miguel, of Uru- 
guay, 207 
Yatay, Battle of, Aug. 17, 1865, 145-146 
Yea, Peru, 482 



Yegros, Fulgencio, First Consul in 

Paraguay, 25 
Yellow Fever in Buenos Aires, 41 
Yellows of Venezuela, 61 S 
Ylo, Peru, 46S-469 

Zaldivar, Mariano Castro, of Peru, 498 

Zambo People in Peru, 533 

Zanartu, Anibal, of Chile, 339, 340, 409 

Zanartii, Manuel, of Chile, 385 

Zapata, Dr, of Antofagasta, 447 

Zarama, Ecuador, 589 

Zevallos, Mariano Herencia, Vice- 
President of Peru, 514 

Zubiaga, Col., Peruvian Commander* 
466 



OLIVER AND BOYD, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH 











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4ECKMAN 

IINDERY INC. 

^ MAY 91 

5!=f|r N - MANCHESTER, 



